DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 1/14 AND ANNEX A ADJUDICATION GUIDELINES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87B01034R000500140006-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 2, 1998
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: March 1, 1980
• Content Type: DCID

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DIRECTOR
OF
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
Security Committee
Director of Central Intelligence
Directive No. 1114
and Annex A
Adjudication Guidelines
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DCID No. 1/14
13 May 1976
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 1/14 1
MINIMUM PERSONNEL SECURITY STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES
GOVERNING ELIGIBILITY FOR ACCESS TO SENSITIVE
COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION
(Effective 13 May 1976)
Pursuant to the provisions of Executive Order 11905, Section 102 of the National
Security Act of 1947 and National Security Council Directives, the following
minimum personnel security standards, procedures and continuing security programs
are hereby established for all United States Government civilian and military
personnel, consultants, contractors, employees of contractors and other individuals
who require access to Sensitive Compartmented Information 2 (hereinafter referred to
as SCI). The standards, procedures and programs established herein are minimum and
the departments and agencies may establish such additional security steps as may be
deemed necessary and appropriate to ensure that effective security is maintained.
Purpose
1. The purpose of this Directive is to enhance the security protection of SCI
through the application of minimum security standards, procedures and continuing
security programs, and to facilitate the security certification process among Govern-
ment departments and agencies.
Applicability
2. The provisions of the Directive shall apply to all persons (other than elected
officials of the United States Government, federal judges and those individuals for
whom the DCI makes a specific exception) without regard to civilian or military
status, form of employment, official rank or position or length of service.
3. Individuals who do not meet the minimum security criteria contained herein
and who are, therefore, denied access to SCI shall not, solely, for this reason, be
considered ineligible for access to other classified information. Individuals whose
access to SCI has been authorized as an exception granted in accordance with
paragraph 7 below, shall not, solely for that reason, be considered eligible for access to
other classified information.
' This directive supersedes DCID 1/14 approved 1 July 1968.
s The term "Sensitive Compartmented Information" as used in this Directive is intended to include all
information and materials bearing special community controls indicating restricted handling within present
and future community intelligence collection programs and their end products for which community
systems of compartmentation have been or will be formally established. The term does not include
Restricted Data as defined in Section II, Public Laws 585, Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended.
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4. The granting of access to SCI shall be controlled under the strictest application
of the "need-to-know" principle under procedures prescribed in the several existing
authorities which govern access thereto, and in accordance with the personnel security
standards and procedures set forth in this Directive. All persons accountable under the
authority of this Directive and given access to information (SCI) containing sources or
methods of intelligence shall, as a condition of obtaining access, sign an agreement that
they will not disclose that information to persons not authorized to receive it.
Personnel Security Standards
5. Criteria for security approval of an individual on a need-to-know basis for
access to SCI are as follows:
a. The individual shall be stable, of excellent character and discretion and of
unquestioned loyalty to the United States.
b. Except where there :is a compelling need, and a determination has been
made by competent authority as described in paragraph 7 below that every
reasonable assurance has been obtained that under the circumstances the security
risk is negligible:
(1) Both the individual and the members of his or her immediate family
shall be US citizens. For these purposes "immediate family" is defined as
including the individual's spouse, parents, brothers, sisters and children.
(2) The members of the individual's immediate family and persons to whom
he is bound by affection or obligation should neither be subject to physical,
mental or other forms of duress by a foreign power, nor advocate the use of
force or violence to overthrow the Government of the United States or the
alteration of the form of Government of the United States by unconstitutional
means.
6. In exceptional cases, the Senior Intelligence Officer (SIO) of the Intelligence
Community organization, or his designee, may determine that it is necessary or
advisable in the National interest to authorize access to SCI prior to completion of the
fully prescribed investigation. In this situation such investigative checks as are
immediately possible shall be made at once, and should include a personal interview
by trained security or counterintelligence personnel. Access in such cases shall be
strictly controlled, and the fully prescribed investigation and final evaluation shall be
completed at the earliest practicable moment.
7. The exceptions to paragraph 5.b.(1)(2) above may be granted only by the SIO
or his designee, unless such authority has been specifically delegated to the head of an
office or organization as set forth in inter-departmental agreements. All exceptions
granted will be common sense determinations based on. all available information, and
shall be recorded by the agency making the exception. In those cases in which the
individual has lived, outside of the United States for a substantial period of his life, a
thorough assessment of the adequacy of the investigation in terms of fulfillment of the
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minimum investigative requirements, and judicious review of the information therein
must be made before an exception is considered.
