ANTI-TERRORISM CZAR - FOREIGN AID BILL: CONVERSATIONS WITH CONGRESSIONAL STAFF

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87B00858R000600940032-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 14, 2010
• Sequence Number: 32
• Publication Date: May 17, 1985
• Content Type: MEMO

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OLL 85-1501
17 May 1985
SUBJECT: "Anti-Terrorism Czar" - Foreign Aid Bill:
Conversations with Congressional Staff
1. During the week of May 13, 1985, I had several
conversations with various Congressional staffers concerning
the "anti-terrorism czar" provisions of the Foreign Aid Bill
and the subject of terrorism generally as follows.
2. I discussed the subject with Gary Chase, Chief Counsel,
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI). I particularly
inquired whether or not it was likely that the "anti-terrorism
czar" provision of Section 407 of H.R. 1555, the House version
of the Foreign Aid Bill, could be added to S. 960, the Senate
Foreign Aid Bill. He indicated that the SSCI was considering
holding general hearings on the subject of terrorism. In light
of this, the SSCI was not likely to support a quick-fix
approach to terrorism such as the "czar" approach of H.R. 1555.
3. This was confirmed in a subsequent conversation with
Dan Finn, Minority Counsel, SSCI. Although Senator Leahy,
Finn's sponsor, had made several public statements in relation
to the recent alleged Lebanese counterterrorism incident, this
did not mean that the Senator was interested in taking any
precipitous action; it seemed more likely that he would want
the SSCI to address the subject fully before any legislative
solution was reached.
4. I spoke with Chip Andrea, staff assistant to Senator
Lugar in his capacity as chairman of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee. Mr. Andrea had been assisting the Senator
in his role as floor manager of S. 960 which was on the Senate
floor during the week of May 13. I repeated my statement from
some months ago that the Agency objected to anti-terrorism czar
provisions and hoped that one would not come in through action
on the floor. Mr. Andrea indicated that he did not expect an
attempt to insert one, notwithstanding all the publicity on the
Lebanese counterterrorism incident. He agreed to contact me,
however, if he was facing the possibility of such a provision.
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5. I then returned a call to this office from Bob Jenkins,
Minority Staff, House Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC). He
stated that he was a member, with Bob Boyer of the P4ajority
Staff, of a terrorism task force which had been established by
the HFAC. The task force's interest in intelligence and
terrorism had been stimulated by the Lebanese incident.He and
Mr. Boyer, therefore, wanted to meet with someone from the
Agency to "chat", not about the particulars of the Lebanese
incident, but rather about: how the intelligence community is
set up to deal with terrorism; how terrorism intelligence is
disseminated; the role of the National Security Counsel; the
entities which provide anti-terrorism training; and, how that
training is done.
6. I politely noted that the HPSCI was this very week,
receiving briefings on the Lebanese incident and, of course,
had a jurisidictional interest in the matter. In view of their
assertion of interest within an area of jurisdiction, I
suggested that he first touch base with HPSCI before proceeding
with the Agency. He concurred. I then put him in touch with
Steve Berry, Minority Staff Director, HPSCI and subsequently
alerted Berry that he would be receivina a call.
Legislative Division
Office of Legislative Liaison
Distribution:
Original - LEG/Subject
1 - D/OLL
1 - DD/OLL
1 - OLL Chrono
1 - LD/OLL,
1 - LD/OLL,
1 - LD/OLL,
1 - PS Signer
- Terrorism
Foreign Aid
LEG/OLL (17 May 1985)
STAT
STAT
STAT
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STATEMENT OF NATHAN M. ADAMS
SENATE JOINT FOREIGN RELATIONS & JUDICIARY COMMITTEE HEARINGS ON
TERRORISM
May 13, 1985
Mr. Chairman, I welcome your invitation to testify before these
very important series of hearings. As a Senior Editor of the Reader's
Digest, I have been assigned for the past several years to investigate
and develop articles which focus upon international terrorism, primar-
ily those state-supported movements and organizations operating in the
Middle East.
In my opinion, there is no greater threat to world peace today
than terrorism and the potentially deadly sequence of events which can
be set in motion by a single incident. The lessons of history should,
by now, be abundantly clear. But just as one reminder, allow me to
point out that it was the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand by Bos-
nian-Serb terrorists in Sarajevo on June 28, 1914 which became a trigger
for events leading to World War I. Other assassinations and acts of
terror have played key roles in shaping the world's history, including
our own.
The issues of disarmament and Central America aside, state-supported
international terrorism and how best to neutralize the danger it poses
to the world community should be second to no other priority for this
nation. Yet, despite a gradual awakening, our diplomatic, military, and
intelligence-gathering capabilities in dealing with the threat remain
in disarray, uncoordinated, unwieldy, and tentative. Most commonly, we
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find ourselves in the position of reacting to an incident. Rarely do
we seem able to prevent it.
I am a journalist. But I am also a citizen of this nation, as
well as of the world. I am alarmed by what I have learned, the extent
of terrorism, and its capacity to provoke an East-West confrontation
which could result in conflict. I am, too, deeply concerned by our
painfully obvious inability to counter the threat. All of which is
why, after consideration of my profession, I have agreed to testify-
before this body.
There are scores of terrorist organizations which operate through-
out the world today. The forces which have shaped them range from the
purely political -- the conquest or recovery of regional territory --
to goals of ethnic autonomy, and sheer revenge for real or imagined
injustices of history. All are different, yet many coordinate to best
achieve their respective aims. Each is identical in their disregard
of innocence. Given the circumstances, the time, and the place every
one of us, our wives, husbands, and children are potential targets.
