DOD DIRECTIVE 5200.30, GUIDELINES FOR SYSTEMATIC DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION IN PERMANENTLY VALUABLE DOD RECORDS, MARCH 21, 1983

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87-00181R000100170002-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 17, 2010
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: April 12, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2010/11/30: CIA-RDP87-00181 R0001 00170002-8
6
40
MEMORANDUM FOR Director of Information Services
Directorate of Administration
Central Intelligence Agency
12 April 1983
SUBJECT: DoD Directive 5200.30, "Guidelines for Systematic Declassifi-
cation Review of Classified Information in Permanently Valua-
ble DoD Records," March 21, 1983
Thank you for 23 March 1983 letter and "Guidelines for Identifying and
Handling CIA Information During Declassification Review of Records from
the Period 1946-1954." I am providing a copy of your letter and guide-
lines to appropriate DoD Components.
Enclosed for your information is a copy of this Department's recently
revised DoD Directive 5200.30 issued in implementation of Executive
Order 12356, "National Security Information."
Arthur E. Fajans
Acting Director oftIy(formation
Security
Approved For Release 2010/11/30: CIA-RDP87-00181 R000100170002-8
 Approved For Release 2010/11/30: CIA-RDP87-00181 R0001 00170002-8
?
?
March 21, 1983
NUMBER 5200.30
Department of Defense Directive USD(P)
?
SUBJECT: Guidelines for Systematic Declassification Review of
Classified Information in Permanently Valuable DoD
Records
References: (a) DoD Directive 5200.30, "Guidelines for Systematic
Review of 20-Year-Old Classified Information in
Permanently Valuable DoD Records," September 9,
1981 (hereby canceled)
(b) Executive Order 12356, "National Security Informa-
tion," April 2, 1982
(c) Information Security Oversight Office Directive No. 1
Concerning National Security Information, June 23,
1982
(d) through (g), see enclosure 1
A. REISSUANCE AND PURPOSE
This Directive reissues reference (a); establishes procedures
and assigns responsibilities for the systematic declassification
review of information classified under references (b) and (c), DoD
Directive 5200.1 and DoD 5200.1-R (references (d) and (e)), and prior
orders, directives, and regulations governing security classification;
and implements section 3.3 of reference (b).
B. APPLICABILITY AND SCOPE
1. This Directive applies to the Office of the Secretary of
Defense (OSD) and to activities assigned to the OSD for administra-
tive support, the Military Departments, the Organization of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Unified and Specified Commands, and the
Defense Agencies (hereafter referred to collectively as "DoD
Components").
2. This Directive applies to the systematic review of per-
manently valuable classified information, developed by or for the
Department of Defense and its Components, or its predecessor com-
ponents and activities, that is under the exclusive or final
original classification jurisdiction of the Department of Defense.
3. Its provisions do not cover Restricted Data or Formerly
Restricted Data under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (reference (f))
or information in nonpermanent records.
4. Systematic declassification review of records pertaining to
intelligence activities (including special activities) or intelli-
gence sources or methods shall be in accordance with special pro-
cedures issued by the Director of Central Intelligence.
Approved For Release 2010/11/30: CIA-RDP87-00181 R000100170002-8
 Approved For Release 2010/11/30: CIA-RDP87-00181 R0001 00170002-8
C. DEFINITIONS
1. Cryptologic Information. Information pertaining to or resulting from
the activities and operations involved in the production of signals intelligence
(SIGINT) or to the maintenance of communications security (COMSEC).
2. Foreign Government Information. Information that is provided to the
United States by a foreign government or governments, an international organi-
zation of governments, or any element thereof with the expectation, expressed
or implied, that the information, the source of the information, or both are
to be held in confidence; or produced by the United States pursuant to or as
a result of a joint arrangement with a foreign government or governments,
an international organization of governments, or any element thereof requiring
that the information, the arrangement, or both are to be held in confidence.
3. Intelligence Method. Any process, mode of analysis, means of gathering
data, or processing system or equipment used to produce intelligence.
4. Intelligence Source. A person or technical means that provides intel-
ligence.
D. POLICY
It is the policy of the Department of Defense to assure that information
that warrants protection against unauthorized disclosure is properly classified
and safeguarded as well as to facilitate the flow of unclassified information
about DoD operations to the public.
E. PROCEDURES
1. DoD classified information that is permanently valuable, as defined
by 44 U.S.C. 2103 (reference (g)), that has been accessioned into the National
Archives of the United States, will be reviewed systematically for declassifi-
cation by the Archivist of the United States, with the assistance of the DoD
personnel designated for that purpose, as it becomes 30 years old; however,
file series concerning intelligence activities (including special activities)
created after 1945, intelligence sources or methods created after 1945, and
cryptology records created after 1945 will be reviewed as they become 50
years old.
2. All other DoD classified information and foreign government information
that is permanently valuable and in the possession or control of DoD Components,
including that held in federal records centers or other storage areas, may be
reviewed systematically for declassification by the DoD Component exercising
control of such information.
3. DoD classified information and foreign government information in the
possession or control of DoD Components shall be declassified when they ' _come
30 years old, or 50 years old in the case of DoD intelligence activities
(including special activities) created after 1945, intelligence sources or
methods created after 1945, or cryptology created after 1945, if they are not
within one of the categories specified in enclosure 2 or 3.
Approved For Release 2010/11/30: CIA-RDP87-00181 R000100170002-8
 Approved For Release 2010/11/30: CIA-RDP87-00181 R0001 00170002-8
0 0 Mar 21, 83
?
4. Systematic review for declassification shall be in accordance with
procedures contained in DoD 5200.1-R (reference (e)). Information that falls
within any of the categories in enclosures 2 and 3 shall be declassified if the
designated DoD reviewer determines, in light of the declassification consider-
ations contained in enclosure 4, that classification no longer is required.
