CHINA'S MERCHANT MARINE EXPANSION: THE IMPACT ON INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T01017R000606440001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 4, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 14, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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Central Intelligence Agency Fie t-
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
14 October 1986
China's Merchant Marine Expansion:
The Impact on international Shipping
Summary
China's merchant fleet has grown by one-third over the past five
years but, we believe, does not pose a competitive threat to US or other
Western shippers at least through the 1980s. Now boasting the world's
ninth largest fleet, China services some 600 world ports--including new
routes to the United States--and is trying to capture a larger share of
non-Chinese cargoes. However, in comparison with other international
shipping firms most of China's vessels are old and inefficient and its
service is unreliable; moreover, Chinese ports are so congested that many
Chinese ships spend long periods awaiting berths instead of carrying
We expect little progress in attempts to negotiate a maritime
agreement with the United States. While China wants the lower costs and
reduced red tape an agreement would offer, Beijing is at the same time
reluctant to guarantee US shippers a share of cargoes that would
otherwise be carried by Chinese ships. Furthermore, a cargo-sharing
This memorandum was prepared by I Office of East Asian Analysis.
Information available as of 14 October 1986 was used in its preparation. Comments and
queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Economic Assessments Branch,
China Division, OEA
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arrangement could prove irrelevant because China's shallow ports and
long turnaround times have kept US and other Western shippers at arm's
length, and sufficient improvements to attract them are not likely for many
years.
Economic Growth Fuels Merchant Fleet Expansion
China's merchant fleet has grown by one-third over the past five years, trying to
keep pace with the growth in Chinese foreign trade 1 and earning much-needed foreign
exchange. The fleet, which had only 25 vessels in 1961, is now the ninth largest--in
tonnage terms--in the world and second in Asia after Japan (see table 1). The amount
of cargo carried by Chinese ships, moreover, increased at a 7-percent annual rate during
1981-84. This growth has come at a time when excess shipping capacity in world trade
has driven shipping rates to historic lows and many shipping firms into financial
difficulty.
When China began to increase its international trade in the late 1970s, Beijing
also started to bolster its merchant fleet, adding domestically built ships as well as new
and secondhand vessels purchased in the world market. The Chinese-flag fleet now has
a capacity of nearly 17 million deadweight tons (dwt). Of that, China Ocean Shipping
Company (COSCO)--China's major state-owned fleet--boasts 614 vessels with about 13
million dwt; provincial and other Chinese shipping firms control an additional 3.5 million
dwt (see table 2). Chinese-owned ships that operate under flags of convenience
brought Beijing's total ocean shipping capacity to nearly 21 million dwt in early 1986
China's merchant fleet lags most international fleets technologically--especially
because of the many old and inefficient ships added to its inventory during the early
days of the buying spree--but Beijing is trying to modernize it. Currently, 35 percent of
ships greater than 1,000 gross registered tons are more than 20 years old. General
cargo vessels--60 percent of the fleet--are the oldest; 45 percent of them are more
than 20 years old. COSCO is now concentrating on acquiring newer vessels and such
specialized vessels as containerships. COSCO's deputy managing director Zhou
Dongming in late 1985 said China will focus on the two-to three-year old vessels
available at low cost in today's market, and will purchase new ships only when the
terms are very favorable. Provincial shipping lines will probably also improve and
modernize their fleets, as they move away from being solely coastal operators and
expand their services to include Japanese ports.
China's total two-way trade, 90 percent of which is seaborne, has soared during the
past three years. We estimate that trade last year exceeded the value of 1984 trade
by more than 33 percent, and that 1984 trade was 26 percent higher than trade in
1983.
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Table 1
The World Merchant Fleet
Million Deadweight Tons
Rank
Country of Registration
Tonnage
Share of Total
(Percent)
1
Liberia
109
17.5
2
Panama
66
10.7
3
Japan
56
9.1
4
Greece
52
8.3
5
United Kingdom
24
3.9
6
USSR
22
3.5
7
US (privately owned)
21
3.3
8
Cyprus
17
2.8
9
China
17
2.8
10
Norway
16
2.5
Other
221
35.6
Department of Transportation, Maritime Administration statistics as of 1 April 1986.
Statistics do not include ships registered elsewhere and operated under flags of convenience.
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Table 2 Thousand Deadweight Tons
China's Merchant Fleet, January 1986
Ship
Chinese Flag
Convenience Flag
Total
Type
Number
Capacity
Number
Capacity
Number Capacity
General Cargo
705
6,881
58
688
763
7,569
Bulk
195
6,131
87
3,344
282
9,475
Tanker
173
2,937
7
166
180
3,103
Container
31
493
2
25
33
518
Roll-on/
Roll-off
10
87
3
11
13
99
NOTE: All ships less than 1,001 gross register tons and passenger, fishing,
research, tugs, offshore oil, and other such vessels--1,252 ships totalling
1,014,627 deadweight tons--have been excluded from the list.
