DCI TALKING POINTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87B00342R000100140001-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 24, 2009
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 19, 1985
• Content Type: MISC

Approved For Release 2009/11/24: CIA-RDP87B00342R000100140001-1
DCI TALKING POINTS
Space Program
The vigorous Soviet space program is predominantly military in nature.
More than 70 percent of Soviet space missions are for military purposes only,
with much of the rest serving a dual military-civil function. The Soviets
view space as an integral part of their overall offensive and defensive force
structure, not as a separate arena or as a sanctuary. While the Soviets seek
to be able to deny enemy use of space in wartime, current Soviet antisatellite
capabilities are limited and fall short of meeting this apparent
requirement. Today, in addition to the dedicated nonnuclear orbital
interceptor, other systems--the nuclear Galosh ABM interceptor and two
ground-based high-energy lasers--have the potential to destroy or interfere
with some satellites in near-Earth orbit, but the potential threat to
satellites in higher orbit is limited.
The Soviets are expending a relatively greater share of their resources
for space on manned space programs than is the US. The Soviets are currently
developing a version of the US space shuttle, a heavy-lift booster system, and
a space plane, and have engaged in military-related experiments aboard the
SALYUT-7 space station. The Soviets continue to pursue their manned space
programs, maintaining in orbit the SALYUT space station, which is manned
during most of the year. This gives the Soviets the capability to perform a
variety of functions from space, including military R&D and using man to
augment their other reconnaissance and surveillance efforts. We are looking
at the long-term military implications of this heavy emphasis on man in
space. In addition, there are other developments indicating Soviet research
on space-based ballistic missile defense.
Strategic Defense
The Soviets spend as much on strategic defensive forces as they do on
strategic offensive forces. Soviet active and passive strategic defenses,
while unable to prevent large-scale damage from a major attack, are intended
to provide a degree of protection for the leadership, military, and military-
related facilities necessary for wartime operations. The Soviets will
significantly improve the capabilities of their strategic defenses over the
next 10 years, as a number of new types of weapons are introduced and many of
the older systems retired.
The Soviets have actively engaged in antiballistic missile (ABM)
research, development, and deployment programs for many years. We are
particularly concerned that the Soviets' continuing development efforts give
them the potential for widespread ABM deployments. The Soviets have the major
components for an ABM system that could be used for widespread ABM deployments
well in excess of ABM Treaty limits.
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There is strong evidence of Soviet efforts to develop high-energy laser
weapons, including those with potential application to ASAT and BMD
missions. These efforts have been taking place, in some cases, since the
1960s. We estimate a laser weapon program of the magnitude of the Soviet
effort would cost roughly $1 billion per year if carried out in the United
States.
We are concerned that Soviet directed-energy programs may have proceeded
to the point where they could construct operational ground-based ASAT
weapons. In addition, Soviet research includes a project to develop high-
energy laser weapons for use in space. A prototype high-energy, space-based
laser ASAT weapon could be tested in low orbit in the early 1990s. Even if
testing were successful, such a system probably could not be operational
before the mid-1990s. The Soviets are also conducting vigorous research in
the areas of particle beam weapons, radiofrequency weapons, and hypervelocity
kinetic-energy weapons.
By their actions and propaganda--directed at scientific and public
opinion elites in Western societies--the Soviets have demonstrated they are
very concerned about the US Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) and its focus
on advanced technology. In their view, it could force them to redirect their
offensive ballistic missile development programs to reduce vulnerabilities or
could stimulate a costly, open-ended high-technology competition for which
they probably are concerned that the United States can outpace their own
ongoing efforts. They are probably also concerned that SDI will lead to a
sustained US effort in strategic defenses--an area in which they have had a
virtual monopoly.
Resource Issues
While Soviet economic problems are severe, we see no signs that the
Soviets feel compelled to forgo important strategic programs or that they will
make substantial concessions in arms control in order to relieve economic
pressures. Soviet force decisions and arms control decisions are likely to
continue to be driven by calculations of political-strategic benefits and the
dynamism of weapons technology. We judge that strategic forces will continue
to command the highest resource priorities and therefore would be affected
less by economic problems than any other element of the Soviet military. We
believe, however, that, as a result of the stark economic realities, decisions
involving the rate of strategic force modernization probably will be
influenced by economic factors more now than in the past and some deployment
programs could be stretched out. In this respect, SDI poses a set of problems
for the Soviets, the potential solutions to which involve considerable risk
and uncertainty--factors with which planned economies do not deal well.
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