There is neither space nor time to examine the motives, personnel,
and operations of the myriad of terrorist organizations which challenge
civilized society today. Undoubtedly, many will be covered by other
witnesses in the days ahead. I will limit my testimony to Iran, and
the support infrastructure that it provides for terrorist movements
and activities throughout the Middle East, Europe, and Asia.
It is a fact, accept it or not, that Iran's present government
considers that a state of war exists between it and the United States.
If we choose to ignore this reality, we do so at our peril. Iran's
ruling Ayatollahs are simply waging this war with the most effective
weapon in a limited arsenal -- terrorism. Their goal: to rid first the
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Gulf, then all of Islam from the envisioned corruption of western in-
fluence as personified by the United States. Only then, under the
guidance of the Ayatollahs in Teheran, can Islam purify itself and
return to its most fundamental state -- clerical rule; government by
Shari'a, canon law of the Holy Koran.
While this may appear somewhat metaphysical to those of us in
the west who are unfamiliar with Iran and the violent forces which
have shaped its dominant religion -- the Shia sect of Islam -- I can
assure you that it is as real as the concussion of a ton of exploding
hexogen. To accomplish their goal of Islamic purity, the Ayatollahs
have embarked on a no-quarter crusade of martyrdom and terror.
Not long ago, a high official of the U.S. Department of State
with a long, working knowledge of Middle East affairs told me that
"Khomeini is the most dangerous threat to world peace since the rise
of Adolf Hitler."
Events have shown that he may not have been far off the mark.
Indeed, there are similarities. Like Hitler's "crusade", initial vic-
tories have been impressive.
On April 18, 1983 a suicide bomber -- he had been recruited from
the ranks of Iranian Pasdaran (Revolutionary Guard) forces based in
Lebanon's Bekaa Valley -- detonated a truck-full of enhanced hexogen
explosives against the U.S. Embassy in Beirut. The toll: 57 dead, 120
injured.
Six months later, on October 23, yet another Shiite kamikaze,
-- also Iranian-trained and indocrinated -- exploded a truck packed
with similar explosives in the ground floor of the U.S. Marine head-
quarters at Beirut's international airport. Nearly simultaneously,
yet another suicide truck bomb destroyed command post Drak~Car of the
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French peacekeeping contingent. The casualties were 296 dead, 84 wound-
ed. Among them were 241 U.S. Marines.
It was the most savage and successful terrorist attack in recent
history. After this, the second suicide bombing of its installations
in Beirut, the U.S. lost its kidney for further involvement and aban-
donned Lebanon to its fate. Still traumatized by the Vietnam experience,
the Nation preferred to sacrifice its ability to influence events in
this critical region rather than risk any further military involvement.
Privately, U.S. supporters throughout the Gulf were aghast at yet another
display of American incompetence and loss of will.
Amongst fundamentalist movements throughout the Middle East -- and
not a few nations -- Khomeini's stock shot up. And so did the belief of
many that terrorism is a valid and credible weapon with which to achieve
political, racial, and religious goals. The frequency of Iranian-aided
and abetted terrorist attacks against the U.S., its assets and interests,
increased dramatically.
On December 12, 1983, a suicide bomber partially destroyed the
U.S. Embassy in Kuwait. Attacks also took place against the French
Embassy and other locations. Five died, 28 were injured. Predictably,
the plot was traced first to Baalbek, Lebanon, finally to Teheran.
On December 21, French headquarters in Beirut were again bombed with
the loss of ten dead, 125 injured. Nor was this to be all.
On December 23, a bomb of plastic explosives disguised within a
Marlboro cigarette carton and wired to a video timer was discovered
at Istanbul's international airport hidden in a gym bag. While the
incident was quickly hustled up by Turkish authorities, the bag had
been ticketed first to Rome, then to New York on a Pan Am 747. The
timer, set at 11 hours was to have been activated in Rome at an interline
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baggage area, set to explode somewhere over the Atlantic. Shortly be-
fore Christmas, the Pan Am flight was packed. More than 350 would have
died. Investigation has revealed that the group suspected of the plot
has strong links to Teheran.
By the year's end, 271 Americans had died as a result of terrorist
attacks, 40 percent of the total worldwide. Nearly all these lives
were taken by Iranian-supported, financed, and trained terrorists. But
more lay in stock for 1984: the brutal assassination of Beirut's Amer-
ican University president Malcolm Kerr in January; five kidnappings of
U.S. citizens between January and May of whom four are still held. One,
including an early kidnapping victim who was later released, is believed
to have been taken to Teheran for "interrogation".
Throughout last year, Iranian-supported or linked terrorist attacks
continued, not only in the Middle East, but in Europe as well. In April
of that year, an Iranian-supported hijacking team using the "Islamic
Jihad" nom de guerre was traced from Lebanon to Bombay, India where
they planned to hijack either a Pan Am or Kuwait Airlines jet. Spotting
Indian surveillance, they fled. Others, however, were more successful
on December 4 when they pirated a Kuwait Airlines A-310 Airbus en route
to Karachi from Dubai. The Airbus was divereted to Teheran where it
remained for five days before being "assaulted" by an Iranian rescue
team. Two American hostages were murdered in cold blood, others were
subjected to torture.
We are presently completing an investigation of this hijacking
which will reveal the full extent the involvement of elements in the
Iranian government in the planning and coordination of this incident.
They were extensive and reached up to the highest levels of government.
Finally, in the first week of March, this year, the U.S. delivered
a clear warning to Teheran via Swiss representatives. If the Iranian-
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allied groups which still hold American kidnap victims subject them
to threatened trials, or harm them in any way, Iran must suffer the
"consequences".
Perhaps.
