THE LIBYAN GAME PLAN IN SUDAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87B00342R001102590013-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 2, 2010
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: May 13, 1985
• Content Type: MEMO

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0 SECRET
The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
NIC 02461-85
13 May 1985
National Intelligence Council
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: Graham E. Fuller
National Intelligence Officer for NESA
SUBJECT: The Libyan Game Plan in Sudan
1. The overthrow of Sudanese leader Nimeiri has been a major gain
for Qadhafi's policies in Northeast Africa. Radical states in the
region--Libya, Ethiopia, PDRY, Syria--all sense the importance of the
next stage in the struggle for Sudan. Although the Libyan role in
Nimeiri's collapse was highly limited when viewed in the context of the
other huge sources of discontent in Sudan, Qadhafi had long worked at
trying to destabilize Nimeiri, particularly through aid to southern
Sudanese leader John Garang. From Qadhafi's point of view:
-- Sudan was the only major base of operations bordering on Libya
for the Libyan opposition to work from. That opposition has now
been told to leave.
Sudan has long backed the Camp David Accords and supported Egypt
in most foreign policy initiatives. Sudan has now implicitly
criticized those accords and will be far more cautiously neutral.
Qadhafi has periodically made major efforts to inveigle Sudan
into unity agreements with Libya--even attempting to include
Egypt in the past. Nimeiri has been steadfastly opposed to such
unity agreements in recent years. With Nimeiri's collapse
Qadhafi will devote new attention to forging unity and probably
views his chances as better now. Sudan, however, will remain
circumspect.
Qadhafi views Sudan as an important tool with which to weaken
the Mubarak regime in Egypt. Water questions obviously play a
major role. Libya reportedly planned to bomb the Aswan Dam last
fall, and Libyan aid to southern Sudanese rebels effectively
stopped Sudanese work on the Jonglei Canal which would have
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increased White Nile water flow to Egypt. (Nimeiri even claimed
that Libya was. intent on rechanneling part of the Nile to
Libya. Libya's gigantic "man-made river project" also can have
potential effect on Egypt as it draws down on the regional
aquifer.)
-- Qadhafi would view disruption of US access and prepositioning
rights in Sudan as an important goal in diminishing the overall
US presence in the area. These rights are very tenuous as of
now and may not survive even the present moderate new regime.
2. The situation in Sudan is still up for grabs--an element critical
to Qadhafi's hopes. Sudanese domestic radical forces could displace the
present military regime which is making efforts to remain broadly
neutral. It makes a lot of sense for Sudanese leader Suwar-el-Dhahab to
offend no one--the USSR, Ethiopia, Libya, the US, Egypt--at a time when
he is struggling to maintain himself. The question is whether Qadhafi
will be able to weigh in more heavily upon this shaky regime.
3. The Libyan-Ethiopian Connection. Radical success in being able
to gain power in Sudan will depend considerably on the extent of
Libyan-Ethiopian cooperation against Sudan. The good news would seem to
be that these relations--never particularly warm--do not seem to be
greatly improving, and the two countries will have difficulty in closely
coordinating a line of attack against Sudan--especially now that their
common enemy Nimeiri is gone.
-- Ideally, Libya and Ethiopia should be closely cooperating on a
strategic basis growing out of the 1981 Tripartite Alliance
between Libya, Ethiopia and the PDRY--an alliance fully blessed
by Moscow. In reality the Libyan leg of that triangle has
consistently been the weak link. Qadhafi has quarrelled with
the PDRY, refused to support PDRY economically, and now has
poor, low level diplomatic relations with them. Qadhafi has
also quarreled with Mengistu and has disappointed the Ethiopian
regime by failing to come through both in 1976 and 'after 1981
with any meaningful aid. Qadhafi has furthermore played around
with occasional support to the Eritrean rebels in Ethiopia. And
Qadhafi and Mengistu have been rivals for the OAU chair.
-- Qadhafi's major goal is to establish a close unity between the
states of Sudan, Libya, and Egypt. This unity is hardly
attractive to Ethiopia which will feel threatened not only by
the potential power of such a grouping but by its implicitly
Islamic cast bordering Christian Ethiopia. Qadhafi's activities
will most likely continue to fuel Ethiopian suspicions about his
ultimate intent--and make him at best an ally of convenience.
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Libya and Ethiopia are furthermore unlikely to agree on the role
of southern Sudanese leader Garang. While Qadhafi has provided
major arms and financial aid to southern Sudanese rebels for
many years, Garang is a Christian; Ethiopia knows that Qadhafi
has limited sympathy for the Christian south. Garang is
primarily?a tool to Qadhafi with which to weaken an unfriendly
Sudanese regime. As of now Qadhafi claims to be cutting off aid
to Garang and reportedly is urging Garang to join the new
Sudanese government.
-- It is unlikely that Garang will join the government.