Investigative Requirements
8. The investigation conducted on an individual under consideration for access to
SCI will be thorough and shall be designed to develop information as to whether the
individual clearly meets the above Personnel Security Standards.
9. The investigation shall be accomplished through record checks and personal
interviews of various sources by trained investigative personnel in order to establish
affirmatively to the adjudicating agency complete continuity of identity to include
birth, residences, education, employments and military service. Where the
circumstances of a case indicate, the investigation shall exceed the basic requirements
set out below to ensure that those responsible for adjudicating access eligibility have in
their possession all the relevant facts available.
10. The individual shall furnish a signed personal history statement, fingerprints
of a quality acceptable to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and a signed release, as
necessary, authorizing custodians of police, credit, education and medical records, to
provide record information to the investigative agency. Photographs of the individual
shall also be obtained where additional corroboration of identity is required.
11. Minimum standards for the investigation are as follows.
a. Verification of date and place of birth and citizenship.
b. Check of the subversive and criminal files of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, including submission of fingerprint charts, and such other National
agencies as are appropriate to the individual's background. An additional check
of Immigration and Naturalization Service records shall be conducted on those
members of the individual's immediate family who are United States citizens
other than by birth or who are resident aliens.
c. A check of appropriate police records covering all areas where the
individual has resided in the US throughout the most recent fifteen (15) years or
since age eighteen, whichever is the shorter period.
d. Verification of the individual's financial status and credit habits through
checks of appropriate credit institutions and interviews with knowledgeable
sources covering the most recent five (5) years.
e. Interviews with neighbors in the vicinity of all the individual's residences in
excess of six (6) months throughout the most recent five (5) year period. This
coverage shall be expanded where the investigation suggests the existence of some
questionable behavioral pattern.
f. Confirmation of all employment during the past fifteen (15) years or since
age eighteen, whichever is the shorter period but in any event the most recent
two years. Personal interviews with supervisors and co-workers at places of
employment covering the past ten (10) years shall be accomplished.
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g. Verification of attendance at institutes of higher learning in all instances and
at the last secondary school attended within the past fifteen (15) years.
Attendance at secondary schools may be verified through qualified collateral
sources. If attendance at educational institutions occurred within the most recent
five (5) years, personal interviews with faculty members or other persons who
were acquainted with the individual during his attendance shall be accomplished.
h. Review of appropriate military records.
i. Interviews with a sufficient number of knowledgeable acquaintances (a
minimum of three developed during the course of the investigation) as necessary
to provide a continuity to the extent practicable, of the individual's activities and
behavioral patterns over the past fifteen years with particular emphasis on the
most recent five years.
j. When employment, education or residence, has occurred overseas (except
for periods of less than five (5) years for personnel on US Government assignment
and less than ninety days for other purposes) during the past fifteen years or since
age eighteen, a check of the records will be made at the Department of State and
other appropriate agencies. Efforts shall be made to develop sources, generally in
the United States, who knew the individual overseas in order to cover significant
employment, education or residence and to attempt to determine if any lasting
foreign contacts or connections were established during this period. However, in
all cases where an individual has worked or lived outside of the US continuously
for over five years, the investigation will be expanded to cover fully this period in
his life through the use of such investigative assets and checks of record sources as
may be available to the US Government in the foreign country(ies) in which the
individual resided.
k. In those instances in which the individual has immediate family members or
other persons with whom he is bonded by affection or obligation in any of the
situations described in subparagraph 5.b.(2), above, the investigation will include
an interview of the individual by trained security, investigative or counter-
intelligence personnel to ascertain the facts as they :may relate to the individual's
access eligibility.
1. In all cases the individual's spouse shall at a minimum be checked through
the subversive files of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other National
agencies as appropriate. When conditions indicate, additional investigation shall
be conducted on the spouse of the individual and members of the immediate
family to the extent necessary to permit a determination by the adjudicating
agency that the provisions of paragraph 5, Personnel Security Standards, above,
are met.
m. A personal interview of the individual will be conducted by trained
security, investigative or counterintelligence personnel when necessary to resolve
any significant adverse information and/or inconsistencies developed during the
investigation.
