THE SNAP ELECTION IN THE PHILIPPINES: WHAT IF THE OPPOSITION WINS?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T01017R000605640001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 7, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 4, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/24: CIA-RDP86TO1017R000605640001--9 25X1
I-P IG
I- Sou.eC.~D
DATE V Oa
DOC 1 KD FA 4 & O00 y
OCR ?
Central Intelligence Agency
Washin,;ton l) C 20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
4 February 1986
The Snap Election in the Philippines:
What If The Opposition Wins?
P&PD / Summary
President Marcos's many organizational
advantages and his control of the vote counting
machinery suggest that a victory by Corazon Aquino
in Friday's presidential election is not as likely
as a narrow win by the ruling party. Because the
race is close, however, we believe an opposition
victory should not be dismissed out of hand. Such
an upset would pose difficult decisions for players
at both ends of the political spectrum, and in our
view create a precarious and fragile political
scene, at least in the short term.
-- An Aquino victory would present the radical
left with a dilemma that could split the
Communist Party--whether to work with
Aquino in the hope of gaining a foothold in
the government, to mount military
operations in an effort to destabilize the
administration, or to continue its strategy
of gradually building a political base.
-- Aquino's victory would also pose hard
decisions for the right, which stands to
lose considerably from her reformist
agenda. So serious is the threat to Marcos
associates such as industrialist Eduardo
This memorandum was prepared by
Office of East Asian Analysis. Information available as
of 31 January was used in its preparation. Comments and queries
are welcome and may be directed to Chief, Southeast Asia
Division, OEA
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/24: CIA-RDP86TO1017R000605640001-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/24: CIA-RDP86T01017R000605640001-9
I I
Cojuangco and Armed Forces Chief of Staff
Ver that they would probably make every
effort--including urging Marcos to reimpose
martial law--to prevent Aquino from taking
If Aquino were allowed to take office, she
would probably have to cut political deals with
Marcos's supporters in key constituencies--including
the military, the business community, and the ruling
party--to manage the government, which Marcos's
party would still control. As a result, we believe
the policies of an Aquino administration would
reflect the realities of political horsetrading as
much as her reformist inclinations. How well Aquino
coped with her early challenges would determine
whether her government took a'pragmatic course that
would begin to stabilize domestic politics over the
longer term or a politically polarizing course that
would sten the country's slide into chaos.
Ambitious Programs
Victory by opposition leader Corazon Aquino in the
presidential election scheduled for 7 February could place in
power a leadership that we believe is determined to shift sharply
Manila's economic, social, and foreign policies. Aquino's
campaign has pursued the theme of presenting a "moral
alternative" to Marcos, and we believe Aquino's primary goal is
to overturn the traditional pattern of machine politics. During
the campaign, for example, she has said she would improve the
government's counterinsurgency performance by legalizing the
Communist Party, calling a six-month cease-fire, implementing a
general amnesty program, improving economic conditions in rural
and urban areas, reorganizing the military, and implementing new
civil action programs. According to press reports, Aquino also
plans to take a tougher stand with foreign creditors, dismantle
the agricultural monopolies, and pursue extensive land reform.
Her agenda includes calling a convention to reframe the
constitution, freeing political prisoners, opening up the press,
and dismantling certain ministries, including Imelda Marcos's
Ministry of Human Settlements.
The outcome of Aquino's attempts to complete this ambitious
agenda would depend not only on the policy inclinations of the
new administration but also on its ability to learn the skills of
practical politics. Aquino and her closest advisers have little
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/24: CIA-RDP86T01017R000605640001-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/24: CIA-RDP86T01017R000605640001-9
? I I
experience in the workings of government at the national level,
and they would be confronted by well defined interests on the
left and right of the political spectrum.
The Immediate Challenges
Aquino's first challenge would be working with other
institutions of national government, a process in which the
political inclinations and orientation of Marcos's party, the
Obstacles to Assuming Power
If Aquino wins the balloting, she will face several
immediate obstacles. At the least, we believe Marcos would be
tempted to declare the election invalid, using his apparent
control of the Election Commission and the Supreme Court.
