MINIMUM PERSONNEL SECURITY STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES GOVERNING ELIGIBILITY FOR ACCESS TO SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION
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Central
Intelligence
Director of Central Intelligence
Directive No. 1/14
Minimum Personnel Security
Standards and Procedures
Governing Eligibility
for Access to
Sensitive Compartmented
Information
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1 September 1983
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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
DIRECTIVE NO. 1/14
(Effective 1 September 1983)
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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE 1/14 1
MINIMUM PERSONNEL SECURITY STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES
GOVERNING ELIGIBILITY FOR ACCESS TO
SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION
(Effective 1 September 1983)
Pursuant to the provisions of Executive Order 12333, Section 102 of the National
Security Act of 1947, and the Director of Central Intelligence Directive on the
Security Committee, the following minimum personnel security standards, proce-
dures, and continuing security programs are hereby established for all United States
Government civilian and military personnel, consultants, contractors, employees of
contractors, and other individuals who require access to Sensitive Compartmented
Information (hereinafter referred to as SCI). The standards, procedures, and programs
established herein are minimum and the departments and agencies may establish such
additional security steps as may be deemed necessary and appropriate to ensure that
effective security is maintained.
1. Definitions
a. Intelligence Community-those United States Government organizations
and activities identified in Executive Order 12333 or successor orders as
making up such Community.
b. Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI)-all information and materials
requiring special Community controls indicating restricted handling within
present and future Community intelligence collection programs and their
end products. These special Community controls are formal systems of
restricted access established to protect the sensitive aspects of sources and
methods and analytical procedures of foreign intelligence programs. The
term does not include Restricted Data as defined in Section II, Public Law
585, Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended.
c. Senior Officials of the Intelligence Community (SOICs)-for the purposes of
this Directive, SOICs are defined as the heads of organizations within the In-
telligence Community, as defined by Executive Order 12333, or their
designated representatives.
2. Purpose
The purpose of this Directive is to enhance the security protection of SCI through
the application of minimum security standards, procedures, and continuing security
programs, and to facilitate the security certification process among Government
departments and agencies.
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3. Applicability
The provisions of this Directive shall apply to all persons (other than elected
officials of the United States Government, federal judges, and those individuals for
whom the DCI makes a specific exception) without regard to civilian or military
status, form of employment, official rank or position, or length of service.
4. General
a. Individuals who do not meet the minimum security criteria contained
herein and who are, therefore, denied access to SCI shall not, solely for this
reason, be considered ineligible for access to other classified information.
Individuals whose access to SCI has been authorized as an exception granted
in accordance with paragraph 6 below, shall not, solely for that reason, be
considered eligible for access to other classified information.
b. The granting of access to SCI shall be controlled under the strictest
application of the "need-to-know" principle, and in accordance with the
personnel security standards and procedures set forth in this Directive. In
accordance with National Security Decision Directive Number 84 and the
DCI Security Policy Manual for SCI Control Systems, signature of a DCI-
authorized non-disclosure agreement which includes a provision for prepub-
lication review s a condition of access to SCI.
5. Personnel Security Standards
Criteria for security approval of an individual on a need-to-know basis for access
to SCI are:
a. The individual shall be stable; trustworthy; reliable; of excellent character,
judgment, and discretion; and of unquestioned loyalty to the United States.
b. Except: where there is a compelling need, and a determination has been
made by competent authority as described in paragraph 6 below that every
reasonable assurance has been obtained that under the circumstances the
security risk is negligible:
(1) Both the individual and the members of his or her immediate family
shall be U.S. citizens. For these purposes, "immediate family" includes
the individual's spouse, parents, brothers, sisters, and children.
(2) The members of the individual's immediate family and persons to whom
he or she is bound by affection or obligation ' ' should neither be subject
to physical, mental, or other forms of duress by a foreign power, nor
advocate the use of force or violence to overthrow the Government of the
United States or the alteration of the form of Government of the United
States by unconstitutional means.
6. Exceptions to Personnel Security Standards
The exceptions to paragraph 5.b.(1) or (2) above may be granted only by the SOIC
of the appropriate organization or his designee unless such authority has been
The requirement for U. S. citizenship in this DCID also applies to a cohabitant.
Including a cohabitant.
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specifically delegated to the head of an office or organization as set forth in
interdepartmental agreements. All exceptions granted will be common sense determi-
nations based on all available information, and shall be recorded by the organization
making the exception. In those cases in which the individual has lived outside of the
United States for a substantial period of his or her life, a thorough assessment of the
adequacy of the investigation in terms of fulfillment of the minimum investigative
requirements, and judicious review of the information therein, must be made before
an exception is considered.