12. Where a previous investigation has been conducted within the past five years
which substantially meets the above minimum standards, it may serve as a basis for
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granting access approval provided a review of the personnel and security files does not
reveal substantive changes in the individual's security eligibility. If a previous
investigation does not substantially meet the minimum standards or if it is more than
five years old, a current investigation shall be required but may be limited to that
necessary to bring the individual's file up-to-date in accordance with the investigative
requirements set forth in paragraph 11 above. Should new information be developed
during the current investigation which bears unfavorably upon the individual's
activities covered by the previous investigation, the current inquiries shall be
expanded as necessary to develop full details of this new information.
13. Programs shall be instituted requiring the periodic reinvestigation of
personnel provided access to SCI. These reinvestigations will be conducted on a five
year recurrent basis, but on a more frequent basis where the individual has shown
some questionable behavioral pattern, his activities are otherwise suspect, or when
deemed necessary by the SIO concerned.'
14. The scope of reinvestigations shall be determined by the SIO concerned
based on such considerations as the potential damage that might result from the
individual's defection or willful compromise of SCI and the availability and probable
effectiveness of other means to continually evaluate factors related to the individual's
suitability for continued access. In all cases, the reinvestigation shall include, as a
minimum, appropriate National agency checks, local agency (including overseas
checks where appropriate), credit checks and a personal discussion with the individual
by trained investigative, security or counterintelligence personnel when necessary to
resolve significant adverse information or inconsistencies.
15. The evaluation of the information developed by investigation on an
individual's loyalty and suitability shall be accomplished under the cognizance of the
SIO concerned by analysts of broad knowledge, good judgment and wide experience
in personnel security and/or counterintelligence. When all other information
developed on an individual is favorable, a minor investigative requirement which has
not been met should not preclude favorable adjudication. In all evaluations the
protection of the national interest is paramount. Any doubt concerning personnel
having access to SCI shall be resolved in favor of the national security. The ultimate
determination of whether the granting of access is clearly consistent with the interest
of national security shall be an overall common sense determination based on all
available information.
Continuing Security Programs
16. In order to facilitate the attainment of the highest standard of personnel
security and to augment both the access approval criteria and the investigate
requirements established by this Directive, member departments and agencies shall
institute continuing security programs for all individuals having access to SCI. In
addition to security indoctrinations, these programs shall be tailored to create mutually
supporting procedures under which no issue will escape notice or be left unresolved
which brings into question an individual's loyalty and integrity or suggests the
possibility of his being subject to undue influence or duress through foreign
3In DoD, an SIO may request, with the approval of the Secretary of Defense or his designee, more
frequent reinvestigations under special circumstances.
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relationships or exploitable personal conduct. When an individual is assigned to
perform sensitive compartmented work requiring access to SCI, the SIO for the
department, agency or Government program to which the individual is assigned shall
assume security supervision of that individual throughout the period of his assignment.
17. The continuing security programs shall include the followings:
a. Security education programs to ensure that individuals who are granted
access to SCI are initially indoctrinated and periodically thereafter instructed as
to its unique sensitivity and that they understand their personal responsibility for
maintaining eligibility for continued access to SCI rests with the individual,
Therefore, the individual is encouraged to seek appropriate guidance and
assistance on any personal problem or situation which may have a possible
bearing on his eligibility for continued access to SCI, and security counseling
should be made available. These instructions should be conducted by individuals
having extensive background and experience regarding the nature and special
vulnerabilities of the particular type of compartmented information involved.
b. Security supervisory programs to ensure that supervisory personnel recog-
nize and discharge their special responsibility in matters pertaining to the security
of SCI, including the eligibility for SCI access. Such programs shall provide
practical guidance as to indicators which may signal matters of security concern.
Specific instructions concerning reporting procedures shall be disseminated to
enable the appropriate authority to take timely corrective action to safeguard the
security of the United States as well as to provide all necessary help to the
individual concerned to neutralize his vulnerability.
c. Security Review Programs to ensure that appropriate security authorities
invariably receive and exchange, in a timely manner, all information bearing on
the security posture of persons having access to sensitive information. Personnel
history information shall be kept current. Security .and related files shall be kept
under continuing review.
