VIETNAM: THE VICIOUS LEGACY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87-00462R000100100009-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 6, 2010
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: April 20, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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THE DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
National Intelligence Council
NOTE FOR: DCI
DDCI
C/NIC
SRP
Each NIO " A/NIO
NIC/AG
24 April 1985
FROM: Herbert E. Meyer
VC/NIC
This article by Paul Johnson is
quite powerful. I thought you might like to
see it.
Herbert E. Meyer
Attachment:
Vietnam: The Vicious Legacy
London Times, 4/20/85
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THE TIMES SATURDAY APRIL 20-1985 p,6E,
Saigon fell 10 years ago this month. Pau, Jvhnso.. r
refits on the paralysing
efeect,-o ,, US.readiness to oppose Soviete P4As c *s . ;, ti;
-- r-r
legacy
The fall of Saigon in 1975 and the
decade that has followed illustrate a
maxim endorsed by wise historians.
It is willpower, rather than physical.
power, which determines the "t-
come of wars.
In analysing the 40-year, tragedy of
Indochina we must never forget that
from 1.945 onwards it was the
determination of Ho Chi Mihh,'the
communist leader, and his ;suc-
cessors to dominate all of Vietnam,
.Laos and Cambodia, which was the
principal dynamic of the strpgg1e'
and the ultimate cause of all the
bloodshed. They' refused to allpw
their aim to be deflected in' the,.
smallest degree by the appalling
casualties their subjects suffeted or
inflicted. The accusations, of geno-
cide hurled at the American, thus
have a bitter irony. It = .the,
communists who never lost dam' 7V'U
to rule, at any cost.
The Americans,; by . c?ntraat,
lacked a clear aim from the' wart,
and lacking an aim how couldahey
find the will to achieve it?-',`Ho
himself owed his initial position to
the sponsorship of the American
Office of Strategic Services (precur-
sor of the CIA) during its anifi-colo-
nialist phase. Truman later reversed
the policy and backed the. Frenich.
But it was Eisenhower who commit-
ted America's original sin- in
Vietnam. When the French pulled
out in 1954 and the country was
partitioned, he acquiesced in the
refusal of the South to submit to, the
electoral process. That in effect
committed the US to sustaining the
Saigon regime.
If Eisenhower had fought the
Vietnam war the outcome would
have been quite different. Being a
military man, he knew that the key
to success in war is to hit the enemy
with overwhelming force and' sus-
tain it until he surrenders. The
notion of fighting a war of restraint,
with one eye on the headlines. was
to him a contradiction in terms.
who attempted to do precisely that.
Kennedy committed US troops in
tiny injections, which acted like a
vaccine to immunize the Vietminh
to the full impact of American
power as it came.
Johnson did the same with US air
power. The USAF told him it could
get results only if the air offensive
was heavy, swift, repeated endlessly.
and without restraint. With political
restrictions, it promised nothing.
Yet from start to finish. Johnson
limited the bombing by restrictions
which were entirely political. Every
Tuesday he had a lunch conference
at which he determined targets and
bomb-weights,
Thus the bombing intensified
very slowly, and the Vietminh had
time to build shelters and adjust.
When Russia sent defensive miss-
iles. US bombers were not p1lowed
to attack while the sites were under
construction: In addition to target
and bomb-weight limits, there were
16 "bombing paii.es". none of
which-evoked the slightest response, -
and no Jean :tha*-:i2- American
"peace initiatives", all ignored.
In a media democracy such as
America, to fight such a hesitant war
was to invite dissension on the
home front. It duly, came, in
1966-67, ~wXen 1,tire $jst : boast
media, ;hitherto I. eathu$iastO ' sup-
'portels,of US intervention, began to
descr1:9 In slue 'ourse.: the.' Seven
Deadly; Si is of 'the US media -
the Nett' Yoe TiMi% the '1 s6,nq-
ton Post, ff'unr?.:.Nesi'M'ek,i ABC,
CBSand NBC- stijck 'at. the rvi11'to
continue, not so much by their
editorializing as by their deeply
pessimistic and critical reporting.
