NSC MEETING ON REGIONAL/BILATERAL ISSUES FOR SUMMIT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87B00342R000100180003-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 31
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 3, 2010
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: November 12, 1985
• Content Type: MEMO

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t,UtJ S CR F: T
12 November 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: SA/DCI
SUBJECT: NSC Meeting on Regional/Bilateral Issues for
Summit
1. You are scheduled to attend an NSC meeting on 13
November 1984 at 1300 to review regional/bilateral issues for
the Geneva Summit.
TAB A Talking Points from NIO/USSR
TAB B Talking Points from SOVA
TAB C Typescript memorandum from SOVA entitled
"Regional Issues at the November Meeting:
Gorbachev's Options"
TAB D Papers prepared for the weekly meeting with
Regional NIOs.
TOP SECRET
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SECRET)
NI0/USSR
12 November 1985
TALKING POINTS FOR NSC MEETING ON REGIONAL AND BILATERAL ISSUES
FOR GENEVA
As of this point, we suspect the Soviets do not take the
President's initiative on regional security issues serious y
and may doubt whether the President takes it too serious y
either. In any case, the Administration's effort to get the
regional issues into central focus at the summit was a failure;
they do not appear (from what we've been able to learn) to have
gotten much attention during Shultz-Shevardnadze-Gorbachev.
The basie point is that the US has not, as yet, given the
Soviets a powerful reason to back away from their adventures or
from the formula for implanting and defending Marxi st~i ni st
regimes.
Arrayed against their total security effort, the total
cost of these adventures, including economic support
for -Cuba and Vietnam, and the military costs of
Afghanistan, is not staggeringly large. There is
disgruntlement about this cost among Soviet elites and
public, but not enough to change Soviet policy.
More important, the risks of Soviet olic in the
Third World are not great. Although the US
a ministration is committed in principle to supporting
Soviet opponents and to making Moscow's policy fail,
it is severely limited in doing so. And it cannot
credibly threaten threaten to raise the level of these
conflicts to the point where Moscow must dramatically
escalate its own actions, face a confrontation with
the US, or get defeated.
At the summit, the Soviets are likely to rebut US arguments
about the evils of what they are doing by denouncing our
policies in their terms. They are likely to shrug off
arguments about the dangers and risks of what they are doing
because they doubt we can make it dangerous or risky.
At the margin, they may show a little interest in
"negotiated settlements" of a vague sort (not
including the local opposition) in order to encourage
those on our side who want to desert the various
groups fighting them.
SECRET
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Talking Points on Regional Security Issues and the Summit
I. The Soviets have made it clear that they don't like the
President's regional conflict initiative and that they will
continue to support their client states.
they sent
more AN-22 heavy transports onl
the largest number of Soviet military transport
aircraft to fly to Angola in one month since August 1983.
(Cargo was military; possibly air defense equipment.)
--They went ahead with a long planned visit by Ethiopian
Chairman Mengistu and put him on the Lenin Mansoleum with
the Soviet Politburo for the November 7th ceremony, the
second time he has been accorded this honor.
2. During Secretary Shultz's recent trip to Moscow, Soviets
listened quietly during US presentation on regional conflict but
made no response.
--Are probably heartened by lack of vocal international
support for President's three-stage proposal for ending
conflicts in Afghanistan, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Angola and
Nicaragua.
--But, they realize topic can't be avoided;
3. Gorbachev has three options, in descending order of
likelihood:
A. Deflect meaningful talks on the issue. Cite this
year s talks on regional issues between State and Soviet
Foreign Ministry, and try to get talks back to arms
control, or take propagandistic approach and come out
swinging.
B. Recast the debate. Offer up USSR's own set of
"tension-reduction" proposals--which might include "code
of conduct," resumption of conventional arms transfer
talks, Asian Collective Security Pact, nuclear-free
zones, UN negotiations on Third World debt, global
program for sharing high technology, etc.
C. Negotiate about one or more of the insurgencies
mentioned by the President:
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--Build upon the President's implicit acceptance in
his speech of the USSR as a superpower and potential
co-guarantor with the United States of agreements.
--Shift the framework of discussions to one where
acceptance would undermine the trust of our friends
(for example Pakistan or anti-Sandinistas among
Central Americans) in US resolve and staying power.
This last option would include Soviet discussion of the behavior
and interests of their own allies, which Moscow would probably
strongly resist.
4. While we think it is most likely that Soviets will try to
downplay and deflect the issue, the President should be prepared
to respond to a more active attempt by Gorbachev to use the
regional conflict theme to promote Soviet interests.
These talking points were prepared byJ 25X1
the Regional Issues Group, SOVA. Uomments and queries 25X1
come and may be addressed to the Chief, Regional Issues
ar
e we
Group 25X1
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Central InteliVnce Agency
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
6 November 1985
Regional Issues at the November Meeting: Gorbachev's Options
Summary
Moscow expects President Reagan to raise the issue of Soviet
bloc military activity in Third World Marxist-Leninist states at
his November meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev, and is
preparing for this. Soviet authorities see the President's
three-stage proposal for resolving conflict in these countries,
which he presented in his address to the UN General Assembly, as
a design to shift the focus of world attention away from SDI,
undercut the Soviet global propaganda campaign keyed to 'star
wars" and nuclear holocaust, and justify armed aid to
"counterrevolutionaries." The Soviet leadership throughout the
1980s has demonstrated a steady resolve to defend its gains in
the states mentioned by the President--Afghanistan, Cambodia,
Ethiopia, Angola and Nicaragua--and has viewed consolidation of
client regimes in these countries as an essential element in
expanding Soviet influence in the Third World. Gorbachev is not
deviating from this line. While the Soviets probably believe
that time is working in favor of consolidation of these regimes,
they are aware of their present weaknesses and will try to ignite
political backfires aimed at deflecting or reducing further
outside support of anti-Marxist insurgencies.