Aquino's victory would also increase the chances that Marcos's
supporters in the military--who reportedly are concerned over
Aquino's alleged ties to the Communists--would attempt a coup to
prevent her from coming to power.
However Marcos proceeds, preventing Aquino from taking
office would require the support of the military. Presumably, he
believes he can tap support for such a move through the network
he has cultivated among senior officers during his 20 years in
power. In our view, however, these sentiments might not
translate into a willingness among senior officers lock
Aquino's assuming power. military
commanders might have a hard time gettinq military rank and file
to go along with the idea--especially if Aquino wins
decisively.
We believe that there are other conditions under which
Aquino could assume power. One would be a refusal by the Supreme
Court to uphold an attempt by Marcos to void the election.
Several press reports indicate that last month Marcos was unable
to persuade the Court to declare the election unconstitutional,
even though the Court traditionally has followed his direction.
Although not a likely prospect, such a show of independence by
the Court would block Marcos's legal opportunity to retain
power. This development probably would force him to reimpose
martial law to remain in office.
newly displaced Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL), would be
critical. The party currently dominates the government at the
national, provincial, and local level, and without its
cooperation Aquino would be unable to implement changes in
policy. As Aquino entered her first months in power, we believe
she would have to cut political deals with the KBL to prevent it
from working to undercut her government. Without Marcos at the
helm, we would expect some fragmentation in the KBL that probably
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/24: CIA-RDP86T01017R000605640001-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/24: CIA-RDP86T01017R000605640001-9
would make it easier for Aquino to cut deals, if she were so
inclined.
An Aquino administration would quickly have to come to terms
with the National Assembly and the Supreme Court. The National
Assembly is dominated by Marcos's party and has always toed the
party line on key issues.* For example, when the opposition
attempted to impeach Marcos last year, the KBL voted unanimously
and quickly to defeat the initiative, preventing a politically
embarrasing public debate. The Supreme Court also has
traditionally acted at Marcos's direction. The Court is
relatively young--over half of the 13 justices are 65 or under--
and cannot be forced to retire before age 70. The Court has the
power to stifle Aquino's reform plans by voiding legislation
even if she deals successfully with the National Assembly.
Aquino would not have an opportunity to work with a new
National Assembly until 1990, when elections are scheduled,
unless she invoked the presidential emergency powers and
dissolved the body. She has said repeatedly during the campaign
that she would not exercise Marcos's authoritarian powers, and
doing so would cost her considerable political capital acquired
during her "reformist" campaign. A better opportunity to whittle
away at the KBL, we believe, would he in local elections
scheduled for May 1986. As local elections approached, we
believe many ruling party officials would likely see little
benefit in opposing a new government and would be eager to strike
deals with Aquino.
In our judgment, Aquino's inability to find quick solutions
to the country's economic and political problems would underscore
the need to develop new alliances to hold intact her political
base. On the economic front, the economy will continue to be
constrained by the country's $26 billion foreign debt--a
circumstance that would limit economic policy initiatives and we
believe would force Aquino occasionally to take unpopular
stands. For the economy to grow and service its foreign debt,
for example, Manila must place a greater emphasis on exports,
which requires a politically painful depreciation of the peso.
Although this would make Philippine products more competitive on
world markets, it would also mean higher prices for imports.
Aquino has yet to take a public stand on this aspect of economic
policy, but her populist leanings probably would lead her to
reject a devaluation.
And even though we believe an Aquino victory could go a long
way toward slowing the momentum of the insurgents by eliminating
*The ruling KBL party holds 111 seats in the National
Assembly, with the opposition holding 59 and independents 11.
