SINO-SOVIET SUMMIT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87-00462R000100080004-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 1, 2010
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: August 30, 1985
• Content Type: MEMO

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JCI.RC 1
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
SUBJECT: (Optional)
Sino-Soviet Summit
FROM: EXTENSION
NO.
NIC #04395-85
Herbert E. Meyer
Vice Chairman, NIC
DATE
30 August 1985
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)
DATE
OFFICER'S
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
RECEIVED
FORWARDED
INITIALS
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1.
DCI
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FORM 61 O USE PREVIOUS
I-79 EDITIONS
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THE DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
National Intelligence Council 30 August 1985
NOTE FOR THE DIRECTOR
FROM: Herbert E. Meyer
Vice Chairman, NIC
SUBJECT: Sino-Soviet Summit
In paragraph 6, Harry raises the prospect of a
Sino-Soviet Summit prior to the President's meeting
with Gorbachev on November 19th. This strikes me
as precisely the sort of stunt that Gorbachev would
try to pull: it's bold, imaginative, and it would
destabilize official Washington. Harry cites some
evidence to support his prediction and I'm having
Fritz and Carl Ford check it out. Their thoughts
will be available on Tuesday.
Herbert E. Meyer
Attachment:
Memo from Harry Cochran
dtd 28 August 1985
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28 August 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH Vice Chairman, National Intelligence Council'"'
FROM Harry C. Cochran, Special Assistant for Warning
SUBJECT Warning and Forecasting: Monthly Assessment
Soviet Summit Strategy
1. The Gorbachev leadership's planning for the November
meeting with President Reagan is based on five principal assump-
tions:
(a) There is no prospect of agreement on major political
or arms control issues; the summit therefore will be used as
a conspicuous forum for waging political warfare against the
Administration, with the specific purpose of deepening perceived
transatlantic differences over arms control policy, Western
nuclear strategy in general, and economic/trade issues;
(b) Prevailing economic and political trends in the US,
fueled by trade and budget deficits, will push Congress to
adopt protectionist measures in the next year or two that will
have damaging repercussions on US relations with West Germany,
Japan, and other major trading partners, thereby opening new
opportunities for Soviet diplomacy;
(c) The Administration is vulnerable to Soviet manipula-
tion of the linkage between SDI and the arms control process.
The Soviets are confident that they will be able to wield
stronger leverage with Western Europe on SDI than on INF deploy-
ment two years ago because of their unyielding insistence that
proceeding with SDI will destroy the entire arms control enter-
prise;
(d) West European governments, whatever their public
positions, are deeply apprehensive about the near- and long-
term consequences of SDI; the Kohl government in particular
is vulnerable because its political stock has been falling
since the CDU defeat in the North Rhine-Westphalia election
in May; political trends in the FRG can be exploited to
strengthen the Social Democratic Party's prospects in federal
elections in April 1987;
(e) Exploitation in domestic propaganda of charges that
the Administration is seeking to recover strategic superiority
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and a first-strike capability, together with a contrived atmosphere
of Soviet-US cold war tensions, will facilitate Gorbachev's
daunting task of overcoming entrenched internal resistance to
his reformist program.
2. Moscow's negative assessment of summit prospects and its
intention to sharpen efforts to discredit US policies, have been
reflected in remarks by Soviet spokesmen in the last two months
that Gorbachev is reorienting Soviet foreign policy away from
Gromyko's excessive preoccupation with the Soviet-US relationship
and shifting priorities in order to devote greater attention to
relations with Western Europe, Asia and the Pacific, the Middle
East, and the Third World in general. Gorbachev himself outlined
his foreign policy priorities in a speech at Dnepropetrovsk on
26 June, in which he relegated relations with the US to last place.
He assigned top priority to "strengthening the positions of the
countries of socialism in the world arena" and promoting their
political and military cooperation and their economic integration.
Next in importance was to "fully overcome" the "negative patch" in
Sino-Soviet relations and to-establish "good-neighborly cooperation."
Gorbachev's third priority was to support Third World struggles
for "freedom and independence," citing recent talks with leaders
of India, Syria and Nicaragua. As for relations with the US,
Gorbachev contended that "the attainment of serious accords evidently
does not enter into (Administration) plans." He dismissed the
rationale for SDI as "a fairy-tale for the gullible" and renewed
his implicit threat to break off arms control talks next year,
warning that "We simply cannot allow the talks to be used again to
secure a US strategic superiority and maintain a line of world
dominance."
