TWO HUNDRED AND SIXTY - FIRST MEETING
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP87B01034R000500190010-0
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
C
Document Page Count:
6
Document Creation Date:
December 19, 2016
Document Release Date:
September 23, 2005
Sequence Number:
10
Case Number:
Publication Date:
March 15, 1983
Content Type:
AG
File:
Attachment | Size |
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CIA-RDP87B01034R000500190010-0.pdf | 371.95 KB |
Body:
Approved For Release 2005/42/Nk 1 ktFAIA ft7B01034R000500190010-0
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Security Committee
SECON-A-253
AGENDA
Two Hundred and Sixty-first Meeting
Wednesday, 23 March 1983, 10:00 a.m.
Room 4E64, Langley Headquarters Building
Preliminary Comments (e.g., NSDD-84)
ITEM 1 Approval of minutes of 26 January and 23 February meeting
ITEM 2 Subcommittee reports
Computer Security
Personnel Security
Technical Surveillance Countermeasures
Unauthorized Disclosures Investigations
ITEM 3 DCID 1/20 revision (discussion of and decision on CIA member's
nonconcurrence in draft revision. See attached material.)
ITEM 4 New Business
ITEM 5 Security Awareness Presentation (if time permits, members will
have opportunity to see "Logan's Story," a 22-minute, color
videotape provided by DIA)
ITEM 6' Next Meeting (10:00 a.m., Wednesday, 30 March 1983, Room 7D32
Langley Headquartaers Building, to hear and discuss program
presentations by the R&D Subcommittee and the Security
Advisory Group USSR)
Attachment
OFFICIAL USE ONLY When
Separated from Attachment
OS ."3 0, tier;
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SECURITY POLICY CONCERNING TRAVEL AND ASSIGNMENT OF
PERSONNEL WITH ACCESS TO SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED
INFORMATION (SCI)1
(Effective 1983)
Pursuant to the provisions of the Director of Central Intel-
ligence Directive (DCID) on the Security Committee, minimum secu-
rity policy is herewith established for assignment and travel of
U.S. Goverment civilian and military personnel, government con-
sultants and employees of government contractors who have, or who
have had, access to SCI.
1. Purpose
This policy is based upon the need to protect SCI from possi-
ble compromise resulting from the capture,, interrogation, explai---?
Cation, or entrapment of personnel (stipulated 'above) : by hostile
nations or groups.
2. Definitions
a. Defensive Security Briefing s--formal advisories which
alert traveling personnel to the potential for harassment, 'prov
ocatiorn;_.or entrapment... These briefings are based on. actual ex-
perience when available, and include information on courses of
action helpful in mitigating adverse security and personal con-
sequences.
b... Hazardous Activities--include assignments or visits to,
and travel through, countries listed in the attached Appendix..
. Hazardous .activities also ' include assignment or travel in-com-
bat zones or other areas where hostilities are taking place,
duties, behind hostile lines, and duties or travel in isolated or
exposed areas-where indivduals cannot reasonably be protected
against hostile action. The use of vessels owned or controlled
by an activity of a country listed-in the. attached -Appendix is
also included.
c. Risk of Capture Briefings---formal advisories which alert
personnel. as to what may be expected in the way of attempts to
force or trick them to divulge classified information if captured
or detained and. of suggested courses of action they should follow
to avoid or limit such divulgence. These advisories include in-
structions/advice for advance preparation of innocuous, alternate
explanations. of duties and background.-
This policy statement supersedes DCID No. 1/2.0, effective 6
June 1978.
