COMPUTER SECURITY REGULATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87B01034R000500150004-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 11, 2005
• Sequence Number: 4
• Content Type: REGULATION

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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
COMPUTER SECURITY REGULATION
(Attachment to DCID 1/16, "Security of
Foreign Intelligence in Automated Data
Processing Systems and Networks")
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CONFIDENTIAL
COMPUTER SECURITY REGULATION
Page
CHAPTER I
Introduction ..................................................................................
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CHAPTER II
Modes of Operation and Minimum Security Requirements for
Processing and/or Storing Intelligence Information in ADP
Systems ......................................................................................
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11.1. General Security Requirements ..........................................
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11.2. Modes of Operation and Minimum Security Require-
ments ..............................................................................
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II.2.a. Dedicated Mode ......................................................
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II.2.b. System High Mode ................................................
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II.2.c. Compartmented Mode ............................................
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CHAPTER III
ADP Networks ..............................................................................
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111. 1. Definition ............................................................................
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111.2. Responsibilities for ADP Network Security Administra-
tion ..................................................................................
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111.3. Accreditation Process ..........................................................
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III.4. Minimum ADP Network Security Requirements .........
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GLOSSARY ................................................................................................................ 15
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CHAPTER I
I.I. Director of Central Intelligence Directive No. 1/16 (DCID 1/16) requires
National Foreign Intelligence Board (NFIB) member agencies and all other United
States Government departments and agencies processing and/or storing intelligence
information in ADP systems and networks to establish and maintain a formal ADP
Security Program to ensure adequate protection of intelligence information. This
Regulation is promulgated to establish the minimum security requirements for the
allowed operating modes of an ADP system or network as defined in Chapters II and
III. ADP security programs shall be based on the provisions of this Regulation and
DCID 1/16.
1.2. All ADP systems and networks, not exempted in DCID 1/16, processing and/or
storing intelligence information must meet the requirements prescribed in Chapters II
and III of this Regulation. Accreditation, as prescribed herein, is required for the
operation of each ADP system and network. The accreditation is contingent upon the
results of a recurring review, testing, and favorable evaluation of employed security
features. These security features shall include hardware/ software features, operating
procedures, accountability procedures, access controls, management constraints, phys-
ical structures, and appropriate Communications Security (COMSEC) measures to
provide minimum security protection for intelligence information processed and/or
stored by the ADP system or network.
1.3. An Information System Security Officer (ISSO) shall be appointed for each
ADP system processing and/or storing intelligence information. An ISSO may serve
for more than one system. Duties and responsibilities of the ISSO are specified in
Chapters II and III.
1.4. The NFIB member or his designee responsible for the management of an ADP
network shall appoint a Network Security Officer (NSO). Duties and responsibilities of
the NSO are specified in Chapter III of this Regulation.
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CENT
CHAPTER II
Modes of Operation and Minimum Security Requirements for Processing
and/or Storing Intelligence Information in ADP Systems
Three modes of operation of an ADP system are allowed for the processing and/or
storing of intelligence information. They are: (a) Dedicated Mode; (b) System High
Mode; and (c) Compartmented Mode. The minimum security requirements for each
mode of operation are contained in this Chapter. Chapter III identifies the require-
ments for ADP networks which are formed by the interconnection of ADP Systems
operating in any of these allowed modes.
11.1. General security requirements for ADP systems processing and/or storing
intelligence information.
Il.l.a. Information Systems Security Officer. Each NFIB member or his designee
shall provide for the appointment of an Information System Security Officer (ISSO). It
is desirable for an ISSO to be responsible for only one system; however, he may be
responsible for more than one. The ISSO is specifically responsible for ensuring
continued compliance with the requirements set forth in this Regulation, providing
system accreditation statements, reporting major security deficiencies in system
operation to the NFIB member or his designee, and monitoring any changes in system
operation that may affect the security status of the total system.
Il.1.b. Communications Links. The communications links between all components
of the ADP system shall be secured in accordance with appropriate directives for the
highest classification of information designated for transmission.
II.l.c. Emanations Security Aspects. The vulnerability of system operations to
exploitation through compromising emanations shall be determined in the process of
system accreditation. Evaluation of the risks associated with the central computer
facility and the remote terminal areas and application of control measures shall be in
accordance with appropriate directives.
