CENTRAL AMERICAN MONTHLY REPORT #32

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T01017R000707150001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 10, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 1, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
MARCH 1986
CENTRAL AMERICAN MONTHLY REPORT #32
Nicaragua's incursions into Honduras in March--the largest and deepest to
date--appeared intended to deal the insurgents a decisive blow before US military
aid could roved and disbursed.
This memorandum was prepared by the Central America North and South
Branches, ALA. It was coordinated with the Directorate of Operations. It contains
information available as of 1 April 1986. Questions and comments are welcome and
should be addressed to Chief, Middle America-Caribbean Division, ALA
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For Tegucigalpa, the US emergency logistical aid and the prospect of renewed
US military assistance to the rebels appear--at least for the time being--to have
outweighed embarrassment caused by continued publicity about the insurgents'
presence in Honduras. US Embassy and press reporting shows that Tegucigalpa
initially was hesitant even to admit that the incursion occurred, but that civilian and
military leaders--presumably encouraged by US promises of $20 million in emergency
aid for Honduras--eventually developed combined military and diplomatic strategy
to help force a Sandinista withdrawal.
The insertion of 600 Honduran troops into the Las Vegas
salient resulted in no clashes and was, in our view, largely a public relations effort.
The decrease in military actions with their arrival suggests, however, that they might
have taken some pressure off the rebel forces and allowed them to continue
infiltration into Nicaragua.
Although the incursion, at least in the short term, failed to defeat the rebels
and undermine Honduran support, we believe the Sandinistas continue to see attacks
against insurgent targets inside Honduras as an important aspect of their overall
effort to complicate rebel infiltration, wear down insurgent morale, and force
Honduras to agree to discuss a joint border commission as has Costa Rica.
even before last month's incursion, the Sandinistas
believed that the US eventually would resume military aid to the rebels, and Managua
may have calculated that neither Washington nor Honduras would take major military
action against them. As a result, the Sandinistas probably concluded that the period
preceding approval and disbursement of US military aid resented the best
opportunity to strike hard at the insurgency.
suggests that the Sandinistas have not abandoned this strategy and are
continuing to improve roads near the border and keeping large numbers of troops in
the area.
We believe Honduras would still like to find a way to expedite the rebels'
departure from Honduras and lessen their own involvement in the conflict.
given continuing Sandinista pressure on the border and Honduras's current
nervousness, Tegucigalpa likely will be more forceful over the next few weeks in
demanding that the US take the lead in supporting the rebels.
NICARAGUA
On the political front, the regime stepped up efforts to undermine the influence of
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the Catholic Church by accusing Cardinal Obando y Bravo and another prelate of treason.
A delegation also traveled to South
America late in the month to seek support for Nicaragua's chairmanship of the
Non-Aligned Movement.
The Nicaraguan economy continued to deteriorate, as controlled prices on
consumer goods were raised an average 150 percent. Prices for meat, milk, and other
staples were increased 120 percent while corn, beans, and other dairy products went up
300 percent. Prices for producers continued to lag far behind, however, providing little
incentive for higher production. Purchasing power dropped further, despite another 50
percent wage hike at mid-month. Inflation, estimated at about 200 percent by the regime,
probably exceeds 400 percent annually, according to the US Embassy. Censored
newspaper articles indicated widespread shortages of staples.
To help offset domestic economic woes, the Sandinistas arranged new aid and
Labor activity dominated the domestic political scene as President Duarte's critics
on the left and right attempted to weaken his regime by mobilizing opposition to the
government's austerity package.
the leftist-backed National Union of Salvadoran Workers (UNTS) believed that a secon
national forum focusing on economic conditions could be used to unite political
opposition to Duarte. funding problems and
tensions between UNTS member groups were seriously hampering planning by the
alliance. honorary ARENA President
D'Aubuisson jumped into the labor fray as well by offering financial support to some
leftwing UNTS leaders and by trying to form an opposition front to Duarte that would
include groups as diverse as ARENA and UNTS.
some opportunistic leftist labor leaders have in fact held discussions with D'Aubuisson,
the US Embassy says that private sector and labor groups are unlikely to become
entangled in a left-right alliance under ARENA, and that, in any case, ARENA would have
difficulty delivering on the financial promises it is using to woo UNTS leaders.