T>-ii s memorandum was prepared by
Regional Issues Group, Office of Soviet Analysis. Comments
an qeries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief,
Regional Issues Group, SOVA
SOV M 85-,10196
25X1
25X1
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At the November meeting Gorbachev will have no interest in
settling the armed conflicts in these `socialist-oriented"
countries on the terms proposed by the President. For tactical
reasons it is conceivable, although unlikely, that Gorbachev
might suggest talks--premised on entirely different terms--about
insurgencies in Afghanistan, Angola or Nicaragua. He will not--
either to promote arms control. objectives or to contain the
"costs of empire'--make significant concessions to the United
States on Third World issues, although such considerations could
affect his decision on whether to take a low-key approach to the
regional conflict problem or look to score propaganda points at
this meeting. Conceivably he might seek to constrain the supply
of mobile surface-to-air missiles mnd other weapon systems to
insurgents fighting against Soviet clients. It is possible that
he will present "tension reduction" proposals designed to
spotlight areas of US vulnerability and capitalize on potential
longer-term opportunities the Soviets see to advance their
fortunes in the Third World.
1. President Reagan's address to the United Nations General
Assembly put Moscow firmly on notice that the United States
intends at the November meeting to pursue vigorously the question
of Soviet bloc military activity in Afghanistan, Cambodia,
Ethiopia, Angola and Nicaragua. This message could hardly have
came a
i to Soviet olic makers;
Nevertheless, the Soviet press response demonstrates that the US
move was an unwelcomed development. Soviet authorities see this
step as an initiative designed to shift the focus of attention
away from SDI, undercut their global propaganda campaign keyed to
"star wars," and pave the way for further US support of anti-
Marxist insurgencies. They themselves have no interest whatever
in settling the armed conflicts in these five "Socialist-
oriented" states on the terms proposed by the President, which
they must read as an invitation to dismantle Soviet influence,
abandon clients and repudiate support for Third World radicalism
in return for more economic aid from the West.
Marxist-Leninist Clients and Soviet Third World Policy
2. Consolidation of pro-Soviet Marxist-Leninist regimes in
Afghanistan, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Angola and Nicaragua
is an essential element of Moscow's continuing broad-gauged
strategy for increasing its influence in the Third World and
acquiring new political and military bases from which to expand
Soviet influence further. Levels of Soviet military and economic
assistance to these regimes have fluctuated considerably over the
past five years, with economic aid clearly being squeezed by
declining growth of Soviet GNP. The constant factor has been a
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basic Soviet determination to make Marxist revolutions
irreversible in these countries. The tactical changes made in
each case--in levels of assistance and Soviet bloc military
participation--have been based principally on the client's degree
of peril and on the Kremlin's judgment of what risks the traffic
would bear.
3. Soviet military assistance in recent years to client
"Socialist-oriented" Marxist-Leninist regimes has been
substantial:
-- In Afghanistan, the USSR increased the number of its
troops by 7,500 men in 1984-85 (now about 118,000) and
has taken more forceful measures to suppress the
insurrection's growing capabilities. This has involved
improved operational planning and reconnaissance, more
direct use of Soviet ground and airpower, more aggressive
tactics, and the dispatch during 1985 of three additional
Spetznaz (Special Purposes Force) battalions (bringing
the total to seven battalions--about 4,000 men).
-- In Cambodia, the USSR has played a key role in supporting
Vietnamese occupation of the country. Soviet military
aid to Vietnam has levelled off in the past three years
to about $600 million annually. Without Moscow's
extensive economic aid (an estimated $1 billion
annually), Hanoi would have been hard pressed to maintain
the level and intensity of its pressure in Cambodia.
Despite the existence of certain frictions between the
Vietnamese and the Soviets concerning Cambodia (and
Laos), more than 100 Soviet military advisors are active
in Cambodia. indicates that newer
Soviet artillery has been made available to Vietnamese
forces in Cambodia, and that the accuracy of Vietnamese
artillery has noticeably improved in the past two
years. The Soviets have also begun providing medium
tanks, older MIG aircraft, and small naval vessels to the
Cambodian armed forces, and have trained Cambodian Air
Force personnel.
-- In Ethiopia, of the $3 billion worth of arms provided by
the USSR since 1977, Moscow sent about $1.3 billion in
1977-1978 and another $1.3 billion in 1983-1985--
including modern MI-24/25 helicopters and jet fighters.
This aid enabled the Ethiopians to mount, for the first
time, a successful counterattack against Eritrean
insurgents and to rapidly recapture lost territory.
-- In Mozambique, the USSR since 1981 has supplied some
$70T--nu million ion in military assistance. Soviet military
assistance rose considerably in 1983, including
unprecedented deliveries of military equipment by air.
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Deliveries fell off in 1984 (probably due to Moscow's
displeasure with Mozambique President Machel's signing of
the Nkomati Agreement with South Africa), but they have
increased in 1985. This year's aid has included MI-24/25
helicopters, tanks and APCs, patrol boats, artillery, and
three batteries of SA-3 surface-to-air missiles. Soviet
economic assistance has also increased in 1985.
-- In Angola, the Soviets have clearly beefed up their
military support, raising their 1983 deliveries of arms
($582 million) to $850 million in 1984, and on occasion
apparently commiting Soviet advisory personnel to direct
military operations against UNITA.* Among the more
sophisticated weapons Moscow has supplied Luanda since
1983 have been over 100 fighter aircraft, including MIG-
23s and SU-22s; more than 20 MI-24/25 helicopters;
antiaircraft systems for the creation of an integrated
air defense over a large portion of the country; and
large quantities of armor, transport, and ammunition.