II.l.d. Individual Security Responsibilities. All users of the system shall be briefed
on the need for exercising sound security practices in protecting the information
processed and/or stored in the system, including all input and output. Users shall be
informed of the security mode in which the system is operating and that the receipt of
any information not specifically requested shall be reported immediately to the ISSO,
or his designee.
11.1.e. Administrative Approvals. Administrative approvals (not requiring substan-
tive briefings) may be used to grant persons access to the central computer facility and
remote terminal areas when such persons do not require access to the intelligence
information processed and/or stored in the system.
11.2. Modes of Operation and Minimum Security Requirements
II.2.a. Dedicated Mode
II.2.a(1) Intelligence information may be processed and/or stored in an ADP
system operating in the Dedicated Mode; that is, the system is specifically and
exclusively dedicated to, and controlled for, the processing of that one particular type
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of intelligence information, either for full-time operation or for a specified period of
time.
I1.2.a(2) Accreditation Process. The NFIB member or his designee can accredit an
ADP system operating in the Dedicated Mode after receiving written assurance from
the computer system manager and the responsible ISSO that the ADP system meets
the minimum security requirements for this mode as outlined below.
II.2.a(3) Personnel Security. All unescorted personnel requiring access to the
central computer facility or any remote terminal shall have a valid security clearance
and formal access approval for the one particular type of intelligence information
contained within the ADP system.
11.2.a(4) Physical Security. The central computer facility and any remote terminals
connected to it shall be secured in a manner commensurate with the classification and
control caveats of the one type of intelligence information contained in the system.
II.2.a(5) System. All peripheral devices not dedicated for use in the processing of
the specific type of intelligence information shall be disconnected from the system in
an approved manner. A controlled copy of the operating system shall be used to
initialize an ADP system for processing TOP SECRET intelligence information or
Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI).'
II.2.a(6) Termination of Dedicated Mode Operation. On changing from Dedicated
Mode operation, all intelligence information and the media used in its processing
and/or storing shall be secured or sanitized in an approved manner. An ADP system
which has operated in the Dedicated Mode may then be returned to its original or
different mode, as appropriate.
II.2.b. System High Mode
II.2.b(1) Intelligence information may be processed and/or stored in an ADP
system operating in the System High Mode; that is, the system is operating with
security measures commensurate with the highest classification and sensitivity of the
information being processed and/or stored.
II.2.b(2) Accreditation Process. The NFIB member or his designee can accredit an
ADP system operating in the System High Mode after receiving written assurance
from the computer system manager and the responsible ISSO that the ADP system
meets the minimum security requirements for this mode as outlined below.
II.2.b(3) Personnel Security. All unescorted personnel requiring access to the
central computer facility or any remote terminal shall have a valid security clearance
and formal access approvals for all data processed and/or stored in the ADP system.
Unescorted personnel do not automatically have authorization to see or use all of the
data processed and/or stored in the system. Need-to-know criteria shall apply.
II.2.b(4) Physical Security. The central computer and remote terminal facilities
shall be secured in a manner commensurate with the highest classification and
sensitivity of information contained in the system.
II.2.b(5) System.
II.2.b(5)(a) All terminals and peripheral devices not designated for use in the
current System High Mode of operation shall be disconnected from the system in an
approved manner.
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II.2.b(5)(b) Authentication of remote terminals and personnel shall be performed
by the system. System controls shall be in conformity with those required for the
protection of the most sensitive information being processed and/or stored in the
system. System controls shall consist of software, hardware, and/or other appropriate
measures designed to validate the identity and file access authority of the system users.
II.2.b(5)(c) Security classification and other required control caveats shall be
identified with the information and programs in the system, and appropriate labeling
of the output shall be ensured.
II.2.b(6) Audit Trails. Each system shall produce, in a secure manner, an audit trail
containing sufficient information to permit the ISSO to perform a regular security
review of system activity.
II.2.b(7) Termination of System High Mode Operation. On changing from System
High Mode operation, all intelligence information and the media used in its processing
and/or storage shall be secured or sanitized in an approved manner. An ADP system
which has operated in the System High Mode may then be returned to its original or
different mode, as appropriate.