The US Embassy reported that the government attempted to counter
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leftist-inspired labor protests and rightist maneuverings by bolstering the democratic
labor movement. The ruling Christian Democrats organized a mid-month demonstration,
which, with the assistance of the newly formed and moderate National Worker and
Campesino Union (UNOC), was instrumental in turning out at least 25,000 in support of
land and social reforms, peace, and democracy. Although the demonstrators criticized the
austerity package, the Embassy reported that the government still viewed the march as a
success, if only because it drew some four times as many participants as a
leftist-sponsored demonstration in February.
Both the government and rebels made or considered new proposals last month
concerning a resumption of the dialogue, but we see little chance that negotiations will
resume soon.
offer to renew negotiations with Salvadoran insurgents if Managua would begin talks with
the anti-Sandinistas was made, in our judgment, primarily to force Nicaraguan President
Ortega to take a public stance toward negotiations with the anti-Sandinistas
On the military front, activity--as measured by numbers of clashes--was relatively
light,) lis committed to
maintaining the more aggressive posture they adopted at the beginning of the year.
Rebel activity was light and largely confined to
continued sabotage of the nation's power grid and agricultural facilities and small unit
ambushes.
GUATEMALA
Anticipation of and reaction to President Cerezo's economic package dominated
reporting from Guatemala this month. After considerable delay, the government
announced a package at mid-month that sought to balance cuts in government spending
and higher luxury and import taxes with a temporary public works jobs program and wage
Although Cerezo has worked hard to win support from the public and various interest
groups, the plan initially has come under heavy criticism, according to the US Embassy.
The private sector, opposition groups, and the press, for example, have recognized the
need for reform, but have criticized the program for its vagueness and lack of investment
incentives. At month's end, the government was continuing to entertain revisions to the
package before implementing it sometime in April.
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Cerezo's political initiatives appeared to win more favor than his economic
pronouncements as he moved cautiously to defuse the human rights issue, aggressively
to reform the internal security apparatus, and map out a counterinsurgency strategy. He
continued to meet with members of the Mutual Support Group--the most vocal
proponents of trials for past human rights abuses--and promised to form a special
commission to investigate future disappearances, according to the US Embassy. Cerezo
also benefitted from the UN Human Rights Commission's decision to end its mandate for
a special rapporteur and issue its first report in eight years that did not condemn
Guatemala for human rights violations. Meanwhile, the Interior Ministry continued its
drive to reform the National Police by ordering an audit of internal practices and making
some 80 changes in its leadership. In a move designed to reassure the military, Cerezo
attended the opening of two model villages, a program the military views as vital to the
success of its counterinsurgency effort.
On the diplomatic front, Cerezo continued to lobby for his idea of a regional
parliament by sending his vice president to lay the groundwork with other Central
American leaders for a summit to be hosted by Guatemala in May. US Embassy reporting
indicates that while Cerezo probably has not yet made a final decision, he appears
willing--initially at least--to allow parliamentary members to be appointed rather than
directly elected, a position strongly supported by Nicaragua. On the issues of Nicaragua
and the anti-Sandinistas, the Embassy reported that the President continued to believe
that a more active regional role for Guatemala requires that his government refrain as
much as possible from making what can be interpreted as partisan statements. Several
times during the month, for example, Cerezo or his ministers attempted to reassure US
officials in private that public statements critical of the US were in fact misstatements
that reflected the government's lack of coordination rather than policy.
Following the decision in late February to normalize relations with Nicaragua, San
Jose signed an agreement with Managua on 12 March providing for the formation of an
international border commission that, in our view, strongly favors Nicaraguan interests.
Costa Rica is likely to remain under considerable pressure from some of the Contadora
states and others to move ahead.
The rapid movement toward a border agreement suggests that both President
Monge and President-elect Arias are intent on defusing tensions with Nicaragua. Press
reports indicate that in March Costa Rican authorities arrested some 60 people associated
with anti-Sandinista rebels in February and 12 insurgents transporting arms. Moreover,
the President-elect recently reiterated,
that he will not tolerate armed Nicaraguan insurgents in Costa Rica and will entorce a
new gun-control law forbidding automatic weapons.