7. Investigative Requirements
a. The investigation conducted on an individual under consideration for access
to SCI will be thorough and shall be designed to develop information as to
whether the individual clearly meets the above Personnel Security
Standards.
b. The investigation shall be accomplished through record checks and personal
interviews of various sources by trained investigative personnel in order to
establish affirmatively to the adjudicating agency complete continuity of
identity to include birth, residences, education, employment, and military
service. Where the circumstances of a case indicate, the investigation shall
exceed the basic requirements set out below to ensure that those responsible
for adjudicating access eligibility have in their possession all the relevant
facts available,
c. The individual shall furnish a signed personal history statement, fingerprints
of a quality acceptable to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and a signed
release, as necessary, authorizing custodians of police, credit, education, and
medical records, to provide record information to the investigative agency.
Photographs of the individual shall also be obtained where additional
corroboration of identity is required.
8. Minimum standards for the investigation are as follows:
a. Verification of date and place of birth and citizenship.
b. Check of the subversive and criminal files of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, including submission of fingerprint charts, and such other
national agencies as are appropriate to the individual's background. An
additional check of Immigration and Naturalization Service records shall be
conducted on those members of the individual's immediate family who are
United States citizens other than by birth or who are resident aliens.
c. A check of appropriate police records covering all areas of the individual's
residence, employment, and education in the U.S. throughout the most
recent fifteen (15) years or since age eighteen, whichever is the shorter
period.
d. Verification of the individual's financial status and credit habits through
checks of appropriate credit institutions or, if such checks are not produc-
tive, through interviews with knowledgeable sources covering all areas of
employment, residence, and education in the most recent seven (7) years.
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e. Interviews with neighbors in the vicinity of all the individual's residences in
excess of six (6) months throughout the most recent five (5) year period. This
coverage shall be expanded where the investigation suggests the existence of
some questionable behavioral pattern.
f. Confirmation of all employment during the past fifteen (15) years or since
age eighteen, whichever is the shorter period, but in any event the most
recent two (2) years. Personal interviews with supervisors and coworkers at
places of employment covering the past ten (10) years shall be accomplished.
g. Verification of graduation or attendance at all institutions of higher learning
within the past fifteen (15) years. If the individual did not attend an
institution of higher learning, verification of graduation or attendance at last
secondary school within the past ten (10) years.
h. Review of appropriate military records.
i. Interviews with a sufficient number of knowledgeable sources (a minimum
of three! developed during the course of the investigation) as necessary to
provide a continuity to the extent practicable, of the individual's activities
and behavioral patterns over the past fifteen (15) years.
j. When employment, education, or residence has occurred in foreign coun-
tries (except for periods of less than one year for personnel on U.S.
Government assignment and less than ninety days for other purposes) during
the past fifteen (15) years or since age eighteen, a check of the records will
be made at the Department of State and/or other appropriate agencies.
Efforts shall be made to develop sources, generally in the United States, who
knew the individual overseas in order to cover significant employment,
education or residence and to attempt to determine if any lasting foreign
contacts or connections were established during this period. However, in all
cases where an individual has worked or lived outside of the U.S. continu-
ously for over one year, the investigation will be expanded to cover fully this
period in his or her life through the use of such investigative assets and
checks of record sources as may be available to the U.S. Government in the
foreign country(ies) in which the individual resided.
k. When the individual has immediate family members or other persons to
whom the individual is bound by affection or obligation in any of the
situations described in subparagraph 5.b.(2) above, the investigation will
include an interview of the individual by trained security, investigative, or
counterintelligence personnel to ascertain the facts as they may relate to the
individual's access eligibility.
1. In all cases, the individual's spouse or cohabitant shall at a minimum be
checked through the subversive and criminal files of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation and other national agencies as appropriate. When conditions
indicate, additional investigation shall be conducted on the spouse of the
individual and members of the immediate family (or other persons to whom
the individual is bound by affection or obligation) to the extent necessary to
permit a determination by the adjudicating agency that the provisions of
paragraph 5 (Personnel Security Standards) above are met (See Annex A).
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m. A personal interview of the individual may be conducted by trained
security, investigative, or counterintelligence personnel to ensure full inves-
tig2tive coverage. A personal interview will be conducted when necessary to
resolve any significant adverse information and/or inconsistencies devel-
oped during the investigation. In departments or agencies with policies
sanctioning the use of the polygraph for personnel security purposes, the
personal interview may include a polygraph examination, conducted by a
qualified polygraph examiner.