II.2.c. Compartmented Mode
II.2.c(1) SCI may be processed and/or stored in an ADP system operating in the
Compartmented Mode; that is, the system is processing two or more types of SCI, or
any one type of SCI with other than SCI, and system access is secured to at least the
TOP SECRET level, but all system users need not necessarily be formally authorized
access to all types of SCI being processed and/or stored in the system.
II.2.c(2) Accreditation Process
II.2,c(2)(a) Only the NFIB member can accredit an ADP system for operating in
the Compartmented Mode.
II.2.c(2)(b) The accreditation will be based upon the results of a security analysis,
test, and evaluation to assure that the ADP system meets the minimum security
requirements for this mode as outlined below. The ISSO will ensure that the security
analysis, test, and evaluation is carried out and the results reported along with his
recommendations to the NFIB member.
II.2.c(3) Personnel Security
II.2.c(3)(a) All unescorted personnel requiring access to the central computer
facility shall have a valid TOP SECRET clearance 2 and formal access approvals for all
data processed and/or stored in the ADP system. Need-to-know criteria shall apply.
II.2.c(3)(b) All unescorted personnel requiring access to any remote terminal
facility shall have a valid TOP SECRET clearance 8 and formal access approvals for all
data designated for input/output at that terminal facility: Need-to-know criteria shall
apply.
II.2.c(4) Physical Security
II.2.c(4)(a) The central computer facility shall be secured in a manner commensu-
rate with the handling of TOP SECRET material and the most sensitive intelligence
information contained in the facility.
a Such clearance must have been granted based on investigative requirements of DCID 1/14.
8 Ibid.
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II.2.c(4)(b) Each remote terminal area will be secured in a manner commensurate
with the handling of TOP SECRET material and the most sensitive intelligence
information, if any, designated for input/output at that terminal facility.
II.2.c(5) System. The ADP system through a combination of hardware and software
capabilities shall provide the requisite protection for intelligence information proc-
essed and/or stored by it. Systems not presently equipped with the required
hardware/software security capabilities prescribed below must compensate for the
lack thereof by the implementation of other security measures or procedures which
afford the same degree of protection.
H.2.c(5)(a) All terminal.and peripheral devices not designated for use in the current
Compartmented Mode of operation shall be disconnected from the system in an
approved manner.
IL2.c(5)(b) Authentication of remote terminals and personnel shall be performed
by the system. System controls shall be in conformity with those required for the
protection of the most sensitive information being processed and/or stored in the
system. System controls shall consist of software, hardware, and/or other appropriate
measures designed to validate the identity and file access authority of the system users.
II.2.c(5)(c) Security classification and other required control caveats shall be
identified with the information and programs in the system, and appropriate labeling
of the output shall be ensured.
II.2.c(5)(d) Memory Access. System hardware/software features shall exercise
control over the memory locations to which a user program has access.
II.2.c(5)(e) Privileged Instructions. The system shall utilize a special class or subset
of instructions to perform and control all input/output operations and changes to
memory boundaries, execution state variables, data elements or tables, and files of the
operating system. The operating system alone shall execute these instructions or
provide access to them.
II.2.c(5)(f) Verified Response. Machine instructions/operation codes, both privi-
leged and user, with all possible tags or modifiers, whether legal or not, shall be
designed and tested to produce results in a predefined set of responses by the
computer hardware/firmware.
II.2.c(5)(g) Read, Write, and Execute Privileges. The system shall enforce the read,
write, and execute privileges of a user with respect to any given file.
II.2.c(5)(h) Separation of User/Privileged Modes of Operation. The user and
privileged modes of system operation shall be separated so that a program operating in
user mode is prevented from unauthorized utilization of privileged functions. Controls
shall be implemented to maintain continued separation of these modes.
II.2.c(5)(i) Residue Clear-out. Measures shall be implemented to ensure that
residue from terminated user programs are cleared before memory and on-line storage
devices' locations are released by the system for use by another user program.
II.2.c(5)(i) Over-the-Counter Access Control. Effective controls shall be imple-
mented to limit over-the-counter (batch) users to authorized access to information and
programs, as well as to control read and/or write access authorizations.
II.2.c(6) Audit Trails. Each system shall produce, in a secure manner, an audit trail
containing sufficient information to permit the ISSO to perform a regular security
review of system activity.