In the absence of such a declassification determination, the classification of
the information shall continue as long as required by national security con-
siderations.
5. Before any declassification or downgrading action, DoD information
under review should be coordinated with the Department of State on subjects
cited in enclosure 5, and with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) on subjects
cited in enclosure 6.
F. RESPONSIBILITIES
1. The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy shall:
a. Exercise oversight and policy supervision over the implementation
of this Directive.
b. Request DoD Components to review enclosures 2 and 4 of this
Directive every 5 years.
c. Revise enclosures 2 and 4 to ensure they meet DoD needs.
d. Authorize, when appropriate, other federal agencies to apply
this Directive to DoD information in their possession.
2. The Head of each DoD Component shall:
a. Recommend changes to the enclosures of this Directive.
?
b. Propose, with respect to specific programs, projects, and systems
under his or her classification jurisdiction, supplements to enclosures 2 and
4 of this Directive.
c. Provide advice and designate experienced personnel to provide
timely assistance to the Archivist of the United States in the systematic
review of records under this Directive.
3. The Director, National Security Agency/Chief, Central Security Service
(NSA/CSS), shall develop, for approval by the Secretary of Defense, special
procedures for systematic review and declassification of classified cryptologic
information.
4. The Archivist of the United States is authorized to apply this Directive
when reviewing DoD classified information that has been accessioned into the
Archives of the United States.
Approved For Release 2010/11/30: CIA-RDP87-00181 R000100170002-8
 Approved For Release 2010/11/30: CIA-RDP87-00181 R0001 00170002-8
G. EFFECTIVE DATE
This Directive is effective immediately.
PAUL THAYER
Deputy Secre~4ry of Defense
Enclosures - 6
1. References
2. Categories of Information That Require Review Before
Declassification
3. General Guidelines for Systematic Declassification Review
of Foreign Government Information
4. Declassification Considerations
5. Department of State Areas of Interest
6. Central Intelligence Agency Areas of Interest
Approved For Release 2010/11/30: CIA-RDP87-00181 R000100170002-8
 Approved For Release 2010/11/30: CIA-RDP87-00181 R0001 00170002-8
?
?
?
Mar 21, 83
5200.30 (Encl 1)
REFERENCES, continued
(d) DoD Directive 5200.1, "DoD Information Security Program," June 7, 1982
(e) DoD 5200.1-R, "Information Security Program Regulation," August 1982,
authorized by DoD Directive 5200.1, June 7, 1982
(f) Public Law 83-703, Atomic Energy Act of 1954
(g) Title 44, United States Code, Section 2103
Approved For Release 2010/11/30: CIA-RDP87-00181 R000100170002-8
 Approved For Release 2010/11/30: CIA-RDP87-00181 R0001 00170002-8
Mar 21, 83
5200.30 (Encl 2)
?
?
CATEGORIES OF INFORMATION THAT REQUIRE REVIEW BEFORE DECLASSIFICATION
The following categories of information shall be reviewed systematically for
declassification by designated DoD reviewers in accordance with this Directive:
1. Nuclear propulsion information.
2. Information concerning the establishment, operation, and support of the
U.S. Atomic Energy Detection System.
3. Information concerning the safeguarding of nuclear materials or facilities.
4. Information that could affect the conduct of current or future U.S. for-
eign relations. (Also see enclosure 5.)
5. Information that could affect the current or future military usefulness of
policies, programs, weapon systems, operations, or plans when such information
would reveal courses of action, concepts, tactics, or techniques that are used
in current operations plans.
6. Research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) of chemical and biolog-
ical weapons and defensive systems; specific identification of chemical and
biological agents and munitions; chemical and biological warfare plans; and U.S.
vulnerability to chemical or biological warfare attack.
7. Information about capabilities, installations, exercises, research, develop-
ment, testing and evaluation, plans, operations, procedures, techniques, organi-
zation, training, sensitive liaison and relationships, and equipment concerning
psychological operations; escape, evasion, rescue and recovery, insertion, and
infiltration and exfiltration; cover and support; deception; unconventional
warfare and special operations; and the personnel assigned to or engaged in
these activities.
8. Information that reveals sources or methods of intelligence or counter-
intelligence, counterintelligence activities, special activities, identities of
clandestine human agents, methods of special operations, analytical techniques
for the interpretation of intelligence data, and foreign intelligence reporting.
This includes information that reveals the overall scope, processing rates, time-
liness, and accuracy of intelligence systems and networks, including the means of
interconnecting such systems and networks and their vulnerabilities.
9. Information that relates to intelligence activities conducted jointly by
the Department of Defense with other federal agencies or to intelligence
activities conducted by other federal agencies in which the Department of
Defense has provided support. (Also see enclosure 6.)
a. Design features, capabilities, and limitations (such as antijam charac-
teristics, physical survivability features, command and control design details,
design vulnerabilities, or vital parameters).
Approved For Release 2010/11/30: CIA-RDP87-00181 R000100170002-8
 Approved For Release 2010/11/30: CIA-RDP87-00181 R0001 00170002-8
b. Concepts of operation, orbital characteristics, orbital support meth-
ods, network configurations, deployments, ground support facility locations,
and force structure.
12. Information that reveals operational communications equipment and systems:
a. Electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCM) design features or performance
capabilities.
b. Vulnerability and susceptibility to any or all types of electronic warfare.