9. Exceptions to Investigative Requirements
a. In exceptional cases, the SOIC or his designee may determine that it is
necessary or advisable in the national interest to authorize access to SCI
prior to completion of the fully prescribed investigation noted in paragraph
8 above. In this situation, such investigative checks as are immediately
possible shall be made at once and shall include a personal interview of the
individual by trained security, investigative, or counterintelligence person-
nel. Access in such cases shall be strictly controlled, and the fully prescribed
investigation and final evaluation shall be completed at the earliest practica-
ble moment. Certification to other organizations of individuals authorized
access in such cases shall include explicit notification of the exception.
b. Where a previous investigation has been conducted within the past five (5)
years which substantially meets the above minimum standards, it may serve
as a basis for granting access approval provided a review of the personnel
and security files does not reveal substantive changes in the individual's
security eligibility. If a previous investigation does not substantially meet
the minimum standards or if it is more than five (5) years old, a current in-
vestigation shall be required but may be limited to that necessary to bring
the individual's file up to date in accordance with the investigative
requirements set forth in paragraph 8 above. Should new information be
developed during the current investigation which bears unfavorably upon
the individual's activities covered by the previous investigation, the current
inquiries shall be expanded as necessary to develop full details of this
information.
10. Periodic Reinvestigations
a. Programs shall be instituted requiring the periodic reinvestigation of
personnel provided access to SCI. These reinvestigations shall be conducted
on a five (5) year recurrent basis, but on -a more frequent basis where the in-
dividual has shown some questionable behavioral pattern, his or her
activities are otherwise suspect, or when deemed necessary by the SOIC
concerned.
b. The scope of reinvestigations shall be determined by the SOIL concerned
based on such considerations as the potential damage that might result from
the individual's defection or willful compromise of SCI and the availability
and probable effectiveness of other means to evaluate continually factors
related to the individual's suitability for continued access. The individual
shall furnish an up-to-date, signed personal history statement and signed
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releases as necessary. In all cases, the reinvestigation shall include, as a minimum,
appropriate national agency checks, local agency checks, overseas checks where
appropriate, credit checks;, and a personal interview with the individual by
trained investigative, security, or counterintelligence personnel when necessary
to resolve significant adverse information and/or inconsistencies. When condi-
tions so indicate, additional investigation may be conducted as determined by
the SOIC or his designee.
11. Determination of Access Eligibility
The evaluation of the information developed by investigation on an individual's
loyalty and suitability shall be accomplished under the cognizance of the SOIC
concerned by analysts of broad knowledge, good judgment, and wide experience in
personnel security and/or counterintelligence. When all other information developed
on an individual is favorable, a minor investigative requirement which has not been
met should not preclude favorable adjudication. In all evaluations the protection of the
national interest is paramount. Any doubt concerning personnel having access to SCI
should be resolved in favor of the national security and the access should be denied or
revoked. The ultimate determination of whether the granting of access is clearly
consistent with the interest of national security shall be an overall common sense
determination based on all available information.
12. Appeals Procedures
Annex B prescribes common appeals procedures to be followed when an
individual's SCI access has been denied or revoked.
13. Continuing Security Programs
a. In order to facilitate attainment of the highest standard of personnel
security and to augment both the access approval criteria and the investiga-
tive requirements established by this Directive, member departments and
agencies shall institute continuing security programs for all individuals
having access to SCI. In addition to security indoctrinations (See Annex C,
"Minimum Standards for SCI Security Awareness Programs in the U.S.
Intelligence Community"), these programs shall be tailored to create
mutually supporting procedures under which no issue will escape notice or
be left unresolved which brings into question an individual's loyalty and
integrity or suggests the possibility of his or her being subject to undue
influence or duress through foreign relationships or exploitable personal
conduct. When an individual is assigned to perform sensitive compartment-
ed work requiring access to SCI, the SOIC for the department, agency, or
Government program to which the individual is assigned shall assume
security supervision of that individual throughout the period of his or her
assignment.
b. The continuing security programs shall include:
(1) Individuals are required to inform the department or agency which
granted their SCI access about any personal problem or situation which
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may have a possible bearing on their eligibility for continued access to SCI
and to seek appropriate guidance and assistance. Security counseling should
be made available. This counseling should be conducted by individuals
having extensive background and experience regarding the nature and
special vulnerabilities of the particular type of compartmented information
involved.
