US-SOVIETS SUMMITS 1955-1979

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87-00462R000100130001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 12, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: REPORT

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SUBM _ US-Soviet Summits 1955-1979
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Raymond Firehock, ACDA/VI
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US-SOVIET SUMMITS 1955-1979
Conference Expectations and Results =- t ~a..-
GENEVA
July 1955
The Big Four (represented by Eisenhower, Ihrushchev and
Bulganin, Eden, and Faure) met to discuss a formal WWII peace
settlement, German reunification, disarmament, and military
tensions in Europe and the Formosa straits. The Western
participants were also interested in getting acquainted with
the new Soviet leaders who had succeeded Stalin. .
The conference took place at what seemed to be an auspicious
moment--just two months after the signing of the treaty which
provided for the reunification and neutralization of
Austria. Caning in the aftermath of Stalin's death and the
Korean armistice, the signing of the Austrian State Treaty
had heightened Western expectations of progress in relations
with the Soviet Bloc.
The summit produced a temporary improvement in therit
atmospherics of East-West relations--often dubbed "the Spirit
of Geneva" but no formal agreements were reached. Moson reoverr
East-West tensions worsened following Moscow's suppT
the Hungarian uprising and the Suez Crisis in October-
November 1956. East-West relations were further exacerbated
in November 1958, when Khrushchev issued an ultimatum that
gave the West just six months to cane to an agreement with
the USSR and East Germany on "normalizing" the status of West
Berlin.
CAMP DWID Eisenhower and Khrushchev met to discuss ways of reducing
September 1959 East-West tensions in Europe, German reef at~l,a and aing
formal WWII peace settlement. They agr to
of the Big Four as soon as possible to discuss East-West
tensions in Europe, but no formal agreements were signed.
"Getting acquainted" was also on the agenda. Khrushchev was
visiting the US for the first time, and Eisenhower wanted to
assure Khrushchev of America's peaceful intentions. To
further the process of getting acquainted, Khrushchev invited
Eisenhower to visit Moscow after the Big Four meeting.
PARIS The Big Four (represented by Eisenhower, Khrushchev,
May 1960 Macmillan, and de Gaulle) met to discuss disarmament
measures, German reunification, and WWII peace settlement,
but the meeting broke up in a furor over the shooting down of
an American U-2 reconnaissance aircraft over the Soviet Union
on may 1, 1960. Khrushchev demanded that Eisenhower publicly
apologize for the U-2 overflights. Eisenhower accepted
responsibility, but did not apologize. Khrushchev withdrew
the invitation for Eisenhower to visit Moscow.
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'Conference
VIENNA
June 1961~`
GLASSBORO
July 1967
MOSCOW
May 1972
Expectations and Results
Kennedy and Khrushchev met to discuss the issues of
German reunification and a formal WWII peace settlement.
and Soviet relations with Cuba in the wake of the, Castro
revolution and the Bay of Pigs invasion were also'-on-the
agenda. There was no agreement on any of these issues.
Kennedy and I(hrushchev discussed banning nuclear tests in--
the atmosphere, and, in the view of the US delegation at.
least, an informal agreement was reached. The Soviets,
however, resumed atmospheric testing a few months after the
summit.
Both sides were eager to get acquainted. Khrushchev
reportedly wished to take the measure of Kennedy rand, if
us-
possible, intimidate him. Kennedy sought
Soviet differences by projecting an image of
reasonableness. According to some historians, Khrushchev
seriously misjudged Kennedy's character by concluding that
the US president was a weak leader who would back down in a
crisis. Soon after the summit, Khrushchev renewed his
ultimatum on Berlin. The ultimatum was later dropped, but
construction of the Berlin Wall began in August 1961. The
Cuban Missile Crisis followed in October 1962.
Johnson and Kosygin met to discuss Vietnam, the situation
in the Middle East in the wake of the June 1967 Arab-Israeli
War, and the possibilities for starting US-Soviet negotiations
on measures to control strategic arms, particularly ABMs. They
cage to no agreement on Vietnam or the Middle East.