13. Information concerning electronic intelligence, telemetry intelligence, and
electronic warfare (electronic warfare support measures, electronic counter-
measures (ECM), and ECCM) or related activities, including:
a. Information concerning or revealing nomenclatures, functions, technical
characteristics, or descriptions of foreign communications and electronic
equipment, its employment or deployment, and its association with weapon systems
or military operations.
b. Information concerning or revealing the processes, techniques, opera-
tions, or scope of activities involved in acquiring, analyzing, and evaluating
the above information, and the degree of success obtained.
14. Information concerning Department of the Army systems listed in attachment 1.
15. Information concerning Department of the Navy systems listed in attachment 2.
16. Information concerning Department of the Air Force systems listed in attach-
ment 3.
17. Cryptologic information (including cryptologic sources and methods). This
includes information concerning or revealing the processes, techniques, opera-
tions, and scope of SIGINT comprising communications intelligence, electronics
intelligence, and telemetry intelligence; and the cryptosecurity and emission
security components of COMSEC, including the communications portion of cover
and deception plans.
a. Recognition of cryptologic information may not always be an easy task.
There are several broad classes of cryptologic information, as follows:
(1) Those that relate to COMSEC. In documentary form, they provide
COMSEC guidance or information. Many COMSEC documents and materials are
accountable under the Communications Security Material Control System. Examples
are items bearing transmission security (TSEC) nomenclature and crypto keying
material for use in enciphering communications and other COMSEC documentation
such as National COMSEC Instructions, National COMSEC/Emanations Security (EMSEC)
Information Memoranda, National COMSEC Committee Policies, COMSEC Resources
Program documents, COMSEC Equipment Engineering Bulletins, COMSEC Equipment
System Descriptions, and COMSEC Technical Bulletins.
Approved For Release 2010/11/30: CIA-RDP87-00181 R000100170002-8
 Approved For Release 2010/11/30: CIA-RDP87-00181 R0001 00170002-8
? ? Mar 21, 83
?
?
?
(2) Those that relate to SIGINT. These appear as reports in various
formats that bear security classifications, sometimes followed by five-letter
codewords (World War II's ULTRA, for example) and often carrying warning caveats
such as "This document contains codeword material" and "Utmost secrecy is neces-
sary..." Formats may appear as messages having addressees, "from" and "to"
sections, and as summaries with SIGINT content with or without other kinds of
intelligence and comment.
(3) RDT&E reports and information that relate to either COMSEC or SIGINT.
b. Commonly used words that may help in identification of cryptologic
documents and materials are "cipher," "code," "codeword," "communications in-
telligence" or "COMINT," "communications security" or "COMSEC," "cryptanalysis,"
"crypto," "cryptography," "cryptosystem," "decipher," "decode," "decrypt,"
"direction finding," "electronic intelligence" or "FLINT," "electronic security,"
"encipher," "encode," "encrypt," "intercept," "key book," "signals intelligence"
or "SIGINT," "signal security," and "TEMPEST."
Attachments - 3
1. Department of the Army Systems
2. Department of the Navy Systems
3. Department of the Air Force Systems
Approved For Release 2010/11/30: CIA-RDP87-00181 R000100170002-8
 Approved For Release 2010/11/30: CIA-RDP87-00181 R0001 00170002-8
? ?Mar 21, 83
?
?
?
CATEGORIES OF INFORMATION THAT REQUIRE REVIEW BEFORE DECLASSIFICATION
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY SYSTEMS
The following categories of Army information shall be reviewed systematically
for declassification by designated DoD reviewers in accordance with this Direc-
tive.
1. Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) missile information, including the princi-
ple of operation of warheads (fuzing, arming, firing, and destruct operations);
quality or reliability requirements; threat data; vulnerability; ECM and ECCM;
details of design, assembly, and construction; and principle of operations.
2. BMD systems data, including the concept definition (tentative roles, threat
definition, and analysis and effectiveness); detailed quantitative technical
system description-revealing capabilities or unique weaknesses that are exploit-
able; overall assessment of specific threat-revealing vulnerability or capabil-
ity; discrimination technology; and details of operational concepts.
3. BMD optics information that may provide signature characteristics of U.S.
and United Kingdom ballistic weapons.
4. Shaped-charge technology.
5. Fleshettes.
6. M380 Beehive round.
7. Electromagnetic propulsion technology.
8. Space weapons concepts.
9. Radar-fuzing programs.
10. Guided projectiles technology.
11. ECM and ECCM to weapons systems.
12. Armor materials concepts, designs, or research.
13. 2.75-inch Rocket System.
14. Air Defense Command and Coordination System (AN/TSQ-51).
15. Airborne Target Acquisition and Fire Control System.
16. Chaparral Missile System.
17. Dragon Guided Missile System Surface Attack, M47.
18. Forward Area Alerting Radar (FAAR) System.
Approved For Release 2010/11/30: CIA-RDP87-00181 R000100170002-8
 Approved For Release 2010/11/30: CIA-RDP87-00181 R0001 00170002-8
19. Ground laser desig.,ators.
20. Hawk Guided Missile System.
21. Heliborne, Laser, Air Defense Suppression and Fire and Forget Guided
Missile System (HELLFIRE).
22. Honest John Missile System.
23. Lance Field Artillery Missile System.
24. Land Combat Support System (LCSS).
25. M22 (SS-11 ATGM) Guided Missile System, Helicopter Armament Subsystem.
26. Guided Missile System, Air Defense (NIKE HERCULES with Improved Capabili-
ties with HIPAR and ANTIJAM Improvement).
27. Patriot Air Defense Missile System.
28. Pershing IA Guided Missile System.
29. Pershing II Guided Missile System.
30. Guided Missile System, Intercept Aerial M41 (REDEYE) and Associated Equip-
ment.
31. U.S. Roland Missile System.
32. Sergeant Missile System (less warhead) (as pertains to electronics and
penetration aids only).
