THE PHILIPPINES' CORAZON AQUINO: PROBLEM AND PERSPECTIVES OF A NEW LEADER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T01017R000606370001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 4, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 20, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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Central Intelligence Agency
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
20 August 1986
The Philippines' Corazon Aquino:
Problems and Perspectives of a New Leader
Summary
Over six months after she took office, Corazon Aquino remains a
popular figure but occupies a precarious political position. Civilian-military
tensions, cabinet infighting, limited progress toward social and economic
reform, and increasing press criticism plague her government.
Aquino--who had never held any elected position prior to her rise to
power in February--appears to be maturing as a political leader, but her
lack of political instincts continues to color her perceptions of the
roblems facing her government and the best way to deal with them. F
Mrs. Aquino is, by all evidence, achievement oriented and thus
frustrated over her administration's lack of progress. To date, she has not
been able to implement programs to meet her campaign pledge to raise
the Philippine standard of living. Her insistence on making her visit to
Washington an official working one instead of a State visit, we believe,
This memorandum was prepared byl -I Office of East Asian Analysis and 25X1
the Office of Leadership Analysis. Information available as of 20 25X1
August 1986 was used in its preparation. Comments and queries are welcome and may
be directed to the Chief, Islands Branch, Southeast Asia Division, OEA,
or t
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the Chief, Political Psychology Division, LDA
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reflects the high priority she places on producing some immediate--and
tangible--accomplishment to enhance her public support.
Aquino's Core Values and Concerns
In a country where personality politics has always prevailed, Aquino is no
exception. She tends to view politics in highly personal terms.
during the presidential campaign Aquino became confident that the people
who attended her rallies, were displaying their personal trust in her and wanted her
alone to replace Marcos.
Aquino probably feels that she must rely on personality politics because she
currently cannot operate in government any other way. She has no effective political
party to support her, and her decision in March to eliminate the government machinery
built by Marcos has forced her to govern without the benefit of political institutions.
Ironically, although Aquino campaigned against Marcos's one-man rule, she now finds
herself wielding much the same authority as her predecessor. Through the "freedom
constitution" that she declared in effect in March of this year, she has broad powers to
enact legislation and reorganize the national government.
Nonetheless, we believe that Aquino--who previously shunned the political
spotlight--is not comfortable with her considerable authority and is genuinely
committed to the decentralization of power. For example, one of the themes that
Aquino has stressed during her presidency has been that of popular participation in
government. In numerous public statements, Aquino has encouraged the Philippine
people to abandon their traditional reliance on local political bosses, to involve
themselves in government at all levels, and become more independent minded and
self-reliant. She also has encouraged government employees to be responsive to
popular sentiment on various issues. For example, in a recent speech to members of
the Philippine Constabulary, Aquino called upon them to "open yourselves to what the
people have to say."
We believe that Aquino views her status as president in terms of this recurrent
populist theme. She has said repeatedly that she intends to lead by example, and
seems to believe that her involvement in politics--as someone who is not a career
politician--represents the level of personal concern regarding the governmental process
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she cQne_r_s her nonprofessional background as an essential 25X1
element of her popularity. 2bA1
that she would like to inspire in the average citizen. Moreover, 25X1
Dismantling Marcos's political machine is one of Aquino's foremost objectives,
and she is concerned that Marcos still believes he has a role to play in Philippine
reports from her advisers that Marcos loyalists are preparing for the former 25X1
president's imminent return. In addition, L Aquino has
been warned of loyalist plans to disrupt her visit to the United States. 25X1
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politics. for example, Aquino receives 25X1
US officials report that Aquino is concerned about the level of her popularity.
She has confided that the aborted Tolentino coup attempt in July made her realize the
fragility of her political position and that "people power" does not provide a stable base
of support. Contributing to her concerns may be a recent nationwide public opinion
survey conducted for the Bishops-Businessmen's Conference, which found that, although
Aquino remains very popular, the majority of Filipinos consider "people power" and not
an election mandate as the source of her legitimacy. Accordingly, Aquino seems
worried that the press is projecting a poor image of her administration and that this is
having an effect on her government's popularity.
