MINUTES OF MEETING AD HOC COMMITTEE ON CIA INTELLIGENCE MUSEUM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87-01130R000200120006-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 28, 2001
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: August 23, 1972
• Content Type: MIN

Review of Cuban Missile Crisis Exhibit:
and members of his staff reviewed for the
COMM committee e state of planning for the Cuban Missile Crisis
MINUTES MEETING .w -...'. `r....._... __ 'PH AD HOC COMMITTEE OX CIA INTELLIGENCE MUSEUM
23 Aug us 2
Present: Walter Pforzheimer
STATINTL Robert S. Wattles
STATINTL
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F ter"2 c ,,y,
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will with STATINTL
c un certain security questions nertainin2 to the
exhibit materials. -is to arrange-a meeting with
Mr. Angleton on secur questions relating to the
papers, the latter to be brought to the meeting by
STATINTL Charter for the Intelligence Museum Commission:
committee considered a draft paper prepared by Mr.
MEWpresented in the form of a memo from the Executive
Director to the Deputies and embracing the plans for the
establishment of the commission. The attached draft is
presumed to represent the agreed amendments to
draft. The Chairman stated he would forward t
to the Executive Director as recommended by the committee.
Internal Lin on.
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STATINTL
STATINTL
SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM_
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Remarks:
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FOLD HERE T
FROM: NAME. ADDRESS AN PHONE NO. DATE
6 E 60 3Aug72
UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET
-HO. 237 Use previous editions
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MINUTES
AD HOC COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE MUSEUM
2 August 1972
Present: Walter Pforzheimer
CIA Anniversary Exhibit:
Mr. Pforzheimer reviewed his plans for this exhibit
which he proposes be in place on September 12.
Cuban Missile Crisis Exhibit:
with his colleagues, briefed the
Committee on e evelopment of plans for this exhibit.
Everything seems in good order and the committee had no
comment except commendation for the work they had done.
Proposal to Locate the Intelligence Museum Function in the
Historical Staff:
Members had received copies of the memorandum from the.
Executive Director proposing the location of the Intelligence
Museum function i a1 Staff. Mr. Pforzheimer,
speaking also fa who was on leave, was
strongly opposed to the Executive Director's proposal.
After extensive discussion the Chairman proposed that
he review this discussion with the Executive Director STATINTL
orally and that he seek to arrange with Mr. Colby for a
discussion either with all of the members of t
Committee, or at least Messrs. Pforzheimer and
so that their point might be most effectively mace.
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Remarks:
Attached see Mr. Colby's response to
our memorandum of 30 June 1972, Sub-
ject: Intelligence Museum Concept.
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER
FROM: NAME. ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.
DATE
Chairman,.Fine Arts Commission
4Jul72
UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDE NTIAL
SECRET
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18 July 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, Fine Arts Commission
SUBJECT : The Intelligence Museum
REFERENCE : Memo to ExDir from C/FAC dtd 30 Jun 72,
Subj: Intelligence Museum Concept
1. Thank you for this excellent review. Your points with respect
to the need to capture our material as the first priority are well taken,
arranging the showing of it later as appropriate. Also, I think it im-
portant that we recognize the compartmented nature of the Agency at
work and not try to centralize all the material in one Agency museum.
2. The organizational problem of how to approach this subject is
closely analagous to that of the production of Agency histories. Here
we have the same compartmentation problem, central indexing, early
capture, etc. In addition, I confess some disinclination to seeing the
establishment of separate committees or commissions when the func-
tion can be consolidated into an existing one.
3. I would suggest, therefore, that we use the Historical Pro-
gram as the vehicle for developing a museum program. The Historical
Program already has an Agency Historical Staff, Directorate Historical
Officers, etc. I would thus suggest that, after these initial probes into
the general subject, we bring this matter under the aegis of the Histori-
cal Staff and Program for continued movement along the excellent lines
you have outlined.
4. Could you review these papers with this thought in mind, after
which we will have a basis upon which to go to the Deputies.