33. Shillelagh Missile System.
34. Stinger/Stinger-Post Guided Missile System (FIM-92A).
35. Terminally Guided Warhead (TWG) for Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS).
36. TOW Heavy Antitank Weapon System.
37. Viper Light Antitank/Assault Weapon System.
Approved For Release 2010/11/30: CIA-RDP87-00181 R000100170002-8
 Approved For Release 2010/11/30: CIA-RDP87-00181 R0001 00170002-8
. 0 Mar 21, 83
5200.30 (Att 2 to Encl 2)
?
CATEGORIES OF INFORMATION THAT REQUIRE REVIEW BEFORE DECLASSIFICATION
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY SYSTEMS
The following categories of Navy information shall be reviewed systematically
for declassification by designated DoD reviewers in accordance with this
Directive.
1. Naval nuclear propulsion information.
2. Conventional surface ship information:
a. Vulnerabilities of protective systems, specifically:
(1) Passive protection information concerning ballistic torpedo and
underbottom protective systems.
(2) Weapon protection requirement levels for conventional, nuclear, bio-
logical, or chemical weapons.
(3) General arrangements, drawings, and booklets of general plans
(applicable to carriers only).
b. Ship-silencing information relative to:
is
?
(1) Signatures (acoustic, seismic, infrared, magnetic (including alter-
nating magnetic (AM)), pressure, and underwater electric potential (UEP)).
(2) Procedures and techniques for noise reduction pertaining to an
individual ship's component.
(3) Vibration data relating to hull and machinery.
c. Operational characteristics related to performance as follows:
(1) Endurance or total fuel capacity.
(2) Tactical information, such as times for ship turning, zero to maxi-
mum speed, and maximum to zero speed.
3. All information that is uniquely applicable to nuclear-powered surface
ships or submarines.
4. Information concerning diesel submarines as follows:
a. Ship-silencing data or acoustic warfare systems relative to:
(1) Overside, platform, and sonar noise signature.
(2) Radiated noise and echo response.
(3) All vibration data.
Approved For Release 2010/11/30: CIA-RDP87-00181 R000100170002-8
 Approved For Release 2010/11/30: CIA-RDP87-00181 R0001 00170002-8
(4) Seismic, magnetic (including AM), pressure, a..d UEP signature data.
b. Details of operational assignments, that is, war plans, antisubmarine
warfare (ASW), and surveillance tasks.
c. General arrangements, drawings, and plans of SS563 class submarine
hulls.
5. Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS) data.
6. Information concerning mine warfare, mine sweeping, and mine counter-
measures.
7. ECM or ECCM features and capabilities of any electronic equipment.
8. Torpedo information as follows:
a. Torpedo countermeasures devices: T-MK6 (FANFARE) and NAE beacons.
b. Tactical performance, tactical doctrine, and vulnerability to counter-
measures.
9. Design performance and functional characteristics of guided missiles,
guided projectiles, sonars, radars, acoustic equipments, and fire control
systems.
Approved For Release 2010/11/30: CIA-RDP87-00181 R000100170002-8
 Approved For Release 2010/11/30: CIA-RDP87-00181 R0001 00170002-8
0 5 30 (Att 3 to Encl 2)
? CATEGORIES OF INFORMATION THAT REQUIRE REVIEW BEFORE DECLASSIFICATION
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE SYSTEMS
The Department of the Air Force has determined that the categories identified
in enclosure 2 of this Directive shall apply to Air Force information.
?
Approved For Release 2010/11/30: CIA-RDP87-00181 R0001 00170002-8
 Approved For Release 2010/11/30: CIA-RDP87-00181 R0001 00170002-8
?
?
Marl, 83
5200.30 (Encl 3)
Monday
January 31, 1983
Part I I I
?
Information Security
Oversight Office
National Security Information; General
Guidelines for Systematic Declassification
Review of Foreign Government
Information; Final Rule
?
Approved For Release 2010/11/30: CIA-RDP87-00181 R000100170002-8
 Approved For Release 2010/11/30: CIA-RDP87-00181 R0001 00170002-8
Federal Register / Vol. 48, No. 21 / Monday, January 31, 1983 / Rules and Regulations
INFORMATION SECURITY OVERSIGHT
OFFICE
National Security Information; General
Guidelines for Systematic
Declassification Review of Foreign
Government Information
AGENCY: Information Security Oversight
Office (ISOO).
ACTION: Final rule.
SUMMARY: The Information Security
Oversight Office is revising its guideline
which relate to the systematic
declassification review of foreign
government information. These
guidelines are issued pursuant to the
provisions of Section 3.3 of Executive
Order 12356, which superseded
Executive Order 12065. The Executive
Order prescribes a uniform information
security system; it also requires the
establishment of guidelines for the
systematic declassification review of
certain information. The purpose of
these guidelines is to assist in
implementing Executive Order 12356.
EFFECTIVE DATE: January 31, 1983.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Steven Garfinkel, Director, ISOO,
Telephone: [phone].
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
List of Subjects in 32 CFR Part 2002
Archives and records, classified
information, Executive orders,
Information, Intelligence, National
defense, National security information,
Presidential documents, Security
information.
Title 32 of the Code of Federal
Regulations, Part 2002, is revised as
follows:
PART 2002-GENERAL GUIDELINES
FOR SYSTEMATIC
DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW OF
FOREIGN GOVERNMENT
INFORMATION
Sec.
2002.1 Purpose.
2002.2 Definition.
2002.3 Scope.
2002.4 Responsibilities.
2002.5 Effect of publication.
2002.6 Categories requiring item-by-item
review.
2002.7 Referral and decision.
2002.8 Downgrading.
Authority: Sec. 3.3. E.O. 12356, 47 FR 14874,
April 8. 1982.
? 2002.1 Purpose.
