LETTER TO ROBERT M. WARNER FROM HARRY E. FITZWATER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87-00181R000100060013-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 20, 2010
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: February 25, 1983
• Content Type: LETTER

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
,; `" ;'cg.istry
2 5 FE B 1983
Dr. Robert M. Warner
Archivist of the United States
National Archives and Records Service
Eighth Street $ Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20408
Dear Dr. Warner:
Enclosed are the "Guidelines for Identifying and Handling CIA Information
During Declassification Review of Records from the Period 1946-54," as
required by Section 3.3(a) of Executive Order 12356 and Section 2001.(c)(3)(i)
of Information Security Oversight Office Directive Number 1. The guidelines
were coordinated in draft with W. Edwin A. Thompson of your staff.
The policy at CIA is that our offices must review information for which
we are responsible before it can be declassified and released to the public.
In the attached guidelines we have attempted to explain the reasoning behind
that policy. In addition, we have described our activities as an intelligence
agency as they relate to the creation and protection of classified records, and
we have tried to anticipate, at least ink broad sense, where such records
might be encountered in the files of other U.S. Government agencies. Finally,
we have provided a three-page listing of the various types of intelligence
reports and publications that CIA produced during the period with descriptions
and comments about where they mar, be held in governmental records.
The enclcsed guidelines supersede the "Central Intelligence Agency
Systematic Review Guidelines" signed by Director Stansfield Turner which were
issued pursuant to Executive Order 12065 and forwarded under a letter of
5 June 1919.
Previously issued guidelines covering the records of the Office of
Strategic Services (OSS), material of the Foreign Broadcast Information
Service (FBIS), and the Foreign Doctmmts Division (FDD) remain in effect but
will be reviewed and considered for revision as necessary.
UNCLASSIFIED WHEN
SEPARATED FROM
ENCLOSURE
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I hope that the enclosed guidelines will Inc ~~~~ Iul ill your systematic
declassification review program. Should You iri questions concerning
these guidelines, please contac Director of Inform:i:ion
Services, Directorate of Adminstrat ion, cu, 1Vd 11.1,. :.0505,
incrrciy,
1 avey E. l:itzwatcr
Deputy Director
for
Adiitinistra.tion
Distribution:
Orig - Addressee w/encl and atts
1 - DDA Subject w/encl and atts
1 - DDA Chrono
1 - D/OIS Subject w/encl and atts
1 - D/OIS Chrono
Vt - CRD Liaison w/NARS w/encl and atts
Chrono
(22 February 1983)
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GUIDELINES FOR IDk 'IFYING AND HANDLING CIA INFORMATION
1546-54
INTRODUCTION
This guideline will serve as the basis for identifying and handling
information which was originated between 1946 and 1954 by th;; CIA or one of
its predecessor organizations, or is information from that period which
falls under CIA jurisdiction. This guideline provides no authority to declassify
information. Its purpose is to provide background and general descriptions
intended to aid declassificatApn review personnel to identify CIA material
that may be found in the reco b of other agencies. When such material is
found it must be reviewed for classification by CIA personnel. This is
necessary because an intelli agency has special security problems.
All components of an intellie agency are either directly involved in
clandestine work, provide. `!t to elements that are engaged in clandestine
work, or are involved in 9tna clandestinely acquired information into a
finished intelligence product., ateye their role, there is an interrela-
tionship among these elements vl'ch makes them all sensitive to one degree
or another and an exposure in one can lead to an exposure in another. It
requires a thorough understanding of these components and their interrela-
tionships to assess the degree of sensitivity of information relating to
intelligence matters and pass credible judgment on its classification status. (U)
The inherent sensitivity of intelligence organizations is attested to by
the fact that no other nation allows, let alone requires, its intelligence
organization to make its records public except after a minimum of 30 years
and then sources and methods re sti 1 e 1111 important from another aspect
BACKGROUND
During the years 1946 to 1954, U.S. intelligence was passing through a
transitional period. The Office of Strategic Services (OSS), which played
the major U.S. intelligence role wing WWII, was disbanded on 1 October 1945.
It was succeeded by the Strafe Se Cos Unit (SSU) which existed for one
year. The records of the OSS:and theSSU reflect a wartime context, being
staffed with military personnel and puttjng emphasis on "hot war" activities
related to the achievement of military objectives. On 22 January 1946 the
Central Intelligence Group (CIG) was created and began to take in more
civilians while it succeeded in absorbing the SSU by the end of October 1946.
The CIG in turn was replaced by the CIA on 18 September 1947. The CIA was
created as a civilian organization and remains one today. (U)
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S`ITCES
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The world environment also was in transition: from wartime, to peacetime,
then very quickly into a "cold war," followed after a few years with hostilities
in Korea, 1950-54. Intelligence activities during the period 1946-54 were not
of wartime nature but they continued to have a strong paramilitary cast.
Considerable resources were devoted to special activities aimed at strengthen-
ing the West and weakening the East through various kinds of direct action
operation,;. Measures were undertaken to prepare for a "hot war" situation.