Expanding Scope: Introducing Competition
Traditionally COSCO's primary function has been the movement of Chinese
cargoes on Chinese ships. Worldwide, COSCO has 94 regular ocean shipping routes,
including 26 container routes, as well as irregular routes. Beijing has announced
publicly that its goal is to carry 70 percent of its oceanborne trade on Chinese
registered vessels; COSCO ships now carry about 55 percent, and 15 percent moves on
Panamanian or Hong Kong ships at least partly controlled by China. The expansion of
other Chinese shipping companies (see the inset) into service to Japan will contribute to
meeting Beijing's goal, although these companies will draw cargoes from COSCO as well
as from foreign shippers.
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China's Shipping: Decentralization Creates Competition
Until 1984, the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade
(MOFERT) arranged the shipment of waterborne cargoes, but China's economic
reforms permitted traders to make their own shipping arrangements. COSCO
had long dominated China's merchant marine, but in recent years other
organizations formed or became more active. For example, MOFERT's
SINOTRANS (China National Foreign Trade Corporation), originally a freight
forwarder, now oversees ship charters, truck fleets, and container freight
stations. Similarly, MOFERT's SINOCHART (China National Chartering
Corporation) handles cargo in addition to its initial chartering function. Both
organizations have established shipping ventures jointly with foreign and local
firms.
there are now 73 Chinese ocean shipping companies. Many are
administered by regional Bureaus of Maritime Transport (BMT). In the past, the
majority of the local and provincial firms operated only in coastal waters and
Hong Kong, but many have expanded their services. Sailing mainly to Hong
Kong and Japan, BMT and other vessels recently began using new
transshipment centers in Kobe and Osaka. China's local businesses are
beginning to favor local shipping lines and as a result COSCO is losing some of
its valuable long-haul cargo to foreign lines that call at these transshipment
centers.
Cross-Trades: Reaching for International Cargo
As these smaller shipping companies cut into COSCO's trade, we expect COSCO
to try to expand its business through cross-trading. Small amounts of cross-trade
cargo were moving along Chinese liner2 routes as early as 1981, primarily between
Malaysia and Europe. Since then, the addition of specialized vessels--such as
containerships--has somewhat improved COSCO's ability to carry cross-trade cargoes.
Chinese ships call at more than 600 ports in 150 countries and, since 1984, have
expanded services to Japan, Australia, and the United States. In addition, COSCO has
established joint operations with firms in Japan, Hong Kong, the Netherlands, West
Germany, Kenya, and the United States.
2 Liner services operate regularly between scheduled ports, charging previously
advertised tariff rates.
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COSCO in July 1985 opened liner service between Hong Kong and the
west coast of the United States, supplementing longstanding service directly
from China. Chinese liner service to the US east coast opened in late 1982.
COSCO canvasses for China-US cargo transshipped in Hong Kong; in fact,
Chinese maritime officials acknowledge that the new service is an attempt to
avoid delays in China's congested ports. The service also competes with other
firms for regular Hong Kong-US cargo, but is not
making money in cross-trading and is probably operated largely as a symbol of
China's emergence as a shipping force.
the Chinese added a Japanese port call to the schedule to make it a profitable
cross-trade route.
The new service carries mostly Chinese transshipments and very little
US-Hong Kong cargo. According to the Port Import-Export Reporting Service
(PIERS),3 COSCO vessels carried only 1,133 metric tons of US west coast-Hong
Kong cargo on 12 trips between July 1985 and early February 1986. On the east
coast route, a single 111-ton shipment was loaded between July 1984 and early
February 1986.
Chinese bulk and general cargo vessels carrying US cargoes to foreign
countries (other than Hong Kong) are doing better than the liner services (see
table 3). According to PIERS, China's nonliner vessels carried more than 1
million tons of US cargo to foreign ports between mid-1984 and early February
1986. Although substantially greater volume than the Hong Kong-US liner
service, these cargoes accounted for only about 1 percent of all cargoes carried
on China's oceangoing vessels. Therefore, they do not represent a significant
move into US cross-trade cargoes.
Despite the expansion, several factors will impede China's development as a
major cross-trader. A key concern is the excess shipping capacity worldwide. COSCO
is attempting to expand its liner services at a time when many carriers are losing
money. For example, excess container capacity in
trans-Pacific trade has forced rates so low that carriers are struggling to meet
expenses, and two major carriers--US and West German--have withdrawn from
trans-Pacific service.
