AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T01017R000808000002-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 17, 2012
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: December 9, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
DATE /~ // ', f1L 86
DOC NO rn rA 8~-doi7.z~x
r~_ h ~!o-do%zpGx
OIR `/ J
P $ PD
Afghanistan Situation Report
79-80
II1C/CB
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SOYA M
December 1986
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fighting on a smaller scale continues in
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several areas of Afghanistan. 25X1
A Chinese official in Kabul believes that the Soviets
have had little success in Afghanistan in 1986 and that
insurgent morale remains high.
Afghan Defense Minister Nazar Mohammad and Foreign
Minister Shah Mohammad Dost were replaced last week by
supporters of Secretary General Najib.
During his latest shuttle between Kabul and Islamabad,
UN Special Negotiator Cordovez reportedly obtained an
agreement on monitoring arrangements, but made little
progress on the key issue, a timetable for withdrawal.
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ISLAM, THE SOVIETS, AND AFGHANISTAN--THE CASE OF
TAJIKISTAN
Although Islam remains important in the lives of many
Soviet Muslims, it does not seem to have increased in
influence because of events in Iran or Afghanistan.
This document was prepared by the Office of Near
Eastern and South Asian Analysis and the Office of
Soviet Analysis. Questions or comments on the issues
raised in the publication should be directed to
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THE DUST SETTLES
fighting
continues in several areas of the country.
US Embassy sources
indicate insurgent activity in the Kabul area picked
up markedly last week, with daily artillery
bombardments. A reliable Afghan source of the US
Embassy in Kabul says a Soviet general was recently
killed in fighting in Lowgar Province. The source
reported seeing a large cortege of vehicles
accompanying an ambulance that apparently
transported the officer's casket to the airport.
The presence of senior Afghan army officers and
Soviets in the cortege suggests the victim was high-
ranking. Fighting in Baghlan and Pol-e Khomri is
heavy with both cities subject to a 2000 0400
curfew, according to US Embassy sources.
CHINESE VIEWS OF THE WAR IN 1986
A senior Chinese Embassy officer in Kabul recently
told US officials that he believes the Soviets have
had only marginal military success in Afghanistan in
1986. The officer claimed, for example, that Soviet
and Afghan regime efforts to seal the Afghanistan-
Pakistan border and mop up opposition in the
provinces of Herat and Qandahar and around Kabul had
produced limited gains at the cost of heavy
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casualties. He also described Soviet attempts to
shift combat responsibility to the regime as largely
ineffective. Moreover, the Chinese official
asserted that the Soviets' brutal conscription
methods probably will cause antiregime dissension.
The Chinese official also said that insurgent morale
is high despite the Soviets' "more effective" use of
air power in 1986. He attributed this to the
guerrillas' improved air defense weapons. In the
official's opinion, these weapons could make a
dramatic difference in the war. Besides proposing
to Beijing that China provide such weapons to the
resistance, he also urged his government to increase
its propaganda efforts on behalf of the resistance,
particularly by highlighting insurgent military
successes.
COMMENT: The Chinese official's assessment tracks
well with--and probably will sharpen--Beijing'.s
longstanding view that the Soviet position in
Afghanistan ultimately will become untenable because
of the unpopularity of the Kabul regime, the ruling
party's debilitating factionalism, and the Soviets'
inability to crush the resistance. The report may
influence the content of Chinese military aid to the
insurgents in 1987, and almost certainly will cause
Beijing to consider redoubling its propaganda
efforts
CABINET CHANGES
Afghan Defense Minister Nazar Mohammad and Foreign
Minister Shah Mohammad Dost were replaced last week
by Mohammad Rafi and Abdul Wakil, respectively,
according-to the official press. Dost will be
posted to the UN, and Nazar Mohammad was named
Deputy Prime Minister, a relatively powerless post.
According to sources of the US Embassy in Kabul,
Nazar Mohammad, an opponent of party chief Najib,
was under criticism for the poor performance of the
Afghan Armed Forces during last month's operations
in Qandahar and because of the successful insurgent
attack against the Qarghah ammunition depot in
August. Rafi is loyal to Najib and reportedly
trusted by the Soviets.