Ethiopia obviously does not want him to do so, and the
Southern Sudanese forces show no sign of responding to
Qadhafi's tactic. Qadhafi himself would lose his major
point of leverage.were Garang to join the Sudanese
government. Furthermore, if Qadhafi does not feel that
efforts are moving favorably in Sudan, he is sure to reopen
financial and arms aid to Garang. The Ethiopians, in the
meantime, have Garang ensconsed in Ethiopia and there are
signs of unease between Libya and Ethiopia on how to best
handle the Garang question. Garang would seem to be an
even more important card for Ethiopia than for Qadhafi.
The PDRY has reportedly gotten into the act by hosting a visit
by Garang last week. It is uncertain what the PDRY could offer
to Garang other than political and moral support--and maybe some
weapons if he needs them. PDRY is hardly in a position to
financially assist Garang. Unlike the Libyan tie, the
Ethiopian-PDRY axis of the Tripartite Alliance has always been
relatively good. PORY has continued to provide training to the
Somali Liberation Front from Aden which is in Ethiopia's
interest.
4. The USSR, as the godfather of the Tripartite Alliance, would
obviously like. to see coordination among these three states to strengthen
radical forces in the region. Any distancing of Sudan from Egypt and the
West is a net gain for the USSR--while Moscow will profit directly from
radical state efforts in Sudan, Moscow's favored vehicle would of course
be the Sudanese Communist Party. Despite Moscow's hope for the
Tripartite Alliance, Qadhafi has not been especially cooperative.
5. Syria and Iran. As part of the radicals' efforts to try to turn
the tide in Sudan, Syria's Assad is reportedly planning a visit to Sudan
himself, certainly to try to shore up the present regime and with the
hope of pushing it in an anti-US direction.. Iran, too, may shortly wish
to lend a hand--and could supply critically needed oil to the new regime.
3
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6. Egypt views the Sudanese crisis as very dicey to its own ,
interests. While Egypt and Sudan enjoy an extremely close historical
relationship based on geography and culture, there is great ambivalence
in the Sudanese view of Egypt as an often obtrusive big brother. The new
Sudanese regime will feel it wise to avoid too close an identification
with Egypt--by both distancing itself from Nimeiri's policies and by
appearing more broadly neutral. Egypt would like to play a more
important role in developments in the Sudan but is wisely mindful of
overplaying its hand with counterproductive results. Egypt could
conceivably play a military role in the Sudan but would probably require
US transport assistance to deliver its troops there and even then would
probably not move unless it felt that pro-Qadhafi elements were about to
seize power.
-- Recognizing the advantages Libya has already accrued from the
change in the Sudanese regime, Egypt has moved further and more
publicly toward support for the Libyan dissidents by granting
them facilities in Egypt for anti-Libyan broadcasts.
7. Qadhafi has showered the new Sudanese regime with a barrage of
proposals designed to push the regime in Tripoli's direction. Libyan
number two man Jallud and Foreign Minister Turayki have just been there
on a heavyhanded week's visit. Libya constantly beats the drums for an
"independent Sudan" which will return to its rightful place in the Arab
world--a codename for abandoning Egypt, Camp David and the access
agreement with the US. Libya has called for a visit of the entire Sudan
cabinet to Tripoli, referring constantly to the historic precedence of
the 1976 abortive unity scheme, has called for a close coordination of
foreign policy between Sudan and Libya, and has already established some
joint agriculture projects. Libyan money could prove to be critically
important to Sudan during its time of crisis--and only likely to be
offset by Saudi money, if any. Qadhafi has furthermore sent in several
dozen Sudanese bullyboys trained in Libya headed by Abdullah
Zakariya--posing a major threat to the American presence and to all
moderate forces in Sudan should terrorism increase.
8. Qadhafi views this as a major opportunity to reorder the balance
of forces in the region. Libyan success would obviously threaten Egypt
significantly, strengthen the Tripartite Alliance (while placing some
potential strains on Libyan-Ethiopian-ties), and would increase Libya's
leverage on Chad and the rest of the Sahel region just below North
Africa. The Saudis would be dismayed by a Qadhafi takeover in Sudan
where they have tried to support moderate forces for several decades. A
triumphant Qadhafi will only grow that much more dangerous in his
handling of Tunisia and in "strengthening" the Libyan-Moroccan tie.
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SEC RE
9. Internal Sudanese forces will play the major role in determining
Sudan's future course. But if Libyan-Ethiopian cooperation can remain
limited, Suwar-el-Dhahab will face a slightly less daunting challenge
than he would if Addis Ababa and Tripoli worked fully in tandem.
Nonetheless, Qadhafi may soon start to play much harder ball if he feels
events are not going well for him in Sudan. He would view the stakes
there as very high indeed for Libya.
(This Memo has been shown to both NIO/Africa and NIO/USSR.)
Graham E. Fuller
5
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SECRETJ
NIC 02461-85
13 May 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: The Libyan Game Plan in Sudan
NIC/NI0/NESA:GEFuller:jcn 13 May 85
Distribution:
1 - DCI
1 - DOCI
1 - SA/IA
-I--- ER
1 - C/NIC
1 - VC/NIC
1 - D/NESA
1 - C/NE/DDO
1 - NIO/AF
1 - NIO/USSR
1 - DDI Registry
2 - NIO/NESA
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