-- In Nicaragua, Soviet bloc military aid deliveries in 1984
doubled over those of 1983. Also, the nature of Soviet
bloc military aid has expanded to include such equipment
as MI-24/25 assault helicopters, minesweepers, and radar-
controlled air defense guns. There was a lull during the
first three quarters of 1985 in the delivery of Soviet
weapons to Nicaragua, although deliveries of Soviet
military-associated cargoes (trucks, jeeps, and so forth)
rose sharply over that of corresponding months in 1984.
In October, however, a major Soviet weapons delivery to
Nicaragua via Cuba appeared to be under way, the first
since last November. Nicaraguan ships shuttled back and
forth between Cuba and Nicaragua's east coast under tight
security. The new weaponry probably includes more tanks,
*Both UNITA and the South Africans claim that Luanda's recent offensive
was planned and directed by Soviet military advisors. As of now we have no
firm independent confirmation of this but we find these claims credible.
There are about 1,200 Soviet military personnel in Angola, including seven
generals. Soviet military advisors are attached to MPLA military formations
down to the brigade level. We as yet have no evidence that Soviet personnel
have participated in ground engagements in Angola. Likewise, we cannot
confirm UNITA and South African statements that Soviet pilots were engaged in
combat missions during the recent offensive, although we think it is quite
possible. The Soviets do have a permanently based squadron of medium-range
air transport aircraft and crews, which daily fly transport missions for the
Angolan military. We believe the Soviets probably also pilot at least some of
the 27 advanced MIG-23 fighters in Angola, with a likely primary mission of
training Cuban and Angolan pilots.
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artillery, and air defense weap lthouah it has not
yet been precisely identified. 25X1
4. Soviet actions over the past months have affirmed
Gorbachev's apparent intention to protect these client regimes.
Like his three predecessors, Gorbachev seems willing to furnish
such military support as appears necessary--at least in the
absence of great risk or significantly increased costs--to ensure
their survival. The USSR does face serious operational and
logistical problems in conducting counterinsurgency wars at great
distances and in unfamiliar situations, but these ventures are
not that costly. Soviet military assistance, while large in
absolute terms is--except for Afghanistan--at the margin of
existing Soviet force structure, stockpiles, and military
production. 25X1
5. Despite Moscow's concern over the possibility of more
forceful US initiatives in the Third World, the Soviet leadership
seems to believe that the United States and others who seek to
frustrate Soviet efforts there are hemmed in by a variety of
constraints which, over the long run, will work against sustained
effective opposition to Soviet aims. At the same time, the
Soviets probably think they will be able to profit from certain
major trends now visible in the international environment:
-- The fundamental shift in the regional "correlation of
forces" in Southeast Asia that could arise with the loss
of US bases in the Philippines--with or without a
successful communist revolution in that country.
-- The accelerating potential for serious revolutionary
activity in South Africa.
-- Growing frustration over the US role in the Middle East
peace process and a possibly growing inclination of
moderates in the region to accept more of a Soviet role.
-- North/South tensions resulting from the debt problem and
possible revolutionary upheavals, especially in Latin
America.
6. The Soviets are well aware, however, of the short run
problems of their client states: economic crisis, incomplete
systemic and leadership institutionalization, and military
vulnerability to insurgent attack. They know Washington has
provided steadily increased support for some resistance groups
and can see Washington is in the midst of a policy debate over
escalation of that assistance to other insurgent groups. The
clear reference in the President's address to support for
democratic resistance forces is probably read by the Kremlin as
an accurate indication of the administration's intent to up the
military ante in anti-Marxist insurgencies if this is politically
feasible.
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7. Under these circumstances, the Soviets almost certainly
will:
-- Attempt to continue to provide client regimes with levels
of military assistance deemed adequate to prevent serious
insurgent challenge to client governments.
-- Seek to generate political pressures that will deflect
further outside support for insurgencies in client
states.
-- Play for time in which to strengthen political, social
and economic controls in t'Fese ;regimes.
-- Try to distract world attention from the anti-Marxist
insurgencies by focusing on areas of US vulnerability and
Soviet opportunity.
Runup to the November Meeting
8. Between now and 19 November Moscow will publicly attack
President Reagan's proposal, strive to impose its own terms of
reference on discussion of regional issues at the meeting, and
lay the groundwork for subsequent exploitation of whatever
positio Gorbachev advances in his talks with President
Reagan.
9. Theoretically, Moscow could consider strengthening
Gorbachev's hand in the talks by attempting to inflict a major
military or political defeat beforehand on freedom fighters in
one or more of its client states. Practically, however, time is
running out and opportunities to score such a psychological
victory are not evident--even if Moscow did decide to risk more
publicity for its involvement in counter-insurgency efforts and
to expose the steel beneath its current efforts to appear
"reasonable."
10. The main arenas of Soviet activity, thus, are likely to
be propaganda and more finely tuned political influence
operations ("active measures"). The most authoritative reaction
to date to the President's comments on regional conflict in his
UN address has been Gorbachev's speech of 1 November at a dinner
for Ethiopian chief Mengistu. Gorbachev did not address the
President's proposals directly, but
-- Asserted that the charge of Soviet machinations in
Ethiopia and elsewhere in the Third World was an attempt
to cover up US interference in these countries, obstruct
their ties with the Soviet bloc (i.e., "hinder their free
and independent development"), distract world attention
from US encouragement of Israel and South Africa, and
avoid addressing the nuclear arms control issue.
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-- Declared that the Soviet Union would continue to support
Ethiopia.