President Reagan and Secretary of State George P. Shultz have
repeatedly warned of preemptive and/or retaliatory U.S. action against
such terrorist groups in the past. However, when there was no follow-
through, Khomeini's credibility -- and that of terrorism, itself --
only increased further. Indeed, a seemingly appropriate catechism is
now so commonplace among Khomeini's supporters that it is part of their
daily language:
"America is the Great Satan.
America is corrupt.
America is a hollow drum.
America cant do a damn thing."
Nowhere have these repeated displays of U.S. impotence had more
of an impact than upon members of the Gulf Cooperation Council such
as Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).
These nations remain very much at risk from Iranian surrogate terror-
ists seeking to destabilize their .governments, or overthrow them out-
right. They have good reason for concern.
In December of 1981, the island nation of Bahrain -- 60 percent
of its residents are Shiites -- uncovered at the last minute an Iranian
funded and equipped attempt to take over its government and declare an
Islamic Republic similar to that in Teheran. Again, in February of last
year, Bahraini security forces uncovered a large cache of Iranian-sup-
plied weapons awaiting use in yet another effort to overthrow the Is-
land's rulers.
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In Saudi Arabia, Iranian funding and support played a key role
in the fundamentalist takeover of the Grand Mosque at Mecca in Novem-
ber of 1979, the holiest of Islam's shrines. Because of religious
considerations, a French counter-terrorist unit was requested and
sent to root out the insurgents. Since then, there has been serious
unrest -- much of it inspired by Iran -- in the Nation's eastern pro-
vinces where the majority of Saudi Arabia's Shiite population is
centered.
Qatar also had a narrow escape. In the fall of 1983, supporters
of the Ayatollah Khomeini attempted to assassinate by explosives and
ground-to-air SAM-7 rockets the entire leadership of Gulf Cooperation
Council member states who had gathered in Doha to attend a Council
meeting. It was discovered that the plot had been financed by a local-
ly prominent, fundamentalist Mullah. But the real paymaster was sus-
pected to be Iran.
Other Iranian-sponsored violence and attempts at destabilization
have taken place as close to the Gulf as Kuwait, as far away in the
Islamic world as Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, Malaysia, Thailand, and the
Philippines. Last year, Iran spent at least $90 million to propogan-
dize its call for fundamentalist revolution world-wide.
In France, for example, Iran earmarked a reported $12 million
for the indoctrination and recruitment of third nation Moslem students.
This, then, for 1984 alone. Similar sums were made available to Kho-
meini's agents in both England and West Germany. The funds were often
drawn from secret bank accounts maintained by the Islamic Republic on
the Channel island of Jersey.
In the Gulf, meanwhile, Iran has installed an 800 kilowatt radio
transmitter on Qeshm Island which broadcasts propoganda and invective
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18 hours each day to audiences on the Arabian Peninsula. In the recent
past, programming has included calls to listeners to overthrow their
corrupt governments, and deliver their nations from "the talons of
Satan."
The "Satan", of course, is the United States. But other western
nations like England and France routinely appear on the hate list. So
does the Soviet Union. But, in this case, the Ayatollahs take great
care to limit their threats to rhetoric, alone. There are an estimated
5,500 Soviet technical advisers and personnel presently in Iran, and
Soviet armed might lies just across the border. What's more, the ex-
perience of neighboring Afghanistan remains a constant lesson.
Infrastructure for Terror. No other nation today has dedicated
itself more overtly to the propogation of terror as a political
weapon than has Khomeini's Iran. At the present time, Teheran hosts
and coordinates the activities of more than 25 terrorist and Islamic
liberation movements. Indeed, there is hardly a major ministry in
the Islamic Republic that does not contribute to their support in
one form or another. The machinery has been functioning smoothly for
years.
No secret was ever made of this support. In September, 1981, for
example, Teheran publicly announced that it had established a body
which it called the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution to plan
strategy for surrogate terrorist movements and activities in the Gulf
and elsewhere. The Council consists of a series of committees and sub-
committees which represent the interests of specific regional groups,
and pool resources to mount individual cell operations.
The Council is reportedly chaired by Hojatoleslam Taki Modaresi.
But the real power behind the Council and its overall control rests
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with Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri. Montazeri is eclipsed in power
only by Khomeini himself, and is considered by most to be the Imam's
successor upon his death. He reports directly to Khomeini who approves
the more significant and high-profile actions by Council members and
surrogate groups.
Herewith a partial listing of those organizations whose activities
are supported and coordinated by the Supreme Council:
The Islamic Revolutionary Organization in the Arabian Peninsula.
This movement comprises dissident elements seeking to overthrow the
rule of the royal family in Saudi Arabia.
The Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain. This organization,
with support and training from Iran -- including on-the-scene assist-
ance provided by the Islamic Republic's Embassy in Manama -- came with-
in an eyelash of successfully toppling Bahrain's government in 1981.
Islamic Da'awa, Islamic Amal, and Mujahidin. These three groups
operate under the guidance of the Council's Supreme Assembly of the
Islamic Revolution in Iraq. In the past, Da'awa terrorist have coordin-
ated with Shiite elements in Baalbek using the nom de guerre of Is-
lamic Jihad. One example of such cooperation was the series of bombings
in Kuwait in December of 1983. One leader of Islamic Amal has boasted
that he can assemble in one week "500 loyal activists ready to throw
themselves into suicide operations".
Takfir wa Hijra (Repudiation & Renunciation), AL-Jihad al-Jadid.