3 PIERS is an on-line data base of shipments to and from US ports. It is operated by
the Journal of Commerce, a commercial information service that specializes in
shipping and commodity news.
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China will not be able to provide high-frequency, containerized services to
third-country shippers for many years because only 3 percent of its vessels are suitable
for containerized liner service." The remainder of China's fleet, mostly older general
cargo and bulk carriers, handles noncontainerized cargoes with little cross-trade
potential.
Financing additional new ships, moreover, may become a problem because of a
lack of foreign exchange--even Chinese shipyards want foreign currency payments for
ships, according to press reports . COSCO already pays the full cost of its purchases in
foreign exchange. China's regional Bureaus of Maritime Transport are expected to pay
half the cost of new ship orders in foreign currency now that their foreign trade
activities earn foreign exchange. As a result, we expect other local shipping lines will
be expected to pay in foreign currency as their trade volume rises. Because the
majority of their earnings have been and will continue to be in Chinese currency from
domestic shipping, we expect the foreign currency requirement to inhibit additions to
the smaller shipping lines.
A Poor Reputation for Reliability
Although China can overcome its lack of suitable vessels through purchases,
COSCO also suffers a poor reputation that limits China's ability
to secure cross-trade cargoes. For example, COSCO recently diverted a ship from its
US west coast - Hong Kong route to an unscheduled west coast port, leaving a US
shipper without expected service.
For years, COSCO's main concern was the movement of Chinese cargoes--
largely allotted by central government organizations--on Chinese ships. Operating in
this noncompetitive atmosphere, COSCO had little reason to develop a reliable shipping
organization, let alone marketing expertise.
even after years of experience in Western markets, COSCO vessels not only have trouble
keeping a schedule, but the crews fail to see the importance of being on time. In
addition, Chinese shipping agents have yet to learn how to market Chinese liner
services.
In addition, I more US cargoes are being shipped
cost-insurance-freight (cif)--whereby the shipper selects the vessel for the China-bound
cargo--which will hurt companies with reputations for poor service. Previously, US cif
shipments were limited mainly to key bulk cargoes such as forest products, but even in
those instances both Chinese timber-buying organizations and US timber sellers have
been selecting non-Chinese vessels. Both groups said this practice results from the
unreliability of Chinese vessels.
" In contrast, 33 percent of the US private fleet is suitable for such service.
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Table 3
Chinese Movement Of US Commodities In Cross Trades, July 1984 -
Early February 1986
US Exports Carried On Chinese Liner Vessels
Metric
Destination Tons Commodities
Hong Kong 75,582 Fresh fruit, hides, empty containers, cotton denim, beer,
flour, furniture, ink, vehicles, oil, filters, soda ash, diammonium
phosphate, telecommunications equipment, and other
miscellaneous equipment and machinery
US Exports Carried On Chinese Bulk Carriers
Destination
Metric
Tons
Commodities
Belgium
48,718
Petroleum coke
France
73,090
Coal
Italy
65,743
Coal, petroleum coke, wheat,
corn
Japan
994,174
Fuel, petroleum products, pe
troleum coke, coal,
Mexico
51,826
corn, soybeans, iron and ste
Coal
el scrap
Netherlands
50,563
Coal, phosphate rock
Portugal
48,758
Soybeans
Suriname
700
Soybean meal
US Imports Carried On Chinese Bulk Carriers
Origin
Metric
Tons
Commodities
Canada
67,097
Iron ore
Romania
24,979
Urea
Senegal
0
Empty containers
USSR
24,193
Urea
Venezuela
51,888
Iron ore, San Isidro pellets
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Port Capacity and Trade Value:
A Comparison of Annual Growth Rates, 1981-85
0 1981
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Port Congestion Ties Up Fleets
The long turnaround in Chinese ports is an additional reason for COSCO's failure
to increase its share of Chinese and cross-trade cargoes. So successful has China's
push been for foreign trade expansion and rapid industrial growth that its coastal and
internal transportation facilities have been overwhelmed by record cargo volumes. As a
result, more than 500 ships were awaiting berthing space at China's chronically
congested ports at various times last year, and major trading partners--headed by
Japan--have voiced strong criticism that an average turnaround time of a month or
more for ships is simply not viable.