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II.2,c(7) Termination of Compartmented Mode Operation. On changing from
Compartmented Mode operation, all intelligence information and the media used in
its processing and/or storing shall be secured or sanitized in an approved manner. An
ADP system which has operated in the Compartmented Mode may then be returned
to its original or different mode, as appropriate.
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CHAPTER III
111. 1. Definition
III.1.a. For the purpose of this regulation and implementation of DCID 1/16, an
ADP network is defined as the interconnection of two or more ADP systems that
operate in any of the modes defined in Chapter II. The ADP network consists of the
components (central computer facility, remote terminals, and interconnecting com-
munications links) of the various ADP systems, front-end processors, and telecom-
munications. This Regulation shall not apply to the individual ADP systems, if any
(e.g., CS in Figure 1), that make up the telecommunications; these are controlled by
pertinent national policies and regulations.
III.1.b. There are numerous ways in which ADP systems operating in any of the
modes defined in Chapter II can be interconnected to form an ADP network.
However, most of these combinations will increase the minimum security require-
ments of the individual ADP systems since their original operating modes cannot be
maintained when they become a part of a network. (For example, when two
Dedicated Mode ADP systems interconnect, they can continue to operate in the
Dedicated Mode only if both ADP systems process the same classification and type of
intelligence information. If this is not the case, their interconnection would require
both systems to meet the requirements of operating in the System High Mode
(Network High) or the Compartmented Mode, depending on the classification and
type of intelligence information to which each ADP system was originally dedicated.)
Therefore, each proposed configuration of ADP systems must be assessed to determine
the appropriate mode of operation (Dedicated, Network High, or Compartmented)
for the resultant network. Each ADP system in the network must be accredited for
operation in the new mode when a change of operating mode is required.
(FIGURE 1 )
(-- P.D.' Sy:;LC -) _ Telc corununic:ation; -- --[ ADP ; y.,;ter --~]
T - RCmOIC TOI' ilnill
CCF - Central Cni t Lcr Facili.ty
1'LP - Front End 1'i nccucor
(-Remote Terminal-]
CS -- Coir nunicrst ions C:oriput(!r or ::.itch (e.g., AUT01)III)
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III.i.c. Some examples of possible configurations of ADP systems and the resulting
ADP network mode of operation are shown in Table 1 below.
111.2, Responsibilities for ADP Network Security Administration
III.2.a. Responsible Authorities. The authority, organization, or manager responsi-
ble for the overall operation and control of the ADP network shall ensure that each
ADP system which is a part of the network adheres to the security required by the
current network configuration (see Ill.1.b. and c. above). The security measures shall
be agreed to in writing by the ADP network authority and the ADP system authority
and implemented before an ADP system is connected to the network, However, each
NFIB member is the responsible security authority for his ADP system participating in
the network.
III.2.b. Remote Station Authority. Security requirements for remote terminals and
peripheral devices of an ADP network shall be prescribed by the authority responsible
for the security of the ADP network. In some cases, this may be a different NFIB
member or designee than the terminal or device user.
III.2.c. Exceptions. When an ADP system becomes a part of an existing ADP
network, approval of any temporary exceptions to the network security requirements
will require the written concurrence of the ADP system authority and the ADP
network authority. The ADP network authority will approve the temporary exception
only with the consensus of all the network participants.
III.2.d. Security Anomalies. Each NFIB member or his designee is responsible for
assuring that he is aware of any known system irregularities occurring within his ADP
system. Any evidence indicating a possible violation of the security integrity or
unexplainable phenomenon of the system shall be made known to the ISSO. The ISSO
ADP System Mode(s) ADP Network Mode
1. All systems are Dedicated to processing and/or storing the same type 1. Dedicated
of intelligence information.
2. All systems are Dedicated a to same classification level but not same 2. Network High b
type of intelligence information, and not SCI.
3. Some systems are Dedicated a to same classification level and same or 3. Network High b
different type(s) of intelligence information and some systems are
System High at classification level of the Dedicated systems, but not
SCI.
4. Some systems are Dedicated a to TOP SECRET level and same or 4. Compartmented
different types of intelligence information and some systems are
Compartmented.
5. All systems are System High to the same classification level .......... 5. Network High b
6. Some systems are System high at TOP SECRET level and some 6. Compartmented
systems are Compartmented.