3. Gorbachev's tactical approach at the summit will be calcu-
lated to "expose" the President's reluctance to address fundamental
security and political issues. He will seek to contrast the
President's plan to "set an agenda for the future" with the Soviet'
Union's detailed proposals for concrete agreements on arms control,
international security issues, and bilateral questions. After the
Shultz-Shevardnadze meeting in Helsinki on 31 July, Ambassador
Dobrynin told the press that Moscow hopes to achieve "serious
results" and "a maximum program" at the summit. Soviet accounts
reported that Shevardnadze urged that both governments focus on
"security issues," especially those related to the "prevention of
an arms race in outer space and putting an end to it on earth."
4. Gorbachev's "maximum program" will concentrate on making
the case that a prohibition of space weapons and mutual renunciation
of the "militarization" of space constitute an indispensable pre-
condition for agreements to reduce offensive nuclear weapons. The
centerpiece of his presentation will be a proposal for joint
moratoriums on research, testing, and deployment of space weapons
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and on nuclear weapons testing. These two measures will be
portrayed as an essential first step toward permanent bans on
space weapons and nuclear tests that will clear the way for
"radical reductions" (by 30 percent) in offensive systems.
5. In addition to these key proposals, Gorbachev's brief
will include some of the following initiatives:
(a) Reaffirmation of the two governments' commitments to
observe the open-ended ABM Treaty of 1972;
(b) An indefinite moratorium on ASAT testing and agreement to
scrap systems whose testing has not yet been completed;
(c) An offer to extend the unilateral Soviet moratorium on
nuclear testing beyond 1 January 1986, if the US agrees
to a reciprocal standdown. Even without a US commitment,
Moscow probably will maintain its test moratorium through
the first half of 1986 and perhaps well into 1987. The
Soviets apparently have completed tests of warheads for
the SS-24, SS-25, and SS-NX-23. The test moratorium is
aimed directly at SDI. TASS military analyst Vladimir
Bogachev recently charged that the Administration's refusal
to join the Soviet test suspension "is largely due to the
fact that a termination of testing of nuclear weapons
intended for use in outer space would seriously obstruct
the fulfillment of the American plans for Star Wars."
(d) A moratorium on deployment of both strategic weapons and
intermediate-range missiles in Europe for the duration of
the Geneva. arms control talks; during his visit to France
on 2-5 October, Gorbachev may announce an extension of
the unilateral moratorium on SS-20 deployments in western
USSR which expires in late October;
(e) A halt to the development and deployment of new types of
strategic weapons such as the SS-24 and SS-25, and the
MX and B-1;
(f) A ban on further testing and deployment of all cruise
missiles with ranges exceeding 600 kilometers;
(g) Reaffirmation of the two governments' informal commitments
to observe SALT II limits and a proposal to maintain these
commitments indefinitely after the treaty technically expires
at the end of December;
(h) An updated version of Chernenko's proposal for a "code of
conduct" for nuclear powers, with emphasis on non-interference
and non-intervention in the internal affairs of Third World
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states (aimed primarily at US policy in Central America);
(i) A proposal to convene an all-Asian conference on the model
of the European Conference on Security and Cooperation
that will negotiate agreements on nonaggression, non-use
of force, and confidence-building and security measures;
6. Prior to the summit, Foreign Minister Shevardnadze,
President Gromyko, or Gorbachev himself may visit China in a trans-
parent attempt to tilt the strategic triangle against the US.
Soviet leaders would act on the assumption that the Chinese share
with Moscow an interest in promoting an impression of steady improve-
ment in bilateral relations that will strengthen the leverage of
both governments in dealing with the US. The Soviet visitor will
stress Moscow's support for China's "one country, two systems"
formula for resolving the Taiwan question and denounce US arms
sales to Taiwan. The possibility of a high-level Soviet visit
in the next two months rests on more than the logic of Soviet and
Chinese interests, During his visit to Australia in late July,
Deputy Foreign Minister Qian Qichen described Sino-Soviet relations
as relatively stable and implied that a Soviet leader may visit
China in October. There were earlier reports that President Li
Xiannian or Politburo member Peng Zhen would pay a state visit
to Moscow late this year.