(2) SCI security education programs of the member departments and
agencies shall be established and maintained pursuant to the require-
ments of Annex C.
(3) Security supervisory programs shall be established and maintained to
ensure that supervisory personnel recognize and discharge their special
responsibility to safeguard SCI, including the need to assess continued
eligibility for SCI access. These programs shall provide practical guidance
on indicators which may signal matters of security concern. Specific
instructions concerning reporting procedures shall be disseminated to
enable the appropriate authority to take timely corrective action to
safeguard the security of the United States as well as to provide all
necessary help to the individual concerned to neutralize his or her
vulnerability.
(4) Security review programs to ensure that appropriate security authorities
always receive and exchange, in a timely manner, all information
bearing on the security posture of persons having access to SCI. Personal
history information shall be kept current. Security and related files shall
be kept under continuing review.
Whenever adverse or derogatory information is discovered or inconsistencies arise
which could impact upon an individual's security status, appropriate investigation
shall be conducted on a timely basis. The investigation shall be of sufficient scope nec-
essary to resolve the specific adverse or derogatory information or inconsistency in
question so that a determination can be made as to whether the individual's continued
utilization in activities requiring SCI is clearly consistent with the interest of the
national security.
14. Security Violations
Individuals determined to have disclosed classified information to any person not
officially authorized to receive it may be considered ineligible for initial or continued
SCI access. Determination will be based on an evaluation of all available information,
including whether the disclosure was knowing, willful, negligent, or inadvertent. A
determination of ineligibility for individuals who currently hold SCI access shall result
in immediate debriefing and termination of access for cause.
15. Implementation
Existing directives, regulations, agreements, and other guidance governing access
to SCI as defined herein shall be revised accordingly.
William J, Casey
Director of Central Intelligence
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DCID 1/14 ADJUDICATION GUIDELINES
PURPOSE
This annex is designed to ensure that a common approach is followed by
Intelligence Community departments and agencies in applying the standards of DCID
1/14. These guidelines apply to the adjudication of cases involving persons being
considered for first-time access to Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) as well
as those cases of persons being readjudicated for continued SCI access.
ADJUDICATIVE PROCESS
The adjudicative process entails the examination of a sufficient period of a
person's life to make a determination that the person is not now or is not likely to be-
come an unacceptable security risk later. SCI access adjudication is the careful
weighing of a number of variables known as the "whole person" concept. The recency
of occurrence of any adverse incident, together with circumstances pertaining thereto,
is central to a fair and uniform evaluation. Key factors to be considered in
adjudication are the maturity and responsibility of the person at the time certain acts
or violations were committed as well as any repetition or continuation of such conduct.
Each case must be judged on its own merits and final determination remains the
responsibility of the individual SOIC. Any doubt concerning personnel having access
to SCI shall be resolved in favor of the national security.
The ultimate determination of whether the granting of SCI access is clearly
consistent with the interests of national security shall be an overall common sense
determination based on all available information. In arriving at a decision consistent
with the foregoing, the adjudicator must give careful scrutiny to the following matters:
a. Loyalty
b. Close relatives and associates
c. Homosexual conduct and sexual perversion
d. Cohabitation
e. Undesirable Character Traits
f. Financial irresponsibility
g. Alcohol abuse
h. Illegal drugs and drug abuse
i. Emotional and mental disorders
j. Record of law violations
k. Security violations
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Adjudicative actions concerning the foregoing items are examined in greater
detail below.
DCID 1/14 establishes the categorical requirement that, to be eligible for SCI
access, an individual must be of unquestioned loyalty to the United States.
CLOSE RELATIVES AND ASSOCIATES
DCID 1/14 requires close examination by the SCI adjudicator when members of
an individual's immediate family and persons to whom lie/she is bound by affection
or obligation are not citizens of the United States, or their loyalty or affection is to a
foreign power, or they are subject to any form of duress by a foreign power, or they
advocate the violent overthrow or unconstitutional alteration of the Government of
the United States.
The adjudicator must assess carefully the degree of actual and potential influence
that such persons may exercise on the individual based on an examination of the
frequency and nature of personal contact and correspondence with and the political
sophistication and general maturity of the individual.
A recommendation for access disapproval is appropriate if there is an indication
that such relatives or associates are connected with any foreign intelligence service.
When there is a "compelling need" for SCI access for an individual whose family
member is a non-U.S. citizen and the background investigation indicates that the
security risk is negligible, an exception to paragraph 5b(1) or (2) of DCID 1/14 may be
recommended.
