WILL NICARAGUA GET MIGS?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T01017R000505410001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 17, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 24, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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DATE /~
DOC NO 7' / 11 r
P & PD /
Summary
in about 1980 Moscow 25X1
decided to provide Nicaragua with MIGs. Since then, however,
Washington's concern regarding this issue has become clear to the
Kremlin and apparently has kept the Soviets from delivering jet
fighters to Managua. We believe the Soviets continue to be
sensitive to US injunctions and are unlikely to send MIGs to
Nicaragua in the near term. They almost certainly assume that
the present US administration would attack such planes if they
were discovered based in Nicaragua. 25X1
Although we consider it unlikely, certain calculations might
nevertheless lead Moscow to introduce the aircraft, even if their
destruction were a forgone conclusion. They might calculate that
a US attack would, once the dust had settled, strengthen
opposition in the United States to further Contra aid, or would
in any event inflame ooini n in Latin America and Europe against
the United States.
Even if the MIGs were not destroyed, however, they would not
add appreciably to the Sandinistas' ability to defeat the
insurgency. Moreover, introduction of MIGs could severely
undercut Soviet diplomatic and political efforts to steer the
US-USSR arms talks in a favorable direction; US destruction of
the aircraft would once again expose Soviet inability to defend a
client against US military power; and the act of introducing MIGs
might well be seen as provocative and alarming by Latin American
countries, such as Mexico.
This memorandum was prepared byl (Office
of Soviet Analysis. Comments and queries and can be directed to
the Chief, Third World Activities Division
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Central Intelligence Agency
Wbashingon. D. C 20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
24 November 1986
Will Nicaragua Get MIGs?
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Moscow believes the next US
on this issue, we do not believe he would do so.
administration may be prone to accept a Sandinista regime as a
fait accompli, which would provide a strong motive to hold back
on delivery until after the 1988 US elections. These arguments
are likely to incline the Soviets to continue to withold the MIGs
from Nicaragua for the next few years. Although it is also
possible that Cuban President Fidel Castro could act unilaterally
The Evidence for MIGs to Nicaragua
in 1980 about 30 Nicaraguan pilots went to the USSR or
fly MIGs.
Ortega publicly announced that Nicaraguans were being trained to
Bulgaria to begin a MIG pilot training program which usually
takes about three to four years to complete. In mid-1984, Daniel
Cuba also has been
involved in some MIG training o Nicaraguans , probably providin
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arguments apply to MIG-17s, -19s, and -23s.
have not yet identified MIGs of any type in Nicaragua. While the
following discussions focus on the MIG-21, the same general
Judging from the number of personnel being trained, it
appears that Moscow planned initially to supply Nicaragua with a
full squadron of MIGs--12-15 aircraft. The typical Soviet pilot-
to-fighter manning ratio of about 1.5:1 would permit the initial
cadre of Nicaraguan jet pilots to support operations of a
fighter-size unit.
squadron.
some 70-75 aviation
technicians have been trained in the USSR--roughly the number of
maintenance technicians associated with a Soviet fighter
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Moscow apparently planned to supply Managua with MIGs to
carry out both air defense and ground attack missions.
Nicaraguan weapons
specialists were trained in the USSR on MIG weapons intended for
Managua has stated publicly that it has the right and need
to acquire these types of aircraft. We have no information,
however, indicating what specifically prompted Moscow in 1980 to
agree to provide fighter aircraft to the Sandinistas. Nicaragua
was not faced with an insurgency at the time, and the US was
providing aid to Managua. For its part, Moscow apparently
believed it could begin arming Nicaragua as it did Cuba without
drawing a serious challenge from Washington. The Sandinistas now
claim to be concerned about a potential US invasion and also are
interested in ways to interdict rebel resupply flights. MIG-21s
could be useful in a defensive role as well as for interdicting
supply flights, but currently this effectiveness would be
hampered by the Sandinistas' limited air surveillance coverage.