China-US-Taiwan
7. President Li Xiannian's visit to the US in late July did
not clarify Beijing's intentions on the issues of US arms sales to
Taiwan and reunification of the island with the mainland. Li and
other senior members of his delegation, however, raised these
issues repeatedly in public statements which conveyed a clear
message that the Administration should press Taiwan authorities
to move toward Beijing's terms for reunification. Li promoted
the "one country, two systems" concept as a fair solution and
urged the US to "take a clear and positive attitude in this matter."
State Councillor Ji Pengfei hinted broadly that China wants the
Administration to adopt an active mediatory role, arguing that
the US "has great influence on Taiwan" and that "there are many
things the US should and can do if it is willing." He claimed
that China has "no specific timetable" for a Taiwan settlement
but said "We hope to see the realization of reunification as soon
as possible."
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8. Ji Pengfei also claimed that the Chinese delegation did
not raise the arms sales question in Washington. If true, this
suggests that Beijing had decided in advance that Li's visit
should be limited to probing the Administration's policy and that
the occasion and timing were not auspicious for a formal demarche.
Li's failure to press the arms sales issue, however, does not
signal a retreat. Three weeks before he arrived in Washington,
China's new ambassador to the US, Han Xu, publicly warned that
the US must carry out its pledge to stop supplying weapons to
Taiwan and voiced regret at the slowness with which the sales
were being reduced,
9. Chinese media apparently did not report President Reagan's
comment to Li that the US wants the Chinese on both sides of the
Strait to solve the Taiwan question themselves without American
involvement as an intermediary. Taiwan authorities, however, were
quick to fill this gap in Beijing's coverage. Taipei radio
ridiculed Li's visit as "accomplishing practically nothing,"
having failed in particular to pressure the US to halt arms sales
or to "play the role of mediator between the two Chinas." Beijing's
one country, two systems "charade" did not "fool the Americans."
10. From a warning standpoint, there remains a better than
even chance that the Chinese, in the next six to 12 months, will
make a formal demand that the US set a specific date for ending
arms sales to Taiwan, endorse the one country, two systems formula
as a just basis for negotiations, and press the Taiwan authorities
to begin negotiations with Beijing. It seems likely that the
Chinese leadership has decided to defer this demarche until they
have had time to assess the outcome of the President's meeting
with Gorbachev. They almost certainly anticipate a sharp downturn
in US-Soviet relations following the summit and a period of harsh
recriminations that will enhance Washington's incentive to avoid
simultaneous damage to US relations with China. Beijing may then
be prepared to gamble that the Administration will yield to a
threat that if the US does not agree to end arms sales and deliver
Taiwan to reunification negotiations, China will be free to
abandon its policy of peaceful settlement.
11. In sum, Li Xiannian.'s benign performance in the US should
not be taken as a reliable indication of Beijing's state of mind
and intentions. There is circumstantial evidence that the Chinese
last spring made a decision to accelerate their drive to achieve a
breakthrough on Taiwan issues. In late May, they extracted from
President Antonio Ramalho Eanes an agreement to begin negotiations
"in the near future" on Macao's return to full Chinese sovereignty,
implying the complete removal of the Portuguese administration.
This unexpected announcement signalled an abrupt change in China's
timetable for Macao. Last October, Deng Xiaoping had told a pro-
Beijing politician from the island that "there is no hurry to
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resolve the Macao issue" and that it might not need to be addressed
for "another seven or eight years." This relaxed posture was
motivated in part by Deng's desire to avoid complications in his
delicate negotiations with the British on a Hong Kong settlement.
Now that the Hong Kong deal has been ratified and an early Macao
settlement is in sight, the Chinese will have cleared the decks
for launching an intensive campaign to break the impasse over
Taiwan before the summer of 1986.
Iraq-Iran
12. Iraq's air strikes against oil facilities on Khark
Island signal a potentially explosive escalation and an Iraqi
decision to raise the stakes in the effort to destroy Iran's
capacity to repay loans and secure new credits abroad to finance
the war. The attacks also imply a greater willingness in Baghdad
to risk significant aircraft losses and to renew strikes against
Iranian cities. If Iran's augmented air defenses on Khark succeed
in downing Iraqi aircraft, Saddam Hussein will be obliged to in-
tensify the attacks to make good his losses.
