PROPOSED CHANGES TO DCID 1/14

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87B01034R000500140077-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 2, 1998
• Sequence Number: 77
• Publication Date: October 28, 1981
• Content Type: DCID

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D R A F T
PROPOSED CHANGES TO DCID 1/14.
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 1/141
MINIMUM PERSONNEL SECURITY STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES
GOVERNING ELIGIBILITY FOR ACCESS TO SENSITIVE
COMPARTMENTED I NFORI'4AT I ON
3
Pursuant to the provisions of Executive OrderflPOM 12036, Section
102 of the National Security Act of 1947 and National Security
Council Directives, the following minimum personnel security
standards, procedures and continuing security programs are
hereby established for all United States Government civilian
and military personnel, consultants, contractors, employees
of contractors and other individual2 who require access to
Sensitive Compartmented Information (hereinafter referred to
as SCI). The standards, procedures and programs established
herein are minimum-and the departments and agencies may estab-
lish such additional security steps as may be deemed necessary
and appropriate to ensure that effective security is maintained.
Purpose -
1.--The purpose of this Directive is to enhance the security
protection of SCI through the-application of minimum security
standards, procedures and continuing security programs, and to
facilitate the security certification process among Government
departments and agencies. -
Applicability
q~1
(Effective )
2. The provisions of the Directive shall apply to all persons
(other than elected officials of the United States Government,
federal judges and those individuals for whom the DCI makes a
specific exception) without regard to civilian or military status,
form of employment, official rank or position or length of service.
3. Individuals who do not meet-the minimum security criteria
contained herein and who are, therefore, denied access to SCI shall
not, solely, for this reason, be considered ineligible for access
to other classified information. Individuals whose access to SCI
has been authorized as an exception granted in accordance with
paragraph 76 below, shall not, solely for that reason, be considered
eligible for access to other classified information.
'This directive supersedes DCID 1/14 approved 13 May 1976.
2The term "Sensitive Compartmented Information" as used
in this Directive is intended to include all information and
materials bearing special community controls indicating restricted
handling within present and future community intelligence collec-
tion programs and their end products for which community systems
of compartmentation have been or will be formally established.
The term does not include Restricted Data as defined in Section 11
Public Laws 585, Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended.
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General
4. The granting of access to SCI shall be controlled under
the strictest application of the "need-to-know" principle under
procedures prescribed in the several existing authorities which
govern access thereto, and in accordance with the personnel security
standards and procedures set forth in this Directive. All persons
accountable under the authority of this Directive and given access
to information (SCI) containing sources-or methods of intelligence
shall, as a condition of obtaining access, sign an agreement that -
they will not disclose that information to persons not authorized
to receive it.
Personnel Security Standards
5. 'Criteria for security approval of an individual on a
need-to-know basis for access to SCI are as follows:
a. The individual shall be stable, trustworthy,
reliable, of excellent character and discretion and of
unquestioned loyalty to the United States.
b. Except where there is a compelling need, and a
determination has been made by competent authority as
described in paragraph 76 below that every reasonable !,_;.~21
assurance has been obtained that under the circumstances
the security risk is negligible:
(1) Both the individual and the members of
his or her immediate family shall be U.S. citizens.
For these purposes, "immediate family" j ~ 'fAf A
A. fg?1091XAJ includes the individual's spouse,
parents, brot erfi s, s sters and children.
(2) The members of the individual's immediate
family and persons to whom he or she is bound by
affection or-obligation" shouldnneither be sub-
ject to physical, mental or other forms of duress.
by a foreign power, nor advocate the use of force
or violence to overthrow the Government of the
United States or the alteration of.the form of
Government of the..United States by unconstitu-
tional means.
~1) Exceptions to Personnel Security Standards
6. The exceptions to paragraph 5.b.(l) (2) above may be granted
only by the Senior Intelligence Officer (SIO) of the Intelligence
Community organization or his designee -unless 'such aut ority as
been specifically delegated to the head of an office or organization
as set forth in interdepartmental agreements. All exceptions granted
will be common sense determinations based on all available informa-
tion, and shall be recorded by the agency making the exception.' Ins
those cases.in which the individual has lived outside of the United
States for a substantial period of his life. .'a thorough assessment
of the adequacy of the investigation in terms of fulfillment of the
minimum investigative requirements, and judicious review of the
information therein must be made before an exception is considered.
