TALKING POINTS - SOUTHERN AFRICA DEVELOPMENTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87B00342R001102550019-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 5, 2010
• Sequence Number: 19
• Publication Date: September 10, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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SECRET
NI0/AF
10 September 1985
o South Africa: As the dominant regional power, South African
developments most profoundly affect the southern Africa region.
-- Domestic violence: -
- Black expectations, raised by government reforms and talk of
more far-reaching changes were not met by the South African
Government's (SAG) new actions. Expansion of franchise to
coloreds and Indians but not blacks in late 1983 was a trigger
event in mobilizing activist blacks to organize and confront the
government.
- SAG overconfidence allowed black activitists to form a national
organization, the United Democratic Front (UDF), which was
quickly dominated by radicals promoting confrontation rather
than negotiation with government. The UDF in its year and
one-half before being largely dismantled by recent SAG security
measures gained an international audience and influenced both
urban black and international opinion in favor of
confrontation. The recent SAG suppression of UDF largely
precludes national orchestration or organization of violence
beyond local manifestations.
- Episodes of violence began in 1984, arising from local economic
grievances largely caused by the recession and government
deflationary policies. Leadership of violence was assumed by
young unemployeds and students and was largely directed against
"system blacks"--shopowners and government workers. While egged
on by UDF and African National Congress (ANC) leaders, the
ringleaders appear not part of any national organization and the
violence is primarily anarchic. Increased state security
measures are containing and suppressing violence
episodes of localized violence
will reoccur over the next year and beyond.
-- Economic stresses:
- In 1984, the SAG, in order to reduce inflation and restore a
positive trade balance, pursued severe deflationary policies.
These policies increased black unemployment, reduced revenues
available for spending on services to blacks, and encouraged
greatly increased private sector borrowing from abroad where
interest was lower.
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In 1985, while a positive ($2 billion) trade balance was
restored, a major overhang in short-term debt ($12 billion due
in 12 months or less) was created. In July, motivated by
domestic US pressures plus concern over black violence, three US
and one British bank publicly refused to roll over short-term
South African debt and began calling in loans. This
precipitated a minipanic among small banks and private
investors, causing a severe outflow of hard currency from South
Africa and heavy downward pressure on the rand.
On 1 September 1985, the SAG declared a four-month moratorium on
principal repayments of private sector debt, reestablished a
two-tier currency, and increased efforts to get European banks
to roll over existing short-term debt and extend new loans.
While the results of these moves are not yet conclusive, they
will likely be successful in accomplishing both goals, but at
the probable cost of delaying the expected 1986 economic
recovery and sacrificing future GNP growth.
o Regional violence: The Nkomati and Lusaka Accords in 1984 sparked
hopes that regional violence could be reduced. However, 1985 has seen
a surge in such violence and additional increases are likely. There
are two principal types--insurgencies and quasi-insurgencies, and
cross-border attacks.
-- Insurgencies: In Angola, Jonas Savimbi's UNITA has doubled the
size of his force (to 40,000) since 1983 and expanded operations to
cover the entire country. In Mozambique, Alfonso Jaccama's RENAMO
also expanded operations to all 10 provinces and expanded his
forces to 15,000. Both insurgencies currently are facing major
government offensives, but both are expected to weather these
offensives and expand operations.
-- Quasi-insurgencies: Activities of both the ZAPU dissidents in
Zimbabwe and the Lesotho dissidents have temporarily abated, but
could quickly pick up should the SAG choose to support them--a real
possibility.
-- Cross-border operations: The largest of these is on the
Namibia-Angola border, where significant numbers of SWAPO
insurgents periodically infiltrate into Namibia, and SAG combat
forces also periodically cross into Angola in pursuit or on
preemptive strikes. This violence abated in 1984 as the SAG
withdrew from its salient in southern Angola pursuant to the Lusaka
Accord, but is slowly picking up again and will likely resume in
December if not earlier. Also in this category are SAG
paramilitary strikes against ANC guerrilla sites and personnel in
neighboring states. These have continued regularly in the past few
years and more appear to be in the cards. ANC guerrilla incursions
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into South Africa were temporarily stymied by the Nkomati Accord,
but have resumed through Botswana and Lesotho as the ANC develops
new infiltration routes. Additionally, Zimbabwe in the last few
weeks has increased its armed forces in Moambique to 9,000 men and
begun serious operations against RENAMO. Zimbabwe will have
difficulty extracting its forces from this involvement in the
Mozambique insurgency, and the Zimbabwean intervention by itself
will not prove decisive. It opens the door to RENAMO retaliation
into Zimbabwe and invites a flareup of the ZAPU dissidency in
western Zimbabwe. Both Angola and Zimbabwe seem to be less
inclined to negotiate with Pretoria recently, curiously
misassessing domestic developments in South Africa as a sign of
weakness. If continued, this could lead to provocative
developments inviting South African retaliation.
o Soviet activities in southern Africa: In 1983 and early 1984, the
Soviets clearly appeared on the defensive. Their two principal client
regimes, the MPLA in Angola and FRELIMO in Mozambique, were reeling
before increasingly successful anticommunist insurgencies despite
Soviet military assistance. The Angolan and Mozambican leaders,
Dos Santos and Machel, intimidated by South African policies, had in
early 1984 signed accords with the SAG without consulting Moscow.
Machel, facing not only insurgency but economic bankruptcy, also began
reestablishing a modus vivendi with the West in return for economic
aid. The principal Soviet long-term vehicle of influence on South
Africa--the ANC--lost its prime operating base when Machel agreed to
the Nkomati Accord with South Africa in March 1984. Since that time,
the Soviets have recouped some ground by pursuing time-honored
tactics: increased military assistance, restrengthened political
ties, a modicum of economic aid, and an active measures program.
-- Increased military assistance: In 1984, the Soviets sent
$1 billion in military hardware and the Cubans dispatched an
additional 5,000 combat soldiers to reinforce the MPLA regime.
Soviet assistance, including new-to-theater hardware such as SU-22
aircraft and MI-24 helicopters, helped both regimes to undertake
current offensives. While the military situations will not
necessarily improve, the rate of deterioration has been slowed.
-- Restrengthened political ties: High-level visits and massive
training of cadres continues, and the pro-Soviet factions in both
the MPLA and FRELIMO have weathered their leaders' policy shifts.
Their position was helped by a change in party "line" espoused by
Karen Brutents of the International Department of the CPSU, who
developed an ideological rationale permitting Western economic aid
as long as "the commanding heights" of the economy are kept under
party control--which is the case in both Angola and Mozambique.
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-- Economic aid: Soviet niggardliness in granting meaningful economic
assistance continues, but constant client pressures have driven the
Soviets to provide POL to Mozambique and promise over $2 billion in
economic aid to Angola.
-- Active measures: The Soviets have pursued a determined active
measures campaign designed to discredit the US by linking it with
negative South African policies and actions and to promote the ANC
and SWAPO as sole representatives of their peoples. A major target
of this disinformation seems to be the leaderships in black
southern Africa.
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