Nicaragua's current air surveillance capability is concentrated
on the Pacific coast and, while useful in defending against a
seaborne invasion, it is inadequate to detect an aerial resupply
effort coming from other quarters. Interdiction of air resupply
operations would require the installation of similar radar sites
along Nicaragua's other borders.
The MIGs also would be useful, of course, for attacking
insurgent base camps across the border in Honduras. They could
also be used to attack insurgents in the field, but the attack
helicopters already in the Sandinista inventory are better suited
for this mission. The Soviets are supplying Nicaragua with more
helicopters, both for attack and troop transport. This year
Moscow has sent nearly 30 helicopters to Nicaragua, more than
doubling the inventory.
Despite Washington's concern about the introduction of jet
fighters into the Nicaraguan inventory, the Soviets reportedly
continue to train Nicaraguans to fly MIGs
Nicaraguans
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recently have gone to the USSR for MIG training and will return
next year. Continuing training by Moscow and Havana suggests
that although Moscow has been cautious thus far, the Soviets are
still holding open the possibility of delivering MIG aircraft to
the Sandinistas.
Indication of Impending Delivery
Should the Soviets decide to send fighters to Nicaragua, they
could easily take advantage of this knowledge, severely
complicating our ability to detect a specific delivery before it
occurred.
Even so there are indicators which might precede a MIG
delivery to Nicaragua. Moscow and Managua reportedly believe
that introducing these fighters would lead to moves on
Washington's part--either military strikes or even an invasion--
to eliminate them. the Grenada
operation in 1983 did much to foster this perception. Because of
this concern over the vulnerability of the aircraft, Moscow
probably would take steps first to help Managua establish air
defenses around the airfield(s) where these fighters are likely
to be based. There are no signs yet that such steps have been
SA-3 normally is used for point defense of fixed sites such as
airfields. These SAMs would significantly improve Nicaragua's
defenses in the area they are deployed, but probably would
require Cuban crews initially to be effective.
Possible Methods of Delivery
Moscow could deliver MIGs to Nicaragua by sea, air
transport, or direct flight from Cuba. Should the Soviets decide
to send fighters to Nicaragua by sea, they could readily
complicate our ability to detect the delivery before it
occurred. Moscow could take steps to conceal aircraft containers
at known arms transfer facilities in the USSR, or use other ports
of embarkation in the Soviet Union such as Leningrad or
Vladivostok. The MIG shipping crates could be loaded and
unloaded under tight security at night and--while en route--be
stored out of sight below deck.
Sea-borne delivery would likely take place at Corinto--
Nicaragua's only deepwater port--on the Pacific coast. The arms
carrier probably would avoid passage through the Panama Canal,
where it would be subject to inspection. Other Soviet arms
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carriers loaded with combat equipment--except those merely
carrying military-associated equipment such as trucks and jeeps--
have taken longer but safer routes to Corinto around Cape Horn or
across the Pacific. Offloading military cargo at El Bluff,
Nicaragua's receiving facility on the east coast, is much more
complicated and involves the use of barges to get the cargo
ashore where it must be loaded on trailers and transported
overland. Because the crates would be much more visible and
vulnerable in such a delivery, we consider it less likely. The
first MI-25 attack helicopters sent to Nicaragua, however, were
delivered through El Bluff.
Fighters could also be delivered to Nicaragua on board
transport aircraft. Soviet AN-22 and IL-76 transports (Havana
also has two IL-76s) can each carry up to two palletized MIGs.