These general guidelines for the
systematic declassification review of
foreign government information have
been developed in accordance with the
provisions of Section 3.3 of Executive
Order 12356, "National Security
Information," and Section 2001.31,of
Information Security Oversight Office
Directive No. 1. All foreign government
information that has been incorporated
into the permanently valuable records of
the United States Government and that
has been accessioned into the National
Archives of the United States shall be
systematically reviewed for
declassification by the Archivist of,the
United States. Declassification reviews
shall be conducted in accordance with
the provisions of these general
guidelines or, if available, in accordance
with specific systematic review
guidelines for foreign government
information provided by the agency
heads who have declassification
authority over that information. All
foreign government information (a) not
identified in ? 2002.6 of these general
guidelines or in specific agency
guidelines as requiring item-by-item
declassification review and final
determination by an agency
declassification authority, and (b) for
which a prior declassification date has
not been established, shall be
declassified as that information
becomes thirty years old.
? 2002.2 Definition.
"Foreign government information" as
used in these guidelines means:
(a) Information provided by a foreign
government or governments, an
international organization of
governments, or any element thereof
with the expectation, expressed or
implied, that the information, the:source
of the information, or both, are to be
held in confidence; or
(b) Information produced by the
United States pursuant to or as a result
of a joint arrangement with a foreign
government or governments or an
international organization of
governments, or any element thereof,
requiring that the information, the
arrangement, or both, are to be held in
confidence.
? 2002.3 Scope.
(a) These guidelines apply to foreign
government information that has been
received or classified by the United
States Government or its agents, and
has been incorporated into records
determined by the Archivist of the
United States to have permanent value.
(b) Atomic energy information
(including information originated prior
to 1947 and not marked as such;
information received from the United
Kingdom or Canada marked "Atomic,"
or information received from NATO
marked "Atomal") that is defined and
identified as "Restricted Data" or
"Formerly Restricted Data" in Sections
ily and 142d of the Atomic Energy Act
of 1954, as amended, is outside the
scope of these guidelines. Such
information is not subject to systematic
review and may not be automatically
downgraded or declassified. Any
document containing information within
the definition of "Restricted Data" or
"Formerly Restricted Data" that is not
so marked shall be referred to the
Department of Energy Office of
Classification for review and
appropriate marking, except for
licensing and related regulatory matters
which shall be referred to the Division
of Security, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission.
? 2002.4 Responsibilities.
(a) Foreign government information
transferred to the General Services
Administration for accession into the
National Archives of the United States
shall be reviewed by the Archivist of the
United States for declassification in
accordance with Executive Order 12356.
the directives of the Information
Security Oversight Office, these general
guidelines, and any specific systematic
declassification guidelines provided by
the agency with declassification
authority over the information.
(b) Accessioned foreign government
information in file series concerning
intelligence activities (including special
activities), or intelligence sources or
methods created after 1945, and
cryptology records created after 1945,
shall be subject to review by the
Archivist for declassification as it
becomes 50 years old. All other
accessioned foreign government
information shall be subject to review
by the Archivist for declassification as it
becomes 30 years old.
(c) Agency heads who have
declassification jurisidiction over
permanently valuable foreign
government information in agency
records not yet accessioned into the
National Archives of the United States
are encouraged to conduct systematic
declassification reviews of it in
accordance with the time limits
specified in paragraph (b) of this
section. These reviews shall comply
with the provisions of Executive Order
12356, the directives of the Information
Security Oversight Office, these general
guidelines, and specific agency
systematic review guidelines that have
been issued-in consultation with the
Archivist of the United States and the
ISOO Director.
Approved For Release 2010/11/30: CIA-RDP87-00181 R000100170002-8
 Approved For Release 2010/11/30: CIA-RDP87-00181 R0001 00170002-8
?
is
?
?
is
Mar 21, 83
5200.30 (Encl 3)
Federal Register / Vol. 48, No. 21 / Monday, January 31, 1983 / Rules and Regulations 4403
(d) Foreign government information
falling within any of the categories listed
in 12002.6 of these guidelines shall be
declassified or downgraded only upon
specific authorization of the agency that
has declassification authority over it.
Such information shall be referred to the
responsible agency(ies) for review.
Information so referred shall remain
classified until the responsible
agency(ies) has declassified it. If the
responsible agency cannot be readily
identified from the document or
material, referral shall be made in
accordance with 12002.7 of these
guidelines.
(e) When required, the agency having
declassification authority over the
information shall consult with foreign
governments concerning its proposed
declassification.
? 2002.5 Effect of publication.
(a) Foreign government information
shall be considered declassified when
published in an unclassified United
States Government executive branch
publication (e.g., the Foreign Relations
of the United States series) or when
cleared for publication by United States
Government executive branch officials
authorized to declassify the information;
or if officially published as unclassified
by the foreign government(s) or
international organization(s) of
governments that furnished the
information unless the fact of the U.S.
Government's possession of the
information requires continued
protection.
(b) The unofficial publication, in the
United States or abroad, of foreign
government information contained in
classified United States or foreign
documents does not in or of itself
constitute or permit the declassification
of such information. Although prior
unofficial publication is a factor to be
considered in the systematic review
process, there may be valid reasons for
continued protection of the information
which could preclude its
declassification. In particular, the
classification status of foreign
government information which concerns
or derives from intelligence activities
(including special activities), intelligence
sources or methods shall not be affected
by any unofficial publication of identical
or related information. The final
declassification determination shall be
made by the agency or agencies having
declassification authority over it.
? 2002.6 Categories requiring Item-by-Item
review.
Foreign government information
falling into the following categories
require item-by-item review for
declassification by agencies having
declassification authority over it.