18. Whenever adverse or derogatory information is discovered or inconsistencies
arise which could impact upon an individual's security status, appropriate investiga-
tions shall be conducted on a timely basis. The investigatiion shall be of sufficient scope
necessary to resolve the specific adverse or derogatory information, or inconsistency,
in question so that a determination can be made as to whether the individual's
continued utilization in activities requiring SCI is clearly consistent with the interests
of the national security.
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Effective Date
19. This Directive supersedes DCID 1/14, 1 July 1968. Existing directives,'
regulations, agreements and such other references governing access to SCI as defined
herein shall be revised accordingly.
' These include pertinent provisions of the Clearance Standards and Investigation and Evaluation section
of the Communications Intelligence Security Regulations.
GEORGE BUSH
Director of Central Intelligence
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DCID 1/14 ADJUDICATION GUIDELINES
PURPOSE
This annex is designed to ensure that a common approach is followed by
Intelligence Community Departments and Agencies in applying the standards of
DCID 1/14. These guidelines apply to the adjudication of cases involving persons
being considered for first time access to Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI)
as well as those cases of persons being readjudicated for continued SCI access.
ADJUDICATIVE PROCESS
The adjudicative process entails the examination of a sufficient period of a
person's life to make a determination that the person is not now or is not likely to later
become an unacceptable security risk. SCI access adjudication is the careful weighing
of a number of variables known as the "whole person" concept. The recency of
occurrence of any adverse incident, together with circumstances pertaining thereto, is
central to a fair and uniform evaluation. Key factors to be considered in adjudication
are the maturity and responsibility of the person at the time certain acts or violations
were committed as well as any repetition or continuation of such conduct. Each case
must be judged on its own merits and final determination remains the responsibility of
the individual SIO. Any doubt concerning personnel having access to SCI shall be
resolved in favor of the national security.
The ultimate determination of whether the granting of SCI access is clearly
consistent with the interests of national security shall be an overall common sense
determination based on all available information. In arriving at a decision consistent
with the foregoing, the adjudicator must give careful scrutiny to the following matters:
a. Loyalty
b. Close relatives and associates
c. Homosexual conduct and sexual perversion
d. Cohabitation
e. Undesirable character traits
f. Financial irresponsibility
g. Alcohol abuse
h. Illegal drugs and drug abuse
i. Emotional and mental disorders
j. Record of law violations
k. Security violations
Adjudicative actions concerning the foregoing items are examined in greater
detail below.
LOYALTY
DCID 1/14 establishes the categorical requirement that, to be eligible for SCI
access, an individual must be of unquestioned loyalty to the United States.
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CLOSE RELATIVES AND ASSOCIATES
DCID 1/14 requires close examination by the SC][ adjudicator when members of
an individual's immediate family and persons to whom he/she is bound by affection
or obligation are not citizens of the United States, or their loyalty or affection is to a
foreign power, or they are subject to any form of duress by a foreign power, or they
advocate the violent overthrow or unconstitutional alteration of the Government of
the United States.
The adjudicator must assess carefully the degree of actual and potential influence
that such persons may exercise on the individual based on an examination of the
frequency and nature of personal contact and correspondence with and the political
sophistication and general maturity of the individual.
A recommendation for access disapproval is appropriate if there is an indication
that such relatives or associates are connected with any foreign intelligence service.
When there is a "compelling need" for SCI access for an individual whose family
member is a non-U.S. citizen and the background investigation indicates that the
security risk is negligible, an exception to paragraph 5b(1), (2) of DCID 1/14 may be
recommended.
In some circumstances, marriage of an individuall holding SCI access approval
could present an unacceptable security risk. An individual is required to file an intent
to marry and it is the responsibility of the SIO to advise the individual of the possible
security consequences, If the individual marries a non-U.S. citizen, SCI access will be
suspended until the case is readjudicated unless an appropriate investigation of the
spouse, as required by Paragraph 11L of DCID 1/14, was conducted with favorable
results. In readjudicating such cases, the same judgments and criteria as reflected in
this section apply.
HOMOSEXUAL CONDUCT AND SEXUAL PERVERSION
DCID 1/14 requires that, to be eligible for SCI access, individuals must be stable,
of excellent character and discretion, and not subject to undue influence or duress
through exploitable personal conduct.