Although Aquino has contrasted herself with Marcos and his pattern of
government, she has not revealed what world leaders she respects and would like to
emulate. The only prominent figure whom she has said she admires is Mother Theresa
of Calcutta; but beyond her late husband Benigno, Aquino may consider her countryman,
Ramon Magsaysay, as a suitable role model. Her obvious pride in being Filipino would
attract her to Magsaysay, a congressman from a neighboring province in Central Luzon
who became president in 1953. Like Aquino, Magsaysay had an honest reputation and
styled himself a man of the people. He invited thousands of peasants and laborers to
tour Malacanang Palace--much as Aquino did when she became president. He also
encouraged farmers to send him telegrams explaining their problems. For her part,
Aquino has instituted a biweekly television interview program entitled "Dialogue" on
which she appears with ordinary citizens.
Aquino might also feel that she can draw upon Magsaysay's experience in dealing
with the Communist Huk rebellion that he inherited when he took office.
Magsaysay--who had previously been Secretary of Defense--reorganized the armed
forces, increased the number of combat troops, and tightened military discipline in the
field. He also addressed the social and economic causes of the rebellion and
established special courts for landlord-tenant disputes, as well as agricultural extension
services and credit for farmers. He had begun a program of land reform when he was
killed in an airplane accident in 1957.
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Aquino's Evolving Style
she has tried to limit the political damage resulting from Minister of Local
Government Pimentel's efforts to replace local officials by making his appointments
subject to the approval of a special committee formed from her coalition, according to
Embassy reporting.
Aquino believes in refraining from direct involvement in the duties of her
subordinates. she feels former President Marcos dictated every
detail to his cabinet ministers and thus deprived himself of the benefits of their
expertise. Consequently, Aquino--who, according to US Embassy reporting, does not
feel confident of her understanding of complex issues--is reluctant to resolve a policy
issue that she has entrusted to an appointee unless the matter has clearly gotten out of
hand.
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Although Aquino's hesitancy to act authoritatively may undercut her efforts to
lead the country--given the Philippine tradition of personality politics--she is
demonstrating growing political acumen. For example, she is
considering replacing Labor Minister Sanchez with someone more acceptable to the
Philippine business community despite her public defense of the controversial minister.
Her decision to create a national security council, suggested by Enrile, and to name him
to such a potentially influential group--thereby giving him greater input into some
policy decisions--is also illustrative.
Aquino is weighing the results of the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission--in which she has publicly promised not to interfere. Despite her public
warning to the commission not to make policy by deciding the issue of foreign military
bases, for example, Aquino has not given any
support to the group of commission members that is trying to keep language out of the
new constitution that would eliminate such bases. In such a case, Aquino's tendency to
avoid interfering in the duties of those whom she has selected to work for her is
probably reinforced by the attitudes of some of her advisers.
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Executive Secretary Arroyo is strongly opposed to government
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interference in the deliberations of the commission. In contrast, according to the US
Embassy, Aquino's brother, Jose Cojuangco, is willing to lobby commission members to
ensure that the new constitution does not contain provisions prohibiting foreign military
bases or nuclear weapons on Philippine soil. An Embassy contact says that Cojuangco
has succeeded in persuading his sister to speak quietly to some commission members.
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Aquino's experience with Enrile--who was Marcos's defense minister when her
husband was jailed under martial law--is largely the reason Aquino has limited his
authority in her government. Soon after becoming president, she announced that Armed
Forces Chief of Staff Ramos and the service chiefs would report directly to her and that
Enrile would simply monitor their performance of their duties. In addition,
Aquino is attempting to balance Enrile's influence in
the military by securing the loyalty of senior military officers through a careful screening
of promotion lists.
The aborted coup attempt in July has prompted Aquino to try to ease the
growing tension between her civilian advisers and her defense minister. According to
the US Embassy, in a cabinet meeting following Tolentino's coup attempt, Aquino
defended Enrile against harsh criticism from some senior government officials who
believe that Enrile was involved in* the abortive coup. although
Aquino believes Enrile knew about Tolentino's plans, she does not think that he was
involved in the planning and does not intend to take any action against him. She has
even begun to heed his advice--over the objection of other cabinet ministers--on some
security issues, and has named him to a newly
security council.
Aquino may well believe that Enrile is biding his time in the expectation that she
will misstep and provide him an opportunity to oust her.
these fears may be well founded. Enrile, for example, appears to us to be positioning
himself to take advantage of unfolding events. In addition to publicly claiming that
Communists have infiltrated the Aquino government, a US Embassy contact says that
Enrile is meeting informally with a wide range of military officers to win their confidence
and loyalty. Also, Enrile is using his contacts in the
former ruling party to rebuild the Nationalista Party and field candidates in the national
and local elections expected early next year.
