DEFINITION OF 'EXTREMELY SENSITIVE INFORMATION ON FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS'.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87B01034R000500190061-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 2, 2007
• Sequence Number: 61
• Publication Date: September 10, 1976
• Content Type: MF

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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Security Committee
COMPARTMENTATION SUBCOMMITTEE
NSA review completed
10 September 1976
MEMOP NDti.4 FOR: Chairman, Security Committee
SUBJECT Definition of "Extremely Sensitive
Information on Foreign Intelligence
Sources and Methods".
1. At the Security Committee meeting of 21 June
1976, the Chairman asked the Chairman, Compartmentation
Subcommittee, to have his Subcommittee begin considering
those certain categories of SCI that would require
restrictions being placed on travel. This charge was
given to the Security Committee by the DCI subsequent
to initial consideration by the NFIB of the proposed new
DCID on "Security Policy Concerning Travel and Assignment
of Persor.Lnel with Access to Sensitive Compartmented
Information".
2. Pursuant to this task, the Compartmentation
Subcommittee submits the following recommendations for
consideration:
a. In the SECOM version of paragraph 4.,
DCID 1/ , the phrase, "extremely sensitive
information on source and methods" be changed to
read, "extremely sensitive information on foreign
intelligence sources and methods".
b. The following definition be added to.
the draft DCID l/ as subparagraph f.,.to
paragraph 3. Definitions:
"f. Extremely Sensitive information on
Foreign Intelligence Sources and Methods.
Such information consists of specific and
deep knowledge of the following categories:
W . i`~F e'r !. v!'.S
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- technological structure, functionsand
technique of sensitive intelligence collection
or exploitation systems/methods; or
- designated system targets or sources; or
method and purpose of target select ion; or,
- degree of success of collection or exploitation
system/method; or
collection or exploitation system/ method
capabilities and vulnerabilities.
0 one ,
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 Approved For Release 2007/11/02 CIA-RDP87B01034R000500190061-4
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. if
SECURITY POLICY CONCERNING TRAVEL AND ASSIGNMENT OF
PERSONNEL WITH ACCESS TO SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED
INFORMATION 1
(Effective
1. General
Pursuant to Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947,
Executive Order 11905 and National Security Council Intelligence
Directives, minimum2 security policy applicable to assignment and
travel of US Government civilian and military personnel, government
consultants and employees of government contractors who have, or
who have had, access to Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI)
This policy is based upon the need to protect SCI from possible
compromise resulting from the capture, interrogation, exploitation
or entrapment of personnel (stipulated in paragraph 1 above) by hostile
or unfriendly nations or groups.
1
Existing directives, regulations (including pertinent provisions of
the Communications Intelligence Security Regulations), agreements
and such other references governing hazardous activities as defined
herein shall be revised accordingly.
2 While CIA has no objection to individual agencies attempting to impose
a more restrictive policy on their own personnel, they do not believe it
appropriate -blend the DCI's authority to such attempts; therefore, CIA
recomrnE~nds eliminating the word "minimum. "
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3. Definitions
a. Sensitive Compartmented Information. The term Sensitive
Compartmented Information (SCI) includes all information and materials
bearing special community controls indicating restricted handling
within pr -sent and future community intelligence collection programs
(and their end products) for which community systems of compart-
mentation, have been or will be formally established. The tern-1 does
not include Restricted Data as defined in Section II, Public Law 585,
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended.
b. hazardous Activities. Hazardous activities include,
assignments or visits to, and travel through, nations listed in
Appendix A, hereto. hazardous activities also include assignment
or travel in combat zones or other areas where hostilities are taking
place, duties behind hostile lines, and duties or travel in isolated
or exposed areas where individuals cannot reasonably be protected
against hostile action.
c. Defensive Security Briefings. Defensive security briefings are
formal advisories which alert personnel as to the potential for harass-
ment, provocation or entrapment by local agencies/officials in
designated areas of risk. These briefings are based on actual
experience whenever feasible, and include information on courses
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of action helpful in mitigating the adverse security and personal
consequences of such acts.
d. Risk of Capture Briefings. Risk of capture briefings are
formal advisories which alert personnel as to what may be expected
in the way of attempts to force or trick them to divulge classified.
information if captured or detained and of suggested courses of action
they should follow to avoid or limit such divulgence. These
advisories include instructions/advice for advance preparation of
innocuous, alternative explanations of duties and background.
e. Seniorlntelligence Officers. Within the meaning of this
policy directive, Senior Intelligence Officers (SIO) are those
officials representing their individual departments and agencies
on the National Foreign Intelligence Board (NFIB), including the
Military Department Intelligence Chiefs.