Vietnam ate, lost not ;o' the
ground;,btlvn the "media. Te ,~cC
episode was th communist T t
offensive on .lanuary 30. 1968. For
the fist time the com"rhunists
conducted -a majp' offensive in the
open. Its object' was to achieve
complete tacttcalxdccess and deton
Majority supported
the war, but the
media said Jptber-is:
But the. 'Atrieiican .'-Media,
especially the TV networks, presen-.
ted it, as a decisive Communist
victory, the -.American eq ui valetst of
the disaster it tyien Bien Phil wlhiclt
led the french to Pull out, An
elaborate study by Peter Bradatup,
published it 'f977..s ws how the
media's' reversal of:'the? truth (not
deliberate, op,, the whole) ' came
about. The media siigilai y d(storted the
attitude of the:'Am eanY teople to
the war. The ti rpn;:Wtow a
platitude, that thr~tfvas ar : t
swinr" away ;frptis tfltaitrar to pu li'G
opinion. abQveoll atnorrtt~g,~,the young.:
is not true Analysis 'oli cottljlls
polls shows 'that' ;support l6r
withdrawal was?rte et' more :than.20
per cent until after thehNovember
.1968 electton,i,:by which time t e
decision to pullout had already been
taken.
Most Americans. in fact, had the
right instincts: they wanted the war
intensified, so that it could be won,
quickly. Support for this policy
was always greater among under-
35s than among older people.
Young white males were the most
consistent group backing escalation.
Johnson's popularity ratings always
rose when he piled on the military
pressure: it leapt by 14, points when
he started the bombing, then fell
gradually as people realized he was
not "bombing to kill".
Johnson's working-class Demo-
crat supporters left him not because
he .was too tough but because they
felt, rightly, he was not tough
enough. He himself finally lost heart
on March 12 1968 when his vote fell
sharply in the New Hampshire
presidential primary. He said he
Unfortunately the active phase of
nc war was conauctea b)' l so ate a Iuuu's uprising. it tatica it, bolh: %%ouia not sees reelection but would
civilians. Kennedy and J^h-- the Vieienno cnfT.,wI h's.,., n nti th^ t?..t -f h.. -.,, -
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Careful analysis of,the primary
voting figures showed that, among
anti-Johnson voters, the hawks
outnumbered the doves by three to
two. But Johnson accepted the
media's false interpretation of what
the, nation wanted. So it was not the
American people who lost stomach
for the tight; it was the American
leadership.
Hence by ere time Richard Nixon
took over the presidency early in
1969 the decision to end the war in
one way or another had effectively
been taken. Over four difficult years,
he negotiated skilfully with 'Hanoi,
in the meantime transforming the
geopolitics of the Far East by hit
new China policy. Although the tIS
military force in Vietnam was
steadily reduced, by the end of 1972
Nixon had succeeded in forcing
Hanoi to' accept two basic condi-
tions. As Henry Kissinger has
summarized them, "America would
not end the war by overthrowing an
allied government. Nor would it
forgo the right to assist peoples that
had fought valiantly at its side":.. -
On- January' 27. 4973 ? `the
"Agreement on Ending the War and
Restoring Peace in Vietnam", signed
by both sides, reserved America's
right to maintain aircraft carriers in
Indochinese waters and to use
aircraft stationed.. in Taiwan and
Thailand if Handibrokethe`accords.
So long as Nikon held ofiiee would.
have been more than .enough to'
ensure the independence l' the
South'. as : well as Laos and
Cambodia.
But Nixon.Has,soon;swept from
power by the media`ptns'cct known is
Watergate. This episode can be seen
either as one of those spasms of sell-
righteous moral hysteria-;to which,
America seems peculiarly pion or
as a deliberate ate mpt to reverse the
popular verdict offahe 172 election.-
It was a hit 'of both, probably. But
for the men in Han it Was an
ui covenantc4stf.6kCdl ~ortuand
for the Sovict~worldfgthit rall 4 vitas
thrr opportunity it had hccn wafting
for since Truman, in 1945, began the
procesti of. resisting tfleraclvance of
Communism allover .toe globe - a
collapse of American will.
