(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T01017R000606520001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: February 28, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 19, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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DATE /2 J ..?
DOC NO C4 /~ Fll,~ o / j y
OIR
P & PD I
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
19 September 1986
China: The National Political Scene
Summary
Deng Xiaoping's top priority for 1986 and 1987, as it has been for
the last four years, is ensuring the positions of his chosen
successors--and thus the survival of his reformist policies. During the
past year, Deng has withdrawn from the public spotlight and emphasized
that daily decisions are made by Party General Secretary Hu Yaobang and
Premier Zhao Ziyang. Younger leaders whom we believe have been
selected to take power after Hu and Zhao have also assumed increasing
prominence. Party elders who have been vocal in opposing aspects of the
reform program appear to have been outmaneuvered, but the reformers
still face a number of difficult and politically volatile problems.
To further his goal of an orderly succession, Deng has retreated from public
prominence and credited Hu Yaobang (71) and Zhao Ziyang (67) with the major
decisions of the past year. Deng has spoken often of retirement and hinted that he
hopes to retire at next year's Party Congress.
This memorandum was prepared by Office of East Asian Analysis. 25X1
Information available as of 19 September 1986 was used in its preparation. Comments
and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Political Assessments
Branch, China Division, OEA, 25X1
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? Leaders of the political generation behind Hu and Zhao have also assumed
greater prominence during the past year, and are clearly being groomed as
successors.
? When they retire, Deng hopes these men, now in their 50s, will assure the
continuity of reform-minded leadership and longevity of reform policies. 0
Deng's next major political initiatives will come at the party plenum
scheduled to begin in late September. We believe Deng will use discussion at the
plenum to create a consensus behind his succession arrangements, including the
heirs to Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang.
? There is, in our judgment, only one candidate for Hu Yaobang's job--Politburo
member Hu Qili, who may be elevated to the Standing Committee at the meeting.
? However, we believe there is a three-way rivalry to succeed Zhao as premier.
? Vice Premier Li Peng, long considered the front runner but now apparently losing
ground, is more conservative in economic matters and favors more aggressive
promotion of trade and economic ties with the Soviets.
? Vice Premier Tian Jiyun, a Zhao Ziyang protege, is a financial expert and a reform
activist. We know little of his foreign policy views but believe he supports the
opening to the west.
? Vice Premier Qiao Shi, whose career has mainly been in party posts, has little
government experience or economics background. He could be a compromise
choice if a deadlock between Tian and Li develops.
The plenum reportedly will also attempt to produce a theoretical document
intended to give the pragmatic reforms some ideological legitimacy. This measure
is intended to prevent party traditionalists from using Marxist arguments to
undermine reform, after Deng is gone.
? Until now the reforms have derived their legitimacy mainly from their economic
success. The document will provide justification for reform policies when they
hit setbacks and yield disappointing results.
High-level opposition to the reform program appears weaker now than at any
time since 1982. Opposition has come chiefly from a group of party elders who,
though they initially supported Deng and his reforms, became alarmed at the pace
of reform and suspicious of some reformist initiatives.
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? These traditionalists have attacked the reform program as responsible for a host
of real and perceived problems--corruption, growing western influence inside
China, a drop in foreign exchange reserves, even a decline in grain production.
? The reformers, through a series of personnel moves, succeeded in undermining
the bureaucratic power bases of prominent opponents. At the same time, the
momentum and success of reform diluted midlevel support for the traditionalists
and created a large group of midlevel officials with a vested interest in
continuing the reforms.
Playing political hardball, the reformers turned the corruption issue against
their opponents by arresting or investigating several children of the traditionalists
for illegally abusing their positions and connections.
? We believe this measure forced some of the most powerful reform opponents to
capitulate--they not only ceased their criticisms but suddenly became
enthusiastic spokesmen for reform.
? Opposition to some reform policies still exists throughout the state and party
bureaucracies, but it is demoralized, incohesive, and without protection at the top.
Deng has sharply reduced the military's influence in top policy bodies. The
Army still has a say in defense matters and related areas--such as science and
technology--but now has little influence on decisions outside its areas of
competence.
? At last year's party conference, military representation on the Central Commitee
was cut to a historic low; several military leaders were dropped from the
Politburo, while none were promoted to it.
? Because the Army in China has been a voice for tradition, its reduced power aids
Deng in carrying out his reforms both within and outside the military.
Deng and his reformist allies have enjoyed great success but still have difficult
political and economic maneuvering ahead.
? A number of problems--increasing corruption, nepotism, growing western
influence inside China--are perceived as byproducts of reform. Deng and his
successors will have to continue to defend the reforms against charges of
responsibility for these sources of resentment.
? Implementation of the industrial reforms now on the agenda will require great
skill and sensitivity. Large numbers of cadre and workers stand to be at least
shortterm losers under these reforms; reform leaders must strike a balance,
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proceeding cautiously and allowing-- for adjustments but avoiding- loss of
momentum. 25X1
The greatest danger the reforms face after Deng is not sharp reversal but
stagnation.
? Deng's prestige, personality, and political skills have been a key element in reform
success to date. His successors will lack Deng's broad authority and will have to
make more compromises and deals.
? Deng, recognizing the danger, has worked to institutionalize reform measures and
bolster his heirs' positions while he is still active. After Deng dies the party
elders will probably elect to accept his designated successors and avoid a costly
succession struggle. The reform coalition will be able to continue along the
general policy lines laid down by Deng but there will likely be some slowing
down and loss of drive.
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Copy 1 of 24 Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger,
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Room 3E880, Pentagon
Copy 2 of 24 RADM Less, Assistant Deputy Director for
Politico-Military Affairs, J-5, Room 2E976, Pentagon
Copy 3 of 24 D/DCI/DDCI Executive Staff, Room 7D60
Copy 4 of 24 DDI, Room 7E44
Copy 5 of 24 Senior Review Panel, Room 5GOO
Copy 6 of 24 PDB Staff, Room 7F30
Copy 7 of 24 C/PES, Room 7F24
Copy 8 of 24 NIO/EA, Room 7E62
Copy 9-13 of 24 CPAS/IMC/CB, Room 7G07
Copy 14 of 24 D/OEA, Room 4F18
Copy 15 of 24 C/OEA/CH, Room 4G32
Copy 16 of 24 C/OEA/Production, Room 4G48
Copy 17 of 24 C/OEA/CH/TT, Room 4G32
Copy 18 of 24 C/OEA/CH/EA, Room 4G32
Copy 19 of 24 C/OEA/CH/PA, Room 4G32
Copy 20-24 of 24 OEA/CH/IS, Room 4G32
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