On August 19, 1968, the US and USSR announced an agreement to
start SALT in October 1968, and the Soviets invited President
Johnson to came to Moscow for the opening of the talks.
After the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia on the following
day, however, the SALT talks were postponed and the Johnson
visit was cancelled.
Nixon and Brezhnev met to complete final negotiations
on the SALT I agreements. The ABM Treaty and the Interim
Agreement, which placed quantitative limits on strategic
arms, were completed and signed at the summit, but the issue
of qualitative limits on strategic arms was postponed until
the next round of negotiations toward a permanent treaty.
During the ensuing years both sides proceeded to implement
qualitative improvements in their strategic arsenals.
The two leaders signed an agreement on the Basic Principles
of US-Soviet Relations under which the two sides promised to
act jointly to prevent situations capable of exacerbating
bilateral relations and forswore the pursuit of unilateral
advantage at each other's expense. The October 1973 Middle
East War badly frayed this agreement.
2
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`Conference Expectations and Results
Brezhnev, while viewing the Moscow summit primarily as a
means of winning public US recognition of the'USSR's
superpower status, also wished to enlist US economic
cooperation in his efforts to ease Soviet econak1c
problans. A joint trade commission set up at the meeting
completed negotiations on a Soviet-American Trade Agreement-
in October 1972. In late 1974, however, by means.of the -
Jackson Vanik amendment, the US Congress linked the granting
of Most-Favored-Nation status to Moscow's agreeing to allow
continued Jewish emigration fran the USSR. In response, the
Soviets repudiated the Trade Agreement in January 1975.
President Nixon reportedly viewed the summit as a major step
toward moderating Soviet behavior by enmeshing the USSR in a
web of cooperative arrangements. He also hoped to persuade
the Soviets to influence North Vietnam to agree to acceptable
peace terms. The Soviets made no promises to influence North
Vietnam, but in January 1973, the US and North Vietnam signed
a peace agreement.
WASHINGTON Nixon and Brezhnev signed additional agreements for US-
June 1973 Soviet political, econamic, and scientific cooperation. They
agreed to continue the SALT talks toward a permanent treaty
to succeed the Interim Agreement. A discussion of the
situation in the Middle East following the October 1973 Arab-
Israeli War produced no formal agreements.
Moscow Nixon and Brezhnev signed additional agreements on Soviet
June 1974 American cooperation and a protocol to the ABM Treaty
reducing the number of ABM sites allowed each side. The US
wanted to discuss North Vietnamese violations of the Paris
Peace Accords, but the Soviets did not respond to US
concerns. North Vietnamese violations of the Paris Accords
continued, and Saigon fell in April 1975.
VLADIVOSTOK Ford and Brezhnev met to resolve obstacles to progress in the
November 1974 SALT talks. They signed the Valdivostok Accords, which set a
numerical ceiling on strategic launchers and a sub-ceiling on
MIRVed launchers. In March 1977, the Carter Administration
proposed going beyond the Vladivostok Accords to seek deep
cuts in strategic force ceilings. The Soviets, however,
rebuffed President Carter's efforts.
HELSINKI Ford and Brezhnev held informal talks in the US and Soviet
August 1975 embassies on the occasion of the meeting of heads of state to
sign the Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe. No formal bilateral US-Soviet
agreements came out of these meetings. Moscow's violations
of the human rights provisions of the Helsinki Accords
subsequently became a source of heightened friction in US-
Soviet relations.
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VIENNA. .
June 1979
stations and Results
Increasing Soviet and Cuban involvement in the Third World
also became a major source of tension in US-Soviet
relations.
Carter and Brezhnev signed the SALT II Treaty. Following
the summit, US intelligence reports of the presence of a
Soviet combat brigade in Cuba raised the issues of whether-
the Soviets had complied with the Cuban Missile Crisis
Accords and whether they could be trusted to adhere to pny
international agreement.
The Soviets invaded Afghanistan in December 1979. In January
1980, President Carter withdrew the SALT II Treaty from
Senate consideration and announced an embargo of grain sales,
and suspension of exchanges with the Soviet Union.
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