These two organizations of Islamic extremists are comitted to the
overthrow of the Mubarek government in Cairo. And members of both took
part in the assassination of President Anwar Sadat. There are uncon-
firmed reports that Iranian financing played a role. 4Jhatever, the
Islamic Republic has since issued a postal stamp commemorating Sadat's
murder. The stamp portrays a snarling Lt. Islambuli, one of the plot
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leaders, and praises him as "The Revolutionary Executioner of Anwar
Sadat."
Party Islam. The opposition party in Malaysia, its spokesmen
have issued calls for a total Islamic state patte-rened along Teheran
lines. In October of 1983, Malaysian security forces uncovered a plot
by Party Islam-linked terrorists to overthrow the legal government.
Also in 1983, a number of Malaysian pilgrims to Mecca were expelled
from Saudi Arabia for exhibiting placards bearing the photograph of
the Ayatollah Khomeini. It is known that significant numbers of Malay
fundamentalists have been trained in terrorist camps in the Islamic
Republic.
The Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). There are more than
two million Moslems in the Philippines, and the fundamentalists among
them are represented by the MNLF. The organization -- it maintains
representatives in Teheran -- has recently formed alliances with
the Communist Party's New People's Army in the Philippines. Meanwhile,
in a show of solidarity, the Islamic Republic has cut off all oil ship-
ments to Manila. The goal of the MNLF and its armed units, the Bangsa
Moro Army, is Islamic autonomy.
While these are only a handful of the many groups and movements
sheltering or headquartering in Teheran, their scope and capacity for
terror and destabilization should be cause for great alarm in the U.S.
as well as the west as a whole.
The best example of support and coordination provided by the
Islamic Republic is best found in the operations of what has become
known as Islamic Jihad in Lebanon (not to be confused with the Iraqi
group of the same name). It is the spearhead of Teheran's campaign
to intimidate the west and, if possible, force a total U.S. withdrawal
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from the region -- a goal which they have nearly accomplished, at
least in Lebanon.
To begin with, there is no Islamic Jihad. It is only a nom de
ug erre used to establish an identity and communality of attacks un-
dertaken by terrorists based in Iran and the Bekaa Valley of Lebanon,
usually against American and Gulf targets. The structure is fluid,
and changes with each operation. Personnel vary. For example, the
bombings in Kuwait in 1983 were laregely the work of Da'awa terrorist
cells directed by the Islamic Republic through its representatives
in Damascus, Baalbek, and Beirut.
Oftentimes, key operatives are selected from among the trained
ranks of Iran's Revolutionary Guard units based near Baalbek. This
is believed to be the case with the first U.S. Embassy bombing in
Beirut, the subsequent attacks upon the U.S. Marine and French ara
units. There are, within Pasdaran (Revolutionary Guard) forces small
groups of individuals who have been indoctrinated and trained as
suicide volunteers in camps set up for this purpose in Iran.
Each action, therefor, is undertaken by an Ad Hoc group assembled
for the specific attack -- whether ~t be a bombing, a kidnapping, an
assassination, or an air hijacking. There are two principal groups
in Lebanon which supply personnel.
The first is known as Hisballah (The Party of God), a pro-Kro:~;ei.ni
organization of Shiite fundamentalists with headquarters in Baalbek,
Beirut, and South Lebanon. The Baalbek group is headed by Shiek Sobhi
Tofailli who founded the Baalbek "chapter" in 1982. The Beirut branch
is controlled by Sheik Mohammed Hossein Fadlallah. The Hisballah ele-
ments in South Lebanon are led by Ibrahim Al-Amin. While there have
been conflicts -- some armed -- between followers of the three leaders
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over dogma and territory, each cooperates in providing security, in-
telligence, and personnel for operations claimed by Jihad. Estimates
of the numbers of followers vary widely. A conservative figure would
be 8,000. A third of Lebanon's population is Shiite, the largest
single minority.
It has been claimed that Sheik Fadlallah personally provided a
certificate for "entry into Paradise" to the suicide drivers who
attacked the U.S. Marine headquarters and the French command post
Drakkar.
Support for Jihad operations is also provided by elements of
Islamic Amal (again, not to be confused with the Iraqi group of the
same name.) Islamic Amal is led by Hossein Mousavi. It is radically
pro-Khomeini, and split off from the mainstream Shiite group, Amal,
controlled by the more moderate Nabih Berri.
Hossein Mousavi and his Islamic Amal played a direct support role
in the Beirut bombings of the U.S. Embassy and the Multi-National
Peacekeeping Forces in 1983. Both he and his organization are based
in Baalbek, thus interphase most closely with the local Hisballah
branch controlled by Sheik Tofailli. This is not to say that Mousavi
plays a role in every Jihad action. For example, during one recent
meeting in which a terrorist action was planned in Baalbek, he was
not even present.
These diverse elements, in addition to providing Jihad fodder,
are also the key groups through which Teheran hopes to control the
final outcome in war-torn Lebanon -- the establishment of an Islamic
state identical to Iran's own. Thus, the mission of Jihad's patrons
is multi-faceted.
One element remains constant: .Islamic Republic sponsorship of
Jihad operations. In Beirut, they are coordinated by Iran's Charge
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~'affaires at the Embassy of the Islamic Republic, Mahmoud Nourani.
Nourani is in charge of coordinating support locally. But he takes his
orders from Iran's Ambassador to Syria, Ayatollah Mohtashami. Mohtashami,
in turn, is in close contact with the leadership of the Supreme Council
in Teheran which approves and often plans terrorist operations under-
taken in the name of Islamic Jihad. Mohtashami's superior, Foreign Min-
ister Ali Akbar Valayati, is also a key figure in the chain of command
and is consulted on operations which involve Foreign Ministry support.