7. All systems are Compartmented .......................................................... 7. Compartmented
8. Some systems are Dedicated to TOP SECRET level and same or 8. Compartmented
different types of intelligence information, some systems and System
High at TOP SECRET level, and some systems are Compartmented.
a These systems, in effect, adopt the operating mode of the network and, therefore, must meet the
minimum security requirements of that mode as expressed in Chapter II.
b Network High requires that all unescorted personnel having access to any of the ADP systems of the
network must have formal access approvals for all data processed and/or stored by all of the ADP systems in
the network.
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shall immediately notify the Network Security Officer (NSO) when network security
breaches are suspected or possible; this notification shall be followed by a written
report as appropriate. The NSO shall determine the impact on network security of any
abnormalities of ADP system operation. Each NFIB member or his designee retains
the prerogative of suspending his organization's operational participation in the
network prior to any notification if he believes sufficient threat of compromise exists.
III.2.e. ISSO Network Responsibilities. Each ADP system in an ADP network shall
have a formally designated ISSO whose responsibilities are as follows:
III.2.e(1) Advise and assist his NFIB member or designee on all physical, personnel,
procedural, hardware/software, and communications security matters pertaining to
the network.
III.2.e(2) Coordinate with other ISSO's and the NSO in the administration of
network security-related activities as required by this Regulation.
III.2.f. Responsibilities and Functions of the NSO
III.2.f(1) Coordinate the application of network security hardware/software (secu-
rity labeling, audit trails, dissemination controls, etc.), physical /personnel security
measures, communications security, and administrative/procedural security measures
within the ADP network.
III.2.f(2) Investigate and resolve network security incidents and/or violations
leading to or involving a potential compromise of classified information.
III.2.f(3) Determine that network security requirements are met before an ADP
system is connected to the ADP network.
III.2.f(4) Advise and assist the ADP network manager on studies, projects, tests and
evaluations, and experiments which relate to the security of the ADP network.
III.2.f(5) Assist the network manager in assuring that all ADP network participants
adhere to the security requirements specified in this Regulation.
III.2.g. Reporting. All ADP system security-related incidents shall be reported by
the ISSO to the NSO. The nature and extent of the report shall be based upon the
security urgency of the event.
III.2.g(1) Routine Security Report. A routine security report shall be made of a
system malfunction or security incident which has potential network security
implications. The report shall include the following information:
III.2.g(1)(a) NFIB member or his designee submitting the report.
III.2.g(1)(b) The ADP system in which the abnormality occurred.
III.2.g(l)(c) Narrative description of the event.
III.2.g(1)(d) Date, time, location of event.
III.2.g(1)(e) Results of the ISSO's internal investigation as to the cause of the
abnormality and remedial actions taken.
III.2.g(2) Special Security Reports. The ISSO shall immediately notify the Network
Security Officer of a system abnormality providing reason to suspect a covert violation
of the security integrity of the ADP system or network. An initial written report
covering the basic information provided in a routine security report shall be
forwarded as soon as possible. The nature and extent of the reporting requirement
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following such an event cannot be projected since it would involve extensive internal
organizational counterintelligence investigation.
III.2.g(3) Evaluation and Analysis of Report. The NSO shall review all reports
submitted for purposes of evaluating the security performance aspects of the network.
III.2.g(4) In the event a NFIB member or his designee takes exception to the
content of, or actions required by, a security report, he shall appeal to the network
authority who shall establish an ad hoc committee of network participants to resolve
the issue.
111.3. Accreditation Process
III.3.a. The authority, organization, or manager responsible for the overall opera-
tion and control of the ADP network shall accredit it in cooperation with the NFIB
members participating in the ADP network.
III.3.b. For networks having multiple NFIB members responsible for the overall
operation and control of the ADP network, the accreditation shall be made jointly by
these NFIB members.
III.3.c. The NSO shall provide written assurance to the appropriate network
authority(ies) that the ADP network meets the minimum ADP network security
requirements as outlined below.
III.4. Minimum ADP Network Security Requirements
III.4.a. ADP System Security. Each ADP system must be accredited for operation
in the appropriate network mode before becoming an active participant of the ADP
network. This accreditation shall be based on the requirements outlined in Chapter II.
ADP system accreditation must be provided to the NSO.