In some circumstances, marriage of an individual holding SCI access approval
could present an unacceptable security risk. Such individuals are required to file
intent-to-marry statements. It is the responsibility of the SOIC to advise the
individuals of the possible security consequences. If the individual marries a non-U.S.
citizen, SCI access will be suspended until the case is readjudicated unless an
appropriate investigation of the spouse, as required by Paragraph 81 of DCID 1/14,
was conducted with favorable results. In readjudicating such cases, the same
judgments and criteria as are reflected in this section apply.
DCID 1/14 requires that, to be eligible for SCI access, individuals must be stable,
of excellent character and discretion, and not subject to undue influence or duress
through exploitable personal conduct.
Sexual conduct can be a relevant consideration in circumstances in which the
conduct indicates a personality disorder or could result in exposing the individual to
direct or indirect pressure because of susceptibility to blackmail or coercion as a result
of the deviant sexual behavior. Such behavior includes: bestiality, fetishism, exhibi-
tionism, necrophilia, nymphomania or satyriasis, masochism, sadism, pedophilia,
transvestism, and voyeurism. Homosexual conduct is also to be considered as a factor
in determining an individual's stability and susceptibility to undue influence or duress.
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In examining cases involving acts of homosexual conduct or sexual perversion, it is
relevant to consider the age of the person, the voluntariness, and the frequency of such
activities, the public nature and the recency of the conduct, as well as any other cir-
cumstances which may serve to aggravate the nature or character of the conduct. A
recommendation for disapproval is appropriate when, in view of all available evidence
concerning the individual's history of sexual behavior, it appears that access to SCI
could pose a risk to the national security.
Cohabitation in and of itself does not preclude SCI access approval.
The identity of a cohabitant must be ascertained and a determination made if
such association constitutes an unacceptable security risk based on the same criteria as
in the section, "Close Relatives and Associates." Cohabitation with an alien, for
example, requires the same scrutiny as marriage to an alien. Extra-marital sexual
relations are also of legitimate concern to the SCI' adjudicator when the potential for
undue influence or duress exists.
It is emphasized that an individual's lifestyle is examined only in an effort to de-
termine whether a pattern of behavior exists which indicates that granting SCI access
could pose a risk to national security. In cases where allegations have been reported
which reflect unfavorably on the reputation of an individual, it is incumbent upon the
SCI adjudicator to distinguish fact from opinion and to determine which negative
characteristics are real and pertinent to an evaluation of the individual's character and
which are unsubstantiated or irrelevant. Relevant negative characteristics are those
which, in the adjudicator's informed opinion, indicate that an individual is not willing,
able, or likely to protect SCI information. The adjudicator's personal likes or dislikes
must not be permitted to affect the determination.
Examples of specific concern in determining whether an individual has undesir-
able character traits are any substantive, credible, derogatory comments by associates,
employers, neighbors, and other acquaintances; any litigation instituted against the
individual by such persons as a result of the individual's actions; or allegations of
violations of law. A recommendation for disapproval would be appropriate for an
individual who cannot be relied upon to obey rules and regulations.
In examining the circumstances of cases involving incidents of untruthfulness, the
adjudicator must weigh all factors with particular emphasis on establishing the intent
of the individual. Where an individual has tried to obscure pertinent or significant
facts by falsifying data, i.e., on the Personal History Statement by either omission or
false entry, such action should be weighed heavily against recommending access.
Failure to disclose derogatory personal information, such as a court martial or serious
crime, would appear to be intentional and, consequently, would warrant a recommen-
dation for disapproval.
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FINANCIAL IRRESPONSIBILITY
Financial irresponsibility represents a serious concern to the SCI adjudicator;
Persons who have engaged in espionage for monetary gain demonstrate the hazard of
granting SCI access to an individual with overly expensive tastes and habits or living
under the pressure of serious debt.
A recommendation for disapproval is appropriate when there is a pattern of
financial irresponsibility and it appears that an individual has not made a conscien-
tious effort to satisfy creditors. In such cases, the adjudicator should determine
whether the individual had been notified about the debts and whether they were
legally valid or ultimately satisfied.
When the financial irresponsibility alone is not of such magnitude to warrant
disapproval, it may contribute to recommendation for denial of SCI access when there
is other evidence of irresponsibility.
ALCOHOL ABUSE
The SCI adjudicator should examine any information developed relative to an
individual's use of alcoholic beverages to determine the extent to which such use
would adversely affect the ability of the individual to exercise the care, judgment, and
discretion necessary to protect SCI information, The adjudicator should determine
whether a pattern of impropriety exists, although one incident caused by alcohol abuse
may be of such magnitude to warrant a recommendation for disapproval.