(a) Information exempted from
declassification under any joint
arrangement evidenced by an exchange
of letters, memorandum of
understanding, or other written record,
with the foreign government or
international organization of
governments, or element(s) thereof, that
furnished the information. Questions
concerning the existence or applicability
of such arrangements shall be referred
to the agency or agencies having
declassification authority over the
records under review.
(b) Information related to the
safeguarding of nuclear materials or
facilities, foreign and domestic,
including but not necessarily limited to
vulnerabilities and vulnerability
assessments of nuclear facilities and
Special Nuclear Material.
(c) Nuclear arms control information
(see also paragraph (k) of this section).
(d) Information regarding foreign
nuclear programs (other than
"Restricted Data" and "Formerly
Restricted Data"), such as:
(1) Nuclear weapons testing.
(2) Nuclear weapons storage and
stockpile.
(3) Nuclear weapons effects, hardness,
and vulnerability.
(4) Nuclear weapons safety.
(5) Cooperation in nuclear programs
including, but not limited to, peaceful
and military applications of nuclear
energy.
(6) Exploration, production and import
of uranium and thorium from foreign
countries.
(e) Information concerning
intelligence activities (including special
activities) or intelligence or
counterintelligence sources or methods
including but not limited to intelligence,
counterintelligence and covert action
programs, plans, policies, operations, or
assessments; or which would reveal or
identify:
(1) Any present, past or prospective
undercover personnel, installation, unit,
or clandestine human agent, of the
United States or a foreign government;
(2) Any present, past or prospective
method, procedure, mode, technique or
requirement used or being developed by
the United States or by foreign
governments, individually or in
combination to produce, acquire,
transmit, analyze, correlate, assess,
evaluate or process intelligence or
counterintelligence, or to support an
intelligence or counterintelligence
source, operation, or activity;
(3) The present, past or proposed
existence of any joint United States and
foreign government intelligence,
counterintelligence, or covert action
activity or facility, or the nature thereof.
(For guidance on protecting United
States foreign intelligence liaison
relationships, see Director of Central
Intelligence Directive "Security
Classification Guidance and Foreign
Security Services," effective January 18,
1982.)
(f) Information that could result in or
lead to actions which would place an
individual in jeopardy attributable to
disclosure of the information, including
but not limited to:
(1) Information identifying any
individual or organization as a
confidential source of intelligence or
counterintelligence.
(2) Information revealing the identity
of an intelligence or covert action agent
or agents.
(3) Information identifying any
individual or organization used to
develop or support intelligence,
counterintelligence, or covert action
agents, sources or activities.
(g) Information about foreign
individuals, organizations or events
which if disclosed, could be expected to:
(1) Adversely affect a foreign
country's or international organization's
present or future relations with the
United States.
(2) Adversely affect present or future
confidential exchanges beween the
United States and any foreign
government or international
organization of governments.
(h) Information related to plans
(whether executed or not, whether
presented in whole or in part), programs,
operations, negotiations, and
assessments shared by one or several
foreign governments with the United
States, including but not limited to those
involving the territory, political regime
or government of another country, and
which if disclosed could be expected to
adversely affect the conduct of U.S.
foreign policy or the conduct of another
country's foreign policy with respect to a
third country or countries. This item
would include contigency plans, plans
for covert political, military or
paramilitary activities or operations by
a foreign government acting alone or
jointly with the United States
Government, and positions or actions
taken by a foreign government alone or
jointly with the United States
concerning border disputes or other
territorial issues.
(i) Information concerning
arrangements with respect to foreign
basing of cryptologic operations and/or
foreign policy considerations relating
thereto.
Approved For Release 2010/11/30: CIA-RDP87-00181 R000100170002-8
 Approved For Release 2010/11/30: CIA-RDP87-00181 R0001 00170002-8
Federal Register / Vol. 48, No. 21 / Monday, January 31, 1983 / Rules and Regulations
(j) Scientific information such as that
concerning space, energy, climatology,
communications, maritime, undersea,
and polar projects, the disclosure of
which could be expected to adversely
affect current and/or future exchanges
of such information between the United
States and any foreign governments or
international organizations of
governments.
(k) Information on foreign policy
aspects of nuclear matters, the
disclosure of which could be expected to
adversely affect cooperation between
one or more foreign governments and
the United States Government.
(1) Information concerning physical
security arrangements, plans or
equipment for safeguarding United
States Government embassies, missions
or facilities abroad, the disclosure of
which could reasonably be expected to
increase the vulnerability of such
facilities to penetration, attack, take-
over, and the like.
(m) Nuclear propulsion information.
(n) Information concerning the
establishment, operation, and support of
nuclear detection systems.
(o) Information concerning or
revealing military or paramilitary
escape, evasion, cover or deception
plans, procedures, and techniques,
whether executed or not.
(p) Information which could adversely
affect the current or future usefullness of
military defense policies, programs,
weapons systems, operations, or plans.
(q) Information concerning research,
development, testing and evaluation of
chemical and biological weapons and
defense systems; specific identification
of chemical and biological agents and
munitions; and chemical and biological
warfare plans.
(r) Technical information concerning
weapons systems and military
equipment that reveals the capabilities,
limitations, or vulnerabilities of such
systems, or equipment that could be
exploited to destroy, counter, render
ineffective or neutralize such weapons
or equipment.
(s) Cryptologic information, including
cryptologic sources and methods,
currently in use. This includes
information concerning or revealing the
processes, techniques, operations, and
scope of signals intelligence comprising
communications intelligence, electronics
intelligence, and telemetry intelligence,
the crytosecurity and emission security
components of communications security,
and the communications portion of
cover and deception plans.
