PHYSCIAL AND PERSONNEL SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS INTELLIGENCE CHARTER ISSUE PAPER FOR THE SPECIAL COORDINATION COMMITTEE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87B01034R000100080032-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 21, 2006
• Sequence Number: 32
• Content Type: REGULATION

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PHYSICAL AND PERSONNEL SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS
INTELLIGENCE CHARTER ISSUE PAPER FOR THE
SPECIAL COORDINATION COMMITTEE
1. Back round:-=This paper describes in summary fashion -`
current practice* and procedures in the conduct of personnel
and physical security investigations by the entities of the
intelligence community. and presents basic issues that
require resolution by the Special Coordination Committee in
order to develop intelligence charter provisions governing
the collection of- information that concerns United States
persons for these purposes;. The general issues in this area
are:
a. Whether, and under what conditions, authority
should be granted for unconsented collection of nonpublic
information that concerns U.S. persons in the course of
personnel security investigations;
b. Whether, and to what extent, should authority be
granted for such collection in connection with maintaining
the physical security of intelligence facilities,
information, and personnel; and,
c. Whether, and subject to which* limitations, should
such collection be authorized in order to identify,
investigate or prevent breaches of security rules,
regulations and contractual obligations.
11. Current Practice: Executive Order 12036 currently
authorizes CIA, DOD and NSA to protect the security of their
installations, activities, information and personnel by
"appropriate means" including "such investigations of
applicants, employees, contractors, and other persons with
similar associations" with those entities as are 'necessary.
Current security investigative activities that concern U.S.
persons may be loosely grouped under three general headings:
(i) personnel security, (ii) physical security of facilities,
information and_personnel, and (iii) violations of security
rules and regulations. These types of activities are all
engaged in, to one degree or another, by CIA, DOD, FBI,
State, and NSA.
(i) Personnel security investigations would include
the collection of information concerning U.S. persons who
are being considered for access to intelligence information
or facilities and would include applicants for various forms
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of staff or contract or proprietary employment or for
clearances, sources or contacts who have agreed to assist
the government, contractors, consultants, detailees, and
service personnel (such as guards, painters, and telephone
and other equipment r:maintenance personnel), and present
employees, contractors, consultants, or other persons with
current access to intelligence information to determine
`heir continued-suitability for such access. Background
information would.be collected concerning individuals in
these categories through means and to a depth that would
very depending on the degree and scope of access to be
oranted. The minimum inquiry would consist of a request for
rcvi(.%7 of entity, national agency, or local and municipal
records for .any existing information concerning the
subject, and the maximum inquiry would. involve a "full field
investigation" that could delve as much as 15 years into the
subject's background and include, at-least as. to CIA employees
and civilian employees of NSA, a polygraph interview. in
addition, periodic reinvestigations of these types of
persons, including a'counterintelligence-oriented polygraph
-interview, could be scheduled as appropriate covering the
intc:.vening period since the last investigation. All-such
inquiries currently are conducted only with the consent of
the-invididual concerned, except for preliminary national
L-enc:y records reviews that may be conducted by CIA solely
to establish the identity of a potential source or contact.
(iio collection of information concerning potential sources
the subject of a separate issue paper.)- Spouses of
applicants for employment may be the subject of national
agency records reviews, and the new spouse of a current
employee may be the subject of a field investigation inquiry
e:;tunding over the-prior five years. Field investigations
couli: include neighborhood inquiries, birth records, and
police and, if appropriate, credit inquiries. In certain
background inquiries conducted by CIA where cover considerations
require, the subject, although providing biographic data and
consenting, or the persons being interviewed, may not be-
.-t%;t.re that the subject of the inquiry will be working either
for an intelligence entity or for an entity assisting the
U.S. Government. -
(ii) Physical security investigations encompass so-
called "site suitability" reviews and threats to the integrity
or safety of entity facilities, information, or personnel. .-'-
Site suitability investigations entail preliminarily surveying
the area surrounding the proposed location of an overt or
clandestine intelligence activity and reviewing entity, and
sometimes national agency,-records to determine whether
entities or persons in the immediate area pose a security
problem for the activity. For example,- it would not do to
locate a CIA or FBI meeting site next door to a'Soviet trade
mission. Investigations relating to threats to facilities,
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information, or personnel are tailored to the circumstances.
