SECOM CHARTER
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP87-00812R000100250005-5
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
K
Document Page Count:
2
Document Creation Date:
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date:
June 8, 2010
Sequence Number:
5
Case Number:
Publication Date:
April 23, 1982
Content Type:
MEMO
File:
Attachment | Size |
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Body:
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/08: CIA-RDP87-00812R000100250005-5
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Security Committee
SECOM-D-157
23 April 1982
MEMORANDUM FOR: Members, DCI Security Committee
airman
OS REGISTRY
FILE ? s,q,
SUBJECT: SECOM Charter
REFERENCE: My Memo to Members, SECOM-D-104, dated 23 March 1982
FROM:
As promised at the 21 April meeting, this addresses comments received on
the draft revision of the SECOM charter forwarded by reference:
a. One member noted that the substance of the draft may
not merit'classification.
Comment: It is planned that the collection of revised DCIDs will be
classifir ed..' Accordingly, our charter will be classified as part of the
package.
b. A suggestion was made that the second sentence of section
four be changed to read "Senior Officials of the Intelligence Community"
instead of "Intelligence Community principals."
Comment: The Executive Secretary NFIB/NFIC chose the "Intelligence
Community principals" terminology to permit continued representation on the
SECOM and other DCI committees from organizations which do not come under "Senior
Officials of the Intelligence Community" as that term is defined in Executive
Order 12333.
c. One member noted that security education and awareness is left
to a working group and recommended that this group be upgraded to permanent
subcommittee status.
Comment: This does not bear on the wording of the draft charter, which
authorize the chairman to establish subcommittees, etc., as required. Under
that authority, I accept the. recommendation contingent upon SECON! member endorse-
ment and approval of a tasking charter.
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d. It was suggested that the list of implementing guidelines
be reformatted for the sake of clarity; be consolidated at some future
date; and include "Minimum Standards for Security Awareness Programs
in the Intelligence Community."
Comment: Suggestions accepted.
. e. A question was raised about the interpretation of section 2.b(2)
on SECOM functions concerning investigations of unauthorized disclosures
of classified intelligence.
" Comment: It is not intended that the SECOM charter contain authority to
mandate procedures shall be employed to investigate such disclosures.
However, the DCI does have clear authority to protect intelligence and to
obtain information on disclosures necessary to assess the impact on the intel-
ligence process and to support development of corrective security measures.
The Security Committee was originally formed to address leaks and compromises
of intelligence. A significant part of the present (18 May 1976) SECOM charter
addresses our role in unauthorized disclosures. Although overall Executive
Branch procedures concerning unauthorized disclosures of classified information
generally are dealt with in the findings and recommendations of the report the
Attorney General sent the President on 31 March 1982, nothing is being considered
now which would in any way reduce the DCI's authorities or responsibilities con-
cerning disclosures of intelligence. Accordingly, I believe we should carry
forward to the new draft the essential elements of our present tasking. If
the White House directs stronger measures to prevent disclosures, we can change
the SECOM charter as needed. In the interim we need to move promptly to agree
on a final draft charter. If SECOM members find the language of section 2.b(2)
of the present draft troublesome, the following adaptation of our present charter,
to be a new section 2.c (in place of 2.b(2) and renumbering sections appropriately),
may be helpful:
"c. On behalf of the DCI, request and coordinate investigations
by Intelligence Community components of unauthorized disclosures or
compromises of classified intelligence; and determine and recommend
corrective security measures needed to reduce the future likelihood of
such disclosures or compromises."
May I have members' thoughts on this approach?
f. Several members advised of an error in section 2.c in stating
the term "Sensitive Compartmented Information."
Comment: Correction made. STAT
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/08: CIA-RDP87-00812R000100250005-5