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Traditional Politicians. Aquino seems to regard Vice President Laurel as an 25X6
politician who is typical of the traditional Philippine political leader 0
She allowed his UNIDO Party only three Cabinet positions and 25X6
has limited his input into policy decisions. 25X1
recently admonished Laurel--along with other ministers--for publicly criticizing her
cabinet. In addition, she was reportedly enraged by his proposal to improve diplomatic
relations with the People's Republic of China through the use of Philippine Government
radio to broadcast anti-Koumintang messages to Taiwan, according to the US Embassy.
the Embassy says she
Nonetheless, Aquino has tried not to alienate her vice president, who boosted her
campaign by providing the organized political machine that she lacked.
Aquino has ordered that any action by a government agency affecting
Laurel's home province must be cleared with him. In addition, Aquino has tried to ease
tension between Laurel and Minister of Local Government Pimentel arising from the
latter's replacement of local officials with members of his PDP-Laban Party instead of
Laurel's party.
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Aquino probably is aware that Laurel is positioning himself for a break with her,
most likely during the national and local elections expected early next year.
Laurel is meeting privately with Enrile to discuss plans for opposing
PDP-Laban in the local elections. Laurel has even told US Embassy officials that he
would not hesitate to campaign against government candidates because his attempts to
forge a unified slate were rebuffed by PDP-Laban leader Pimentel. Laurel may actually
have little choice in the matter because UNIDO members are unhappy over their
treatment in the coalition. The US Embassy says that party leaders are frustrated with
Laurel's inability to provide most of them with senior government positions.
The Catholic Church. Because of the Catholic Church's prominent role in poll
watching during the presidential campaign and Cardinal Sin's public support for her
presidency, Aquino is aware that good relations with the Catholic Church are important,
according to the US Embassy. She continues to consult Cardinal Sin and other church
leaders for advice on some issues because "the Church has contacts with the people's
grassroots". Aquino has publicly stressed, however, that they do not dictate government
policy.
Recognizing the value of the Church's nationwide organization and its influence
with the local populace, Aquino has sought the Church's help in negotiating with the
Communist insurgents. she is encouraging contacts between
clergy and insurgents in different areas of the country to determine the rebels' terms for
a ceasefire and surrender. On the government's behalf, the archbishop of Cebu, Cardinal
Vidal, has negotiated with insurgents in his province who were interested in
surrendering. Aquino probably believes that church involvement in negotiations in the
field will convince the military to treat those who may surrender fairly.
Aquino's relationship with the Church may have seen its best days. In spite of
their general willingness to assist the Aquino administration with counterinsurgency
issues, for example, church leaders seem increasingly hesitant to be closely identified
with her government. Cardinal Sin has emphasized in his public statements that the
Church intervened to help oust Marcos only because it was an emergency situation in
which peoples' lives were in danger. He has said that the Church will now concentrate
on providing educational and social services and aid for the poor. According to the US
Embassy, leading clerics have privately told Aquino that they intend to follow a policy of
"constructive critical collaboration" with the government.
many of the Catholic hierarchy are concerned about
the stability of the Aquino government and its inability to make progress toward reform.
To express their concerns in the least obtrusive way, several bishops were appointed by
the Catholic Bishops Conference to talk privately with Aquino.
= Aquino has been sent a letter by the religious superior of the Carmelite convent in
Cebu--where Aquino took refuge when the military rebellion against Marcos began in
February--protesting the disruptive increase in labor militancy in Cebu City since Aquino
took office.
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Aquino's Views of the United States
In our judgment, Mrs. Aquino is philosophically and personally well disposed
toward the United States. She attended US Catholic schools from junior high through
college and was steeped in the democratic philosophy of the American "founding
fathers." Her gratitude for Benigno Aquino's successful triple bypass surgery in Dallas
and the outpouring of sympathy she received from the American people after her
husband's assassination further strengthened her positive association with the United
States.
President Aquino considers the United 25X1
States an important historic and strategic element in Philippine politics and desires close
Philippine-US relations. Nevertheless, she has pledged to do "whatever is in the interest
of the Philippine people" and will be reluctant to foster too dependent a relationship
with any one country. This should be particularly true in light of the growing 25X1
nationalistic and anti-US sentiment in the Philippines. We expect her position in future
bilateral relationships to reflect a stronger pro-Philippine--although not necessarily
anti-American--perspective than has previously existed in US-Philippine relations.