there a crowd or demonstration appears to pose a threat to
an. installation, the appropriate federal, state, military,
or local police authorities are contacted and the intelligence
entity representatives generally limit their activities to
support of these police officials and to observing the crowd
behavior at or near the facility. Suspicious activities by
individuals outside entity-facilities (for example, use of
telepho'o lens cameras or listing license plate numbers of
cars entering or leaving) are also reported to the police,
and the entity activity may be limited to obtaining a
license plate number and attempting to identify the persons
involved. Entity officials also would notify the FBI or
Secret Service, as appropriate, of the contents of threatening
mail or if the author of such mail should appear in the
area.--= Where intrusion into an intelligence entity facility
has occurred, the FBI, or local police if cover considerations
require, would be notified and would investigate from a
criminal or counterintelligence standpoint depending on the
circumstances. Overseas, depending upon the circumstances,
the local police may be contacted or the entity may 'conduct
(iii) Breaches of security may be either inadvertent
or deliberate. Inadvertent breaches by employees are
usually discovered, investigated, and remedied administratively.
Collection of information would proceed through interviews
with the offending and other employees to determine the
circumstances,of the breach. Deliberate breaches of security
regulations or suspected leaks by employees would be investigated
by interviews with employees with knowledge of the situation.
Executive Order 12036 requires that senior intelligence.
officials recommend to the Attorney General that serious or
continuing security breaches be investigated by the FBI and
where it is suspected that-'an employee may be furnishing
information to a foreign entity, the matter would be turned
over to the FBI.
.111. Issues
1. Personnel Securi~X. Executive Order 12036
authorizes the DCI to protect intelligence sources and
methods, by lawful means, against disclosure by present CIA
employees or contractors. It also authorizes investigations,
as necessary, of applicants,' employees, contractors, and
other persons similarly associated with CIA, DOD, or NSA and
permits by other than intrusive techniques the collection
(using physical surveillance in some cases), retention, and
dissemination of nonpublic information concerning U.S.
persons without their consent when acquired in the course of
"lawful" personnel security investigations or when related
to present or former employees, present or former contractors
or their employees,, and applicants for such employment or
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contracting when necessary to protect intelligence sources
or methods. In limited circumstances this collection may
include physical surveillance and pretext interviews.
S. 2525 would have authorized CIA to conduct "background
investigations" (without-elaboration but presumed to require
consent) concerning applicants for employment, and would
have* authorized'd issemination of information concerning the
trustworthiness-qf any U.S_ person who has, had, or is being
considered for, access to classified information.-.
The issue-is whether,_and to what extent, statutory
authority should be provided to collect nonpublic information
that concerns U.S. persons without- their- consent in the
context of personnel security investigations. It is assumed
that any such authority for personnel security investigations
need not extend to persons'beyond present employees and -_-
various types and their employees, applicants for employment.-
with an intelligence entity or proprietary and their spouses
d close relatives to a-limited degree, applicants fo'r
a
n
contractor status,. and persons who. are being cons'ide'red for
access to intelligence facilities or information.,
electronic surveillance (or monitoring), physical searches=
(including mail opening), or mail covers. The techniques
that remain for consideration include only nonpublic sources-
of information, "physical surveillance, covert human source
inquiries, pretext and third party interviews, and federal,
state and local records reviews. The options then appear to
include:
Option A - Provide no authority for collection of
nonpublic information without consent;
Option B Provide limited authority for such col-
- - lection"only to the extent consent is unavailable-or.
impractical' and only_as necessary to determine suitability
or trustworthiness, and only through use of.-all or some -
of the available techniques;
Option C - Provide unlimited authority for such collection,
or authority limited in some general way as to extent,
or technique, but subject to regulation by entity
procedures approved by the Attorney General;; .
Ootion D- Provide unlimited authority, leaving regulation
to entity heads. _
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2. pysical Security. Executive order 12036 authorizes
,
of their facilities
it
y
ct the secur
CIA, DOD and NSA to prote
information, and personnel by "appropriate means". The
Order also permits collection (using physical surveillance
in some cases), retention,-and dissemination of nonpublic
information that concerns an unconsenting.U.S. person
arising out of "lawful" physical-security investigations, or
concerning present or former employees or contractors or.
their contacts, a.r concerning persons or activities that
constitute a "clear threat" to any intelligence facility or
personnel provided it is retained only by the threatened -
entity and the Secret Service and FBI if appropriate. -The
Order further exempts from its restrictions concerning
relations with law enforcement authorities, cooperation with
law enforcement entities to protect facilities and personnel.
S. 2525 would have authorized unconsented collection of
information concerning any U.S person-in or near an intelligence
facility to determine whether to exclude that person, but?._
such colle'ction' would- have. been limited to physical surveillance,
and requests for reviews of_federal,_state and local entities.