Attachment:
Reference
cc: Chief, Historical Staff
Executive Director - C o'fi.ptr oiler
ri
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2. The task we must undertake then, well before we talk
out a museum, is to identify, and tag for non-destruction,
1 material which is important to the history of CIA's opera-
tonal development, before the material finally vanishes. This
effort would involve documents, photographs, hardware and
MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director-Comptroller
SUBJECT: Intelligence Museum Concept
The attached concept paper by STATINTL
identifies a set of principles connectea with the establish-
ment of an historical museum which I would like to recommend
to you. They are:
1. Some offices - Communications is an example - have
taken an historical view and already have begun to preserve
technical gear which in its day raised the technology of
communication to a higher plateau, or gear which has been
used in notable operational cases. Other offices with less
sense of history have-no such program, and already may have
lost or destroyed material which played a significant role
in CIA's history, then became outmoded and was discarded.
other materiel, vehicles and miscellaneous memorabilia, all
henceforth called "historical material."
3. Exhibition - the concept of a museum - is a
by-produ o esservation. At least initially empTasis
STATINTL show d be given to the primary task of identifiin historical
material in order.to arrange or i preservation, rather
than to the luxury of exhibiting it. This sequence should
e p def ect a natural concern that the security of a sensi-
ive device, even an outmoded one, machined into one or
nother piece of intelligence collection may be threatened
y exhibiting in a museum. For this reason we see the museum
s evolving slowly, and perhaps at several security levels.
I static collection. Instead it would be a series of displays
J using declassified historical material which would be
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STATINTL
rotated in and out of the conservancy collection. (The
forthcoming exhibit of Cuban Missile Crisis photographs and
hardware is a good example of endlessly interesting material
which once was highly classified but now can be shown in
this way.) A possible adjunct to the basic museum collection
would be a small museum which we understand the DCI wants
near his office, in which he could show Agency achievements
to selected visitors. Other additions to the basic museum STATINTL
would be th 11mQ -high eady a-11 TSD exist, STATINTL
such as th
collection n e museum at
Such satel i e museums in our opinion should continue, and
should not be superseded by a central museum. In fact we
would expect these satellite museums to provide exhibits to
the central museum, and to whatever small classified museum
is created for the DCI.
J
5. No central repository need be established for all
material which is designated as historical. Offices which
have the space and interest in housing their own histori-
cal material (Commo, OTR, and TSD are examples) may wish
to retain custody of it, so long as all items which have
been accorded historical material status are recognized as
being under the ultimate control of the central Agency I STATINTL
to be made from time to time for especially sensitive items.
6. In summary we see the problem as the following: (
collection. Nevertheless, at least one storage site will
have to be established for the historical material from
offices which lack storage space of their own.
is a possible site. Special storage arrangement m y nave
documents, photographs, hardware and other materiel,
vehicles and miscellaneous memorabilia which have
been significant in the development of CIA and its
operations;
a. Identifying, cataloguing and prVin
b. Arranging for their progressive declassifi-
cation, on terms agreed to by whichever directorate
used the material operationally; and
c. Exhibiting the material when exhibition
would have a salutary effect on employee morale,
on training, or on special problems the DCI
,identifies.
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We believe that a one-shot exhibit such as the Cuban Missile
Crisis can be arranged under the aegis of the Intelligence
Museum Committee, as is being done, but that the larger
problem needs the attention of a separate commission which
will attend not just to the last but to all three of the
foregoing functions. Furthermore, we think it important
to find a senior officer to chair the historical material
commission and actively to head the program, whom the
irectorates will trust with the -custodyof historical
material--items-which in some cases may be politically
sense 1ve as well as highly classified Our guess is that
` e ti her the commission chairman or alternatively a curator L
working under his guidance will have to be employed full-
time.
6. If you agree that the foregoing principles are a
reasonable basis for further action I suggest that they be
distributed to the deputy directors for comment, and for
their recommendations of candidates to take the commission
chairmanship and get the program rolling.
Ivilefnat U U ly.