Another Foreign Ministry link to Islamic Republic-supported ter-
rorist operations in Lebanon and elsewhere is Deputy Foreign Minister
Sheik Oleslam who often relays orders by hand from Teheran rather than
risk western interception of telephonic and telex communications. Sheik
Oleslam is also Teheran's principal liaison with Libyan terrorist net-
works which have supplied support for Iranian operations in the past.
And the reverse.
(For example, shortly before Libyan gunmen and diplomats were ex-
pelled from London last year for their role in the machine-gunning of
anti-Kadaffi demonstrators -- a woman police constable was killed --
European operatives for the Islamic Republic offered to blow up the
Libyan Embassy with a suicide truck bomb, thus destroying any incrimi-
nating evidence.)
Significantly, Sheik Oleslam recently visited Nicaragua to dis-
cuss Islamic Republic support for Daniel Ortega's Sandanistas. This
support included the offer of Islamic Republic terrorist facilities,
personnel, and training.
While Syria has itself provided intelligence back-up for Jihad
operations which Damascus sees as helping it achieve its own ambitions
in Lebanon, President Assad is not always consulted before an opera-
tion. In the case of one recent incident supported by elements in
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the Islamic Republic's Syrian Embassy, an open clash took place between
the two governments because President Assad had not been informed.
Partly to avoid such disagreements -- and in return for Syria's soli-
darity -- the Islamic Republic sends an estimated million free tons of
oil to Damascus each year.
Islamic Jihad operations also have the close support of Iranian
Pasdaran forces which Syria has permitted to be stationed in the Bekaa
Valley. While Assad has since ordered their numbers reduced, there were
5,000 of them at one time. These Revolutionary Guard units provide both
personnel, indoctrination, and training for Hisballah and Islamic Amal
terrorists, the twin backbones for Jihad operations. A Pasdaran deputy,
Hossein Dehghan, serves as coordinator of these services. His dual
control is the Islamic Republic's embassies in Beirut and Damascus.
Since 1981, Iran's Ayatollahs have also provided training for
Hisballah martyr-terrorists in the Islamic Republic, itself. Most of
this schooling takes place at a terrorist training camp located out-
side Teheran at Manzarieh Park, not far from Khomeini's residence.
The camp is directed by Mehdi Hashemi -- a relative of the Republic's
powerful Ayatollah Montazeri.
Arguably, the connections between Jihad operations and Islamic
Republic officials in Teheran, Lebanon, and Syria have been documented
to such an extent that it is inconceivable to absolve Iran's respon-
sibility. In the business of terrorism, there is no such thing as
happenstance or coincidence. Operations are too carefully planned.
Take, for example, the twin bombings in December, 1983 of France's
crack, high-speed train, the "Tres Grand Vitesse", and the Marseille
rail station. The explosions killed five, injured scores. Theywere
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claimed by a group which identified itself as the "Armed Arab Struggle"
as retaliation for the bombing by French aircraft of Shiite terrorist
facilities in the Bekaa Valley.
Within a week of the attack a letter, postmarked East Berlin, was
sent to French officials by the notorious "Carlos". The letter included
a fingerprint for positive identification and claimed that it was he,
"Carlos", who masterminded the attack on behalf of the Armed Arab
Struggle. The French took him at his word.
Now "Carlos" is presently suspected of being a Libyan asset, wil-
ling to work for anybody if the price and cause is right. Significant-
ly, however, a key Iranian terrorist coordinator -- travelling on
a Syrian passport -- had arrived in East Berlin only two days before
"Carlos"' letter was postmarked. His name was Mousavi Khoeniah and his
name will arise again later in my testimony.
Was Khoeniah's presence in East Berlin a mere coincidence? Or
could one simply substitute Islamic Jihad for "Armed Arab Struggle?"
Clearly, it had been their personnel who suffered most from the French
bombing.
Institutionalized Terrorism. Quite apart from the non-indigenous
movements which it supports, the Islamic Republic maintains its own
formidable terrorist apparatus ranging from the often-youthful Basiij
Corps -- they have been indoctrinated to martyr themselves, and many
of them already have at the Iraq front -- to the 300,000-strong Pas-
daran, or Revolutionary Guards, who operate many of the terrorist
training camps.
It is no accident that the use of terror to obtain political ends
has become an institution in Iran. The formulative process began in the
early'1960's when, in 1963, the Ayatollah Khomeini was sent into exile,
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first to Turkey, then to Najaf, Iraq in 1965. Thousands of his follow-
ers were to be trained in terrorist camps operated by the PLO in Leba-
non, Syria, and South Yemen.
Yassar Arafat once boasted that more than 10,000 Khomeini loyal-
ists had been trained in these camps. Much of the funding for this
training was provided by the Soviet Union who reportedly underwrote
the expenses of each trainee. But more of this later. Suffice it to
say that many terrorist-trained Khomeini supporters now hold important
offices in the Islamic Republic.
Sheik Oleslam, Deputy Foreign Minister, is one. Mostafa Mir Salim,
an advisor to the Islamic Republic's President Hojatoleslam Ali Khamenei,
is another. A former student at Moscow's Patrice Lumumba University,
he also attended terrorist training camps in South Yemen. He is connect-
ed today to at least one terrorist training facility in Iran. Yet, in-
congruously, he was the Islamic Republic's chief negotiator with the
hijackers of the Kuwaiti Airbus in Teheran last December.
Mousavi Khoeniah, another graduate from Patrice Lumumba -- and
the University of Leipsig in East Germany -- also was a terrorist camp
trainee. For the past several years he has headed the Islamic Republic's
H_a~' pilgrimage to Mecca. And the Saudi's have twice expelled him for
inciting disturbances, leading pro-Khomeini demostrations. In the mid-
1970's, Khoeniah was a Soviet bagman who helped funnel nearly $400
thousand from Kremlin sources each month to finance Khomeini's revolu-
tion. He also delivered propoganda tapes from Khomeini to KGB editors
in Moscow who, in turn, would relay them on to Baku for broadcast into
Iran over a black radio station called the National Voice of Iran.