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Dost, a long-time supporter of former President
Babrak, has been Kabul's principal negotiator at the
UN-mediated peace talks with Pakistan. The US
Embassy reports that his removal may have been
prompted in part by his differences with Moscow over
Soviet-instigated concessions during the peace
talks. His replacement reportedly has ties to Najib
dating from the late 1970s. According to the US
Embassy in Kabul, the appointment of Wakil, who was
believed to be slated for diplomatic assignment in
Prague, has renewed speculation that Babrak Karmal
will again become ambassador to Czechoslovakia.
Babrak is staunchly resisting diplomatic exile.
COMMENT: The changes indicate Moscow's
determination to stifle feuding between Najib's and
Babrak's supporters in the ruling party, and Najib
apparently has a green light to weaken those still
opposing his rule. Despite ongoing purges at lower
levels of the party--including rumors of extensive
arrests in the Defense Ministry--he has not yet been
able to eliminate from the Politburo Babrak's
remaining supporters--including Nazar Mohammad,
Mahmud Barialay, and Anahita Ratebzad. Dost's
removal is unlikely to affect the peace
negotiations--set to resume in Geneva in February--
but suggests that there may be differences between
Moscow and Kabul over negotiating issues.
STATUS OF UN-SPONSORED NEGOTIATIONS 25X1
US officials report that UN Special Negotiator
Cordovez concluded an agreement on monitoring
arrangements for a potential settlement during his
recent Kabul-Islamabad shuttle. The monitoring
arrangement provides for up to ten five-man military
units--stationed in both countries--operating under
the direction of a representative of the UN
Secretary General. But Cordovez apparently made
little progress on a schedule for a Soviet troop
withdrawal, which is to be the focus of the Geneva
talks planned for February.
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COMMENTS: Islamabad almost certainly doubts that a
mutually acceptable timetable can be drafted at
Geneva, and President Zia has hinted to US officials
that a timetable might have to be negotiated
directly between Pakistan and the USSR. Meanwhile,
the 7-10 December visit of Foreign Secretary Abdul
Sattar to Moscow will provide Islamabad with an
opportunity to probe Soviet views on this issue and
the nature of a post-Soviet government in Kabul.
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--The United Arab Emirats' (UAE) Red
Crescent Society recently set up an office
in Quetta to provide humanitarian aid to
Afghan refugees, according to press
reports. A Red Crescent official told the
US Embassy in Abu Dhabi that this is the
first large project for Afghans undertaken
by the organization. The society--which
is the only private charitable
organization in the UAE--is funded by
private donations.
--The US Embassy in Copenhagen reported
last week that Denmark is considering
backing moves to secure observer status
for the insurgents at the United Nations
and marshaling West European diplomatic
pressure on the USSR to withdraw frnm
Afghanistan.
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the
morale of Afghan pilots is plummeting as a
result of the successful use of surface-
to-air missiles by insurgents. After the
SAM shootdown of an AN-26 on 22 October,
eight AN-26 pilots were arrested for
refusing to fly. The following day most
AN-26 pilots and engineers went on strike
to show support for those arrested.
--Afghan resistance leader Burhanuddin
Rabbani was scheduled to leave Paris on 4
December for Gabon, Senegal, and Niger,
where he is hoping to boost support for
the Afghan resistance cause.
--On 4 December, the United Nations
General Assembly adopted the Social and
Humanitarian Affairs Committee's human
rights resolution on Afghanistan by a vote
of 89 in favor of the resolution, 24
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against, and 36 abstentions. Last year's
vote was 80 in favor, 22 against, and 40
abstentions. Ghana, Guinea and several
Caribbean countries accounted for the
increase in positive votes, according to
the UN mission in New York.
--In a trip aimed at shoring up tribal
support for Islamabad's Afghan policy and
responding to local concerns about Soviet
and Afghan-sponsored destabilization
efforts in the province, Prime Minister
Junejo visited Pakistan's North-West
Frontier Province on 29-30 November. In
speeches to tribal jirgas, he pledged to
respond to Afghan border violations and
compensate Pakistani victims of cross-
border attacks. He also praised the
tribesmen for their support of the Afghan
refugees.
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THE WAR IN NOVEMBER
Increased Security in Kabul
According to the US Embassy, the regime extended the
nightly curfew to six hours, increased the number of
checkpoints and armed personnel throughout the city
augmented Soviet armored vehicle patrols, and
instituted body searches at banks, post offices, and
large department stores. Nonetheless, sporadic
small arms fire continued in Kabul throughout the
month. Kabul was also subject to rocket attacks,
including a hit on Arg Palace and a coordinate
attack on the Darulaman late in the month.