13. This prospect of a sustained Iraqi air offensive will
compel the Khomeini regime to mount unprecedented retaliatory
actions. Since Iran's air, force lacks the egpacity, to respond in
kind against Iraqi targets, Tehran will have no choice but to
escalate air and sea strikes in the Gulf against foreign ships
with cargoes bound for Iraq or to attack ports and oil facilities
in Kuwait or other Gulf states.
14. The failure of the Arab summit in Casablanca to endors-
the Jordanian-PLO peace initiative represents a damaging setback
for King Hussein and Arafat. It will embolden the Syrians to move
more aggressively against them. Abortive attempts to assassinate
Arafat in Casablanca and Sana were harbingers of tougher Syrian
efforts to destroy Arafat's leadership and bring the PLO under
tight Syrian control. Fatah in turn will intensify terrorist
strikes against Syrian officials in Damascus, Europe and North
Afiica. An upsurge in internecine warfare between rival Palestinian
factions and Syrian reprisals against Fatah and Jordan will generate
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greater unrest in the West Bank and Palestinian attacks on Israeli
citizens. Escalating violence will fuel the growing momentum of
ultra-rightist sentiment in Israel represented by Meir Kahane's
movement, reducing even further Israel's ability to be responsive
to the Administration's policy.
Nicaragua
15. Sandinista tactics in the next three to six months will
focus on exploiting the Contadora Group's renewed sense of urgency
to secure a settlement before FDN advances into Nicaragua's economic
and agricultural heartland trigger an escalation. On the one hand,
Managua will repeat its strategem last fall of announcing readiness
to sign a new Contadora draft treaty. The Sandinistas will be
encouraged to play this card by the decision of Argentina, Brazil,
Peru, and Uruguary to form a support group to assist the Contadora
governments. A Nicaraguan announcement may be timed to coincide
with Contadora missions to Washington and Havana.
16. On the other hand, the Sandinistas may attempt to bring
matters to a head by staging larger and more frequent cross-border
raids against contra bases in Honduras and Costa Rica. Their
failure to block FDN infiltration in border regions and growing
casualties among their forces may prompt ill-considered military
initiatives that would alienate Contadora and undercut Managua's
political strategy. In any event, the Sandinistas will be operating
under unprecedented pressures in the next few months, and this
climate may produce surprises as they attempt to recover the
military initiativec::and inflict damaging defeats on the contras.
El Salvador
17. With battlefield trends flowing against them, FMLN
commanders will resort to bolder and more frequent terrorist actions
against Salvadoran and American officials in increasingly desperate
attempts to provoke a rightwing backlash. Statements in early
July and mid-August stressed an intent to concentrate on "economic
and political destabilization" in heavily populated areas. The
insurgents will seek to force President Duarte to resume talks that
were broken off last November by trying to exploit growing left-wing
union and student grievances and strikes against the government.
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The FMLN reportedly is sending increasing numbers of guerrillas
into towns and cities for political agitation and organization.
The outlook in the next six months therefore is for more strikes,
.protest demonstrations, kidnapings, and attacks on local and
US officials.
18. There will be strong potential for political upheaval
if the government acts on its plan to introduce campus "stabiliza-
tion" legislation this fall that provides new authority to crack
down on student militants. Although President Chun Doo Hwan
decided in mid-August not to force a vote during a special session
of the National Assembly, he cannot afford a second retreat on
this volatile issue. He had purged several moderate leaders of
the ruling party who opposed the legislation. The opposition
New Korea Democratic Party had organized nation-wide,-,struggle
against the bill, and its assemblymen were considering a provocative
sit-in to prevent the government from taking a vote. The opposi-
tion has Vowed to mobilize again to defeat the measure this fall.
A government move to force the issue almost certainly will trigger
extensive campus violence and a major political test of strength
in Seoul. If the government is compelled to employ military forces
to control the situation, there would be a substantial chance of
an Army coup to remove Chun Doo Hwan.
Southern Africa
19. The formation of a new federation of black labor unions
representing 500,000 workers may signal a major turning point in
the politicization of the black majority. The strike by the
National Union of Mineworkers on 1 September will force a crucial
test of strength =which could rapidly escalate into a general
strike of black workers demanding far-reaching political concessions.
Mass dismissals of strikers could provide the spark to precipitate
an unmanageable breakdown in public order. Escalating violence
will lead to a sharp deterioration of South Africa's relations with
neighboring black states, and there will be a high probability of
renewed military operations against Botswana, Lesotho, Angola,
and Mozambique.
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