In determining the security impact of a person's pattern of alcohol use, the
adjudicator should consider the circumstances, amount and rate of consumption, the
time and place of consumption, and the physiological and behavioral effect such
drinking has on the individual. For example, does the individual's drinking result in
absences from work or careless work habits? Does the individual become talkative,
abusive, or manifest other undesirable characteristics? Does the individual drink until
intoxicated? Has the individual been arrested for any acts resulting from the influence
of alcohol?
In the absence of conclusive evidence, additional insight may be available from
appropriate medical authorities. If the individual acknowledges having an alcohol
abuse problem and is seeking help, it may be appropriate to defer access determina-
tion and monitor the individual's progress for a year or so.
If, after considering the nature and sources of the information, the adjudicator
determines that an individual's drinking is not serious enough to warrant a recommen-
dation for disapproval of SCI access, it may be appropriate to recommend approval
with a warning at the time of indoctrination that future incidents of alcohol abuse may
result in SCI denial. The adjudicator may also recommend a reinvestigation of the in-
dividual's use of alcohol after an appropriate period of time has passed.
ILLEGAL DRUGS AND DRUG ABUSE
The SCI adjudicator should examine all allegations of an individual's use,
transport, transfer, sale, cultivation, processing and manufacturing of hallucinogens,
narcotics, drugs and other materials and chemical compounds identified and listed in
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the Controlled Substance Act of 1970, as amended. Consequently, an individual's
involvement in any of these activities is of direct concern to the SCI adjudicator in or-
der to determine the individual's capability to exercise the care, discretion, and
judgment required to protect SCI information. The use of these substances may lead to
varying degrees of physical or psychological dependence as well as having a
deleterious effect on an individual's mental state and ability to function.
Persons involved in drug trafficking, i.e., the commercial cultivation, processing,
manufacturing, purchase, or sale of such substances should normally be recommended
for disapproval.
In cases involving the use of drugs, the adjudicator must consider the nature of
the substance used and whether the use is experimental or habitual. The frequency,
recency, and circumstances surrounding said use are key elements. For example, has
the individual used "hard" drugs or hallucinogens such as heroin, cocaine, or LSD?
Has the individual used drugs regularly or only on occasion? Does the individual
currently use drugs? Does the individual regularly purchase drugs or participate
merely when offered drugs by others? Has the individual's behavior been affected by
the use of drugs and, if so, to what extent?
Once the judgment is made that an individual is a habitual user of any controlled
substance (multiple use beyond the point of mere experimentation), a recommenda-
tion for disapproval is appropriate. Moreover, even experimental use of hard drugs or
hallucinogens, such as LSD, could warrant a recommendation for disapproval.
DCID 1/14 requires that persons considered for access to SCI be stable,
trustworthy, reliable, and of excellent character, judgment and discretion, Emotional
and mental disorders which interfere with an individual's perception of reality or
reliability are of serious concern to the SCI adjudicator in determining whether an in-
dividual is able or willing to protect SCI information.
It is essential to obtain as much information as possible when an allegation has
been made in this area. If feasible, the individual should be interviewed to obtain ad-
ditional detail. When appropriate, government psychological and psychiatric person-
nel should be consulted so that psychiatric or psychological data may be properly
evaluated.
If a current emotional instability appears to be a temporary condition (for
example, caused by a death, illness, or marital breakup), it may be advisable to
recommend postponing final action and rechecking the situation at a later date. This
precludes a security disapproval for what may be a temporary condition which, when
cured, would have no security implications.
Military and civilian personnel who decline to take medical/psychiatric tests
when so directed by competent authority should not be recommended for SCI access.
In determining whether an individual is stable; trustworthy; and of excellent
character, judgment, and discretion as required by DCID 1/14 for access to SCI, the
adjudicator must weigh carefully any record of law violations by the individual.
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Although a pattern of repeated minor traffic violations could be significant, the
adjudicator is principally concerned with more serious criminal violations or court
actions reflecting adversely upon the individual's reliability or trustworthiness.
Each case involving convictions for criminal offenses must be considered from
the standpoint of the nature and seriousness of the offense, the circumstances under
which it occurred, how long ago it occurred, whether it was an isolated offense or a re-
peated violation of the law, the offender's age at the time, social conditions which may
have a bearing on the individual's actions, and any evidence of rehabilitation.