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CIA HISTORICAL MUSEUM
If a CIA Historical Museum is to be established, prompt action
is required to collect significant material before it is discarded. As
each day passes, it becomes clearer that positive steps must be taken
if such intelligence hardware and related items of historical interest
are to be preserved.
As an example consider audio surveillance equipment. ? When
integrated circuits in the last few years replaced transistorized
equipment which in the late fifties had rendered vacuum tube devices
obsolete, it was only natural that as this evolution took place earlier
equipment was cannibalized or disposed of. While some of the original
audio gear can perhaps still be located, as each month goes by it
becomes more and more difficult to assemble an historical collection
of eavesdropping equipment used or designed by CIA during the past
Z5 years. If another 10 years is allowed to pass the earliest equip-
ment will certainly have vanished.
Only the establishment of a CIA Historical Museum can lead
to the orderly identification of significant historical items and their
proper preservation. The problem permeates all directorates of
the Agency since candidate material would come from TSD, Commo,
NPIC, and perhaps offices which would not immediately come to mind,
such as Medics, Logistics, and even General Counsel.
Security considerations impose constraints which do not
apply to conventional museums. Some unclassified CIA material
could surely be brought together for immediate display in the main
lobby of the Headquarters building where it would be visible to
uncleared visitors. By far the bulk of the items, however, is classified
and these presumably would not be candidates for exhibition for
several or even a great many years. In some instances it would be
difficult to imagine that certain items could ever be displayed to
uncleared personnel, but this fact should not prevent the material
from being identified and preserved for classified exhibitions.
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These peculiar security con side ration s surrounding
espionage material require a correspondingly unusual. organizational
set-up for the Museum. While it would be better to assemble material
in a central location, the sensitive nature of some items might be such
that the directorate wherein they originate may wish to retain custody
of them.. In this case, the curator would be responsible for locating
and identifying items which must be preserved and may not be des-
troyed without approval of the Museum.
Less sensitive material could be assembled in a holding area
where the passage of 5, 10, or 50 years could be expected to result
in their gradual declassification. During World War II members of
OSS would have shuddered at the suggestion that their equipment
could ever be openly displayed to the public. While this is not yet
true in all cases, many items such as the crossbow and one-shot
pistol certainly are no longer SECRET. Sabotage techniques used
by OSS have appeared many times in the press, TV, and movies and
the original security classifications certainly no longer need apply.
This question unfortunately is academic since it is highly unlikely
that any of this gear has survived and could be added to the Museum.
With a few exceptions such as the U-2 reconnaissance plane
STATINT of the TSD most of the material would not
pose a warehousing pro) em. It will be necessary, however, to store
the material selected for the Museum so as to avoid deterioration.
In all cases it will be mandatory to catalog and document the items
and establish their provenance.
It would be impossible for the establishment of the Museum
and organization of periodic exhibitions to be handled by an individual
on a part-time basis. A full-time curator with access to clerical
assistance, Printing Services, maintenance personnel, etc. , is
required. An experienced museum curator or conservator wai.ld
find no difficulty in setting up the Agency collection. Since it is
unlikely that such a person is already employed by CIA, it may be
necessary to identify a candidate for the position and detail him or
her to the Smithsonian Institution for several months of familiarization
and training. Alternately, the Smithsonian would no doubt be willing
to furnish a consultant who would, of course, require clearance.
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The curator of the Museum Would work closely with the
Curator, Historical Intelligence Collection (HIC), to avoid over-
should come under the jurisdiction of the Museum or the HIC. Some
items of importance including perhaps early directives or instructions
received from the White I-louse most certainly should be preserved,
as should photographs or portraits of senior executive personnel.
Candidate material would include captured Soviet equipment
such as audio surveillance devices, photographic gear, or assassi-
nation weapons. Material issued to a CIA agent and returned after a
successful operation is obviously of great interest, as would be his
actual photographs, microdots, or deaddrop concealments. The
list of desiderata is long, but before it can be drawn up the Museum
must be established to prevent further loss of desirable items.
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