The re uirement for U.S. citizenship in this DCID also applies to
a co a itant.
-fo - Including a cohabitant.
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Investigative Requirements
7. The investigation conducted on an individual under
consideration for access to SCI will be thorough and shall be
designed to develop information as to whether the individual
clearly meets the above Personnel Security Standards.
8. The investigation shall be accomplished through record
checks and personal interviews of various sources by trained
investigative personnel in order to establish affirmatively to
the adjudicating agency complete continuity of identity to include-
birth, residences, education, employment and military service.
Where the circumstances of a case indicate, the investigation
shall exceed the basic requirements set out below to ensure that
those responsible for adjudicating access eligibility have in
their ppssession all the relevant facts available.
9. The individual shall furnish a signed personal history
statement, fingerprints of a quality acceptable to the Federal
Bureau of Investigation and a signed release, as necessary, author-
izing custodians of police, credit, education and medical records,
to provide record information to the investigative agency. Photo-
graphs of the individual shall also be obtained where additional
corroboration of identity is required.
10. Minimum standards for the investigation are as follows:
_a. Verification of date and place of birth and
cititenship. ? .
b. Check of the subversive and criminal files of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, including submission of
fingerprint charts, and such other National agencies as are
appropriate to the individual's background. An additional
check of Immigration-and Naturalization Service records
shall be conducted on those members of the individual's
ir,~nediate family who are United States citizens other than
by birth or who are resident aliens.
c. A check of appropriate police records covering all
areas -~90? $ fyo YAK to~,iO,?gl of the individual's
residences', employment and education'in the U.S. throughout
the most recent fifteen (15) years or since age eighteen,
whichever is the shorter period. -
d. Verification of the individual's financial status'
and credit habits through checks of appropriate credit
institutions and/or interviews with knowledgeable sources
covering all areas of employment, residence, and educa-
tion in the most recent ?X J seven (7) years.
e. Interviews with neighbors in the vicinity of all
the individual's residences in excess of six (6) months -
throughout the most recent five (5) year period. This
coverage shall be expanded where the investigation sug-
gests the existence of some questionable behavioral
pattern.
f. Confirmation of all employment during the past
fifteen (15) years or since age eighteen, whichever is
the shorter period, but in any event the most recent two
(2) years. Personal interviews with supervisors and
co-workers at places of employment covering the past
ten (10) years shall be accomplished.
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g. Verification of graduation or attendance at all
institutions of higher learning v;it in the east fifteen (15)
years. If individual did not attend an institution o-higher
learning , verification o gr actuation or ttendance at last
secondary sc ool wit in t e past ten lU years.
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Watt A~Aut~
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2S
h.. Review of appropriate military records.
-Interviews with a sufficient number of knowledgeable
i
?
. sources 'ZMM? (a minimum of three developed during
t e course of the investigation) as necessary to provide a
continuity to the extent practicable, of the individual's
activities and behavioral patterns over the past fifteen (15)
years.
j. When employment, education or residence has
occurred overseas (except for periods of less than 11j$
t~ one year for personnel on U.S. Government assignment
and le ss than ninety days for other purposes) during the past-
fifteen (15) years or since age eighteen, a check of the
records will Be made at the Department of State and/ or
other appropriate agencies. Efforts shall be made to
develop sources, generally in the United States, who knew
the. individual overseas in order to cover significant
employment, education or residence and to attempt to deter-
mine if any lasting foreign contacts or connections-were
established during this period. However, in all cases
where an individual has worked or lived outside of the
U. S. continuously `for over ,fi~O ,($)' YO~tA one year, the
investigation will be expanded to cover fu y t is period
in his life through the use of such investigative assets
and checks of record sources as may be available to the
U.S. Government in the foreign country(ies) in which the
individual resided.
k- 14 JM~tAA40$ 1-4 1?$Z?g When the individual
has immediate family members or other persons )6Xti to whom
$ the individual iss bound by affection or obligation in
any o t,e situations escribed in subparagraph 5.b.(2),
above, the investigation will include an interview of the
individual by trained security, investigative or counter-
personnel to ascertain the facts as they may
intelligence
relate to the individual's access eligibility.