III.4.b. Telecommunications. The communications links between all components
(i.e., ADP systems, see Figure 1) of an ADP network shall be secured in accordance
with appropriate directives for the highest classification of information designated for
transmission.
III.4.c. Emanations Security Aspects. The vulnerability of network operations to
exploitation through compromising emanations shall be determined in the process of
network accreditation. Evaluation of the risks associated with the individual ADP
systems and their interconnections shall be accomplished in accordance with appropri-
ate directives.
III.4.d. Network Components. All ADP systems, terminals, and peripheral devices
not designated for use in the current network mode of operation shall be disconnected
from the ADP network in an approved manner.
III.4.e. Security Identification and Labeling. The security level of network users,
remote sites, network programs, and files shall be identifiable. Specific classification
level, common controls, procedures established by DCID 1/7, and SCI markings shall
be identified. This identification shall be a primary factor in the monitoring and
control of data transfers. Security classification and other control caveats shall be
identified with the network information and programs while in the ADP network.
Appropriate labeling of any output from the network shall be ensured.
III.4.f. Access to Network Files. Each data file in the network shall have an Office
of Primary Interest (OPI). The OPI as owner, manager, and controller of the
information in the file is responsible for file maintenance, file classification, and
read/write access authorization of other network users of the file. A current list, by
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file, of network users and their access approvals shall be maintained, classified, and
controlled by the OPI. A copy of this list shall be provided to the cognizant ISSO and
NSO.
III.4.g. Network User Access Control. Each ADP system shall assure that a network
user is confined within the bounds of that system's files to which the user has been
authorized access, and that the user can exercise only those privileges for which he has
been authorized, A network user shall not be able to access or alter any of the network
security capabilities.
III.4.h. Network Programs. Network programs, such as log-in programs, file
maintenance programs, and listing programs, shall perform network specific functions
which are prohibited to the ADP systems' and users' programs. However, network
programs shall not have complete freedom and shall be given only the authority that is
needed to accomplish the particular network functions.
III.4.i. Procedures. The security procedures established for the protection, and
operational security, of the network shall be coordinated among all participants by the
Network Security Officer and administered by the ISSO of each ADP system in the
network.
III.4.i. Audit Trails. Security audit trails shall be generated by the ADP systems in
the network. This information shall be made available to the Network Security Officer
to permit a regular security review of the network activity. In some instances a manual
security audit may be warranted.
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GLOSSARY
The following definitions apply to the terms used in the Computer Security
Regulation.
Access. The ability and the means to approach, communicate with (input to or
receive output from), or otherwise make use of any material or component in an ADP
system or network.
Accreditation. A formal declaration by the responsible NFIB member or his
designee, as appropriate, that the ADP system or network provides an acceptable level
of protection for processing and/or storing intelligence information. An accreditation
should state the operating mode and other parameters peculiar to the ADP system or
network being accredited.
ADP System. The central computer facility and any remote processors, terminals,
or other input/output/storage devices connected to it by communications links.
Generally, all of the components of an ADP system will be under the authority of one
NFIB member or his designee.
Authentication. A positive identification, with a degree of certainty sufficient for
permitting certain rights or privileges to the person or thing positively identified.
Central Computer Facility. One or more computers with their peripherals and
storage units, central processing units, and communications equipment in a single
controlled area. This does not include remote computer facilities, peripheral devices,
or terminals which are located outside the single controlled area even though they are
connected to the central computer facility by approved communication links.
Escort. Duly designated personnel who have appropriate clearances and access
approvals for the material contained in the ADP system and are sufficiently
knowledgeable to understand the security implications and to control the activities and
access of the individual being escorted.
Front End Processor. A computer associated with a host computer that performs
pre-processing functions. It may perform line control, message handling, code
conversion, error control, data control, data management, terminal handling, etc. (See
Regulation, Chapter III, Figure 1.)
Operating System (O/S). An integrated collection of service routines for supervising
the sequencing and processing of programs by a computer, Operating systems control
the allocation of resources to users and their programs and play a central role in
assuring the secure operation of a computer system. Operating systems may perform
input/output, accounting, resource allocation, compilation, storage assignment tasks,
and other system-related functions.
Processing and/or Storing. All inclusive term used to include in addition to
processing and storing such functions as manipulating, deleting, modifying, editing,
outputting, etc.
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