Soviet and Afghan regime air forces closed some air
routes out of Kabul and changed their flight
patterns to prevent further aircraft losses to
guerrilla surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), according
to sources of the US Embassy. Soviet and Afghan
helicopter flight formations were reduced in size,
and local helicopter operations consisted primarily
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of patrolling around the airport when large
transport aircraft took off. Fixed-wing aircraft
performed tighter "corkscrew" ascents and descents
and the Embassy reported greater use of flares to
counter SAMs.
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Victory for Resistance in Baghlan
Resistance forces overran a regime garrison in
Baghlan Province in mid-November, according to the
US Consulate in Peshawar. Three hundred Jamiat-i-
Islami guerrillas launched a two-stage attack on a
regime garrison. In the first phase of the attack
on 11 November, the guerrillas captured outposts
belonging to the police, Ministry of State Security,
and the Army in addition to the district
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administration headquarters. Delayed slightly by
enemy air strikes, the insurgents initiated the
second phase of the attack on the main garrison on
Resistance forces had withdrawn from the garrison
shortly after seizing their booty.
A resistance spokesman told the US Consulate that
guerrilla forces sustained 19 dead and 26 wounded.
He claimed that 450 government troops were either
wounded killed or captured,
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ISLAM, THE SOVIETS AND AFGHANISTAN--THE CASE OF TAJIKISTAN
A contractor study
It is easier to demonstrate that Islam remains
influential among the traditionally Muslim peoples
of the Soviet Union than to show that its influence
has increased recently in reaction to events in
Afghanistan and Iran. Recent Soviet statements
portraying Islam as on the rise in Central Asia are
not necessarily indicative of great Soviet concern.
Islamic Persistence and Diversity
Islam in Central Asia has retained a broad following
throughout the Soviet era. Despite major constets
raints imposed by Moscow and periods of Soviet
persecution, believers still meet many of the formal
and informal obligations of establishment Islam and
look to Islam for help. Perhaps even more
importantly, for practicing Muslims and a
significant number of those who are not religious,
Islam is an integral part of their ethnic identity
and way of life.
An estimated 45-55 million Soviet citizens are of
Muslim ancestry out of a total estimated Soviet
population of nearly 280 million in 1986. The
traditionally Muslim peoples are a diverse group.
They differ with regard to language, geographic
location, way of life, history, and culture.
Muslims in the Soviet Union historically have had
their share of wars and lesser animosities among
dynastic states, tribes, peoples, and ambitious
conquerors.
The recent increased Islamic activism outside the
USSR, especially in Afghanistan and Iran, may have
caught the attention of at least some Soviet
Muslims, but no solid evidence is available to
indicate whether such interest takes the form of
increased attention to spiritual matters and ritual
observance or an increased striving for a political
alternative to the Soviet regime. We also cannot be
certain how interest in Islam has changed over time,
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either in response to the strong but inconclusive
Afghan resistance to the Soviet invasion or as the
problems characterizing Islamic government in Iran--
internecine struggle, stalemated reforms, and ,a lone
a bloody war with Iraq--have become evident.
Taiikistan's Muslims
Although Islamist political activism in the late
1970s may have influenced Tajikistan's Muslims, such
influence has not necessarily entailed political
radicalization. The decentralized structure of
Soviet Islam is ill-suited to mobilizing broad
support.
The Soviet republic of Tajikistan borders
Afghanistan and the Tajik language, a dialect of
Persian, provides an important link to both
Afghanistan and Iran. The Tajik intelligentsia
portrays Tajiks as contributors and heirs to 2500
years of high Iranian civilization. The Tajiks
differentiate themselves from their Turkic
neighbors.
Tajikistan's population numbered 4.5 million at the
start of 1985. Tajiks comprise about 60 percent of
the republic population, Uzbeks about 20 percent,
and Russians, Ukrainians, Kirghiz, Jews, and others
make up the rest.
Powerful internal forces work to sustain Islam's
influence, quite apart from any spill-over of
Islamic militance from countries to the south:
--The predominantly rural, agrarian environment of
Tajikistan's population tends to preserve more of
the traditional way of life and is less amenable to
Soviet efforts to transform people's outlook than is
the case in the cities.