1. In all cases, the individual's spouse or cohabi-
tant shall at a minimum be checked through the subver ve
n&-criminal files of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
and other National agencies as appropriate. When conditions
indicate, additional investigation shall be'conducted on the
spouse of the individual and members of the immediate family
(or other ersons to whom the individual is bound by ar ffec-
tion or obligation to t e extent necessary to permit a
ef:_e nation y the adjudicating agency that the provisions
of paragraph S (Personnel Security Standards) above are met
(See Annex A).
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nt. A personal interview of the individual will be
conducted by trained security, investigative or counter-
intelligence personnel when necessary to resolve any
significant adverse information and/or inconsistencies
developed during the investigation.
Exceptions to Investigative Requirements
11 (Old Paragraph 6) In exceptional cases, f ,A??'
. 'the SIO or his designee may determine that it is necessary or
. 1,1Z advisable in the National interest to authorize access to SCI
prior to completion of.the fully prescribed investigation noted
in paragraph 10 above. In this situation, such investigative
r c5r ac nrP immP ,ately possible shall be made at once and
trained security, investigative, or counterin-ce.Li1~,'GUI..G ~/G1 ,1)1111G1.
ll e strictly controlled and the fully
Access in such cases sh all-be-
prescribed investigation and final evaluation shall be completed
at the earliest practicable moment. Certification to,other
!srg anizations of individuals authorized access in such cases
hallinclu e explicit note ication o t e exception.
12. Where a previous investigation has been conducted
within the past five (5) years which substantially meets the above
minimum standards, it may serve as a basis for granting access
approval provided a- review'of the personnel and security files
does not reveal sub"stantive changes in the individual's security
eligibility. If a previous investigation does not substantially
meet the minimum standards or if it is more than five (5) years
old, a current investigation shall be required but may be limited
to that necessary to bring the individual's file up-to-date in
accordance with the investigative requirements set forth in para-
3 2., graph 10 above. Should new information be developed during the
s
the individual`
bl
y upon
ars unfavora
current investigation which be
activities covered by the previous investigation, the current
inquiries shall be expanded as necessary to develop full details
of this new information.
Periodic Reinvestigations
13. Programs shall be instituted requiring the periodic
reinvestigation of personnel provided access to SCI. These
reinvestigations shall be conducted on a five (5) year recurrent
basis, but on a more frequeit basis where the individual has
shown some questionable behavioral pattern,'his.activities ~?are.
Ur otherwise suspect, or when deemed necessary by the SIO concerned.
14. The scope of reinvestigations shall be determined by the
SIO concerned based on such considerations as the potential damage--
that might result from the individual's defection or willful
compromise of SCI and the availability and probable effectiveness
of other means to continually evaluate factors related to the
individual's suitability for continued access. The individual
si nod ersonal history statement
ish an u -to-date
ll f
h
,
urn
a
s
an Si ne releases as necessary. n al cases, t e reinvesti-
riate Natianal agency
gatishall inclu e, as a minimum, approp
checks, local agency checks, (including overseas checks where
credit checks and a personal interview
riate)
o
p
appr
, with the individual by trained investigative, security or counter-
intelligence personnel when necessary to resolve significant
adverse information and/or inconsistencies. When conditions so
3 indicate, additional investigation may be conducte as etermined
by -e SIO or is designee.
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15. The evaluation of the information developed by investiga-
tion on an individual's loyalty and suitability shall be accomplished
under the cognizance of the SIO concerned by analysts of broad
knowledge, good judgment and wide experience in personnel security
and/or counterintelligence. When all other information developed
on an individual is favorable, a minor investigative requirement
which has not been met should not preclude favorable adjudication.
In All evaluations the protection of the National interest is
paramount. Any doubt concerning personnel having access to SCI -
shall be resolved in favor of the National security. The ultimate
determination of whether the granting of access is clearly consistent
with the interest of National security shall be an overall common
sense determination based on all available information.