Air delivery of a squadron of MIGs and their associated equipment
would thus call for more than half a dozen flights. The flights
could be phased over a long period of time, however, to maintain
a low profile. Soviet air access to Cuba and Nicaragua from the
USSR would essentially follow one of two routes and is dependent
on overflight clearances and refueling stops in a variety of
countries. The northern route crosses either Sweden, Norway,
Iceland, and Canada, or Western Europe to include the UK and
Ireland. The southern route crosses Yugoslavia, Algeria, Mali,
Guinea, and probably Cape Verde and Suriname. By using Aeroflot
markings the Soviets might hope to conceal the military nature of
these flights. Instead of a direct air delivery from the USSR,
the Soviets could also send transports to Cuba to deliver MIGs
already there or they could use the Cuban IL-76s. We would be
likely to detect the arrival of large transport aircraft in
Nicaragua.
The Soviets could also elect to fly MIGs directly to
Nicaragua from Cuba. MIG-21s have adequate ferry range to fly
the 750 nautical mile trip from Cuba and about 160 MIG-21s are
currently based at four airfields in Cuba. There are also about
12 other Cuban airfields that have runways long enough for these
fighters. Nicaragua itself has five airfields that could
accommodate MIGs--Sandino, Punta Huete, Montelimar, Bluefields,
and Puerto Cabezas (see Map). Punta
Huete was designed to accommodate MIG aircraft. Sate lite
photography indicates that this new military airfield--the runway
is complete hut support facilities are still under construction--
has many of the earmarks of a fighter base. Sandino, however, is
currently the only airfield with hangars that could be used to
conceal newly arrived fighters. We believe flying MIGs directly
to Nicaragua would be the quickest and perhaps most secure method
of delivery. Moreover, the aircraft would arrive intact and
would be available for combat operations within hours.
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Jet fighters generally are not equipped with adequate
navigation systems for long-range over-water flights. MIGs
flying from Cuba to Nicaragua, however, could cross the Caribbean
Basin by following a properly equipped aircraft--such as a Cubana
airlines IL-62. Alternatively, ships equipped with navigation
beacons could be stationed along the route--about 150 miles
apart--to assist the transit. Cubans likely would fly some, if
not all, of the aircraft.
Other Jets
Nicaraguans have
been trained to fly French-built Mirages and that Managua would
receive some of these fighters. Paris, however, has announced
that it would not provide Managua with advanced fighter
aircraft.
Managua also is expecting L-39 jets. The Czechoslovakian L-39 is
designed as a subsonic trainer for advanced jet fighters, but is
also attached to some Warsaw Pact operational units as a ground
attack fighter. Versions in Cuba and Libya also have a dual
role--training and light attack. The L-39 has been used
effectively in a counterinsurgency role in Libya and Iraq.
Although there is no interceptor version of the L-39, this 340-
knot aircraft could also be modified for clear-weather air
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defense. In 1984 the Sandinistas publicly announced plans to
procure the 1-39- mentionina negotiations with Prague on training
and sales.
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a Libyan IL-76 transport
aircraft en route to Nicaragua with at least one disassembled
L-39 on board was seized and turned back by Brazilian authorities
when it was discovered that the IL-76 did not hold medical
supplies as declared. As far as we can determine, this is the
closest the, Sandinistas have come to receiving combat jet
aircraft.
Soviet Policy Considerations
For Moscow the decision whether or not to supply jet
fighters to the Nicaraguans obviously involves a careful weighing
of pluses and minuses. US demarches to the USSR have made clear
the seriousness with which the United States would take the
introduction of jet fighter aircraft into Nicaragua. Under the
Reagan administration, the United States has warned the Soviets
on at least 10 occasions. The Soviets almost certainly assume
that the present administration would attack such planes if they
were discovered in Nicaragua and that Moscow would not be able to
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prevent their destruction. Conceivably they could believe that
the US administration might also seize this opportunity to seek
through further military action to dislodge the Sandinista
government altogether, or to attack Cuba if Cuban forces were
drawn into the fighting.
Certain calculations might nevertheless lead Moscow to
introduce the aircraft, even if their destruction were a forgone
conclusion. If the Soviets judged that, as a consequence of a US
attack, support for Contra aid would be decisively undermined and
consolidation of the Sandinista regime thereby assured, Moscow
might go ahead. Moscow also might calculate that the game would
be worth it if a US attack inflamed opinion in Latin America and
Europe against the United States. But we believe that, for the
time being at least, Moscow will find arguments for restraint
more compelling.