CLASSIFIED BY:
DECLASSIFY ON:
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d. Senior Officials of the Intelligence Community (s0xc)--
for the purposes of thisYpolicystatement, SOICs are defined as
the heads of organizations within the Intelligence Community,.
as defined by Executive Order 12333, or their designated repre-
sentatives.
e. Sensitive Com .~ !r tntented Information (SCI)---all information
and materials requiring special community controls indicating
restricted handling within present and future community intelli-
gence collection programs and their end products. These special
Community controls are formal systems of restricted access estab-
lished to protect the sensitive aspects of sources, methods and
analytical .procedures. of foreign intelligence programs. The term
does not include Restricted Data as defined in Section II, Public
assigned or directed to participate in a hazardous activity, as
defined herein, until he or she has been afforded. a defensive
security briefing and/or risk of capture briefing by an of f i-
cial specified by the cognizant SOIC. Consideration will be
given to the relative. protection enjoyed by U.S. personnel having
a. Official Travel. No person with access to SCI will be
e a ac a Append ix
.
Persons granted access to :i.nfo'rmation about the sensitive
aspects of sources, methods and analytical procedures of foreign
.intelligence incur a special security obligation and are' to be
alerted to the risks associated with travel to, through, or
within,-or with other activities involving the countries listed
in th tt h d
3. Policy
an unofficial travel to or through or within countries listed
in the attached Append i:x must:
b. Unofficial Travel. All. persons having access - to SCI who
-1
(2) obtain a defensive security briefing from the speci-
fied official prior to performing such travel-
(W contact immediately the nearest U.S. consular, at-
tache, or the Embassy Regional Security Officer or the Post Duty
Officer if detained or subjected to significant harassment or
provocation while traveling ; and
(4) report upon return from traveling, to the specified,
official unusual incidents, including incidents of potential
security. concern encountered during such travel
(1) Give advance notice of such planned
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- (5) collection or explo?tation system/method capabilities
and vulnerabilities.
(2) designated system targets or sources;
(3) method and purpose of target selection;
(4) degree of success of collection or exploitation
system/method; or, - .
Failure to comply with the above provisions may result in the
withdrawal of approval for continued access to SCI.
c.. Specific and Extensive Knowledge. Persons with specific
and extensive knowledge of the following aspects of foreign in-
telligence shall be advised that unofficial travel without the
approval of the cognizant SOIL may result in the withdrawal of
approval for continued access to SCI.
(1) Technological structure,' function, and techniques of
sensitive intelligence collection or exploitation system/methods;
d. Previous Access. Persons whose access to-SCI is being
terminated will be officially reminded of their continuing ob-
ligation to protect SCI and will be afforded advisories on the
risks associated with participation in hazardous activities.
4. Responsibilities
a. The DCI will cause to be prepared and disseminated to the
SOICs a list of countries identified as posing a security risk
bearing on this policy (see Appendix). The Security Committee
will coordinate required support including source materiel con-
cerning these risks.
b. SOICs will issue implementing directives concerning
travel and assignment of personnel of their departments or
agencies. Such directives will include the overall' policy,
definitions, and criteria set forth herein and will provide for.
(1) Annual reminder of the policy set forth in paragraph
3, above.
(2)* Preparation and provision of defensive security brief-
ings or risk of capture briefings to personnel of their departments
or agencies.
(3) Institution of positive programs for the collection of
information reported under the provisions of paragraph 3b(4), above.
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(4) Ensuring that new information obtained by their de-
partments or agencies on harassments or provocations, or on risk
of capture situations, is provided to the DCI and to other inter-
ested NFIB agencies. (Where warranted by new information, changes
to the Appendix hereto will be made. Recommendations with sup-
porting .justification may be made for either addition or dele-
tion of countries.)
5.. Classification. As this directive sets forth security policy
for persons with access to SCI, it merits and warrants the overall
classification of CONFIDENTIAL in its totality. Selected para-
graphs may be excerpted for use at the FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY level
by SOICs, their designees, or SCI Special Security/Control Of-
f ivers, when considered appropriate. The identification of any
country in the Appendix as having been designated as a hazardous,
area, by the DCI is CONFIDENTIAL.
Appendix:
Countries and Areas in Which Visits, Travel, and Assignment
are Considered to be a Hazardous Activity
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COUNTRIES AND AREAS IN WHICH VISITS, TRAVEL., AND ASSIGNMENT
ARE CONSIDERED TO BE A HAZARDOUS ACTIVITY
25X1
25X1
. Appendix
IT 'q
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