(t) Information concerning electronic
warfare (electronic warfare support
measures, electronic counter-
countermeasures) or related activities,
including but not necessarily limited to:
(1) Nomenclature, functions, technical
characteristics or descriptions of
communications and electronic
equipment, its employment/
development, and its association with
weapoins systems or military
operations.
(2) The processes, techniques,
operations or scope of activities
involved in the acquisition, analysis and
evaluation of such information, and the
degree of success achieved by the above
processes, techniques, operations or
activities.
(u) Present, past or proposed
protective intelligence information
relating to the sources, plans,
techniques, equipment and methods
used in carrying out assigned duties of
protecting United States Government
officials or other protectees abroad and
foreign officials while in the United
States or United States possessions.
This includes information concerning
the identification of witnesses,
informants and persons suspected of
being dangerous to persons under
protection.
(v) Information on deposits of foreign
official institutions in United States
banks and on foreign official
institutions' holdings, purchases and
sales of long-term marketable securities
in the United States.
(w) Information concerning economic
and policy studies and sensitive
assessments or analyses of economic
conditions, policies or activities of
foreign countries or international
organizations of governments received
through the Multilateral Development
Banks and Funds or through the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and
the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD).
(x) Information described in ? 2002.6
(a) through (w) contained in
correspondence, transcripts, memoranda
of conversation, or minutes of meetings
between the President of the United
States or the Vice President of the
United States and foreign government
officials.
(y) Information described in ? 2002.6
(a) through (w) contained in documents
originated by or sent to the Assistant to
the President for National Security
Affairs, his Deputy, members of the
National Security Council staff, or any
other person on the White House or the
Executive Office of the President staffs
performing national security functions.
(z) Federal agency originated
documents bearing Presidential,
National Security Council, or White
House or Executive Office of the
President staffs' comments relating to
categories of information described in
? 2002.6 (a) through (w).
(aa) Information as described in
? 2002.6 (a) through (w) contained in
correspondence to or from the President
or the Vice President, including
background briefing memoranda and
talking points for meetings between the
President or the Vice President and
foreign government officials, and
discussions of the timing and purposes
of such meetings.
(bb) Information as described in
? 2002.6 (a) through (w) contained in
agency message traffic originated by
White House or Executive Office of the
President staff members but sent
through agency communication
networks.
? 2002.7 Referral and decision.
(a) When the identity of the agencies
having declassification authority over
foreign government information is not
apparent to the agency holding the
information, or when reviewing officials
do not possess the requisite expertise,
the information shall be referred for
review and a declassification
determination as follows:
(1) Categories 2002.6 (b) through (d),
Department of Energy or Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (as
appropriate).
(2) Categories 2002.6 (e) and (f),
Central Intelligence Agency.
(3) Categories 2002.6 (g) through (1),
Department of State.
(4) Categories 2002.6 (m) through (t),
Department of Defense.
(5) Categories 2002.6 (u) and (w),
Department of the Treasury.
(6) Categories 2002.6 (x) through (bb),
National Security Council.
(b) Referrals to agencies shall include
copies of the documents containing the
foreign government information.
Agencies shall review the referred
documents and promptly notify the
Archivist of the United States of the -
declassification determination.
Forwarded copies of the documents
shall be marked to reflect any
downgrading or declassification action
and shall be returned to the National
Archives.
Approved For Release 2010/11/30: CIA-RDP87-00181 R000100170002-8
 Approved For Release 2010/11/30: CIA-RDP87-00181 R0001 00170002-8
?
?
Mar 21, 83
5200.30 (Encl 3)
Federal Register./ Vol. 48, No. 21 / Monday, January 31, 1983 / Rules and Regulations 4405
? 2002.8 Downgrading.
Foreign government information
classified "Top Secret" may be
downgraded to "Secret" after 30 years
unless the agency with declassification
authority over it determines on its own,
or after consultation, as appropriate,
with the foreign government or
international organization of
governments which furnished the
information, that it requires continued
protection at the "Top Secret" level.
Dated: January 27, 1983.
Steven Garfinkel,
Director, Information Security Oversight
Office.
iFR Uo,. 83-2614 Filed 1-26--83: 8:45:,mi
BILLING CODE 6820-AF-M
Approved For Release 2010/11/30: CIA-RDP87-00181 R000100170002-8
 Approved For Release 2010/11/30: CIA-RDP87-00181 R0001 00170002-8
. S
Mar 21, 83
5200.30 (Encl 4)
DECLASSIFICATION CONSIDERATIONS
?
?
1. Technological developments; widespread public knowledge of the subject
matter; changes in military plans, operations, systems, or equipment;'changes
in the foreign relations or defense commitments of the United States; and similar
events may bear upon the determination of whether information should be declas-
sified. If the responsible DoD reviewer decides that, in view of such circum-
stances, the public disclosure of the information being reviewed no longer would
result in damage to the national security, the information shall be declassified.
2. The following are examples of considerations that may be appropriate in
deciding whether information in the categories listed in enclosure 2 may be
declassified when it is reviewed:
a. The information no longer provides the United States a scientific,
engineering, technical, operational, intelligence, strategic, or tactical
advantage over other nations.
b. The operational military capability of the United States revealed by
the information no longer constitutes a limitation on the effectiveness of the
Armed Forces.
c. The information is pertinent to a system that no longer is used or
relied on for the defense of the United States or its allies and does not
disclose the capabilities or vulnerabilities of existing operational systems.
d. The program, project, or system information no longer reveals a current
weakness or vulnerability.
e. The information pertains to an intelligence objective or diplomatic
initiative that has been abandoned or achieved and will no longer damage the
foreign relations of the United States.
f. The information reveals the fact or identity of a U.S. intelligence
source, method, or capability that no longer is employed and that relates to
no current source, method, or capability that upon disclosure could cause
damage to national security or place a person in immediate jeopardy.
g. The information concerns foreign relations matters whose disclosure
can no longer be expected to cause or increase international tension to
the detriment of the national security of the United States.