Sexual conduct can be a relevant consideration in circumstances in which the
conduct indicates a personality disorder or could result in exposing the individual to
direct or indirect pressure because of susceptibility to blackmail or coercion as a result
of the deviant sexual behavior. Such behavior includes: bestiality, fetishism, exhibi-
tionism, necrophilia, nymphomania or satyriasis, masochism, sadism, pedophilia,
transvestism, and voyeurism, Homosexual conduct is also to be considered as a factor
in determining an individual's stability and susceptibility to undue influence or duress.
In examining cases involving acts of homosexual conduct or sexual perversion, it is
relevant to consider the age of the person, the voluntariness, and the frequency of such
activities, the public nature and the recency of the conduct, as well as any other
circumstances which may serve to aggravate the nature or character of the conduct. A
recommendation for disapproval is appropriate when, in view of all available evidence
concerning the individual's history of. sexual behavior, it appears that access to SCI
could pose a risk to the national security.
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COHABITATION
Extra-marital cohabitation with a member of the opposite sex, in and of itself,
does not preclude SCI access approval.
The identity of a cohabitant must be ascertained and a determination made if
such association constitutes an unacceptable security risk based on the same criteria as
in the section dealing with Close Relatives and Associates. Cohabitation with an alien,
for example, requires the same scrutiny as marriage to an alien. Extra-marital sexual
relations are also of legitimate concern to the SCI adjudicator when the potential for
undue influence or duress exists.
UNDESIRABLE CHARACTER TRAITS
It is emphasized that an individual's lifestyle is examined only in an effort to
determine whether a pattern of behavior exists which indicates that granting SCI
access could pose a risk to national security. In cases where allegations have been
reported which reflect unfavorably on the reputation of an individual, it is incumbent
upon the SCI adjudicator to distinguish fact from opinion and to determine which
negative characteristics are real and pertinent to an evaluation of the individual's
character and which are unsubstantiated or irrelevant, Relevant negative characteris-
tics are those which, in the adjudicator's informed opinion, indicate that an individual
is not willing, able, or likely to protect SCI information. The adjudicator's personal
likes or dislikes must not be permitted to affect the determination.
Examples of specific concern in determining whether an individual has undesira-
ble character traits are any substantive credible derogatory comments by associates,
neighbors and other acquaintances; any litigation instituted against the individual by
such persons as a result of the individual's actions; or allegations of violations of law. A
recommendation for disapproval would be appropriate for an individual who cannot
be relied upon to obey rules and regulations.
In examining the circumstances of cases involving incidents of untruthfulness, the
ajudicator must weigh all factors with particular emphasis on establishing the intent of
the individual. Where an individual has tried to obscure pertinent or significant facts
by falsifying data, i.e. on the Personal History Statement by either omission or false
entry, such action should be weighed heavily against recommending access. Failure to
disclose derogatory personal information, such as a court martial or serious crime,
would appear to be intentional and, consequently, would warrant a recommendation
for disapproval.
FINANCIAL IRRESPONSIBILITY
Financial irresponsibility represents a serious concern to the SCI adjudicator.
Persons who have engaged in espionage for monetary gain demonstrate the hazard of
granting SCI access to an individual with overly expensive tastes and habits or living
under the pressure of serious debt.
A recommendation for disapproval is appropriate when there is a pattern of
financial irresponsibility and it appears that an individual has not made a conscien-
tious effort to satisfy creditors. In such cases, the adjudicator should determine
whether the individual had been notified about the debts and whether they were
legally valid or ultimately satisfied.
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When the financial irresponsibility alone is not of such magnitude to warrrant
disapproval, it may contribute to recommendation for denial of SCI access when there
is other evidence of irresponsibility.
The SCI adjudicator should examine any information developed relative to an
individual's use of alcoholic beverages to determine the extent to which such use
would adversely affect the ability of the individual to excerise the care, judgement,
and discretion necessary to protect SCI information, The adjudicator should determine
whether a pattern of impropriety exists, although one incident caused by alcohol abuse
may be of such magnitude to warant a recommendation for disapproval.
In determining the security impact of a person's pattern of alcohol use, the
adjudicator should consider the circumstances, amount and rate of consumption, the
time and place of consumption, and the physiological and behavioral effect such
drinking has on the individual. For example, does the! individual's drinking result in
absences from work or careless work habits? Does the individual become talkative,
abusive or manifest other undesirable characteristics? :Does the individual drink until
intoxicated? Has the individual been arrested for any acts resulting from the influence
of alcohol?