Khoeniah is today considered one of the most powerful figures in Iran,
ranking in importance to Speaker of the Majlis (Parliament) Ali Akbar
Rafsanjani.
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Other terrorist-trained figures in the Iranian government include
Minister for Heavy Industry, Bahzad Nabavi, and Oil Minister Mohammed
Gharazi. A former Pasdaran commander, he once ordered the slaughter
of an entire Kurdish village.
Frequently under the guidance of Pasdaran officials, the Islamic
Republic today maintains a network of at least 8 identifiable terror-
ist training facilities. Many of the students are foreigners recruited
abroad whose patrons are movements included under the umbrella organi-
zation of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution. The camps
are scattered throughout the Islamic Republic from Bandar Abbas in
southern Iran, to Teheran in the north. Each has a specific mission.
For example, Pasdaran suicide pilots are trained on Swiss-supplied
PC-7 Pilatus aircraft at a camp near Bushire which is called "The Base
of the Soldiers of Imam." North of Teheran is the Manzarieh Park
training facility for suicide volunteers where they are indoctrinated
and schooled in demolitions and light weapons use. Other camps -- in-
cluding those solely for women -- exist in Meshed, and the port of
Bandar Abbas. The latter facility is used to teach mining techniques
in, not only Gulf ports, but also key oil terminals in Europe such
as Holland's giant Europort complex.
Last March, yet another camp was spotted some 40 miles from Isfa-
han where as many as 90 foreign recruits can be trained in explosives
and small arms at a time.
Were this all not menacing enough, events have now shown a signi-
ficant Iranian terrorist capability in Europe where networks are coor-
dinated by Foreign Ministry officials up to the rank of Ambassador.
Iranian diplomats have been expelled from England, France, and Spain
for their roles in, and links to, terrorist activities. Meanwhile,
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U -17-
there is evidence to suggest that Islamic Republic terrorists and sur-
rogates have become active in Athens, Greece. Indeed, keeping track
of potential terrorist activity in the ever-growing numbers of cul-
tural and student religious centers financed by the Islamic Republic
is rapidly becoming a security nightmare throughout all of Europe.
But perhaps the most telling example of the institutionalizing
of terror in Iran today is a political leaflet we acquired last year
before the Majlis elections took place. The leaflet, not unlike those
distributed by our own politicians at election time, touted the quali-
fications of one candidate as follows:
~'~ Trained as a defender of the revolution in Libyan PLO camps.
~, A fighter for Polosario forces operating in the western Sahara.
%~ Former member of Pasdaran, a participant in revolutionary
actions.
The revolutionary assassin of three officials in the Shah's
government.(The names of the victims were then mentioned
prominently.)
Like most American politicians -- or those anywhere for that
matter, the candidate wore a clear expression of sincerety. He was
bearded. And he was wearing a baseball cap when photographed. I do
not know if his campaign was successful. Perhaps I should check.
A Grim Future. What does the Islamic Republic's wholesale export
of terrorism and revolution hold in store for the United States and
its western allies?
Unfortunately, it appears that no one in the pre-
vious administration considered this question when the danger signals
were first hoisted during the Shah's crumbling rule. If the present
adminsitration has addressed this question, they have not shared the
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answers. Perhaps they would only echo the reply given me by a senior
American diplomat in our embassy in Saudi Arabia last year.
Spreading his arms in helplessness, he said: "Just what the hell
does anybody expect us to do about it?"
It was not an answer which inspired confidence in this Nation's
ability to influence events, or even control its own destiny, in this,
perhaps the most strategic region of the entire world. Like the flu,
incompetence, uncertainty, and the total absence of a firm policy is
catching. Can a weak Kuwait count on American assistance or interven-
tion if they are threatened by Iranian-sponsored internal disorders,
and terrorism? They think not. Can Bahrain? Can Saudi Arabia? How
about Qatar?
With Congress' reluctance to commit U.S. forces or meaningful
assistance in case a key ally is threatened from within, the future
for the United States in the Persian/Arabian Gulf is bleak indeed.
Only an outright attack upon a Gulf nation is likely to bring about
a response. And the Ayatollahs will never make such a mistake. But
let us take the scenario one step further.
Assume, if you will, that an American hostage -- say William
Buckley -- is placed on trial and executed by those who now hold him.
We have warned Iran of the consequences of this act. But, apparently,
there has been little consideration of an often over-looked treaty
between the Soviet Union and Iran. Signed in 1921, the treaty legal-
izes Soviet intervention if Iran is attacked by a foreign power.
I do not mean to suggest that the Kremlin would embark on a
military confrontation with us. But the treaty is still in force. How
would the Soviet Union react? What about our allies within NATO? High
officials in Europe have explained to me that the United States could
expect no support from them in the event of a retaliatory attack upon
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U -19-
Iran. Quite the contrary, I was informed that they would condemn such
an action. Hisballah and Islamic Amal bases in the Bekaa Valley might
be expendable, they suggested. But Iranian targets like the port fa-
cilities at Bandar Khomeini, Bushire, or the oil terminals at Kharg
Island and the Sirri Islands, never.
The Emperor has appeared naked once too often. And it's every
man for himself. Clearly, planners of U.S. policy in the Gulf never
anticipated this development once events which toppled the Shah began
to unfold. It was a disastrous mistake which generations of Americans
may have to suffer from -- to say nothing of the world community as
a whole.
