SOUTH AFRICA: COMMENTS ON THE WASHINGTON POST SERIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T01017R000707000004-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 25, 2011
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: January 7, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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CONFIDENTIAL
OCR .. ....J ......
P&PD '
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
Z January 1986
SOUTH ; AFRICA: COMMENTS, OUTHE WASHINGTON: POST SERIES
Summa'r. y.
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The recent series in. The Washington Post? "Black Pow er?, White
Control: South Africa's Year of Struggle, * gives?a generally weTh
balanced description of the major dynamics shaping the South,African,
situation. W e agree with most points made in the series, particularly
that blacks "have created an enduring crisis, not a revolution," even
though a new and more radical fervor is gripping urban blacks, especially
youths. We also agree that events have shaken many'South. African;
whites and: that most plausible scenarios for the country's future include
intensified violence and repression.
The recent. series of articles in, The Washington . Posts "Black Power,,
White Control: South. Africa's Year of Struggle,," is' well-written and' a
cut above most analyses 'on the topic by.j,ournal?ists'br scholars. Drawing,
on relevant current events as well. as historicall background, Glenn Frankel
paints a: vivid: portrait of an intransigent white regime besieged by
restive blacks showing unprecedented ! political consciousness and an
increasingly hostile international: community.
* See- the series' in The Was.hYng,ton Post,, 29-31 December 1985? written by
T Post correspondent G1`enn Franker a. U?S citizen) with' the? assistance of
Allister Sparks (a South African journalist).;
This paper was prepared for the DCI by South Africa Branch,
Office of African and'Latin American Analysis,. Comments and queries may
be directed to the Chief, South Africa; Branch,
ALA M 86-20002
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Frankel correctly points out that the unrest and international
pressure have exposed some vulnerabilities of South African whites:
-- Declining economic conditions have hurt white morale.
-- Many whites have been shaken by the sporadic attacks against
members of their community and by the ferocity of the
fratricide in black townships as the number of victims with
even remote ties to the government increases daily.
-- The ability of blacks to unite behind and sustain protests
such as consumer boycotts of white-owned stores does not augur
well in the view of many whites who fear further flexing of
black economic muscle.
-- Many skilled white workers and professionals are leaving South
Africa.
Strengths and Weaknesses
Frankel deserves credit, in our judgment, for putting the last 16
months of violence in a context that bucks the trend established by many
journalists who have seasoned their reports with cataclysmic language. He
writes, and we agree, that:
"while blacks have succeeded for the first time in a
generation in seriously damaging white South
Africa, they remain far from their goal of toppling
white rule. The dream that many youths believe is
around the corner remains elusive. And because
white military power remains intact, there is no
clear path to get there. Blacks have created an
enduring crisis, not a revolution."
We believe that Frankel correctly emphasizes the importance of white
reactions to growing pressures from the black populace and the
international community. White resolve and unity, in our view, are the
most important factors affecting South Africa's political future, as
evidenced by their central position in the various scenarios outlined in
the series. As one South African expert on black politics is quoted by
Frankel, "in the end, the (white) regime will collapse from within, when
the groups whose support it enjoys withdraw." Frankel skillfully, and
correctly in our view, explains why pressures from the black populace and
the international community are likely to continue to build. He also
gives the reader an appreciation of the diverse factors, such as the
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unique history of the Afrikaners, that one must consider when assessing
potential white responses to those pressures.
We believe Frankel is strongest in his analysis on trends in the
black community. He offers some poignant insights into the causes and
effects of a growing nihilism among young urban blacks. He also describes
vividly the dramatic phenomenon of attacks on black collaborators and the
losing battle that black moderates are waging to retain credibility among
their dwindling constituencies. Departing from the romanticism that
frequently characterizes other journalists' work on the topic, Frankel
depicts the African National Congress as a two-faced group--sometimes
moderate in appearance, other times radical--that is heading toward
full-fledged urban terrorism, but faces almost insurmountable obstacles to
overthrowing the white regime.* This is consistent with our own views.
Our criticisms of the series are relatively minor:
-- Frankel occasionally overstates his case; e.g., he writes that
"there is virtually no one in the black community who expects
to be ruled by whites in the year 2000." Even some
influential black leaders, including. Colored activist Allan
Boesak and ANC head Oliver Tambo, have stated privately or
publicly that it may be several decades before the white
regime falls.
-- Frankel dismisses the rightwing threat to the National Party
too quickly without explaining its constraining influence on
the government's attitude toward reform. Similarly, he does
not adequately address the trauma that the reform issue has
generated within National Party ranks and the larger white
community.
-- We believe that Frankel's observation that the government is
"unsure of its direction after decades of certainty" is
somewhat off the mark. This has become a familiar theme of
critics of the government, and a growing lament among even
* Frankel quotes analaysts who believe, as we do, that the ANC "is still
far from developing the disciplined clandestine networks that could launch
a sustained guerrilla war or endure a long-term tit-for-tat campaign with
the South Africans... rural warfare is unlikely because of South Africa's
vast barren spaces and the long distances between its borders and
population centers."
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some of its supporters. The government, nonetheless, has
continued to stick to a course of reform roughly hewn by
senior officials. Although seemingly blind to the unviability
of some of its plans, the government has partially unveiled
them in the past year while continuing to work out the details
behind the scenes.