Nonetheless, we believe the small patrols envisoned by the agreement will face
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considerable difficulties in monitoring the 300-kilometer border effectively.
Anti-Sandinista forces rely on Costa Rica more as a sanctuary than as a staging area, and
the rebels enjoy some support among locals and members of the civil and rural guard
located along the border. Moreover, a formal agreement is unlikely to affect the
insurgents' political offices located in San Jose.
In mid-March, the national labor coalition, supported by the political opposition and
some business interests, staged a ten-day general strike to protest government efforts to
reform labor, agricultural, and industrial policy. One person was killed, and millions of
dollars in property damage were reported.
troublemakers employed by the military to discredit the political opposition may have
triggered the violence. Key unions loyal to Defense Chief Noriega refused to join the
strike, and the US Embassy reports the military intends to increase its influence in the
labor movement to block future work stoppages. Some labor leaders, bitter about the
military's support for the government's economic adjustment program, have urged
workers to break ranks with the ruling party and join the opposition, but the failure of the
strike may weaken enthusiasm for the next scheduled demonstration in late April Reform
legislation passed at mid-month appears to meet the preconditions for a long-delayed
REGIONAL PEACE NEGOTIATIONS
During March, participants in the Contadora talks--despite objections from some
Central Americans--continued to focus on implementation of the Caraballeda declaration
and the Nicaraguan-Costa Rican border agreement, preventing any real progress toward
resuming negotiations on the draft treaty.
The next ministerial meeting was scheduled for early April.
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SIGNIFICANT NICARAGUAN POLITICAL EVENTS
12 March Nicaragua and Costa Rica initial draft outline of border
agreement
30 March President Ortega appeals to Contadora nations to create plans
for Honduran-Nicaraguan border patrol force. n 25X1
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NICARAGUAN HUMAN RIGHTS CHRONOLOGY
Sandinista allegations of human rights abuses by the insurgents increased during
March, probably reflecting both an upturn in combat activity and regime efforts to
influence US Congressional debate on renewing military assistance to the rebels. For
their part, the insurgents tried--but acquitted--a high-ranking rebel commander for
Insurgent Human Rights Record
According to the proregime press, the government-sponsored human rights
organization investigated the death of a Swiss agronomist in northern Nicaragua in
February and concluded that insurgents were responsible. The commission planned to
send its final report to international human rights groups.
A Western press service reports that President Ortega has accused the rebels of
kidnaping 32 peasants and killing three in Zelaya and Rio San Juan Departments.
The US Embassy in Managua reports the Sandinistas continue to accuse the
insurgents of kidnaping nine teachers and killing four of them. The Embassy cites
considerable evidence refuting the charges.
A group of US medical doctors opposed to US policy in Central American have
accused the insurgents of destroying 61 health facilities and forcing the closing of 37
others since 1981, according to a Western news service.
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The Sandinista press reports that guerrillas kidnaped two forestry workers near
Puerto Cabezas.
The Nicaraguan Government accused the rebels of murdering a Canadian priest in
Honduras. An outspoken local bishop repeated the allegations and accused the rebels of
numerous other abuses of locals, including raping children and murdering entire families
The proregime press reports the arrest of a group of insurgents trained in El
Salvador who were assigned the task of destabilizing Leon and Chinandega Departments,
including the kidnaping of families.
Sandinista Human Rights Record
The US Embassy in Managua reports that state security agents arrested 14
members of independent labor unions living on a cooperative--no reason was given for
the arrests, and the status of the prisoners is unknown.
An evangelical priest, recently released after two months in detention, tells US
Embassy officers that the regime, while not prohibiting the practice of his faith, is making
his work difficult. The government routinely turns down requests for outdoor meetings,
and he and other ministers are heavily surveilled.
At a press conference in Brazil, Interior Minister Borge states that his security
officers were "reaching a high degree of technical development in interrogations" and
discussed the ability of the government to tape conversations and infiltrate opposition
groups. Borge states that "only 5 percent of all those detained are innocent."
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The head of Nicaragua's independent human rights organization tells visiting US
officials that, while the Sandinistas maintain three model prisons to show foreign
delegations, conditions at government facilities are grim. He also cites reports from
locals that government security officers commit human rights abuses while posing as
guerrillas to build anti-insurgent sentiments.
