LEBANON-ISRAEL: IMPACT OF UNIFIL WITHDRAWAL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T01017R000807930001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 29, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 29, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/29 : CIA-RDP86TO1017ROO0807930001-3 25X1
Central Intelligence Agency
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
29 January 1986
LEBANON-ISRAEL: Impact of UNIFIL Withdrawal
security in the Israel-Lebanon border area.
Summary
Violence in southern Lebanon--especially by radical
Shia Hizballah elements--is likely to increase over the
next few months regardless of whether or not UNIFIL
withdraws. The presence of UNIFIL has only a marginal
effect on the Lebanese and Palestinian groups that are
determined to escalate their attacks against the Army of
South Lebanon (ASL) and Israeli forces. Although the
UNIFIL presence may have reduced ASL reprisals against
civilians, it has not deterred Israeli or ASL operations
in the security zone. A UNIFIL withdrawal may coincide
with, but would not be the cause of, a breakdown of
If UNIFIL leaves, the Israelis probably will extend
their patrols into areas vacated by UNIFIL but will not
formally expand the boundaries of the security zone. An
mechanized infantry brigade--about 2,800 men.
Israeli attempt to control the entire area vacated by
UNIFIL's nearly 6,000 troops probably would require a
minimum commitment of the equivalent of a full-strength
This memorandum was prepared by
directed at Chief, Arab-Israeli Division,
Ithe Arab-Israeli
Division, Office of Near Eastern and South Asian
Analysis. At the request of Lt. Col. Fred Hof,
'International Security Affairs, Office of the Secretary
of Defense. Information as of 29 January 1986 was used
in its preparation. Questions and comments should be
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UNIFIL has never succeeded in inhibiting armed Lebanese or
Palestinian factions from carrying out ambushes, bombings, or
rocket attacks against Israeli or pro-Israeli targets in southern
Lebanon. UNIFIL rarely interdicts guerrilla units or their
supplies as they transit UNIFIL zones, and most of these groups
operate with impunity throughout the areas patrolled by the
various UNIFIL battalions. The guerrilla groups view UNIFIL with
contempt and do not significantly curtail their operations because
We believe that some of the guerrilla forces in southern
Lebanon are determined to extend their campaign of violence into
northern Israel. "Carrying the struggle on to Jerusalem" is a ke
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unlikely to be a significant factor in their planning.
Virtually all of the armed Lebanese and Palestinian groups
active in the south--Amal, Hizballah, SSNP, LCP, CAO, Lebanese
Bath Party, and the full spectrum of Palestinian factions--are
committed to increasing their attacks against the ASL and Israeli
patrols in the security zone. Their common objective remains to
obliterate the ASL and eliminate the residual Israeli presence in
southern Lebanon. A UNIFIL withdrawal may give them some extra
impetus to go through with their planned operations, but it is
slogan of the radical Shia Hizballah organization,
growth or activities of the radical Shia organization.
Hizballah network in southern Lebanon is growing in size and
capabilities, and UNIFIL has had practically no effect on the
operations.
Although most leaders of the more moderate Amal militia oppose
cross-border attacks that would provoke retaliation, even the
Israelis admit that some Amal elements are beginning to consider
operations against northern Israel. Certain Amal leaders believe
that the militia must engage in cross-border violence to
strengthen Amal's ideological credentials and compete with the
Hizballah for the hearts and minds of Lebanese Shias. Extremist
Palestinian factions such as the DFLP and the PFLP-GC remain
committed to cross-border attacks. Neither Amal nor the
Palestinians view UNIFIL as a serious obstacle to their
We believe that all these factors point to an increase in
cross-border attacks, such as Katyusha rocket firings, in the next
few months. This growing threat to the security of northern
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Lt
Israel is unlikely to be affected by the presence or absence of
UNIFIL, although it could coincide with a UNIFIL withdrawal. P
The Israeli Perspective
Israel would.like UNIF?IL to leave southern Lebanon because it
believes the UN force has been ineffective in preventing terrorist
attacks and has impeded efforts by Israeli troops and those of
General Lahad's ASL to police the security zone.
Israel will not agree to a UNIFIL
deployment south of its current area of responsibility.
increasingly assumed a partisan role in southern Lebanon by
reco g Shia militias but refusing to work with ASL troops.
Israel contends that UNIFIL is more of a hindrance than a
help. The Israelis admit that UNIFIL has aided them in certain
ways. UNIFIL monitoring has probably served to reduce reprisals
against civilians by Lahad's troops, and UNIFIL has intercepted at
least one shipment of arms destined for radical Shia guerrillas.
In the Israeli view, however, UNIFIL has been ineffective in
preventing cross-border attacks and provides a safe haven for Shia
and Palestinian fighters. Israel believes that UNIFIL has
Moreover, Tel Aviv faults UNIFIL for constantly pressing for
permission to deploy south to the international border but never
seeking to deploy north into Syrian-controlled areas. The
2 Israelis also maintain that friction between UNIFIL on the one
hand and the Israelis and their auxiliaries on the other leads to
tension between Tel Aviv and countries that contribute troops to
responsibilities.
If UNIFIL leaves, the Israelis probably will expand their
patrols into areas north of the security zone that have been
vacated by the UN troops. Despite a recent increase in rocket
attacks on the northern settlements, Rabin and Prime Minister
Peres are opposed to a formal expansion of the security zone to
include areas that may be vacated by UNIFIL because this would
mean sending more troops back into Lebanon. The Israelis
recognize that General Lahad's force has its hands full with its
current duties and could not take on any additional
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refusing to cooperate with guerrillas.
Peres and Rabin remain convinced that Israel's best hope for
securing its northern settlements is to press the Shia Amal
movement to prevent Palestinian and radical Shia groups from
launching attacks on the security zone and across the border. So
far, Amal has resisted any such agreement. In lieu of guarantees
from Amal, Israel has taken to retaliating against Shia villages
in the vicinity of any attacks on Israeli targets, hoping that the
villagers will choose to avoid such punishment in the future by
If this strategy is not successful and the northern
settlements come under steadily increasing attacks, Peres and
Rabin probably will beef up the number of troops operating in the
zone. Currently the 91st Territorial Infantry Division and the
36th and 162nd Armored Divisions provide troops for the zone. The
bulk of the manpower comes from reservists who belong to the 91st
Territorial Infantry Division's 300th and 769th Brigades operating
The Israelis could simply activate larger contingents of these
reservists for service in southern Lebanon. If strengthening the
forces available to operate in the zone did not stop the rocket
attacks and cross-border infiltrations, Peres and Rabin probably
would have to yield to pressure--especially from Likud
hardliners--to increase the depth of the zone and station more
troops there. If the Israelis chose to attempt to control the
entire area vacated by UNIFIL's nearly 6,000 troops, it probably
would require at a minimum the commitment of the equivalent of a
full strength independent mechanized infantry brigade--about 2,800
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SUBJECT: LEBANON-ISRAEL: Impact of UNIFIL Withdrawal
NESA M#86-20013
DISTRIBUTION:
External:
Orig - Lt. Col. Fred Hof, ISA
Internal:
1 - DDI
1 -.D/NESA
1 - DD/NESA
1 - C/NESA/PPS
1 - C/AI
1 _ NESA/NIO
2 - NESA/AI/I
2 - NESA/AI/L
DDI/NESA/AI/L&I
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29Jan86)-
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