Eager not to allow its port congestion problems to stifle progress, China last year
mobilized soldiers and military equipment to assist in clearing the ports. In addition,
huge quantities of goods, which had been left uncollected at the ports for up to three
months, were confiscated and resold by the state when consignees ignored warnings to
remove their cargoes from port areas. Chinese port operations and the economy were
disrupted despite the emergency measures, however. Steel imports, for example, were
virtually halted for months after mid-July 1985 when, according to the official Chinese
news agency, 146 steel-carrying ships were queued at six Chinese ports waiting to
unload. Similarly, the inability to remove fertilizer imports from port areas brought a
temporary halt to China's fertilizer buying on the world market, according to
Fertilizer International.
China's congested ports adversely affect its own and others' fleets.5 Last fall's
congestion at Chinese ports tied up shallow draft vessels causing a severe worldwide
shortage of ships able to carry grain in the 4,000-to-10,000-dwt range, according to
Japan's Shipping and Trade News.
Efforts at Improvement
At major ports, China increased freight-handling capacity more than 10 percent in
1984 to 275 million tons. And although capacity exceeded 300 million tons in 1985,
expansion was still far outpaced by the growth in trade (see figure). In all, during the
Sixth Five-Year Plan (1981-85), China completed 54 deepwater berths, adding 100 million
tons of port capacity. However, only 193 of China's 418 berths can handle
10,000-ton-and-above vessels.
In addition to long turnarounds, the shallow draft at many Chinese ports is
discouraging to many Western carriers which tend to operate larger ships. For
example, China's container fleet averages out at 15,600 dwt compared with 26,200
dwt for US containerships. The average 9,400 dwt of Chinese bulk carriers is even
more striking when compared to the US 52,100 dwt average.
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Congestion Thwarts Trade
Last year proved to be a year of massive congestion at Chinese ports.
To illustrate the frustrating times experienced by shippers, the China Daily
reported on improving port conditions in late July, noting that the number of
ships waiting at China's major ports fell from 540 to 501 in just one week after
introducing emergency measures. By fall, however, 500 ships still were awaiting
berth space. The Chinese find it difficult to clear the ports when as many as
300 ships arrive per day--about three times the number the ports can handle.
According to Chinese statistics, foreign ships spent, on average, 2.4 days longer
unloading or loading in 1985 than they did the previous year.
Shanghai--China's largest port both in number of berths and cargo
handled--was particularly inundated, with 161 ships waiting and storage areas
holding 50 percent more than normal, according to the China News Service.
Over three years ago, a World Bank study warned that serious congestion
problems could occur if Shanghai's cargo-handling capacity failed to keep pace
with the anticipated growth in traffic. And fail it did. The number of foreign
vessels calling at Shanghai rose rapidly from 2,081 in 1981 to 2,933 in 1985, a
40-percent increase, compared with a 4-percent increase in berthing capacity
during the same period. Even though 18 new berths are to be added by 1990,
Tu Deming, director of Shanghai Harbor Administration's Planning Department
acknowledged that berthing space still may be inadequate and ships still can
expect some delays.
Last December, while acknowledging the inability of Chinese ports to keep pace
with the rapid growth in trade, Huang Zhendong, Vice Minister of Communications,
explained that, beginning 1 January 1986, new port fees would be used to add 200
million tons of annual handling capacity by 1990. The Minister of Communications, Qian
Yongchang, expects to raise port capacity to 550 million tons by 1990 through the
addition of another 100 deepwater berths--most of which are under construction.
Nonetheless, in our view, poor management at the ports, a failure to develop an inland
support infrastructure, and continuing growth in trade will negate some of these
accomplishments. As a result, foreign traders and shippers can look forward to
continuing problems.
Implications for the United States and Other Shippers
Although Chinese capability for cross-trading is increasing and, in our judgment,
will continue to increase, we believe China is at least five years away from becoming a
serious competitor to US liner services. China's price advantage, a product of its
low-cost crews, has been eroded by fierce competition. More important for the long
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term is the small percentage of container ships in China's fleet and its port congestion
and modernization problems. Moreover, these problems may be easier to overcome
than COSCO's reputation for poor and unreliable service. As a result, we believe China's
merchant marine will continue to carry mostly Chinese cargoes through the rest of the
decade.
US-China Maritime Agreement
The 1980 US-China maritime agreement, which expired in 1983, was
designed to increase bilateral trade by opening ports to each other's merchant
shipping--giving each an equal opportunity to participate in the trade generated
between the two countries. The Chinese have access to three times as many
ports in the United States as US shippers have in China. Port access has not
changed in spite of the expiration of the maritime pact. Lack of an agreement,
however, complicates scheduling and is more costly to the Chinese, who now
must give seven days notice of port calls and pay port tonnage fees of $1 06
compared with four days and 6 cents under the agreement. US ships were
required to give seven days notice for Chinese ports even under the old
agreement. But seemingly of greater importance than port notice and tonnage
fees is China's desire to avoid the controls of the US-Controlled Carrier Act
(Ocean Shipping Act of 1978). This act requires a foreign government-owned or
-controlled carrier to maintain just and reasonable classifications, rules, or
regulations and to have on file with the US Federal Maritime Commission rates
and tariffs that are deemed just and reasonable to obtain the commission's
approval for cross-trading.