Frankel writes that, "for the first time, there is a tension
and contradiction between the state's military and economic
power..Unbridled use of the former... causes direct, measurable
harm to the latter." There is no question that heavyhanded
security actions have contributed to the institution of
international sanctions against South Africa and the
introduction of black economic protests at home. This is not,
however, unprecedented; South Africa went through the same
experiences during outbreaks of violence in 1960 and
1976-77. Moreover, the government to date has eschewed the
option of an all-out, unbridled security response to the
unrest. Its reluctance to do so, in our view, is tied more
closely to lingering hopes it can succeed in coopting blacks,
rather than fear- of the economic consequences of its
actions.
Open-Ended Outcome
Frankel shies away from making a specific prediction on the most
likely outcome of the racial tensions in South Africa, ending the series
by laying out some of the best-known scenarios with little indication of
his own thoughts on which is the most probable. However, he seems
attracted to an Algerian-type scenario in which increasingly repressive
measures by the government would only steel the resolve of blacks to
perpetuate violence. In his defense, each cycle of violence in South
Africa's modern history has spawned a multitude of predictions about the
country's future (as Frankel himself notes, a cottage industry of
forecasting on South Africa has developed recently). His reluctance to
select one future scenario as his personal favorite probably reflects a
healthy respect for the fast pace at which events are unfolding and the
host of factors that could affect both the nature and timing of the
eventual outcome.
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Major Points in
"Black Power, White Control: South Africa's Year of Struggle"
Black Threat
1. The "comrades," angry young urban blacks, now control many townships.
2. Unrest has spread even to rural, traditionally conservative black
areas.
3. Blacks have refined their protest tactics, including consumer
boycotts, and these are likely to continue.
4. The political middle ground has all but vanished.
5. Nonetheless, the black movement at times seems leaderless and without
direction, is not united, and remains far from toppling white rule.
6. Young urban blacks believe liberation is one or two years away; their
elders speak of 5 or 10 years; virtually no blacks expect to be ruled
by whites in the year 2000.
7. Black students may boycott schools to commemorate the 10th anniversary
of the Soweto riots.
8. A new black labor federation may become more politically active.
The African National Congress
1. The group has gained stature and is perhaps the biggest winner in the
unrest.
2. Usually one step behind events, the ANC's role has been mainly
inspirational.
3. The group has two faces: one moderate, the other radical and violent.
4. ANC attacks--widely applauded by blacks--are up significantly but do
little damage to the country's energy infrastructure or white morale;
attacks unite whites behind retaliatory strikes.
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5. The ANC shows signs of developing into a more hardline, terrorist
group, but it is still far from developing capability to launch
sustained guerrilla war or endure all-out effort by South Africa to
wipe it out.
Government Program and Plans
1. Apartheid is no longer viable, because it is too expensive and
unwieldy.
2. The white regime is losing its grip, unsure of direction after decades
of certainty.
3. Both liberal businessmen and the right wing lack adequate leverage to
coerce the National Party.
4. The pace of reform is glacial; reforms are not mollifying the blacks
as intended.
5. Attacks on black moderates undermine the deal the government had hoped
to forge with the black urban middle class, but Pretoria is likely to
continue to pursue measured reform while cracking down hard on
dissidents. It probably hopes that after black radicals have been
subdued by security measures,, black moderates will come to bargain.
6. Botha may call for a snap election before support for the ruling
National Party erodes further, and may hold a referendum for whites on
new constitutional proposals.
Scenarios
1. Analysts at a multinational firm believe South Africa might hobble
into the next century under a rightwing white regime that responds
fiercely to increasing black unrest and international sanctions by
taking extreme measures against the black opposition, repudiating
South Africa's foreign debt, seizing foreign assets, and stopping
foreign currency flows.
2. The Rhodesian scenario: an intractable guerrilla war wears down white
resolve and ends in a political settlement with major concessions to
blacks.
3. The Algerian scenario: increasingly repressive measures by the white
regime only steel the resolve of blacks to perpetuate violence;
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security forces always maintain the upper hand, but their actions also
swell the ranks of blacks bitterly opposed to any compromise; a crisis
among whites over government tactics eventually results in complete
victory for blacks.
4. Following intensified black unrest, the white regime averts an all-out
race war by reaching lasting compromise with blacks (this scenario is
based on the belief that Afrikaners are-"survivors": once they see
the choice is between survival under black rule or destruction, they
will seek a settlement).
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SUBJECT: South Africa: Comments on The Washington Post Series
Distribution:
Original
- NIO/Africa to for
ward to th
e DCI
1
-- NIO for Africa
1
-- National Intellig
ence Counc
il
1
-- DDO/Africa
1
-- PDB Staff
1
-- Intelligence Liai
son Staff
1
-- Chief, DDI/PES
1
-- Director of Afric
an and Lat
in American Analysis
1
-- Research Director
, ALA
2
-- Production Staff,
ALA (one
sourced copy; one clean copy)
4
-- OCPAS/IMD/CB
5
-- Africa Division,
ALA
2
-- ALA/AF/S
4
--
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ALA/AF/SI
I
(6 Janua
ry 1985)
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