But here is another scenario which deals with the future of Iran,
itself:
Forged and maintained in a climate of violence, martyrdom, and
terror, the Islamic Republic is apt to exit the same way upon the
death of the Ayatollah Khomeini, now 84. Resistance to the harsh rule
of the Ayatollahs is already growing. Even the Mullahs have begun to
question the leadership in Teheran. Meanwhile, the military -- never
trusted by Khomeini -- is resentful of clerical control and mismanage-
ment of the war against Iraq which has already cost Iran an estimated
150,000 dead.
Within the Islamic Republic, armed resistance is surfacing. Fight-
ing, for example, continues in the Kurdish region on the border with
Turkey. Not even 100,000 well-armed Pasdaran have managed to suppress
the Kurdish drive for ethnic autonomy. One reason may be that there
are over three million Kurds in Iran today.
The regions of Baluchistan to the east, Azerbaidjanistan to the
north, also harbor dreams of ethnic autonomy. And Azerbaidjanis repre-
sent more than a quarter of Iran's population. In the wake of internal
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disorders -- perhaps even civil war -- which may follow Khomeini's
death, they will surely seek autonomy from Persian Iran, joining
the Kurds in breaking with Teheran. There are those who stand ready
to assist them.
If the Soviet Union could co-opt these ethnic forces and regions,
the impact on those nations across the Gulf, Turkey, and Pakistan
would be catastrophic -- to say nothing of Iran's oil customers like
Japan and Europe. In the case of an autonomous and allied Baluchistan,
Moscow would enjoy de facto control over the gate to the Persian/Ara-
bian Gulf, the strategic Straits of Hormuz. An ethnically Balkanized
Iran would extend Soviet influence to the rear doorstep of Turkey.
Pressures which could be brought to bear would be irresistible.
Imagine the possibilities for the Kremlin: a slab of allied ter-
ritory extending from the Sino-Pakistan border, encompassing Afghan-
istan, across nearly the northern third of Iran to its frontier with
Turkey, then south from the Afghan border to the Gulf of Oman.
I am not waving the banner of the "Red Menace". I am simply de-
scribing an opportunity which Moscow would be a fool to overlook. The
Soviet Union shares a 2400 kilometer border with Iran. Thus, the region
is legitimately within their security concerns, as Mexico is within
ours. One thing is for sure: having assisted in the collapse of one
pro-western government in Teheran, Moscow will not stand by idly while
another is installed. In the same position, given the same priorities,
I would do the same. And so, I suspect, would you.
Somebody in this body and in the present administration better
consider this possibility. Moscow already has. Over the past decade,
the Soviet Union has managed to penetrate these ethnic forces to a
significant degree. Indeed, throughout most of World War II and until
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~ ~
1946,. Moscow controlled a good chunk of Iran. They called it the Azer-
baidjan Democratic Republic. And the Soviet Union has not attempted
to hide a desire to return. Speeches given by Soviet officials in Baku,
not far from the Iranian border in the Azerbaidjan SSR have continually
mentioned this intention.
It is a fact that there are documented links between the Islamic
Republic's Azeri ethnic community and Politburo member Gaydar Ali Reza
Aliev. For the record, Aliev was head of the KGB in the Azerbaidjan
SSR for 17 years. Aliev has also been directly tied to an attempt by
a former SAVAK official to overthrow the Shah in 1962. He also enjoys
significant standing within the Kurdish independence movement. Increas-
ing numbers of Kurds now identify with Moscow -- the best opportunity,
as they see it, to achieve autonomy.
These ethnic movements which seek to split off from the Islamic
Republic are not the only elements which have been penetrated. Since
the very first days of its clandestine support for Khomeini, Moscow
has quietly constructed its own infrastructure within the Islamic Re-
public's religious community. This, then, in consideration of the
day when Iran's clerical regime will fall. Moscow's assets are now
believed to include key officials in the Teheran government.
Informed Iranians in exile, as well as many still residing in
the Islamic Republic, insist that Mousavi Khoeniah is one such "a-
gent of influence". Another is said to be Deputy Foreign Minister
Sheik Oleslam. A third is believed to be Mostafa Mir Salim, an impor-
tent presidential advisor. And there are many others. Collectively,
they have acquired the name "The Red Mullahs". They will be in a
position to help swing a post-Khomeini regime towards Moscow's line.
At present, the Soviet Union is content to sit back quietly as
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Khomeini's Pasdaran and SAVAMA (the successor to the Shah's SAVAK)
winkle out and eliminate the last cells of Iran's overt communist
movement, the Tudeh Party. But its most important "agents of influence"
remain undetected, Literally under Khomeini's nose.
As dissent increases within the Islamic Republic, is there nothing
that the United States can do to influence the outcome, and put an end
to the wholesale export of terror and revolution? Is there no alterna-
tive to the present regime in Teheran except one which would support
Moscow and vice-versa?
In a display of ignorance which can only be called appalling at
best, over 50 of your colleagues sent messages of support last June
to Massoud Rahjavi, leader of the Paris-based Mujaheddin al Kalq. This
was in commemoration of the anniversary of his ill-fated attempt to
overthrow the Ayatollahs in 1981. Presumably, there must have been
some confusuion between the Afghan Mujaheddin and Rahjavi's organiza-
tion which is totally committed to Marxist dogma.
The Mujaheddin al Kalq began its existance as a terrorist organi-
zation which sought to overthrow the Shah. To this end, it allied it-
self with forces loyal to the Ayatollah Khomeini, then in exile in
Najaf, Iraq. Mujaheddin publications have openly boasted of the assas-
sinations of five U.S. servicemen in Iran during its campaign of de-
stabilization. Rahjavi, himself, is believed to have ordered the mur-
ders.