As for the US bases, prior to the elections, Aquino--like her husband--said she
wanted Clark Air Base and Subic Bay Naval Base removed. Last February she also
stated, "No sovereign nation should consent that a portion of its territory be a perpetual
possession of a foreign power." On the other hand, she has--since her
election--indicated she will keep her options open until 1991. In our view, Mrs. Aquino
wants as much national independence as possible. But her recognition of the need for
US fiscal support--the annual payment for the bases is nearly 10 percent of the total
Philippine Government's domestic tax collection and the bases directly support nearly
40,000 Filipinos--will strengthen her resolve to fight against immediate or midterm
removal of the bases.
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Aquino stated she wanted to assume a direct role in the bases talks. Although
we do not expect her to be firmly wedded to specific details prior to the negotiations,
we expect her to bargain hard for beneficial terms for the Philippines. According to the
press, members of her administration are seeking information about the experiences of
other countries--Greece and Spain--in renegotiating their base agreements with the
United States. We also expect Mrs. Aquino will consult with other ASEAN members
Although Aquino's chances for implementing her program of social and economic
reforms will depend heavily on the support of local and national officials, she does not
appear to be making an effort to ensure that her people will be in place once
elections--tentatively scheduled for early next year--are held. The situation is
particularly urgent from her point of view because, among other reasons, the
government's program to replace local officials who held office under Marcos has been
unpopular in many parts of the country and
opposition politicians--who possess considerable
preparing for the upcoming elections.
actively
Embassy reporting indicates that Aquino is aware of the possibility that members
of Marcos's former party could defeat government candidates if her coalition cannot
close ranks before elections. She has created a committee of close advisers to study
the feasibility of establishing her own political party that would draw elements from
PDP-Laban and UNIDO. In the meantime, she has also encouraged her brother,
Secretary-General of PDP-Laban, to meet with representatives from UNIDO and the
Liberal Party to try to plan a joint election strategy.
As for the longer term, Aquino has demonstrated a capacity to learn from
experience and should continue to evolve into a more competent leader. It remains to
be seen whether she will make significant changes in people and approach that are
needed to encourage longer term policies about how to address serious economic,
political, and security problems, rather than rely on quick fixes based largely on her
popularity and charisma.
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Subject: The Philippines' Corazon Aquino: Problems
and Perspectives of a New Leader 25X1
Outside distribution:
RADM Edward Baker, Director, OSD/ISA/EAD
Don Eirich, OSD/ISA
Karl Jackson, DAS, EAsian & Pacific Affairs, OSD/ISA
Lt. Col. William Wise, USAF, OSD/ISA
Lt. Col. John Haseman, HODA (DAMI-FII)
Nancy Boshoven, State PM/SP, New State
Charles Salmon, Director, EAP/PHL, Department of State
John C. Monjo, DASecretary for EAP Affairs, Department of State
Nicholas Burakow, EB/IFD/OMA, Department of State
Robert DuBose, Director, INR/GI, Department of State
Robert Duncan, Director, EAP/EP, Department of State
John Finney, DDirector, EAP/PHL, Department of State
Richard Hermann, INR/IS, Department of State
Fred Greene, Acting Director, INR/EAP, Department of State
Francis McNeil, DAS/INR, Department of State
Majorie Niehaus, INR/EAP/SEA, Department of State
James Norris, AID/DAA/ANE, Department of State
Doug Paal, PPStaff S/P, Department of State
Peter W. Rodman, PPStaff, Department of State
Frank Young, ANE/SEA/AID, Department of State
Roger Severance, Director, 0 of P Basin, Department of Commerce
Ronald Oechsler, ITA, Department of Commerce
William Brown, Department of Commerce
Rear Admiral John L. Butts, Director of Naval Intelligence
Lt. J.G. Fijol, NAVOPINTCEN, World Navies
Major Don Call, USMC
Richard Childress, NSC
Douglas P. Mulholland, Treasury Department
James Conrow, DAS, International Affairs, Treasury Department
William McFadden, OS/IDN, Treasury Department
LTC Robert Cooey, USAF
Don Gregg, Assistant to the Vice President
LTC Roger Hill, USA
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Rob Huddleston, JSI 3B
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Robert Nevitt, Director, EA, USIA
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Paula Causey, New State
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Gerald West, OPIC
George Payne, Department of Commerce
The Honorable Richard L. Armitage, Department of Defense
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Verne Dickey, Department of State
The Honorable Gaston Sigur, Department of State
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