Repeated the conventional Soviet propaganda appeal for
channeling funds saved from arms spending to Third World
development needs.
Approved the resolution of the organization of African
Unity on turning Africa into a nuclear free zone and
announced that the USSR would be prepared to observe
Africa'a nuclear free status and serve as a guarantor of
such a zone.
Lesser Soviet spokesmen have stated that the USSR will be willing
to discuss regional conflicts at the November meeting, but have
suggested that Moscow's agenda might include US "state terrorism
and imperialist interference in the internal affairs of other
people," settlement of the Middle East conflict, and
establishment of various "zones of peace" and nuclear free
zones.
11. Moscow probably will wait to see how much positive
response the President gets before deciding whether more is
needed before the November meeting to put the United States on
the propaganda defensive. Thus far, the Soviets appear
encouraged by statements from some Western leaders and Prime
Minister Gandhi that the primary focus of the November meeting
should be arms control, not regional conflicts. If the
President's proposal does not achieve much international
resonance, the Soviets could very well decide to play it down An
their own propaganda--hoping others will ignore it or write it
off as simply a rhetorical maneuver.
Soviet Behavior at the November Meeting: Gorbachev's options
12.
Soviets reportedly dismissed US efforts to discuss regional
issues in order to get the talks back to arms control. Moscow
realizes that, whatever it might wish, it cannot prevent the
United States from raising the issue of regional conflict for
discussion at the November meeting. Gorbachev's choices revolve
around (a) acceptance or not of any "linkage" between Soviet
behavior in the Third World and achievement of Soviet objectives
in the bilateral US/USSR relationship, including arms control
agreements; (b) whether there is anything at all to be gained
from even discussing the possibility of negotiations over
insurgencies in one or more of the five Soviet client states
mentioned in the President's address; (c) how actively to engage
the President in talking about regional conflict; and (d)--
looking beyond the meeting--what the best way is to turn the
regional conflict theme against the United States.
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Linkage with the US/USSR Bilateral Relationship and Arms
Talks
13. There are no compelling reasons from Moscow's
standpoint to give up gains already achieved in the "socialist-
oriented" countries or elsewhere in the Third World out of hopes
of enticing Washington to agree to more favorable terms in arms
negotiations. Soviet America watchers would hardly feel
confident enough to offer their leadership assurances about what
such concessions might gain from Washington, and Gorbachev would
probably not be able politically to-"give away the farm"--even if
he wanted to, which he does not. -The Soviet leadership does
recognize as a practical matter, however, that there is a
connection between flagrant Soviet support of "national
liberation" activities in the Third World and Congressional
treatment of arms control issues. For this reason it may well
continue to exercise tactical caution in its support of, or
conduct of, counterinsurgency efforts in its client states; and
it may choose at the November meeting to argue that it has been
acting prudently with respect, for example, to "provocations"
along the Pakistan border or to military supply of Nicaragua. If
reminded of linkage at the November meeting by the United States
and pressed for a commitment to future responsible behavior, the
Soviets will probably restate their general principle of support
for revolutionary movements. But conceivably they might decide
that calculated ambiguity or assertions that "revolution cannot
be exported" could be perceived in this context by the United
States as tacit consent to restrain specific possible future
actions--for example, military supply of guerrillas in South
Africa or the New Peoples' Army in the Philippines.
Deflecting the Issue?
14. In previous exchanges with Western leaders Gorbachev
has dealt with their attempts to raise Third World issues by
merely listening and quietly reiterating Soviet positions. He
might do the same with the President at the November meeting.
Alternatively, he could reaffirm agreement that the two
countries' foreign ministers continue and institutionalize the
dialogue begun this year on regional issues. The objective would
be to terminate the discussion as quickly as possible and get
back to arms control. Such a strategy would help muffle the
regional conflict theme, display Soviet "statesmanship," and
minimize potential tensions that might arise between the USSR and
client regimes if serious talks were initiated with the United
States. However, the strategy would not provide much of a
platform for post-meeting propaganda and active measures campaigns,
and would leave the initiative with Washington. 25X1
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15. Taking a more activist stance, Moscow might use the
discussion of regional issues at the meeting to score propaganda
points against the United States while attempting to manipulate
American unease with appearing to act hypocritically or not
"even-handedly." Picking up themes already in Soviet propaganda,
Gorbachev could try to put the President off balance by directly
accusing him of instigating "state terrorism against regimes
friendly to the USSR, of preparing to crank up aid to the South
African "puppet" Savimbi, of supporting South African racism and
aggression against its neighbors, of working with Israel against
Arab interests, of backing military dictatorships in Chile and
elsewhere in Latin America, or of exacerbating Third World
tensions by deploying nuclear-armed vessels throughout the
world. Such an approach might win kudos for Gorbachev among
conservative elements in the Soviet elite, but would risk
generating unwanted controversy over Soviet bloc military
activities in the Third World and might be seen by Soviet
strategists as likely to spoil an atmosphere at the meeting
otherwise more conducive to American concessions on arms control
questions.
Recasting the Entire Debate
16. An obvious option open to Gorbachev is to try to put
the US in a "no win" position by presenting "constructive"
"tension-reduction" proposals that are not transparently self-
serving, but acceptance of which would constrain US military
power projection capabilities, weaken US political influence, and
enhance the Soviet presence in the Third World. If Washington
decided to accept the proposed negotiating agenda, so much the
better from the Kremlin's standpoint. But Moscow's main aim
would be to position itself to (a) link US rejection of the
proposals with US "bellicosity" in "star wars" and use this
indictment to fan anti-Americanism in Western Europe and the
Third World, and (b) to advance political initiatives in the
Third World calculated to exploit US vulnerabilities.