"f. Cl I;xtremSensitive Information on
.Foreign Intelligence Sources and Methods.
Such :information consists of specific and
deep ;~nowlcdge of-the following categories:
technological structure, function and
technique of sensitive intelligence collection
or exploitation systems/metliods; or
?- designated system targets or sources; or
?- method and purpose of target selection; or.
degree of success of collection or exploitation
system/method; or
?- collection or exploitation system/ method
capabilities and vulnerabilities.
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Security Committee Version:
NSA Version:
CIA Version:
A T-) -I
'*? t' Vlll. `'
a. Unofficial Travel: While
US citizens are not restricted by
US laws from traveling in foreign
countries, persons granted author-
ization for access to certain cate-
gories of extremely sensitive
information on foreiEn intelligence
sources and methods of SCI incur
a special security obligation and
are to be discouraged by their SIO
from engaging in unofficial visits
to, or travel through, the countries
listed in Appendix. A. The DCI, in
consultation with SIOs, will identify
the categories having special
sensitivity and the SIO concerned
should advise persons with 'such
access that travel in the listed
countries may result in the with-
drawal of clearance for continued
access to SCI.
Y.-- P(}1Ll.V
Unofficial Travel: Persons
granted authorization for access to
certain categories of Sensitive
Compartmented Information (SCI),
especially sources and methods,
incur a special security obligation
which may require their refraining
from unofficial visits to, or travel
through, the countries listed in
Appendix A. The DCI, in consul-
tation with SIOs, will identify the
categories having special sensitivity
and the SIO concerned shall advise
persons with such access that un-
authorized travel in the listed
countries may result in the with-
drawal of access to SCI.
Unofficial Travel: While US
citizens are not restricted by US
laws from travelling in foreign
countries, persons granted author-
ization for access to certain categories
of extremely sensitive information on
sources or methods of SCI incur a
special obligation and are to be alerted
by the SIO to the risks associated with
their engaging in unofficial visits to,
or travel through, the countries listed
in Appendix A. The DCI, in consul-
tation with the SIOs,will identify the
categories having special sensitivity.
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All persons having access to SCI who plan unofficial travel to or
through countries listed in Appendix A must:
(1) `Give advance notice of such planned travel.
(2) Obtain a defensive security briefing from a specified
official before traveling to such countries.
(3) Contact immediately the nearest United States consular,
attache or Embassy official if they are detained or subjected to
significant harassment or provication while traveling.
(4) Report upon return from travel to their SIO any
incidents of potential security concern which befell them.
(5) Be reminded annually of the foregoing obligations
through security education programs.
b. Official Assignment/Travel: No person with access to SCI will
be aEsigned to or directed to participate in hazardous -activities until
he has been afforded a defensive security briefing and/or risk of
capture briefing as applicable.3
c. Individuals with Previous Access: Persons whose access to
SCI is being terminated will be officially reminded of the risks
associated with hazardous activities as defined herein and of their
obligation to ensure continued protection of SCI.
3
Due consideration will be given to the relative protection enjoyed by US
officials having diplomatic status.
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5. Responsibilities
a. The DCI will cause to be prepared and.disseminated to the SIOs
alist of countries identified as posing a security risk bearing on this
policy (Appendix A). The Security Committee will coordinate required
support including source material concerning these risks.
b. MOs will issue implementing directives concerning travel and
assignment of personnel of their departments or agencies. Such
directives will be consistent with the overall policy, definitions and
criteria set forth herein and will provide for::
(1) Preparation and provision of defensive security briefings
and/or risk of capture briefings to appropriate personnel of their
departments/agencies as/when applicable.
(2) Institution of positive programs for the collection of
information in reports obtained under the provisions of paragraph 4A(4)
above and other means as feasible.
(3) Insuring that new information obtained by their departments
or agencies on harassments or pro ocations, or on risk'of capture
situations, is provided to the DCI and to other interested NFIB agencies.
(Where warranted by new information, changes to Appendix A will be made.
Recommendations with supporting justification may be made for either
addition or deletion of countries. )
(DRAFr)
George Bush
Director of Central Intelligence
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DRAFT
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 1/
SECURITY POLICY CONCERNING TRAVEL AND ASSIGNMENT OF
PERSONNEL WITH ACCESS TO SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED
INFORMATION
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25X1
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