The independents are closely aligned with the KBL.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/24: CIA-RDP86T01017R000605640001-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/24: CIA-RDP86T01017R000605640001-9 25X1
" I I
their ability to exploit anti-Marcos sentiment, her government
would still face the grim reality of an entrenched insurgency
with hard-core Communists in control of the movement. An
ambitious counterinsurgency program with an effective military
component would have to be put in place. This would require that
Aquino work closely with the military--an institution she
profoundly distrusts. Moreover, a drawn-out military effort to
eradicate the insurgency would require a sustained effort to
improve civil administration at the local level--including
providing costly infrastructure, such as roads and schools, and
more social services. And this would have to would be
administered by what would be left of Marcos's party.
Perspectives of the Right and Left
How Marcos's associates on the political right would deal
with an Aquino victory would be, in our view, the most important
determinant for political stability following her election. They
have reaped enormous political and financial benefits in Marcos's
service and are a primary target of Aquino's proposed policies.
In our view, the right--which will retain considerable
postelection political and financial clout--has three choices:
come to an accommodation with Aquino, challenge the new
government, or leave the country. There is little doubt, in our
view, that Aquino would benefit if some of the blatant symbols of
Marcos's spoils system--including Ver and sugar czar Roherto
Bendicto--chose the latter route.
Cutting deals with Aquino, however, may be the most
attractive option for the right. By giving up some of the spoils
they have received over the last 10 years, they probably could
retain others and allow Aquino some victories in her attempts to
reform economic policy. For example, if Cojuangco paved the way
for more competition in the coconut industry--he currently
controls domestic and export marketing--we believe he would be
allowed to retain other assets in his financial empire, such as
his growing control over the country's food processing and
lucrative fertilizer industries, if for no other reason than that
his huge financial resources would be needed to get the economy
moving again.
Other elements of the right would be likely to use their
financial and political assets to retain influence in Aquino's
new government and, from their perspective, moderate her policy
swings. One way that the right could sway her policies would be
to back candidates in the local elections in May. If rightwing
political kingpins such as Ramon Durano of Cebu Province
succeeded in retaining control of substantial portions of local
and provincial administration, we believe it would constrain
Aquino's ability to implement civil action and social programs.
In this way former Marcos loyalists might be able to prevent
Aquino from going too far in her efforts to divest them of their
fortunes and to obstruct their access to continued financial
gain.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/24: CIA-RDP86T01017R000605640001-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/24: CIA-RDP86T01017R000605640001-9 25X1
The extreme option open to the right would be to use its
control of local government officials, the National Assembly, or
perhaps even its own private armies or the armed forces to hasten
the end of the Aquino government--a course the right would be
likely to take if it believed that Aquino could be replaced by a
government more attuned to its interests. For example, rightwing
elements of the KBL could obstruct legislation in the National
Assembly and even institute impeachment proceedings against
Aquino. In that case, Aquino almost certainly would be forced to
dissolve the Assembly and resort to exercising Marcos's
authoritarian powers, such as rulinq by decree--an option that
she would want to avoid.
At the other end of the political spectrum, an Aquino
victory would present the Communist Party with a dilemma, in our
judgment. So far, Communist strategy--concentrating on mass
political organization while mounting enough military operations
to discredit the government--has been based on Marcos's continued
rule. With Aquino at the helm, we believe these calculations
would substantially change, especially if she showed promise of
implementing reforms that would erode its mass base or improve
the counterinsurgency effort. With Aquino in office, the party
would be facing an administration that was elected without
Communist support. The party would have to weigh a variety of
options in that case, including whether to wait to see how events
following the election played out, to respond to offers from
Aquino for a cease-fire, to implement measures designed to
sustain revolutionary fervor in Marcos' or to embark on
an urban terrorism campaign in Manila. ~ el 25X1
Making these decisions could pose an unprecedented challenge
to party unity. So far, tight discipline on key decisions has 25X1
been a hallmark of the party,
Although the party temporarily split over whether to 25X1
participate in the election--a vocal minority favored support for
Aquino- all party leaders toed the 25X1
line once the boycott decision was reached. During the debate,
this minority--mainly leaders from Manila--argued that even
though an Aquino victory was unlikely, it would give the party an
entre into a new government. This faction also contended that