In addition, S.- 2525 .would have. authorizes3 unconsented,
nonpublic collection as to Li. S. persons. who are "reasonably -_-
oses a clear
h
hi
i
p
c
ty w
believed to be engaging-in. any activ
threat" to any, intelligence facility 'or personnel,, but such- .-
ld have been limited to physical surveillance
i
wou
collect
on. in the immediate vicinity of the-facility, pretext interviews,-
and requests for reviews of federal, state and local entities.
Again the issue centers on whether and to what extent
should authority be provided to collect nonpublic informa-
tion that concerns U.S. persons without their consent in the
context of physical security investigations. It is assumed
here also that specialized authority to use electronic
surveillance and monitoring, physical searches. (including
mail opening), or mail covers is unnecessary.- This leaves
open for discussion'the-use of such techniques as physical
surveillance, nonpublic- _sources' of information, covert human-----
sources, pretext and third party interviews, and -federal,
state,- and local records reviews. The options then appear
to include: .-
Option A - Provide no authority for collection of non-
public information without consent.
Option B - Provide limited authority for such collection
only to the extent necessary to protect intelligence
activities (e.g., site suitability investigations) or
in the U.S. to determine whether to refer a matter
(e.g., threats or disturbances) to. law, enforcement -
authorities, and only through use of all or some of the
available techniques. .
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option C - Provide unlimited authority for such col-
lection, or authority limited in some general way as to
extent or techniques, but subject to regulation by
entity procedures approved by the Attorney General; -.-
Option D - Provide unlimited authority, leaving regulation.
to entity heads.
3.-- Breaches. of Securi. Executive order 12036
places responsibility in the DCI to protect against disclosure
ence sources and methods by present or former CIA
lli
t
i
g
e
n
o
f
employees or contractors through "lawful means". Senior-
intelligence officials are charged by the order with reporting
ches to the Attorney -
b
rea
serious or continuing security
vest ;Rat ion. This provision
__ F
I
B
n
was intended to focus responsibility for_investig-ating
security violations in the* FBI and, to some extent, to
compensate-for the limitations imposed upon such activities
by the_ intelligence entities. The order also authorizes
CIA, DOD and NSA to protect security by- "appropriate means",
ations of applicants, employees,
investi
ar
g
y
including necess
contractors, and other similarly associated _?persons. Physical
surveillance is permitted by the Order for the purpose of-
protecting intelligence_ sources and methods so long-as
limited within the U.S., insofar as U.S. persons are -concerned,_
to present employees, contractors and their employees,
military personnel, and persons in contact with such persons,
and outside the U.S. also to persons formerly in any of
these categories. Collection, retention, and dissemination
of nonpublic information concerning U.S. persons without-
their consent is permitted under the order regarding* present
or former employees, contractors and their employees, and
persons in contact with them, when necessary to protect.
sources and methods from disclosure.
S 2525 would have provided authority to collect
information concerning U.S. persons who are employees, or ---- . --
contractors'and'their employees-to determine whether they----:--!--
have =-_
have violated any security rule or regulation. Such collection---
would have required entity head approval to proceed beyond. _
180 days or to use covert human sources, mail covers;
physical surveillance, or tax or.. other confidential records.
In addition, S. 2525 would have-provided authority to collect _
information concerning U.S. persons in. contact with suspected-
intelligence agents, but limited to 90 days and only to__
identify the person and determine whether the person has,'
had, or will have access to sensitive information. In its
November 1978 position paper, the SSCI indicated its preference..
that investigations of employees or former employees not be
authorized unless there is "some evidence or reasonable -
probability" that the person has or is about-to 'violate
security regulations.
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The issue here, as before, is focused on the nature and
extent of the authority that should be granted in statute to
collect nonpublic information and investigate actual or
suspected breaches of security rules, regulations, or
contractual obligations by U.S. persons without their
consent, and the means by which such investigations should
be carried out. Again it is assumed that electronic surveillance
and monitoring or- physical searches (including mail opening)
will not-be used ,for these purposes. It is also assumed
that investigatory authority in this context need not extend..
beyond present and -former employees and contractors and
their employees, as well as, to a limited degree, persons
with whom these individuals come into contact. The options -
appear- to_ include:
Option A - Provide no authority for collection o
nonpublic information without consent.
Option B.- Provide unlimited authority for intelligence
entities to collect nonpublic information concerning
U.S. persons for these purposes, with or without a
specific statutory standard.
Option C - Same.as.option A but require entity procedures
approved by the Attorney General.
Option_D Provide limited authority through such means- -
as time limitations and restrictions on the use, of
certain techniques. -
Option E - Provide limited authority to the intelligence
entities but augment the responsibility and, authority
of the FBI to conduct such investigations on behalf of
.the intelligence entities.
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