Any conviction for a felony will normally support a recommendation for
disapproval. If the offense was committed many years prior, the individual has shown
evidence of rehabilitation, and the investigation shows no other derogatory informa-
tion, an approval may be considered. A large number of minor offenses, however,
could indicate irresponsibility and may support an adverse recommendation.
Most security violations are caused by carelessness or ignorance with no intention
of compromising security. However, the record of an individual responsible for
multiple violations should be scrutinized. The individual's current attitude toward
security should be confirmed with his/her supervisor. A pattern of violations may be
sufficient ground for a recommendation for disapproval. Individuals responsible for
unauthorized disclosure of classified information may be denied initial or continued
SO access.
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DCID 1/ 14 APPEALS
This annex establishes common appeals procedures for the denial or revocation of
access to Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) by entities of the Intelligence
Community after adjudication pursuant to the provisions of DCID 1/14. This annex is
promulgated pursuant to Executive Order 12333, Executive Order 12356 and Section
102 of the National Security Act of 1947. For the purpose of this annex, all references
to DCID 1/14 include the basic document and all of its annexes. Any person who has
been considered for initial or continued access to SCI pursuant to the provisions of
DCID 1/14 shall, to the extent provided below, be afforded an opportunity to appeal
the denial or revocation of such access. This annex supersedes any and all other
practices and procedures for the appeal of the denial or revocation of SCI access. This
annex shall not be construed to require the disclosure of classified information or
information concerning intelligence sources and methods, nor shall it be construed to
afford an opportunity to appeal prior to the actual denial or revocation of SCI access.
In addition, the provisions of DCID 1/14, this annex, or any other document or
provision of law shall not be construed to create a property interest of any kind in the
access of any person to SCI. Further, since the denial or revocation of access to SCI
cannot by the terms of DCID 1/14 render a person ineligible for access to other
classified information solely for that reason, the denial or revocation of SCI access
pursuant to the provisions of DCID 1/14 and this annex shall not be construed to cre-
ate a liberty interest of any kind.
This annex applies to all United States Government civilian and military
personnel, as well as any other individuals, including contractors and employees of
contractors, who are considered for initial or continued access to SCI. This annex does
not apply to decisions regarding employment and shall not be construed to affect or
impair Public Law 88-290 or the authority of any entity to effect applicant or
personnel actions pursuant to Public Law 88-290, Public Law 86-36, or other
applicable law.
Adjudications for access to SCI shall be made in accordance with DCID 1/14 by a
Determination Authority designated by the Senior Official of the Intelligence
Community (SOIC) of each entity. Access to SCI shall be denied or revoked whenever
it is determined that a person does not meet the security standards provided for in
DCID 1/14.
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PROCEDURES
1. Persons shall be:
a. notified of the denial or revocation of SCI access;
b. notified that they may request to be provided the reasons for such denial or
revocation; and/or
c. afforded an opportunity to appeal, whenever the Determination Authority
of any entity, in the exercise of his or her discretion, deems such action in
any given case to be clearly consistent with the interests of the national
security.
2. Any person who is given notification and afforded an opportunity to appeal
pursuant to paragraph 1. above may, within 45 days of the date on which such person
is notified of the reasons for denial or revocation of SCI access, submit a written ap-
peal of that denial or revocation to the Determination Authority. The written material
submitted for consideration may include any information which the person believes
will assist the Determination Authority in reviewing the case.
3. After a further review of the case in the light of the written appeal, the person
will be notified of the decision of the Determination Authority.
4. If the Determination Authority reaffirms a denial or revocation of access, the
person may, within 30 days of the date on which such person is notified of the
Determination Authority's reaffirmation, request a final review of the case. In that
event, the SOIC, or his or her designee, shall personally review the case and exercise
his or her discretion pursuant to the provisions of DCID 1/14, and shall inform the
person of his or her decision, which shall be final and unreviewable.
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ANNEX C
MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR SCI SECURITY AWARENESS
PROGRAMS IN THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
Minimum standards are hereby established for the SCI security education
programs designed to enhance the security awareness of U.S. Government civilian and
military personnel and private contractors working in the U.S. Intelligence Communi-
ty. Compliance with these standards is required for all departments/agencies within
the Intelligence Community. Existing security awareness programs shall be modified
to conform with these standards. Departments/agencies will establish a documented
program to ensure that training has been presented to all personnel.
The security awareness requirements set forth herein are divided into three
phases. Phase 1 concerns the initial indoctrination of individuals which is normally
administered prior to access to SCI. Phase 2 concerns the continuing security
awareness program required to maintain and increase security awareness throughout
the period of access. Phase 3 sets forth the final guidelines and instructions when
access to SCI is terminated.