It ryvas rtpt just that Nixon. a
`powelrfitl.and..wily'-pret#jldent with a
huge opular mandate,. was replaced
ah the' most difficutt.circumstances
.possible by the inexperienced Gerald
Ford,, who had not been-.elected at
all. It watt also that, temporarily at
least,-.,,wader the, impact. ,'of anti
Vietnam feeling in Congress and still
.more Watergate, the.. balance of
powe6had swung from the White
Housea61 Congress,
in 90 the, War Powers Resolu-
tion ..over Niiop'5' veto,
ifttpo ' ``' Onp. recedettiedi' restraints
on the power ofi the= president to
commit wS forces abroad. Further
limitations on, preidential foreign
policy were imposed byithe Jackson-
Vanik and Stevenson amendments
In . 19 4'4: Congress succeAfulfy
rrvent,tliie president from; taktpg,
"s in Cyprus, an to
ilq. It pail fet# the s
F,Jited- ? t- Act J Itbolishing
supp y,nIt tatted fivaikK; controts' to
limit "presidential agreements" (as
opposed to treaties) 'with foreign
powers, 6,300 of which had been
made in the 30 )ears 1946-74.
No fewer than. 33 congressional
committees, now supervised, every
aspect of the president's work in
foreign and defence policy.
Against this background, there
was little that Gerald Ford could do
when the North Vietnamese broke
the accords and launched a general
invasion of the south. Twice, in
January. and March 1975, Ford
made desperate appeals to Congress.
Congress did nothing. Saigon fell.
Then came the real genocide. We
shall never know how, many of the
people of South Vietnam were
massacred. -By 1977 a fifth of the
population was in exile, 200,000 in
political prisons. But the worst
atrocities were committed in.:Csm-
bodia by the con)munist Khmer
Rouge. which entered the capital in
mid-April. shortly before the fall of
Saigon:.
Africa pcijne, target,
in Mos6w's' new
adventu4s abroad
Between Apgql; 1975 , and the
beginning of 197'7 I00.000iCambo-
dians were cxe u ed, 20,000 died
truing to flee. 400.000 in ,.forced
c\odus from the_iOwns and.680.000
in prison campst and:' villages" - a
total of 1.2 millign,?.a.fifth, of the
population. fh t! was the . price
Indochina had,, to pay so that
NmCriclt's Fourth Estate might enjoy
unlimitk4 icence
Antdriea's humf liation ;and. the
cyidonf pllralysit bf its presidency
eneoulrigott the; Soviet .Union to
makes Ae es of forward, moves of a
kind `it;h td not -attempted since
Stalin's Idly (with the one exception
of the abortive Cuban :venture in
19622?). Africa was the prime target,
with the ultimate object ot? replacing
the white regittte ; in, South Africa
with a black, Marxist one, thus
giving Russia navel predominance
in the southern oceans and control
over the largest And most varied
deposits of minerals in the world,
after its own. I .
'In D?cembcr 19.75,, eight ?rnonths
after theSa collapse, the first
Cuban, troopp~,,,~under, Sgvicl nitval
escoFt, Ianded Ih Angdlu:. Thi node
year they moved into Ethiopia and
into Central and East Africa. By the
end of the 1970% there were ten
Marxist. African states, some with
Cuban garrisons, providing Russia
with diplomatic and propaganda
The second halt of the 1970s.
marked by growing economic 'crisis
in the West and a falling'US dollar,
were distinguished by American
paralysis or retr(;at all over the
world, and by the unremitting
,,advance by':,Russin and its surro-
Ilan ' America's most important
ally .in western Asia and the Gulf
' bandohed.?his throne to a fiercely
anti-western theocratic dictatorship
which ` immediately plunged
America into fresh humiliations.
istory is so rich =
m or, Shiite extremists
in.,mobon a chain! of.
h ??feversed the. whole
bellS11` a the Kremlin. increasingly
suttpicibtts'ef its,50:.million Muslim
subjects with their spectacularly high
birthrate. A,
In December 19794 irritated, by.
internal events,.9 Afghanistan. a.;
potential source of Muslim fuAcia-:
mentalist uhrest righton its booers,,
- and assuming. wythout : question
that the, West would no longer react.
Russia invaded and, occupicd,.thc
country, nominally at the request of
one of its political factions.
That was the turning .point.,;, he
West did react, ,Abbye all,.America .
reacted.. The p~ralys d giant, Fame
back to life. Within a,; year the
American people. by an overwhelm-
ing majority, had elected a strong
president with a clear mandate )o,
reassert the powers of the presi-
dency. restore the arms balange;pnfii
give America and. the Wash-a
vigorous leadership all over the
world:. '
Ronald Reagan has certainlydone
what the electors asked. In the
process he has done. two further
things which seerhed~scarccly. -poss-
ible when he began his election
campaign in the Spring of ?1930.