17. The statement issued by a meeting of leaders of the
Warsaw Pact in late October, together with Gorbachev's response
to a letter from the Club of Rome on the international arms trade
and his 1 November speech, probably provide some clues about the
items that would be included in such a set of "tension-reduction"
proposals. We might see calls for:
-- A "code of conduct" for the Third World based on "respect
for national independence and sovereignty, nonuse of
force or the threat of force, inviolability of borders,
territorial integrity, peaceful solution of disputes,"
etc.
-- Resumption of the conventional arms transfer talks.
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An international effort to effect dismantlement of
foreign military bases and a withdrawal of forces from
foreign territories.
-- The convening under UN auspices of an international
conference on the Arab-Israeli dispute.
-- An invitation to the US to join with the USSR in
promoting an Asian Collective Security pact.
-- Recognition of "zones of peace" and nuclear free zones in
the Mediterranean, Persia-,Gulf, Africa, Indian Ocean and
South Pacific.
-- Approval of principles of North/South trade that paid lip
service to the Third World's "New International Economic
Order" initiative.
-- Negotiations under UN auspices dealing with the Third
World debt problem.
-- Approval of a global program for sharing high
technology.
We rate the chances of the Soviets presenting some set of
"tension-reduction" proposals at the November meeting about
fifty-fifty. Whatever the particular mix of proposals may be,
the package would be designed not only to deflect attention from
President Reagan's regional conflict agenda, but actively to
advance longer-term strategems of capitalizing on the perceived
opportunities noted just above.
Negotiating One or More Conflicts Mentioned by the
President
18. From Moscow's perspective, the President's proposal
implies actions which are either in fundamental opposition to
Soviet interests, or are unlikely to succeed:
-- Promotion of negotiations between client Marxist regimes
and insurgents. The Soviets have tried but apparently
failed to achieve negotiations in Ethiopia; they are
probably uninterested in either having such talks or
pressuring Cuba to engineer them in Angola and Nicaragua;
and they are probably skeptical about the prospects of
achieving serious talks with the Mujahedeen in
Afghanistan, or between the two opposed Cambodian
factions even if they wanted to pursue such a tack.
-- Democratization of these five states. This path would
involve a complete reversal of efforts by the Soviets and
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their bloc partners to build single-party Marxist-
Leninist systems of rule.
-- Withdrawal of bloc military support of clients, with
verification. Pursuit of such a move would lead to
collapse of client regimes in at least Afghanistan and
Angola, serious loss of influence with Vietnam, probably
loss of presence in Ethiopia, and major conflict with
Cuba.
-- Expanded trade and aid relations between client regimes
and Western partners. While the Soviets accept a certain
amount of such intercourse as unavoidable and even
desirable, their long-term objective is precisely to
reduce the structural economic dependence of their
clients on the West and stren then integration of those
countries in the Soviet bloc.
19. Perhaps the only positive aspects of the President's
proposal from Moscow's standpoint are its implicit acceptance of
the USSR's role in the Third World as a superpower and potential
co-guarantor with the United States of agreements, and acceptance
by Washington of non-intervention principles that might constrain
future US actions. Conceivably those pluses, supplementing more
concrete cost/benefit calculations (including the benefits to be
gained from simply bein seen to be engaged in a negotiating
process with Washington), im ght lead Gorbachev to explore talks
about some of the insurgencies mentioned by the President. It is
difficult to imagine why Moscow would broach the subject of
Ethiopia or Cambodia, but scenarios involving the three other
countries are not totally implausible:
-- Afghanistan. The objective here would be to draw or
create the illusion of drawing the United States into
discussion of "guarantees" before the initiation of talks
between the Karmal regime and the Mujahedeen, with the
aim of eroding Pakistan's confidence in US staying power
and Pakistani resistance to direct talks with the
Afghans, and creating doubts among the Mujahedeen about
the continuation of external, support.
-- Angola. The Soviets might restate their theoretical
acceptance of at least partial Cuban evacuation from
Angola in return for withdrawal of South African support
for UNITA, combined with implementation of UN 435
guaranteeing free elections in Namibia supervised by the
UN. The gain would be a probable SWAPO victory in
Namibia; but the Soviets probably would doubt that the US
could deliver the South Africans, and they would feel
that the MPLA could not handle UNITA one-on-one even
though they might be more heartened by FAPLA's
performance in this year's offensive.
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-- Nicaragua/El Salvador. Any Soviet counter-proposal here
would be conditioned by the need for gaining Cuban and
Sandinista collaboration, which could well prove an
insuperable obstacle. No doubt the Soviets would be
prepared to trade withdrawal of Western support for the
Afghan freedom fighters for Soviet withdrawal of support
from the insurgency in El Salvador.; but it is difficult
to conceive how they would visualize such a deal being
consummated. The Soviets might see hints of it, however,
as a useful active measures tactic aimed at undercutting
Pakistani resolve. Similarly, while they would see
consolidation of Sandinista power in Nicaragua as far
more important than legitimation of limited participation
of the FMLN in electoral politics in El Salvador, they
might see hints of talks between Moscow and Washington
about reciprocal incorporation of insurgents into the
political process of both countries as a means of sowing
doubt in Central America about the US commitment to El
Salvador, and encouraging Congressional opposition to
further US support for the contras.