3. Declassification of information that reveals the identities of clandestine
human agents shall be accomplished only in accordance with procedures estab-
lished by the Director of Central Intelligence for that purpose.
4. The NSA/CSS is the sole authority for the review and declassification of
classified cryptologic information. The procedures established by the NSA/CSS
to facilitate the review and declassification of classified cryptologic in-
formation are:
Approved For Release 2010/11/30: CIA-RDP87-00181 R000100170002-8
 Approved For Release 2010/11/30: CIA-RDP87-00181 R0001 00170002-8
a. COMSEC Documents and Materials
(1) If records or materials in this category are found in agency
files that are not under COMSEC control, refer them to the senior COMSEC
authority of the agency concerned or by appropriate channels to the following
address:
Director
National Security Agency
ATTN: Director of Policy (Q4)
Fort George G. Meade, Maryland 20755
(2) If the COMSEC information has been incorporated into other
documents by the receiving agency, referral to the NSA/CSS is necessary
before declassification.
b. SIGINT Information
(1) If the SIGINT information is contained in a document or record
originated by a DoD cryptologic organization, such as the NSA/CSS, and is in
the files of a noncryptologic agency, such material will not be declassified
if retained in accordance with an approved records disposition schedule. If
the material must be retained, it shall be referred to the NSA/CSS for systematic
review for declassification.
(2) If the SIGINT information has been incorporated by the receiving
agency into documents it produces, referral to the NSA/CSS is necessary before
any declassification.
Approved For Release 2010/11/30: CIA-RDP87-00181 R000100170002-8
 Approved For Release 2010/11/30: CIA-RDP87-00181 R0001 00170002-8
Mar 21, 83
5200.30 (Encl 5)
?
DEPARTMENT OF STATE AREAS OF INTEREST
?
?
1. Statements of U.S. intent to defend, or not to defend, identifiable areas,
or along identifiable lines, in any foreign country or region.
2. Statements of U.S. intent militarily to attack in stated contingencies
identifiable areas in any foreign country or region.
3. Statements of U.S. policies or initiatives within collective security
organizations (for example, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and
Organization of American States (OAS)).
4. Agreements with foreign countries for the use of, or access to, military
facilities.
5. Contingency plans insofar as they involve other countries, the use of
foreign bases, territory or airspace, or the use of chemical, biological,
or nuclear weapons.
6. Defense surveys of foreign territories for purposes of basing or use in
contingencies.
7. Reports documenting conversations with foreign officials, that is, foreign
government information.
Approved For Release 2010/11/30: CIA-RDP87-00181 R0001 00170002-8
 Approved For Release 2010/11/30: CIA-RDP87-00181 R0001 00170002-8
Mar 21, 83
5200.30 (Encl 6)
?
?
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AREAS OF INTEREST
1. Cryptologic, cryptographic, or SIGINT. (Information in this category
shall continue to be forwarded to the NSA/CSS in accordance with enclosure 4,
paragraph 4. The NSA/CSS shall arrange for necessary coordination.)
2. Counterintelligence.
3. Special access programs.
4. Information that identifies clandestine organizations, agents, sources,
or methods.
5. Information on personnel under official or nonofficial cover or revelation
of a cover arrangement.
6. Covertly obtained intelligence reports and the derivative information
that would divulge intelligence sources or methods.
7. Methods or procedures used to acquire, produce, or support intelligence
activities.
8. CIA structure, size, installations, security, objectives, and budget.
9. Information that would divulge intelligence interests, value, or extent
of knowledge on a subject.
10. Training provided to or by the CIA that would indidate its capability or
identify personnel.
11. Personnel recruiting, hiring, training, assignment, and evaluation
policies.
12. Information that could lead to foreign political, economic, or military
action against the United States or its allies.
13. Events leading to international tension that would affect U.S. foreign
policy.
14. Diplomatic or economic activities affecting national security or inter-
national security negotiations.
15. Information affecting U.S. plans to meet diplomatic contingencies affecting
national security.
16. Nonattributable activities conducted abroad in support of U.S. foreign
policy.
17. U.S. surreptitious collection in a foreign nation that would affect
relations with the country.
18. Covert relationships with international organizations or foreign govern-
ments.
Approved For Release 2010/11/30: CIA-RDP87-00181 R000100170002-8
 Approved For Release 2010/11/30: CIA-RDP87-00181 R0001 00170002-8
19. Information related to political or economic instabilities in a foreign
country threatening American lives and installations therein.
20. Information divulging U.S. intelligence collection and assessment
capabilities.
21. U.S. and allies' defense plans and capabilities that enable a foreign
entity to develop countermeasures.
22. Information disclosing U.S. systems and weapons capabilities or deployment.
23. Information on research, development, and engineering that enables the
United States to maintain an advantage of value to national security.
24. Information on technical systems for collection and production of intel-
ligence, and their use.
25. U.S. nuclear programs and facilities.
26. Foreign nuclear programs, facilities, and intentions.
27. Contractual relationships that reveal the specific interest and expertise
of the CIA.
28. Information that could result in action placing an individual in jeopardy.
29. Information on secret writing when it relates to specific chemicals,
reagents, developers, and microdots.
30. Reports of the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) (-- Branch,
-- Division) between July 31, 1946, and December 31, 1950, marked CONFIDENTIAL
or above.
31. Reports of the Foreign Documents Division between 1946 and 1950 marked
RESTRICTED or above.
32. Q information reports.
33. FDD translations.
34. U reports.
Approved For Release 2010/11/30: CIA-RDP87-00181 R000100170002-8