Appeals Procedures
16. Annex B prescribes common a
when an individual's SCI access has 5
peals_procedures to be followed
Continuing Security Programs
17.X$ In order to facilitate the attainment of the highest
standard of personnel security and to augment both the access
approval criteria and the. investigative requirements established
by this Directive, member departments and agencies shall institute
continuei security programs for all individuals having access to
SCI. In addition to security indoctrinations, (See Annex PC,
"Minimum Standards for SCI Security Awareness Programs.in t e
intelligence ommunity' , these programs shall e tailored
to create mutually supporting procedures under which no issue will
escape notice or be left unresolved which brings into question an
individual's loyalty and integrity or suggests the possibility of
his being subject to undue influence or duress through foreign
relationships or exploitable personal conduct. When an individual
is assigned to perform sensitive compartmented work requiring
access to SCI, the SIO for the department, agency, or Government
program to which.the individual is assigned shall assume security
supervision of that individual throughout the period of his
assignment.
18.17 The continuing security programs shall include the
following:
a. SCI Sectirity..'educatiori 'programs to OAA34~~ f)'iAt
~A X X ~ky Ato OO o~~ to $01 At$ X Xf XX
to fAO 0AX O $W ffWfi AAA X f W IAA .A H A~ tyolt
WWAI t OA MXXX / to/ AtAXA X X X tot
0oAffAO?A A~00$$ to $~X to~f$ XXA fY X X X~li : of the
member departments and agencies shall. be established and
maintains pursuant to the requirements a Annex
Additionally, , the individual is encouraged to
seek appropriate guidance and assistance on any personal
problem or situation which may have a possible bearing on
his-eligibility for continued access to SCI, and security
counseling should be made available. These instructions
should be conducted by individuals having extensive back-
ground and experience regarding the nature and special
vulnerabilities of the particular type of compartmented
information involved.
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related files shall be kept under continuing review. .
b. Security supervisory programs to ensure that super-
visory personnel?recognize and discharge their special
responsibility in matters pertaining to the security of SCI,
including the eligibility for SCI access. Such programs
shall provide practical guidance as, to indicators which may
signal matters of security concern. Specific instructions
concerning reporting procedures shall be disseminated to
enable the appropriate authority to take timely corrective
action to safeguard the security of the United States as
well as to provide all necessary help to the individual
concerned to neutralize his vulnerability.
c. Security Review Programs to ensure that appropriate
security authorities-invariably receive and exchange, in a
timely manner, all information bearing on the security posture
of persons having access to sensitive information.1 Personnel
history information shall be kept current. Security and
security..
19.1$. Whenever adverse or derogatory information is"discovered o:
inc istencies arise which could impact upon an individual's security
status, appropriate investigations shall be conducted on a timely
basis. The investigation shall be of sufficient scope necessary to.,
resolve the specific adverse or derogatory information, or.incon:-
sistency', in question so that a determination can be made as to
whether the -individual's 'continued utilization in activities requir-
ing SCI is, clearly;consistent .with the interests of the National- .
such o er references governing access to SCI as defined herein
13 Ma '197.6. :Existing directives,4regulations, agreements and
20.10 This Directive supersedes DCID 1/14, X} X~~,
Effective- Date- "' `'
shall be. revised accordingly.
Signals'. Intelligence Security Regulations. .
4These include pertinent provisions of the Clearance Standards
and Investigation and Evaluation section of the
WILLIAM J. CASEY
Director of Central Intelligence
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1 19 March IS83
ANNEX A
DCID 1/14 ADJUDICATION GUIDELINES
PURPOSE
'hisariuaz is desigr..ad to ensure that. a common a=ro=cli is followed fry.
Intr liis Coinir nxsity Ducats and Ageacias in applying thes,an sands cf'
D= 1/14. Th aguid2Ti apply to the adauc3.iC2tion of costa invohMrs
baiag consul d for first U=0 access to S-nsit1va Compartxa~nted Inforoaatioo (SC)
as well as thcss cr of P mw= berg readjudica.tzrl forcontinuccf SC3. acce .-
AD ICA3 "POCC "S5
The ' ad u dicat crrhils- t inanon of a suffici tk peecd of a.,
S di fe ton a de ?- -~~szmticn that tbs paw is not now or is not die to Me,-
r=& s d?abbs amity SCI acc,? ac's-.dii is t3 ? ca-z~ wr ,
of a.-m of ? va iab.s 6awn as t' -who-tv
pia" cow. Tim r o
of any adva. ini.d`??ztt, tcsa~ with PctZmL--z there , is
c=ftA tza a fair a 'czz:ior evadvation. Key factors to be cc da t in a d -a e~
ter t x r s i _ * r d rr I i t s - o f t b p at th t?mz +cs-tain act or?, tola.;
as wed as any r_ on ur : iuclurataat ra giver 4 y to the foll&w= x~::'rss:
s a: Loyat,y
da . Clax r.' r. , aacl tea
c Ho 3cx tad smL4
e IT tr *1
h. ntc~m3 {lam and drag abuse
. aaa me=t3 des
ar Iav+-
i R
e=ra
k Se-ty viaylm zs
Ad a txt t ns- the. Foreg d ta? t=2 i od in
C1 -'*ail bA- 7w.