First, he . has .presided overt a
formidable revival of the American
economy which has. created . 10
million new jobs.. -.recovered US
supremacy in a rangF of advanced
tech nolog}esyapotKcyalped the dollar.
All this has led. secondly, to a
restoration of Amer tpli, Qta+e,stnd(
self confidence. Ordinary American%
have rediscovered( ; pride : ?in .. .their'
country, together with- the . will '.to
defend its interests..
In turn. Rea an' 4 first'fotir and'a
half years have forced, Russia into all
uncomfortable reapraisal 61" its
policies: The end of'the 1910s foupd
it overstretchc'tf.? once it was clear
that Afghanistan would be a heavy,
military. and tifa'ncial commitment
for many t'rsirs. ' Imncedial6ly
Reagan began to raise lIS defence
spending Moscow was forced to look
around for savings in order to give
itself financial room to respond to
the challenge
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The choice fc11 ` on southern'
Africa. Moscoll+? '' is ' no' ' loigger
prepared to. pa}* the Cuban bill, and'
its forces are being slowly excncated.
.South Almon t'uc `able-lb make,
.peace with:ita nF'i~hbgiits ajd'engage"
in a process'gf Idleim I''`ti~form."
Indeed; Mosco' .hat downgrade--
Africa as a,whott'in its schh"mes. .11"
Thus a great art'ofthe damage to
the West , which''thlloCved'the fall of
,Saigon has behn"re0d~trd; But its
destivcdive consequenccs' kre''s III
With, us. The triumph-'of communist'
North Vietnam'' brough1'ihio exist
encc one. of the frereeM at f idct''
militaristic gtatcs the world ha'S ever',
known. Vietnam has 't* onie an'
Asian Prussia. (with 1,200,0(10 men''
under arms. more per capita than
any other country.
These forces are 'a.tltlrt#tlittot'
merely to near neighbours such a
'fhailan'd and Malaysia but to no11
communist regimes throughou} a,
vast' new alt of_jr=ision, jita4 ng
through sdt,ih and south-cast Asia
deep intii 'the ~' Indian, land ' Paci4i
oceans. In 'this immense 'sector ',of
the world.' hitherto. almost, un-L'
troubled by -:Soviet geopolitics,
Moscow can set in motioh difficult-'
ics for the West at little or no cost to
iiself. The Soviet ocean-going naval'
and fishing fleets, with Vietnam
land-forces as potential assistants,.
are the physical means by which,
these difficulties can be exploited..,
Orie Opgoitunity.presents itself ;n
'Sri Lanka'. There 1s another,m New
Caledonia.' where 't
, `he FScnch, ltgvc
made an' atrrighty' hash f things (as.
they did in Indochina'. there 'is'
trouhle with Mauritius,- now ncgo-
h ating with Moscow.. The Vietna-
mese are showing - an, activq irllerest
in Vanuatu (formerly the, New
Hebrides. he Russia~s t-h iscIves
are negotiating 'rsh,inngg rights" , with
Kiribati (formerly',' Ihq i E1li~e (s
lands): and. where t he Sovi i trawlers
come their nuclear, submarines are
rarely. far behind.
At this delicate rttpm~nt.'thG N'gw
.Zealanders t- w,! ci'afer all have far
moreao 'lose then'ae 'ha've have
chosen . to put in power a'. Comic
Methodist lay-preacher whose:hrsv
major aft ftas been- to destroy, the
Anzus Tmat-v.
Hence., s hile'the psychosis 'in.
duced tby the fall of Saigon has titan
largely exortisedithe physical?legacy
remains. Irt the.' early 1070s ??we
allowed to.emerge in south-east Asia,
a political and military~.Franken-
stein influenced front.afar. by its
Soviet progenitors.- We must.bolt all
the doork' in the region that v* can.
' mT6w Nrw p b41tet,1*' '
qq p y~g y.r~
fFt9. '? yam...
.61
t(i 'i ft~
3
t~t~x~l>sil~
January 27, 1973: the four-party agreement ending the war.
Then came Watergate - and the communist onslaught
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