Upon Khomeini's triumphant return to Teheran, Rahjavi volunteered
his cadres to assist in organizing the Islamic regime's security ser-
vices, and Pasdaran units. In 1980, when Khomeini was weighing the re-
lease of American hostages siezed during the Embassy take-over by fol-
lowers of the so-called "Imam Line" -- incidentally, they were led by
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Mousavi Khoeniah -- Rahjavi pleaded with Khomeini to welsh on the deal.
There was much more to gain by holding the hostages than releasing
them, he insisted. He pointed out, in any event, that the U.S. had al-
ready exhibited its inability to rescue the hostages in the disaster
at Desert One. Happily, Rahjavi was overruled.
In June of 1981, he finally wore out his welcome by demanding
that the Mujaheddin were entitled to share power with the Ayatollahs
because of their services and sacrifices for the revolution. When this
demand was denied, Rahjavi decided on a test of strength and ordered
his loyalists into the streets of Teheran. He lost. Massoud Rahjavi
and the irrelevant Bani Sadr then fled together to France. Since then,
he has been building an image of legitimacy as a viable goverment-in-
exile.
Meanwhile, moderate exile leaders like former Prime Minsters Ali
Amini and Shahpour Bahktiar have been all but ignored. They, too, have
built significant organizations in both France and the United States.
It is true that both men have endorsed in principal the return of the
Shah's son, and a limited restoration of the Peacock Throne on a strict,
constitutional basis. The allied Amini and Bahktiar forces have advoca-
ted stringent neutrality for Iran with favoritism for neither east nor
west -- vital if the Soviet Union is not to feel compelled to intervene.
The Amini-Bahktiar coalition is known to have support inside the
Islamic Republic, mainly within the disaffected middle class and the
military. They also have an insurgent capacity though it is not as ac-
tive in Iran as that of the Mujaheddin. It occurs that this body might
well take under advisement support of these moderate elements so that
they may more effectively pursue their campaign against the extremism
of the Ayatollahs, the equally hostile alternative of the Mujaheddin.
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The point is, can we afford not to? Or, like our committed dip-
lomat in Saudi Arabia across the Gulf, do we just spread our arms and
ask: "What the hell does anybody expect us to do about it?"
So much for the grim future. What then about the present and the
immediate threat of terrorism?
As a journalist, it is not up to me to recommend or endorse any
specific legislation. And I do not intend to. Meanwhile, I realize
that these hearings are of an exploratory nature. Thus, I do not feel
constrained from sharing observations with you. I am convinced that
there are two areas which should be carefully considered by this body.
The first is our ability, or assets, to counter terrorist threats a-
gainst our vital interests. The second is restraints which prevent us
from countering the threat.
1. Counter-terrorism has become bureaucratically fashionable.
Indeed, federal agencies boast a dizzying array of intelligence units,
SWAT capabilities, and inter-agency coordinators. In reality, however,
the tradecraft of counter-terrorism has become a career and empire
builder for bureaucrats. Now this may be the American way of govern-
ment, but the habit puts us all at risk.
Count the players in the game. The State Department has its
own department of counter-terrorism. So does the FBI. Ditto the DIA.
The Pentagon, the Army that is, owns rights to the Delta Force. Not
to be outdone, the Navy claims the SEALS. The Airforce is involved.
The CIA is also charged with the mission of detecting and neutralizing
terrorist threats. It, too, has its own "hard men". The DEA has divert-
ed some assets from its primary mission to assist in developing intel-
ligence. And so has the NSA. And the NSC.
Everyone wants a piece of the action. The confusion, the dupli-
. cation of effort, the unwieldy -- and often conflicting chains of
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command -- structure simply dilutes our efforts. It seems to me that
this nation should pool its anti-terrorist talents under one roof, an-
swerable only to the highest levels of government. Its director should
be a member of the Cabinet. The Delta Force would be directly control-
led by this body, not by a succession of Pentagon brass hats. The re-
sult would be a totally integrated effort without outside duplication.
The body should be able to call upon Pentagon assets wherever
and whenever needed. It should develop its own intelligence capability
with imput from those agencies which have relevant access to material
which concerns its mission.
Within government, scattered throughout involved agencies, there
are individuals with extraordinary insights into the world of terrorism,
and demonstrated abilities in penetrating to its core. Apart, these
men and women are less than effective. Together, they would be formid-
able, indeed. Because the threat of terrorism is today greatest abroad,
the body's mandate should be international, not domestic. But it would,
of course, coordinate with the FBI. The unit could either be a separate
body, or it could function under the auspices of the CIA.
2. Prevention is the best cure for terrorism. This depends directly
on intelligence capabilities. But developing this capability is nearly
impossible under present constraints which, in some cases, strictly
forbids the suborning of assets, the funding of counter-terrorist
surrogates of a second or third nation.
Fighting terrorism is a dirty game. But, if you lose the game,
the consequences can be worse. I am not advocating the Israeli ap-
proach, but when was the last time one of their embassies was bombed,
or an El Al jet hijacked? If one accepts that terrorism is a form of
war -- at least as practiced by the Islamic Republic -- one must meet
the challenge, or accept defeat and increasing losses.
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I am troubled by a moral dilemma. Does one maintain retraints
legally on our counter-terrorist effort, and await the inevitable?
If so, we place ourselves in the position of retaliating for an attack
with, in some cases, a certain loss of innocent lives -- perhaps
scores of them. Or do we assume the preventive role? As for myself,
I would prefer to prevent rather than retaliate.
But it means we must play a dirty game.
Thank you for your time. I hope it has not been wasted for it is
far more valuable than mine.
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