Nonetheless we expect maritime issues increasingly to be a source of friction in
China's relations with other maritime nations COSCO's aggressive efforts to expand its
share of the market are already exacerbating cargo sharing issues with some nations,
and the Chinese are taking a hard line in negotiations The Japanese complained last
May about COSCO's inroads into Sino-Japanese trade but were rebuffed. Beijing
claimed that it was too early to allocate shares because China was just developing its
container fleet We believe other nations will encounter similar stonewalling as long as
China is in a position to expand its market share
For this reason, negotiations on a new US-China maritime agreement will be
difficult. The cargo-sharing issue will be a major sticking point, and, in our opinion,
China has little real incentive to resolve it. What it stands to gain--somewhat lower
costs and less red tape--would come at the cost of a reduced share of Sino-US
cargoes (see the inset). In any case, we doubt that US shippers would benefit greatly.
China's shallow ports and long turnaround times are obstacles that an agreement cannot
remove. And China's refusal to allow foreign shipping agents to establish offices in
Beijing makes it difficult to compete for Chinese business On the plus side--and
independent of a maritime agreement--China's economic reforms have given Chinese
enterprises greater freedom to use non-COSCO vessels, and US shippers are in a good
position to compete for Chinese cargoes transhipped through Japan.
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White House and National Security Council
1 - David Laux, Senior Assistant for China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong, EOB Rm 302
Department of State
1 - Richard Williams, Director, EAP/C, Room 4318
1 - Joan Plaisted, Deputy Director for Economics, EAP/C, Room 4318
1 - Thomas Fingar, Chief, INR/EAP/CH, Room 8840
1 - John Danylyk, INR/EC/CER, Room 8722
1 - Richard Scissors, Director, Office of Maritime Affairs, Room 5826
1 - John Bemis, EB/TRA/MA, Room 5826
Department of Defense
1 - John J. Sloan, Defense Intelligence Officer, East Asia and Pacific,
Room 2C238, Pentagon
1 - Major William Suggs, Office of the Army Assistant Chief of Staff for
Intelligence, DAMI-FII, Room 2A474, Pentagon
1 - Ron Montaperto, JSI-3A, Room 1C945, Pentagon
1 - DIA/DB-2B, Room C2837, DIAC
1 - DIA/DB/4E2, DIAC
1 - DIA/AT-3/China, Room 1120, Pompano Plaza West
1 - LCDR Robert Maggi, OPS- 612, Room 4E475, Pentagon
1 - Hal Leach, NISC-OOW, Room 2006, Suitland
1 - Karen Steelberg, Chief, NOIC/04, Room 1650, Suitland
Department of Transportation
1 - Reginald Bourdan, Associate Administrator for Policy and International
Affairs, Maritime Administration, Room 7216, 400-7th St SW
1 - Jim Treickel, Director, Office of International Activities, Room 7216,
400-7th St SW
Department of Commerce
1 - Chris Lucyk, Director, Office of PRC and Hong Kong, Room 2317
1 - Intelligence Liaison Staff, Room 6854
Department of the Treasury
1 - Doug Mulholland, Special Assistant to the Secretary for National Security,
Room 4324
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1 - Robert G. Adam, Office of Policy Planning, International Affairs,
Room 12313, 1100-11th St NW
United States Trade Representative
1 - William B. Abnett, Director for China Affairs, Room 316, Winder Building, 300-17th St N
Central Intelligence Agency
1 - DDI, Room 7E44
1 - DCI/DDCI/Executive Staff, Room 7D60
1 - D/OEA, Room 4F18
1 - C/OEA/China, Room 4G32
1 - OEA/PA, Room 4G32
1 - OEA/IS, Room 4G32
1 - OEA/TT, Room 4G32
1 - OEA/EA, Room 4G32
1 - OEA/Production Officer, Room 4G48
1 - Senior Review Panel, Room 5G00
1 - NIO/EA, Room 7E62
1 - C/PES, Room 7F24
1 - LDA/China, Room 1H18
1 - C/EADRoom 5E18
1 - C/NEAAD/China Branch, 306 Key Bldg
5 - CPAS/IMC/CB, Room 7G07
5 - Chrono
5 - Author
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