20. The level of sophistication and destructiveness of
weapon systems introduced into Third World conflicts is a
question which Soviet policymakers inevitably must address. As
we suggest below, it is conceivable they might see some utility
in broaching this issue on a global level in the context of a
proposal to renew the conventional arms transfer talks. But they
also might see an advantage in raising the question on a regional
basis. As a backer of counterinsurgency warfare in the five
countries mentioned by the President, the Soviets now have an
obvious interest in reducing the flow to insurgents of anti-armor
weaponry and--especially--mobile surface-to-air missiles and
heavy machineguns capable of downing helicopters and fixed-wing
aircraft. The problem from the Soviet standpoint would be to
find something to trade--openly or tacitly--for restraint on the
part of their opponents. It is conceivable that Soviet policy
planners might entertain the possibility of offering to trade
continued restraint in the bloc's supply of such weapons to
guerrillas in El Salvador for future restraint in weapons
available to the contras in Nicaragua. Less plausible would be a
Soviet attempt to gain US agreement to seek restraint in the
types of weapons that might get to insurgents in Afghanistan or
perhaps even in Angola by means of an offer of Bloc restraint,
for example, in overall military delivers to Nicaragua or of
Soviet restraint in "active pursuit" along the Pakistan border.
It is highly unlikely that the Soviets would initiate discussion
of US restraint anywhere in return for an understanding, however
vague, about possible future Soviet non-supply of arms to South
African dissidents or Communist insurgents in the Philippines.
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DDCI Meeting with Regional NIOs
13 November 1985, 0930
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
NIO Page
USSR ....................1
LATIN AMERICA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
EUROPE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
EAST ASIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
AFRICA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
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NIO/USSR
12 Novwmber 1985
NIC OUTLOOK MEETING WITH DCI NIO/USSR
1. Once Again on Gorbachev's Game Plan: The Summit Outlook
By now we've said what we can, but it's worth recapping.
Gorbachev wants a breathing space for the USSR in the form of some relief
from the more intensely competitive behavior of the United States seen in
the last five years, specifically:
from our rising defense spending;
from our more vigorous weapons development, especially SDI and new
conventional weapons;
from greater US engagement in regional issues;
and from our more challenging political stance toward his system and
its behavior.
He wants this breathing space for two reasons:
First, and most important, he wants to devote more economic resources
and leadership attention, at the margin, to fixing the deep problems
of a very unhealthy economy and society. Doing so will. be the
measure of his time in.power.
Second, a breathing space like the one-sided detente of the 1970s
would also allow the USSR to expand its influence at low cost and
risk in the Third or and among a ies.
Gorbachev is as yet not ready to pay anything substantial in the form of
concessions to the US on vita security issues -- arms control or
regional conflicts -- or human rights. He wants a breather on the cheap,
and believes he can get it.
While sweeping, his arms control position is one-sided, demands great
concessions from the US on SDI, and would take years to negotiate in
any case. Making his proposal involved no real concession so far.
So far, Gorbachev has signalled no real flexibility on the re ional
issues. He appears determined to ac his Leninist clients in the
Third World and to hang tough on Afghanistan. With the exception of
Afghanistan, the USSR's Third World adventures are not that costly or
risky now. Their real cost is the possibility that they will
continue to inspire strong competitive behavior from the US on all
fronts. But this is not certain. [See Item #3 below]
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Gorbachev will clearly do what he can to exploit and deepen fissures
in US alliance relationships by a more activist foreign policy. He
sees a detente environment as offering a favorable setting, but will
try do this no matter what the atmosphere.
He shows no sign of readiness to move toward liberalizing the human
rights situation insthe USSR, except for some cosmetic gestures;
an is pressing for more discipline out of East Europe.
At this point, Gorbachev is not counting on specific concessions from the
US that give him his breathing space. At the summit, what he is after is
an atmospheric result and a continuing political process that encourage a
re axation of pressures from the US through other forces over the rest of
the rest dent s term. He wants to convince publics, Congress, allies,
and the President himself (if he can), that Moscow is willing to be
reasonable, but cannot be pushed. Coming out of Geneva, he wants all
these parties to believe that Washington bears the main burden to make
concessions and accommodations for the sake of bettern US- oviet
relations. If he can create this perception, over time the burden will
wear down the Reagan administration and deliver a more accommodating
president in the next election.
As he watches the fate of defense budgets and other security issues
in the on ress, he sees how this can happen in the last years of
e Reagan presidency.
At the summit, Gorbachev will not be open to persuasion that his views
and policies are wrong.
Both his personality as a counterpuncher and his system run against
his letting himself be persuaded. _
On the contrary he will be out to take the measure of the President and
to persuade him that his anti-Soviet policies are wrong and can easily be
altered because Moscow will be forthcoming if the US makes concessions.
Gorbachev is, indeed, likely to use the argument that Soviet domestic
problems "prove" the Soviets will be reasonable -- if only the US
signs up to peaceful coexistence on Soviet terms. He did this in
Time.
There is not much the President can do to change Gorbachev's position at
the summit. His most important and achievable task is to inject doubt in
the minds of Gorbachev and his team that they can get a cheap reathgel
space without serious concessions, solely by playing on atmosp ere, Congress, etc.
This places a premium on the following:
At the summit, the President conveys confidence in the rightness of
his policy course, in its congruence with US national interests and
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the cause of peace, and in his ability to stay the course and make it
a lasting part of American politics.
After the summit, the President demonstrates his ability to keep his
national security agenda on course in the Congress.
2. NIE on "Domestic Stresses on the Soviet System" and Implications
As this NIE nears completion, there are still likely to be important
arguments among NFIB agencies as to whether and just how much Soviet
domestic, mainly economic, troubles oblige Gorbachev to hold to a flat or
even go to a reduced level of defense spending. Nevertheless, as of now,
there is agreement that:
Soviet internal troubles are deep and serious, both as regards the
economy and the surrounding political and social environment.