the party would gain better access to moderate ranks even if
Aquino lost, and would be better positioned to influence the next
presidential election. With an Aquino victory, however, leaders
of the minority faction--who in the past have advocated the use
of violence in Manila--would probably put up stiffer resistance
to the views of conservative party leaders and lobby hard for
implementing more radical tactics. Pursuit of such a high-risk
strategy we believe could force Aquino into securit crackdowns
far more stern than she would want to undertake. 25X1
Peering Into the Future
There are no precedents in the Philippines for the far
reaching transfer of power that would accompany an Aquino
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/24: CIA-RDP86T01017R000605640001-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/24: CIA-RDP86T01017R000605640001-9
victory, and we believe it is impossible to say how the "Aquino
Experiment" would work out. The problems the Philippines faces
are sufficiently serious that we cannot be optimistic that the
first year or so of an Aquino government would witness real
progress righting the economy or defeating the insurgency--
achievements which are out of the reach of any government. We
can envisage two broad courses that an Aquino government might
take in its early stages--one generally favorable to US interests
and one not. In practice, of course, the path an Aquino 25X1
t
ld t
k
b
bl
governmen
wou
a
e pro
a
y would not be as distinct and
clear-cut as we project. More than likely, it would be a
combination ion of elements from both of the following scenarios.
An Optimistic Scenario. Aquino could deal with the right by
giving them limited influence in her government and refraining
from extreme actions such as stripping them of all their
financial holdings. At the same time, she would benefit either
from a decision by the Communist party not to implement massive
military operations against her government, or from her own
ability to negotiate a cease-fire with the insurgents and work
with the military.
If economic and security problems allow her breathing room,
what might emerge in Aquino's first few months of power would be
a newly defined process of governing. If Aquino were to develop
into the successful reformer her supporters believe she could be,
her style would be open and accessible to a broad range of
interest groups. Although the process of government emerging
from such a style would probably be noisy and fractious at times,
it would signal the return of political competition and could
lead to institution building in the national political arena--a
necessary if partial step to the restoration of the political
center, in our judgment.
Aquino's desire to continue a reformist course past her
initial honeymoon would probably be very strong. Although she
would face an uphill battle in her attempts to uproot both
Marcos's spoils system and the Communist party's political and
military organization, we believe she would be more willing than
Marcos to press ahead over the longer term with political,
military, and economic change. For one thing, Aquino has less to
lose in changing the system because it would not undercut the
vested interests of her closest associates--as is the case with
Marcos. In addition, we believe she would be more likely to bend
to domestic and foreign pressure for reform because she would
lack Marcos's monopoly on power.
The initial legitimacy and popular support that Aquino would
enjoy, we believe, are key to her ability to begin implementing
reform. For example, merely the promise of reform following
Aquino's election would probably improve the climate for domestic
and foreign investment in the near term. Although an Aquino
victory would be accompanied by considerable uncertainty, she
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/24: CIA-RDP86T01017R000605640001-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/24: CIA-RDP86T01017R000605640001-9 25X1
appears to have the confidence of much of the Philippine business
community and a popular mandate could halt the forty percent
investment decline that the country has suffered in the last two
years. For these reasons, in the optimistic scenario, Aquino--
despite her lack of a strong power base--would have a running
start in dealing with the country's most critical problems.
Initial policy moves might include reframing the constitution,
freeing political prisoners, and taking a stronger stand with
foreign creditors.
Coopting Marcos's party, or parts of it, would entail
backing away from her campaign promise to prosecute Marcos, his
close associates, members of the government, and military
personnel she believes are involved in graft and corruption. We
believe Aquino's advisers--whose ranks include businessman Jaime
Ongpin, former Supreme Court Justice Cecilia Munoz-Palma, and
former Senator Jovito Salonga--would counsel her to dampen her
desire for revenge and she might ultimately choose to pursue
other options toward Marcos and his closest supporters including
political exile, tax harassment, and removal of military officers
who have been extended beyond retirement age. Such steps
probably would undercut much opposition from the extreme right
and might also satisfy most of her supporters--leftists and
moderates alike--who are already demanding some form of
retribution against Marcos and his associates. After securing
her political power base in this manner, we believe she would be
better positioned in the near term to implement broader reforms,
ranging from dismantling the agricultural monopolies to
reorganizing the military.