Refugee and especially defector debriefings were an important source of
intelligence information although classical intelligence collection operations
were not ignored. Throughout. this period the "iron curtain" between the West
and East proved very difficult for our relatively young intelligence agencies
to penetrate, and it restricted, the flow of even overt information to the
West. That forced collection; efforts into many unlikely areas which normally
would be considered overt. (U)
During this period, CIA and the other U.S. national security agencies
were learning to coordinate their intelligence activities and were developing
channels among themselves. asrd,wi other U. S. government agencies to get
administrative and operational Sport.. Because intelligence agencies must
The identification of intelligence related documents and information can
be very difficult, and one purpose of this guideline is to assist the records
reviewer in identifying records that relate to intelligence and, more
specifically, to CIA. When files are encountered that relate to CIA, or
relate to intelligence matters, but the specific organization cannot be
determined, they should be given to CIA for declassification review. (U)
GENERAL GUIDELINE
For the purpose of identifying information relating to CIA we may break
down its activities into four major areas: Plans and Policies; Collection;
Processing and Analysis; and Production and Dissemination. Following is a
brief general description of each of these areas intended to serve as a
framework within which to identify CIA intelligence related information. (U)
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Plans and Policies - Overall guidance to the intelligence
community comes rom a National Security Council (NSC). Many
intelligence activities, particularly special activities, are
initiated by the NSC or by presidential commissions such as the
Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) or the Operations Coordinating
Board (OCB). Several agencies may be involved in discussing and
eventually adopting and formulating such guidance and the record
of such collective activities may be held by all the participating
agencies. The implementation of such plans must be coordinated at
all levels and with the many types of units. This broad involvement
will be documented and that record will be found somewhere in the
files of the participating agencies. At the NSC level planning
papers often do not indicate the source of the specific information
used. In such a document if an intelligence matter is involved and
it is not possible to identify the specific agency or department
responsible for the information, CIA would like to have the
opportunity to review that material. Classified planning and
policy records relating to.intelligence activities normally will
require protection for long periods of time because (1) they
officially confirm U.S. involvement and preclude the use of plausible
denial and, (2) might provide details which could compromise
intelligence sources and methods. (C)
Collection - The acquisition of intelligence information by
all merit o s o human and technical. This involves the
development, placement, and exploitation of sources that can
obtain the intelligence information that our government needs.
The protection of these intelligence sources is paramount to
preserve the flow of intelligence information, to prevent disruption
in our foreign relations, to protect those persons and organizations
who risk themselves on our behalf, to protect our national
investment in costly projects and technical devices, and to prevent
the targeted persons and countries from becoming aware of our
intelligence efforts and degree of success so they will not take
actions to nullify the results obtained or take aggressive
countermeasures detrimental to our national security. (U)
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Processing and Analysis - Processing is the conversion of
technical data into in -formation useful to the intelligence analyst.
An example would he the development of film from overhead
reconnaissance, and its examination and reporting by photo interpreters.
Since most of this conversion falls under the heading of
"intelligence methods", the process and technical parameters are
always classified, with the most highly classified information
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being about the degree of success of the system and data which, if
divulged, would aid in the development of countermeasures to
negate collection. (U)
Much of the processing of technical data (such as in the
field of overhead photography) is a joint effort by CIA and other
U.S. government agencies',, particularly elements of the Department
of Defense. The research and development of advanced methods of
technical collection is often a joint effort, with CIA sharing
contracting, appropriations, testing, etc. with other agencies.
Consequently, many documents concerning such joint efforts will be
found in the files of all participating agencies. The review of
classified documents arising from such joint activities must be
coordinated with all the agencies involved. (C)
Analysis is generally known and understood as the collation
and processing of raw data from Many different sources to find the
solution to some question confronting our policy makers. There are
many specific techniques. that will be classified. The weighing and
establishing of priorities for collection data and its use in
estimating foreign capabilities and intentions is an intellectual
process used by all analysts. But the fact that the Agency employs
unique intelligence. methodologies, for example, to estimate the
costs of foreign defense activities, is classified. So are
analytical techniques used in assessing the impact of natural
resources, science and technology development, and food and
population factors on foreign military, political, and economic
responses to the U.S. The substantive intelligence produced by
such analysis is often unavailable any other way. (C)
As in the case of processing, CIA has often shared analysis
duties with other government agencies, with many of the private
"think tanks," and with analytical institutions sponsored by
various American universities. CIA often has shared in contracts
other U.S. government agencies have had with such institutions.
Once again, this will result in documents of interest to CIA being
found in many files within and outside the intelligence community,
and review of these classified records from joint activities must
be coordinated with all the agencies involved. (C)
Production and Dissemination - The basic infonnatioiial end
product inte1Tig'ence ser ice is the finished intelligence
report. It results from the collation, analysis, and evaluation
of information available on a particular subject from all sources
both overt and covert. (Attachment B is a list of many of the
finished intelligence products that were published and disseminated
by CIA during the period 1946-54.) Most finished intelligence
reports are classified. Many of them include information from
other U.S. government agencies or from foreign governments. This
means that classification review must be coordinated with other
interested elements before the information can be downgraded or
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declassified. In some cases the titles of in e.1ligence reports
may be sensitive .and require careful hand, i ng . Also, t' jetie
publications receive very wide distribution t hroug;hou;t the U. S.
g, vernment and therefore will be found in c~ ; ;i~lcrrt~,le i,w".l.,cis a,n,.!
in a variety of files not only in the rec ~r, s of intelliw.ern".e :tad
national security agencies but other U.S. ,ovc-~rrnr~.rrtt. a en+-.ies as
well. (U)
As noted above, information that CIA is rc s} >tisihie Loy: may r"} ;gar' in
doctm,ents which are not clearly discernible as ClA-ori.ginatc~,:,,, or
in docin,ent.s
origluated by other ag,enc.te;. This ,cakes the idem i F.i ation o," ('IA invnlve;iie;nt
very difficult. t