Gorbachev's likely conservative strategy for addressin them will
probably not make the Soviet s stem a reat deal healthier in the
next five years. Even if he takes more reformist steps than we think
likely, it will still take longer to make serious improvements.
Moreover, many domestic intiatives (e.g., cadre replacement and
management reform) will produce more social tension before they
produce better system performance.
All in all, the domestic scene is a heavier drag on the USSR's
effectiveness as a superpower than ever.
Nevertheless (and this goes beyond the NIE), the USSR can still field a
lot of new military-power at.reduced--levels of defense spen in because
it is operating from such a-high base of production and active forces,
and can still pursue its policies in the Third World, unless we make them
more costly and risky.
Thus, Gorbachev has a middle option between intensifying Soviet
competitive effort and making concessions (which the NIE now
mentions) of reducing defense spending somewhat and only for a finite
eriod of four or five years, while stiff-arming the US on security
issues and trying to work our allies. His ability to get away with
this depends on a US Congress which fails to support the
Admininstration ondefense and regional security.
A foot-
sal on these matters that the KGB does not report 'to the
ea ers ip on broad domestic conditions (which helps explain why they
have been slow to get the picture), that religious adherence, while no
real political threat, is growing in the USSR (our view as well), that
detente because of the "operational opportunities" as well as-the
economic help it brings the USSR (no surprise here).
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3. Regional Security Issues and the Summit
As of this point, we suspect the Soviets do not take the President's
initiative on regional securit issues serious and may doubt whether
the President takes too serious y either . any case, the
Administration's effort to get the regional issues into central focus at
the summit was a failure; they do not appear (from what we've been able
to learn) to have gotten much attention during
Shultz-Shevardnadze-Gorbachev.
The basic point is that the US has not as yet, given the Soviets a
powerful reason to back away from their adventures or from the formula
for implanting and defending Marxist-Leninist regimes.
Arrayed against their total security effort, the total cost of these
adventures, including economic support for Cuba and ietnam, and the
military costs of Afghanistan, is not staggeringly large. There is
disgruntlement about this cost among Soviet elites and public, but
not enough to change Soviet policy.
More important, the risks of Soviet policy in the Third World are not
great. Although the administration is committed in principle to
supporting Soviet opponents and to making Moscow's policy fail, it is
severely limited in doing so. And it cannot credibily threaten to
raise the level of these conflicts to the point where Moscow must
dramatically escalate its own actions, face a confrontation with the
US, or get defeated.
At the summit, the Soviets are likely to rebut US arguments about the
evils of-what they are doing by-denouncing our policies in_their terms..
They are likely to-shrug off arguments about the dangers and risks of
what they are doing because they doubt we can make it dangerous or
risky.
At the margin, they may show a little interest in "negotiated
settlements" of a vague sort (not including the local opposition) in
order to encourage those on our side who want to desert the various
groups fighting them.
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NIO/EA
12 November 1985
Taiwan -- All the King's Horses and All the King's Men?
1. Only a few years ago the prospects for a smooth transition of power
on the mainland of China from Deng Xiaoping to his successor looked
uncertain while Taiwan awaited Chiang Ching-Kuo's passing with confidence
and optimism. Now the tables have turned. China's September party
conference placed Deng's reformers more firmly in control and reduced the
chances of old guard military officers playing king maker at his death.
Meanwhile, the untimely stroke of Taiwan's Premier Sun and KMT party Chief
Y. S. Chiang's indirect involvement in financial shenanigans on the island
have thrown the succession to CCK into turmoil and doubt.
2. In retrospect, Premier Sun, as heir apparent, was a crucial element
in CCK's succession plans. He had the confidence of the old guard
mainlander conservatives and the vision to depend on a younger generation of
mainlander technocrats and upstart native Taiwanese to guide Taiwan into the
21st Century. CCK forged just such a coalition when he assumed power from
his father, the legendary Chiang Kai-shek, in 1975. The decade of political
and economic progress that ensued spoke well of the idea and with CCK's
blessing Premier Sun appeared poised to carry on in the same fashion long
after CCK had passed from the scene.
3. So, too, was the KMT in good hands headed by the bright and
articulate Y. S. Chiang. The President's-trouble shooter of-many years
presided over the modernization and Taiwanization of what had become almost
a moribund and irrelevant artifice. He breathed new life into the ruling
party by promoting able, young, western educated mainlanders and transfusing
the rank and file until about 70 percent of the membership became native
Taiwanese. What had begun many years before as a Leninist mechanism of
control on the mainland became a modern political party stressing competence
and constituent services on Taiwan. He was so successful that it literally
took the wind out of the sails of the once vigorous Taiwanese opposition.
KMT victories in local elections with mostly native Taiwanese politicians
left the opposition Tangwai little to criticize and more of an irritant than
a real electoral threat.
4. Premier Sun's incapacitation and Y. S. Chiang's fall from grace
changed all that. An older and seemingly tired out CCK reacted to the new
situation by surrounding himself with conservative hardliners suspicious of
change and the native Taiwanese majority. Old friendships rather than
talent apparently counted for more in his choices. The new Premier,
Yu Kuo-hua, for example, has proven irrefutably that he cannot be counted on
to lead Taiwan out of its economic decline despite his friendship with the
President and reputed financial and economic expertise. Others around the
President appear no better. They are quick to say yes, but apparently fear
to give the "old man" bad news. At the same time, they monopolize access to
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CCK and keep the young reformers at arm's length. Possessed of little
vision themselves and loathe to turn to a younger generation for ideas,
these men appear bent on leaving Taiwan unprepared for CCK's passing.
5. What had once seemed assured for Taiwan--a smooth transition and
continued political and economic progress--is now clouded and uncertain. No
new leader of the stature and capability of Premier Sun has emerged and the
group influencing events now is more of a hinderance than help to CCK. None
of them seem capable of stepping into his shoes and carrying on.