-D?C D 1/14 - s the catr-'~ rcquireme-at thzt;, to he eligibl -torStt
=c= s, an indvidnral .mom be of unquestion-d loyalty to the United States.
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COHABITATION
V~yy,I , `Xf ?Cohabitation )UfA A NOt Of f3$ ?H$ fA
in and of itself does not preclude SCI access approval.
The identity of a cohabitant must be ascertained and a
-determination made if such association constitutes an unaccept-
able security risk based on the same criteria as in the section
dealing with Close Relatives and Associates. Cohabitation with
an-alien, for example, requires the same scrutiny as marriage
to an alien. Extra-marital sexual relations are also of .
legitimate concern to the SCI adjudicator when the potential
for undue influence or duress exists.
.personal likes or dislikes must not e p
UNDESIRABLE CHARACTER TRAITS.
It is emphasized that an individuals ifestyle is examined
only in an effort to determine whether a. pattern of behavior
exists which indicates that granting SCI access could pose a
risk to national security. In cases where allegations have been
reported which reflect unfavorably on the reputation of an indi-
vidual, it is incumbent upon the SCI adjudicator to distinguish
fact from opinion and to determine which negative characteristics
are real and pertinent to an evaluation of the.individual's --,
character and which are unsubstantiated or-irrelevant. Relevant
negative. characteristics are those which, in the adjudicator's -
informedbopinion -indicate that an individual is not willing, -
able, or likely-to .-protect SCI information. The adjudicator's
b ermitted to affect the
determination... -
Examples o spec
individual has undesirable character traits are any substantive
credible derogatory comments by associates, em loyers, neighbors
-and----other acquaintances; any-litigation institute against the
individual by such persons as a result of the individual's
act.ons.;._.or allegations of. violations of law. A recommenda-
tion for disapproval.would,be appropriate for an individual
nn It
f ific concern in determining whether an
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 ANNEX -P
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MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR SCI SECURITY AWARENESS
PROGRAMS IN THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COL'rMUNITY
Minimum standards are hereby established for the- SCI' sec-urity-
education programs designed to enhance the security- awareness of
U.S. Government employees and private contractors working in. the
U.S. Intelligence' Community. Compliance with these standards is
required. for all Departments/Agencies within the=Ircte1-T-iGeuue- Cozx
mS
r
.
munity.. It is intended that existing security' a a.reszess prag
shall be modified to conform with these standards. Degar entS!
ra eauze--. zaa Cy r ?a-' -
ing has been presented to all personnel. The security awareness requirements set_ forth 'here tee cli ridecl.
into three phases. Phase I concerns the initial iztdacttiu =tasa~ a
the employee which is normally administered prior to access to SCI
elassifiefermatien... Phase.. II concerns the'corztinuing: security'
awareness-program required to maintain and increase sec~zrity. aware -
ness throughout the period of access. Phase III sets forth the #i.aal-
guidelines and instructions when access to SCI
is terminated.
1. Initial Indoctrination--As soon as practicahle after being
approved for access. to SCI elassi- ied-infaraati.eg,, empT_uyees; shall
itial security indoctrination which shall
i
n
receive an
A. The need for and purpose of SCI elass1e4-iertiee
.,?A ?t1, aa'vPr!e effects to the. national- security th= CCuld.
result from unauthorized disclosure.
B. The intelligence mission of the Dep=rtmemt,fAg:ce y- to
include the reasons why intelligence information i-s. sensitive-
C. . The administrative, personnel., physicaL aud- oth..e:r
procedural security requirements of the DepartaentfAge-zcy> aMCI
those requirements peculiar to specific duty assimrzts_
1.7
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