A More Likely Scenario. Whether an Aquino government could
remain on the above course is open to doubt. The seriousness of
the country's economic and internal stability problems suggest
the government would be pressed for immediate results. But an
overly ambitious upending of the political and economic order--
including reorganizing the military and substantially changing
the pattern of relations with the US--could prompt an exodus of
businessmen, politicians, and military leaders, which would rob
the country of experienced members of the traditional ruling
elite. For example, Aquino has adopted a foreign policy platform
that leaves in doubt the future of the US military facilities.
On the domestic front, if she moved too quickly to dismantle the
sugar and coconut monopolies, she might face a massive flight of
capital by Roberto Benedicto and Eduardo Cojuangco--as well as by
other Marcos associates--which would undermine the nascent
economic recovery. Such conditions would provide the Communist
Party with an unprecedented opportunity to make new political and
military inroads.
There is also reason to doubt an Aquino government's
willingness to move vigorously on counterinsurgency. Aquino's
initial campaign remarks, together with the views of some of her
advisers, suggest that they see the insurgency principally as a
"social problem," and do not fully appreciate the immediacy of
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/24: CIA-RDP86T01017R000605640001-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/24: CIA-RDP86T01017R000605640001-9 25X1
the Communist threat. If an Aquino government persisted in
maintaining a benign view of the insurgency and gave short shrift
to the counterinsurgency, the Communists, in our opinion, would
be able to continue to build their position in the countryside.
Such a policy approach also would make Provision of increased US
security assistance more difficult. 25X1
Aquino would also face the difficult task of maintaining
order in opposition ranks. Many opposition leaders suppressed
personal ambition to unite behind her candidacy and will be
competing for political rewards. Longstanding rifts in
opposition ranks were papered over only shortly before the
deadline on filing election bids in December 1985. Since then,
the campaign has been marred by internal squabbles over
financing, according to the US Embassy, with Laurel's party
charging Aquino supporters with cornering all the funds. Laurel
recently told US officials that Aquino turns to her own advisers 25X1
shut him out of the government if she is elected
Even if Aquino includes Laurel and his supporters in her
cabinet, divisiveness in the ranks could ultimately prove fatal
to the new government. The opposition's relative cohesion during 25X1
the campaign is based coley on the goal of removing Marcos from
office. Internecine debates in her cabinet over policy issues
could paralyze her government, leaving open the possibility that
leftists in her cabinet could take advantage of the disarray.
And no matter what Aquino wishes, her government will find
it difficult to avoid assuming the traditional habits and styles
of Filipino governments. Some of her supporters--who would now
benefit from taking their "turn at the trough"--will be tempted
to encourage Aquino to maintain Marcos's spoils system. In this
case, the dismantling of the coconut and sugar monopolies, for
example, would in reality only be the passing of control from the
Cojuangcos and Benedictos of the Marcos era to "Cory's
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/24: CIA-RDP86T01017R000605640001-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/24: CIA-RDP86T01017R000605640001-9
I I
SUBJECT: The Snap Election in the Philippines: What if the
Opposition Wins?