A Nicaraguan refugee in Costa Rica claims Sandinista troops executed 30 people in
a town near Nueva Guinea in June 1985. The victims were tortured before being shot,
and their gold teeth extracted before or after the executions. Two Catholic laymen were
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tortured and had their gold fillings extracted before their execution. The refugee also
alleges the Sandinistas dress as insurgents and commit human rights abuses. 25X1
The representative of the independent human rights group assigned to Boaco and
Chontales Departments tells the US Embassy that during the past year he had received
over 100 complaints of Sandinista abuses compared to only two for the guerrillas.
According to US Embassy reporting, Sandinista security forces occupied a house
owned by one of the independent labor confederations.
The US Embassy in Managua reports that the Sandinistas forcibly recruited 75
Miskito Indians. Further Embassy reporting on regime activity along the Atlantic coast
points to other abuses, including random shelling of villages.
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27 February -
7 March
16 March
18 March
21-23 March
24-27 March
2 April
NICARAGUAN TRAVELS/VISITS
Nicaraguan Interior Minister Tomas Borge
visits Peru and Brazil.
President Ortega returns from vacation in Cuba. =
President Ortega attends funeral for Swedish Prime Minister
Palme.
Vice President Ramirez and Cardinal Obando y Bravo meets
with visiting US Congressional delegation.
Vice Interior Minister heads delegation to 17th Czechoslavakian
Communist Party Congress. F-1
Nicaraguan Minister of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform Jaime
Wheelock leads Nicaraguan delegation to Bulgaria's 13th
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Communist Party Congress in Sofia.
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COMING EVENTS IN CENTRAL AMERICA DURING APRIL
3-5 April Anti-government forum planned by leftist labor organization.
5-6 April Contadora meeting of all 13 participants in the talks.
11-12 April & Central American Vice Foreign Ministers will
24-25 April meet in Guatemala to lay the groundwork for Central American
Parliament.
Vice presidents from El Salvador, Honduras, Costa
Rica--possibly Guatemala--will meet in San Jose to discuss
Monge's economic initiative
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Distribution
Copy #
32 - PDB Staff - 7F30
33 & 34 - D/ALA - 3F45
35 - C/DDO/LA - 3C3203
36 - DDO/LA 3D5309
37 - C/DDO/ 3C3203
38 - C/DDO/LAO - 3844
39 - C/LAJ- 3844
40 & 41 - ALA/PS - 3F38
42 - ALA Research Director - 3F44
43 - 46 - CPAS/IMC/CB - 7G07
47 - DDI/CPAS/ISS - 7G40
48 - CPAS/CDPB/CC - GH25
49 - DC/RIG/SOYA - 5E25
50 - C/LE/OCR - 11-139
31 -
30 - Legislative Liaison - 7804 (attn:
29 - Director, Legislative Liaison - 7D43
28 - D/OlA -
26 - Daniel Childs, Comptroller - 7C21
27 - C/DDI/PES - 7F24
20 - Executive Registry - 7E12
21 - DDI - 7E44
22 - DDO - 7E26
23 - IAD/SAG/SOIC - 1E4846
24 - NIO/LA - 7E62
25 - NIC/AG - 2G40
19 - SA/DCI/IA - 7E12 (Attn:
13 - Ambassador Elliott Abrams
14 - Doug Mulholland
15 - Dr. Darnell Whitt
16 - DCI - 7D60
17 - DDCI - 7D6011
18 - Executive Secretary - 7D~&0
1 - Vice Admiral John Poindexter
2 - Mr. William Walker
3 - Mr. Donald Gregg
4 - Ambassador Shlaudeman
5 - HPSCI
6 - SSCI
7 - Lt. Gen. Leonard H. Perroots, USA
8 - Mr. Nestor D. Sanchez
9 - Mr. Ray Burghardt
10 - Lt. Gen. William E. Odom, USA
11 - LTG John H. Moellering, USA
12 - Ambassador Morton I. Abramowitz
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- SIO/CPAS - 7F27
- PPS/PO/RPB - 3D02
24
--C/MUD
- DC/MCD
- C/MX
- C/CAR
- C/CU
- C/CAS
- C/CAN
- MCD Files
- CAN Files
- CAS Files
DDI/ALA/MC/CAS/ I(1 April 1986)
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