--Islam is strongly linked to national identity
among Tajiks;
--Family and the clergy, often acting in concert,
seek to preserve Islamic observance as an integral
part of the way of life.
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Impact of Afghanistan 25X1
In the immediate aftermath of the invasion, the
Soviets made a concentrated effort to destroy the
guerrillas in regions along Afghanistan's border
with the USSR, and stories that Afghan guerrillas
have crossed into Soviet territory on a number of
occasions, bringing Korans and their own propaganda
literature to the local inhabitants--according to
some versions, trading Korans for weapons or other
goods--remain unconfirmed. We cannot be sure how
people on the Soviet side of the border react to
such encounters. Given the scarcity of Korans in
the Soviet Union, obtaining one may be most
important as an end in itself, not necessarily as an
indication of new militance on the part of Soviet
Muslims. It is probably still extremely difficult
to penetrate Soviet border security.
Although the use of the Soviet army in Afghanistan
has stimulated some discontent among Soviet Muslims,
other segments of Soviet society--including some
Ukrainians, Balts, Georgians, and Armenians--also
disapprove of the war. The number of defections in
Afghanistan seems to be few, and Muslims are not the
only defectors. Defectors have been prompted by
various motives, many of them personal rather than
political. The initial Soviet invasion force
probably included a disproportionate number of
Central Asians because it was composed of troops
regularly stationed in the military districts
nearest Afghanistan, supplemented by local reserves.
Later, regular units replaced the reserves, with the
result that the ethnic composition of the Soviet
troops returned to normal.
The actions of Soviet authorities do not suggest
they fear that Central Asian Muslims' loyalty will
be undermined by contacts with Afghans. Young
Afghans are brought to Dushanbe to study in
institutions of higher education and technical
schools. Tajiks continue to be sent to Afghanistan
in various capacities. They and other Central
Asians fill many positions in Afghanistan's
administration and educational system.
Propaganda Treatment
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Soviet authorities do not behave as though they see
the influence of foreign Islam as a serious threat
to the loyalty of Tajikistan's Muslims. The Soviets
have complained repeatedly about foreign broadcasts
on Islamic themes, but the Soviets also want to
reduce attention to the domestic shortcomings which
they believe contribute to the persistence of Islam.
The Soviets are at least as concerned about Islamic
propaganda from Western as from Islamic sources.
Radio broadcasts by Western and other non-Muslim
countries come in for more criticism than do
stations in Islamic countries. Afghan opposition
groups are not listed among the offenders by the
Soviets.
Soviet authorities may even see foreign Islam's
political activism as advancing Soviet interests in
some cases. The assessment of foreign Islam which
the Soviet media presents to a mass audience
includes much that is positive. The message
conveyed to the general public in Tajikistan is that
Islam can serve as mass ideology espousing things
the Soviets favor: anti-imperialism (including
anti-Americanism and anti-Zionism); disenchantment
with the Western economic model; and advocacy of
social transformation.
While the Party frequently calls for more and better
atheist propaganda, it also recognizes that too
vigorous a campaign against Islam would be
counterproductive. This clearly implies that the
authorities regard the persistence of Islam as a
problem of manageable proportions, rather than a
crisis which demands an all-out effort.
Soviet expressions of concern about the revival of
Islam since 1979 are virtually identical to
statements made before then. During the 1960s and
1970s Soviet authorities periodically directed their
attention to the persistence of religion in general,
and Islam in particular. Each time they found the
situation worrisome. They saw a "revival" led by
mullahs and Sufis, and in general noted the
continuing influence of Islam. Islamic countries
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neighboring the Soviet Union were accused of
encouraging religious obs by Soviet citizens
for subversive purposes.
Although there is more public discussion of the
persistence of Islam in the Soviet Union now than
there was before the revolution in Iran and the
anti-Communist insurgency in Afghanistan, the
substance of the discussion has not changed.
Moreover, even the increased rhetoric about domestic
Islam in recent years is still small by comparison
with Soviet rhetoric on other subjects.
An Ultimate Sanction
The Soviet leadership has amply demonstrated to the
citizens its readiness to crush all real or imagined
opposition. Even though the extremes of the Stalin
terror are past, the leadership has on occasion used
force to thwart what it considered opposition. If
the Soviet leaders should perceive themselves to be
threatened by domestic Islamic militance, there is
no reason to doubt that they would use as much force
as necessary to end the threat.
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Top Secret
Top Secret
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