Distribution:
Original - OEA/SEA/IB
1 - Morton Abramowitz, State Department
1 - The Hon. Michael H. Armacost, State Department
1 - Nancy Boshoven, State Department
1 - Nicholas Burakow, State Department
1 - Michael Crosswell, State Department
1 - Verne Dickey, State Department
1 - Robert DuBose, State Department
1 - John Finney, State Department
1 - Corazon Foley, State Department
1 - Charles Greenleaf, State Department
1 - Richard Hermann, State Department
1 - Allen Kitchens, State Department
1 - John Maisto, State Department
1 - Francis McNeil, State Department
1 - David Merrill, State Department
1 - John C. Monjo, State Department
1 - Majorie Niehaus, State Department
1 - James Norris, State Department
1 - Doug Paal, State Department
1 - Ernest H. Preeg, State Department
1 - Peter Rodman, State Department
1 - Dr. Jack Sheerin, State Department
1 - John Taylor, State Department
1 - The Hon. Paul Wolfowitz, State Department
1 - Frank Young, State Department
1 - The Hon. Richard Armitage, Pentagon
1 - RADM John Butts, Pentagon
1 - CDR Ed Cahill, Pentagon
1 - LTC Robert Cooey, USAF, Pentagon
1 - RADM James D. Cossey, Pentagon
1 - BGEN Larry Dillingham, Pentagon
1 - BGEN Philip Drew, USA, Pentagon
1 - Don Eirich, Pentagon
1 - LTC John Haseman, Pentagon
1 - Rob Huddleston, Pentagon
1 - James Kelly, Pentagon
1 - Col James Martin, USA, Pentagon
1 - LTCDR Bill Mason, Pentagon
1 - Bill Mayo, Pentagon
1 - LTC James E. Smith, USAF, Pentagon
1 - LTC George Tannehill, II, USA, Pentagon
1 - Mary P. Tighe: Pentagon
1 - LTC William Wise, USAF, Pentagon
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/24: CIA-RDP86T01017R000605640001-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/24: CIA-RDP86T01017R000605640001-9 25X1
I I
1 - Capt Reginald Avery, USA, Washington Navy Yard
1 - William Brown, Department of Commerce
1 - Byron Jackson, Department of Commerce
1 - Ronald Oechsler, Department of Commerce
1 - George Payne, Department of Commerce
1 - Roger Severance, Department of Commerce
1 - Russell Price, Export-Import Bank
1 - Ray Albright, Export-Import Bank
1 - William Quinn, Treasury Department
1 - Douglas P. Mulholland, Treasury Department
1 - David Mulford, Treasury Department
1 - William McFadden, Treasury Department
1 - Ciro Defalco, Treasury Department
1 - James Conrow, Treasury Department
1 - Alan Thomas, National Security Council
1 - Gaston Siqur, National Security Council
1 - Richard Childress, National Security Council
1 - Don Gregg, Office of the Vice President
1 - Maj Don Call, USMC, Navy Annex
1 - Chairman Paul Volcker, Federal Reserve Board
1 - Robert Emery, Federal Reserve Board
1 - Warren Moskowitz, Federal Reserve Bank of NY
1 - Gerald West, OPIC
1 - Felton Johnston, JR, OPIC
1 - Robert Draggon, OPIC
1 - LT J. G. Fijol, NAVOPINTCEN
1 - Leslie Ross, USDA
1 - Robert Nevitt, USIA
1 - OEA/SEA/ITM
1 - OEA/C/SEA
1 - OEA/DC/SEA
1 OGI/TNAD/TAB (2G17)
1 - DDI (7E44)
1 - D/OEA (4F18)
1 - Senior Review Panel (5G00)
1 - C/PES/DDI (7F24)
1 - PDB Staff (7F30)
1 - C/NIC (7E44)
1 - OEA/Research Director (4G48)
1 - OEA/NEA (4G43)
1 - OEA H 4 20) 25X1
1 - NIC/Analytical Group (7E47)
1 - C/DO/(3D01) 25X1
1 - A/NIO/Econ (7E48)
1 - NIO/EA 7E62
1 - CPAS/ILS (7G15)
5 - CPAS/IMC/CB (7G07)
1 - OCR/EA A (1H18)
1 - C/EA(5D10)
1 - OCR/ISG (1H19)
1 - C/DDO/IAD (3D00)
1 - C/DDO/EA (5D00)
1 -
1 -
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/24: CIA-RDP86T01017R000605640001-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/24: CIA-RDP86T01017R000605640001-9
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/24: CIA-RDP86T01017R000605640001-9