1. Initial Indoctrination-As soon as practicable after being approved for access
to SCI, personnel shall receive an initial security indoctrination which shall include:
a. The need for and purpose of SCI, and the adverse effect on the national se-
curity that could result from unauthorized disclosure.
b. The intelligence mission of the department/agency to include the reasons
why intelligence information is sensitive.
c. The administrative, personnel, physical and other procedural security
requirements of the department/agency and those requirements peculiar to
specific duty assignments.
d. Individual classification management responsibilities as set forth in appro-
priate directives and regulations to include classification/declassification
guidelines and marking requirements.
e. The definitions and criminal penalties for espionage, including harboring or
concealing persons; gathering, transmitting, or losing defense information;
gathering or delivering defense information to aid foreign governments;
photographing and sketching defense installations; unauthorized disclosure
of classified information (Title 18, U.S.C., Sections 792 through 795, 797
and 798), the Internal Security Act of 1950 (Title 50, U.S.C., Section 783)
and, when appropriate, the Atomic Energy Act, Sections 224 through 227).
f. The administrative sanctions for violation or disregard of security
procedures.
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g. A review of the techniques employed by foreign intelligence organizations
in attempting to obtain national security information.
h. Individual security responsibilities including:
(1) The prohibition against discussing SCI in a nonsecure area, over a
nonsecure telephone, or in any other manner that permits access by
unauthorized persons.
(2) The need to determine, prior to disseminating SCI, that the prospective
recipient has the proper security access approval, that the SCI is needed
in order to perform official duties, and that the recipient can properly
protect the information.
(3) Administrative reporting requirements such as foreign travel, contacts
with foreign nationals, attempts by unauthorized persons to obtain
national security information, physical security deficiencies, and loss or
possible compromise of SCI material.
(4) Obligation to report to proper authorities any information which could
reflect on the trustworthiness of an individual who has access to SCI,
such as:
(a) willful violation of security regulations,
(b) unexplained affluence or excessive indebtedness,
(c) serious unlawful acts,
(d) apparent mental or emotional problems,
(e) coercion or harassment attempts, and or
(f) blackmail attempts.
(5) Identification of the elements in the department/agency to which
matters of security interest are to be referred.
2. Periodic Awareness Enhancement-Each department/agency shall establish a
continuing security awareness program which will provide for frequent exposure of
personnel to security awareness material. Implementation of a continuing program
may include live briefings, audio-visual presentations (e.g., video tapes, films and
slide/tape programs), printed material (e.g., posters, memoranda, pamphlets, fliers), or
a combination thereof. It is essential that current information and materials be
utilized. Programs should be designed to meet the particular needs of the
department/agency.
a. The basic elements for this program shall include, but are not limited to,
the following:
(1) The foreign intelligence threat.
(2) The technical threat.
(3) Administrative, personnel, physical, and procedural security.
(4) Individual classification management responsibility.
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(5) Criminal penalties and administrative sanctions.
(6) Individual security responsibilities.
(7) A review of other appropriate department/agency requirements.
b. Special security briefings/debriefings are required to supplement the
existing security awareness programs in the following situations:
(1) When an individual is designated as a courier.
(2) When an individual travels, officially or unofficially, to or through
communist countries, or areas of high risk.
(3) When an individual has, or anticipates, contact with representatives of
communist-controlled countries.
(4) When any other situation arises for which a special briefing/debriefing
is required by the department/agency.
3. Debriefing-When a department/agency has determined that access to SCI is
no longer required, final instructions and guidelines will be provided to the individual.
As a minimum these shall include:
a. A requirement that the individual read appropriate sections of Titles 18
and 50, U.S. Code, and that the intent and criminal sanctions of these laws
relative to espionage and unauthorized disclosure be clarified.
b. The continuing obligation, under the prepublication and other provisions of
the nondisclosure agreement for SCI, never to divulge, publish, or reveal by
writing, word, conduct or otherwise, to any unauthorized persons any SCI,
without the written consent of appropriate department/agency officials.
c. An acknowledgement that the individual will report without delay to the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, or the department/agency, any attempt by
an unauthorized person to solicit national security information.
d. A declaration that the individual no longer possesses any documents or
material containing SCI,
e. A reminder of the risks associated with foreign travel and certain hazardous
activities as defined in the DCI policy document entitled "Security Policy
Concerning Travel and Assignment of Personnel with Access to Sensitive
Compartmented Information," and department/agency reporting require-
ments as applicable.
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