In the absence of conclusive evidence, additional insight may be available from
appropriate medical authorities. If the individual acknowledges having an alcohol
abuse problem and is seeking help, it may be appropriate to defer access determina-
tion and monitor the individual's progess for a year or so.
If, after considering the nature and sources of the information, the adjudicator
determines that an individual's drinking is not serious enough to warrant a recommen-
dation for disapproval of SCI access, it may be appropriate to recommend approval
with a warning at the time of indoctrination that future incidents of alcohol abuse may
result in SCI denial. The adjudicator may also recommend a reinvestigation of the
individual's use of alcohol after an appropriate period of time has passed.
ILLEGAL DRUGS AND DRUG ABUSE
The SCI adjudicator should examine all allegation of an individual's use,
transport, transfer, sale, cultivation, processing and manufacturing of hallucinogens,
narcotics, drugs and other materials and chemical compounds identified and listed in
the Controlled Substance Act of 1970, as amended. Consequently an individual's
involvement in any of these activities is of direct concern to the SCI adjudicator in
order to determine the individual's capability to exercise the care, discretion, and
judgement required to protect SCI information. The use of these substances may lead
to varying degrees of physical or psychological dependence as well as having a
deleterious effect on an individual's mental state and ability to function.
Persons involved in drug trafficking, i.e., the commercial cultivation, processing,
manufacturing, purchase or sale of such substances should normally be recommended
for disapproval.
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In cases involving the use of drugs, the adjudicator must consider the nature of
the substance used and whether the use is experimental or habitual. The frequency,
recency and circumstances surrounding said use are key elements. For example, has
the individual used "hard" drugs or hallucinogens such as heroin, cocaine or LSD? Has
the individual used drugs regularly or only on occasion? Does the individual currently
use drugs? Does the individual regularly purchase drugs or participate merely when
offered drugs by others? Has the individual's behavior been affected by the use of
drugs and, if so, to what extent?
Once the judgment is made that an individual is a habitual user of any controlled
substance (multiple use beyond the point of mere experimentation), a recommenda-
tion for disapproval is appropriate. Moreover, even experimental use of hard drugs or
hallucinogens, such as LSD, could warrant a recommendation for disapproval.
EMOTIONAL AND MENTAL DISORDERS
DCID 1/14 requires that persons considered for access to SCI be stable and of
excellent character and discretion. Emotional and mental disorders which interfere
with an individual's perception of reality or reliability are of serious concern to the
SCI adjudicator in determining whether an individual is able or willing to protect SCI
information.
It is essential to obtain as much information as possible when an allegation has
been made in this area. If feasible, the individual should be interviewed to obtain
additional details. When appropriate, government psychological and psychiatric
personnel should be consulted so that psychiatric or psychological data may be
properly evaluated.
If a current emotional instability appears to be a temporary condition, for
example, caused by a death, illness or marital breakup, it may be advisable to
recommend postponing final action and rechecking the situation at a later date. This
precludes a security disapproval for what may be a temporary condition which, when
cured, would have no security implications.
Military and civilian personnel who decline to take medical /psychiatric tests
when so directed by competent authority should not be recommended for SCI access.
RECORD OF LAW VIOLATIONS
In determining whether an individual is stable, of excellent character and
discretion as required by DCID 1/14 for access to SCI, the adjudicator must weigh
carefully any record of law violations by the individual. Although a pattern of
repeated minor traffic violations could be significant, the adjudicator is principally
concerned with more serious criminal violations or court actions reflecting adversely
upon the individual's reliability or trustworthiness.
Each case involving convictions for criminal offenses must be considered from
the standpoint of the nature and seriousness of the offense, the circumstances under
which it occurred, how long ago it occurred, whether it was an isolated offense or a
repeated violation of the law, the offender's age at the time, social conditions which
may have a brearing on the individual actions, and any evidence of rehabilitation.
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Any conviction for a felony will normally support a recommendation for
disapproval. If the offense was committed many years prior, the individual has shown
evidence of rehabilitation, and the investigation shows no other derogatory informa-
tion, an approval may be considered. A large number of minor offenses, however,
could indicate irresponsibility and may support an adverse recommendation.
Most security violations are caused by carelessness or ignorance with no intention
of compromising security. However, the record of an individual responsible for
multiple violations should be scrutinized. The individual's current attitude toward
security should be confirmed with his/her supervisor. A pattern of violations may be
sufficient ground for a recommendation for disapproval.
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