Even if the MIGs were not destroyed, they are not as useful
as helicopters in many close air support roles and would not
contribute appreciably to interdiction of resistance resupply
flights without a costly and difficult upgrading of Nicaragua's
air surveillance capability. Nor would the Soviets calculate
that MIGs would pose a significant military deterrent to US
operations in the event of a postulated US attack on the
Sandinistas.
We think that Moscow would judge that introduction of MIGs
could severely undermine Soviet diplomatic and political efforts
to steer US-Soviet relationship in a favorable direction.
Fallout from a confrontation with Washington over the jet
fighters could affect the whole range of bilateral issues
including other regional hotspots, a possible Summit, or the
progress of arms limitation talks.
The Soviets would almost certainly be concerned about the
likely negative effects of such an action on Latin American
audiences. On the one hand, the introduction of MIGs might well
be seen as provocative and alarming by the moderate governments
in the region that Moscow is wooing, especially Mexico. On the
other hand, the destruction of the jets by the United States
would reinforce the message sent to leftists by the Grenada
events that Moscow and Havana are unwilling or unable to protect
Moscow believes a
successor US administration may be prone to accept a Sandinista
regime in Nicaragua as a fait accompli. The Soviets think that
time works to their advantage. The premise that the most serious
challenge to the survival of the Sandinistas will be removed in
the next several years militates against willfully placing
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Managua in possible jeopardy in the meantime, or sacrificing
other Soviet equities.
The Soviets also have the option of publicly transferring
control of the MIGs to Nicaragua and communicating somehow that,
until suitable basing is available in Nicaragua, the aircraft
were to be stationed in Cuba. This step could be accompanied by
demonstrative flights from Cuban airfields of these "Nicaraguan"
aircraft. Moscow might see such a move as a means of escalating
regional tensions in a way that could embarrass Honduras, build
pressures on the US administration not to deliver F-5s to
Honduras, stimulate demands for concessions on Contadora, or
generate international controversy over the MIGs and US
intentions sufficient to constrain a US response in the future to
basing of the aircraft in Nicaragua. The Soviets would, of
course, have to calculate that the US administration would
perceive this move as a serious confrontational step, and they
would have to weigh the chances that Washington would attack
these aircraft on the ground in Cuba or in flight.
continued training of Nicaraguan pilots
indicate that until it judges the time propitious for delivery,
Moscow will keep MIG-trained pilots up-to-speed on the aircraft,
and it could decide in the meantime to introduce air defense
equipment such as surface-to-air missiles at some Nicaraguan
airfields. Such steps would be intended to reassure the
Sandinista leadership and prepare Managua to receive the aircraft
on short notice.
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Radii of MIG-21 and L-39 in Offensive Role
L Stated
tees
Havana
Cayman
I
l
Mexz
s
ands
1 l 280 nm \K.)
North
Pacific
Ocean
Nassau
The
Bahamas
Guantanamo
(U.S. Naval Base)
N mpstan
MIG-21- and L-39-capable airfield
Offensive radii
MIG-21
L39
\k(iitY
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SUBJECT: Will Nicaragua Get MIGs?
External Distribution
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SUBJECT: Will Nicaragua Get MIGs?
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SUBJECT: Will Nicaragua Get MIGs?
Internal Distribution (continued)
1 - C/SOVA/TWA
1 - C/SOVA/TWA A
1 - C/SOVA/TWA
1 - C/SOVA/TWA/FA
1 - SOVA/TWA/FA/Chrono
1 - SOVA/TWA
1 - SOVA/TWA
2 - SOVA/TWA
1 - C/DEIG/DID
25X1
25X1
I Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/25: CIA-RDP86TO1017R000505410001-5