6. CCK set in motion the beginnings of a major social change on the
island by reversing the polarization of mainlanders and native Taiwanese
that had been a fact of life even before his father retreated to the island
in 1949. While not yet complete, the gradual process of evolutionary change
bringing mainlander and Taiwanese closer together portends profound
consequences by the end of the century.
7. Unfortunately, those advising CCK today are not only out of step
with this new reality, but are representative of the very group who in the
past most vehemently opposed change. Many of them have counselled
repression over reform fearful that they and their kind would have no place
in the new Taiwan envisioned by CCK. Moreover, CCK had the advantage of
rapid economic progress that allowed for a slow and patient strategy of
reform. His successors will not have that luxury. The economic downturn
that promises to linger on for sometime is likely to increase the demands
for quickening the pace of political reforms. A resort to repressive
measures would only make matters worse and heighten the appeal of the more
radical opposition.
8. The military's role in politics-also appears on the rise General
Hau Pei-tsun, the Chief of Staff, and General--Wang Chi-ng-hsu, -Director of
NSB, appear positioned to play a larger role in the succession than
previously expected. Fortunately, both are able men and more enlightened
than their civilian counterparts currently ensconced close to the
President. In the event of a near term succession crisis, both would have a
large say in the outcome. Some even speculate that General Hau might wish
to become part of the civilian administration after CCK's death. In any
event, both men could prove decisive in choosing the shape and focus of a
new government. Although personally very capable, their power comes from a
group--the military and security services--most desirous of stability and
fearful of change. Each may find it difficult to keep Taiwan moving on the
course charted by CCK, Premier Sun and Y. S. Chiang.
9. CCK, to his credit, apparently recognizes that all is not well.
Economic disarray and the prospects for opposition gains in the November
elections have spurred reports that the President plans to reshuffle his
Cabinet and bring in new advisors. His choices and the overall complexion
of the government and party apparatus that he puts his confidence in at this
crucial stage will go a long way in determining whether his successors will
be able to put Humpty Dumpty back together again. Will he continue to rely
on old trusted civilian lieutenants looking to the past for guidance, or
will he turn to a more forward looking group of younger reformers? At this
point, unfortunately, it is anybody's guess.
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yr - 11 1
NIO/AF
13 November 1985
DCI/NIO REGIONAL CONFERENCE
SUDAN: Over the last weekend, Sudanese Defense Minister
Osmandullah stated that Soviet military experts were en route to Sudan
to recondition Soviet-supplied aircraft in the Sudanese air force
inventory. Abdullah also noted that Sudan had asked the US to remove its
military equipment in Port Sudan (the US has prepositioned $100 million
in military equipment for CENTCOM contingency in Port Sudan). (In fact,
the Sudanese Government has as yet made no such request.) Given the
manifest desire of both military and civilian leaders to obtain more
military hardware from all sources--and US unwillingness to provide arms
usable against southern insurgents--it is likely that such a request will
be made of the US to enhance Sudanese prospects of receiving Soviet and
Libyan arms. Such a move would also reflect civilian and military
desires to be more "nonaligned."
indicates that the current south
i
ern
nsurgent
Pos nonoring a ceasefire and encouraging negotiations is a ploy.
In fact, the SPLA is preparing for a major offensive against Sudanese
positions. A new offensive will only increase northern military and
civilian desires for more arms to fight the insurgents.
ANGOLA/SOUTH AFRICA: the Soviets are
once again sending several large air transports to Angola, almost
certainly containing military materiel. This substantiates the
prediction in our recent SNIE that the Soviets would quickly make up MPLA
losses incurred in their recent offensive, and especially that the
Soviets would reinforce and ex and the southern air defense network.
Informatio suggests the South
Africans are contemplating a new, relatively large-scale incursion into
Angola, allegedly to hit SWAPO targets. We speculate that any new
incursion may well have the real purpose of both helping Savimbi and
sending a message to the MPLA and Soviets regarding extension of the air
defense line southward, if not eastward.
LIBERIA: The situation in Liberia remains unsettled as some troops
loyal to of State Samuel Doe have apparently decided to battle the
supporters of the coup launched by former commanding General Quiwonkpa.
Although our mission reports that US citizens are safe, the situation in
Liberia will likely remain very dangerous over the next few days as Doe
and Quiwonkpa vie for the support of Liberia's military. Given the
widespread unhappiness with Doe, we believe Quiwonkpa stands a good
chance of emerging the victor. Regardless of who wins, however, the
United States will come under increased pressure from the Liberian
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Government for increased economic and military assistance. Liberia's
latest descent into chaos will.also open new-doors for Soviet and Libyan
meddling. A Quiwonkpa takeover would likely see the re-emergence in
Liberia of a political left despite Quiwonkpa's personal pro-US and
conservative views. Numerous leftists who fled from Doe's regime would
be likely to return and benefit from their opposition to Doe.
LIBYA-CHAD: Libyan leader Qadhafi has again focused his attention on
Chad, and the recent heightened Libyan military activity in northern Chad
suggests that Qadhafi is again prepared to initiate attacks against
Chadian territory south of the 16th parallel. During the next few weeks,
we will probably see Chadian rebel probes against government garrisons
near the 16th parallel, and Qadhafi may well commit some Libyan military
assets in support of the rebels. The Libyans could provide some air
cover for rebel operations, as well as send Libyan armor or artillery
units to back the rebel efforts. The French are unlikely to stand up to
these initial Libyan challenges, thus encouraging Qadhafi to prepare for
a?large-scale Libyan thrust into southern Chad.
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