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• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T01017R000505120001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: March 7, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 11, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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Central Intelligence Agency
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DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
11 July 1986
Afghanistan: Are Soviet Intentions Shifting?
Summary
Recent developments in the Afghan situation suggest to us
that Moscow may be reassessing its policy, perhaps including the
issue of the minimum outcome that Moscow might tolerate:
-- The Soviets have increased their use of special forces and
tactics for ambushing insurgent units and have adopted
more effective security measures, while simultaneously
pressing DRA forces to assume a greater part of combat
operations.
-- The highly partisan former head of the DRA intelligence
service--Najibullah--replaced Babrak Karmal in a move
accompanied by an open display of Soviet military backing
in the face of apparent opposition within the Afghan
Party.
-- Moscow has stepped up both military and political pressure
on Pakistan, at the same time disseminating propaganda
This memorandum was prepared by of the Third World Activities
lysis, with contra utions by
Conments and queries can be directed to the
Chief, Third World ivi ies Division
SOV M 86-20060CX
Copy No. of Zf~
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emphasizing the Soviet desire for peace and the US role in
prolonging the conflict.
Moscow and Kabul took a hard line at the latest Geneva
round, but reportedly have drafted an 18 month withdrawal
timetable that may be introduced at a future session.
international
and domestic strains resulting from the Afghan war have disposed
Moscow to make concessions in order to withdraw Soviet troops,
the Soviets are determined to continue
the war until a viable Communist government can be guaranteed.
We believe Moscow almost certainly continues
survivable, subservient Communist government
attrition, even though recent events suggest
leadership now attaches increased importance
reducing the military and political costs of
to seek a
through a war-of
that the Soviet
to containing or
If some
our assumptions are wrong, particularly about the leadership's
perceptions of the conflict, considerably different strategies
may be under consideration in Moscow--though the bulk of our
evidence suggests this is unlikely.
It is possible, for example, that we have substantially
underestimated Soviet pessimism about the war and the
costs that involvement in Afghanistan.has imposed on the
USSR. If so, Moscow may seek a negotiated formula for the
reduction or withdrawal of Soviet troops, calculating
either that a viable Communist regime would still be left
in place, or that a non-hostile multiparty government
could be guaranteed that would adequately meet the basic
requirements of Soviet security. Soviet tactics at
Geneva, however, have shown no urgency and do not suggest
that the strain caused by the war has disposed Moscow to
accept the risks that this policy would entail.
If the Soviets take a far more optimistic view of military
trends than we believe is justified, they may now judge
that they can achieve a military breakthrough within the
next few years by ending or significantly reducing
Pakistani support for the resistance while Soviet and DRA
military performance improves.
the Soviets are unlikely to take
so sanguine a view of either the military situation or the
prospects for DRA forces becoming a significantly more
The leadership under Gorbachev is clearly dissatisfied with
the status quo and has tried various tactics for improving the
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be created as a result of their maneuvering.
Soviet position, but a final decision on whether and how to alter
Afghan policy probably has not yet been reached. Moscow appears
to be probing for potential advantages in several directions,
hoping to be well placed to pursue whichever opportunities might
resistance and Islamabad will be severely tested.
Once Moscow's plans for Afghanistan have crystallized, we
would expect to see evidence clarifying Soviet strategy. Certain
developments would be compatible with more than one policy, but
the most important indicators are likely to come from the Geneva
negotiations--whether the Soviets have Kabul give ground or
continue to raise roadblocks; the nature and effectiveness of
Najibullah's efforts to consolidate his regime; and how Soviet
and DRA forces fare in the summer campaign. If the Soviets are
successful either in reducing political and military costs or
achieving a military breakthrough, the resolve of both the
The Evidence: Soviet Behavior in 1985-86
Military Trends
1. Overall, Soviet forces in Afghanistan increased somewhat
during 1985 (from 114,000 to 120,000), but the number of special
purpose forces (Spetsnaz) battalions doubled to eight (4500 men)
between March 1985 and January 1986. A new motorized rifle
regiment was deployed to reinforce Soviet/Afghan forces in
western Afghanistan, while the Spetsnaz units were positioned to
conduct operations near the major Soviet/DRA lines of
communication. Early in 1986 additional assault helicopters were
deployed, in part to support the larger Spetsnaz force.
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3. Both Soviet and DRA operations have concentrated on the
eastern border region, attacking insurgent supply routes and base
camps and trying to forestall resistance assaults on DRA
garrisons. There have been no campaigns comparable to the
Panjsher and Konar-operations of previous years, and the results
thus far have been mixed. For example, a large Soviet offensive
to clear part of northern Paktia Province in late May was
inconclusive, and neither Soviet nor regime forces have been able
to stabilize the Afghan border posts in Nangarhar Province to the
east of Kabul. The Soviets have not conducted any ground forces
campaigns against Masood's strongholds in the Panjsher Valley
this year--in part because of the low level of insurgent
activity--but apparently are moving to counter Masood's efforts
to organize resistance groups in Baghlan-and Qonduz provinces.
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forces, especially for night ambushes.
5. The Soviets have had some success in using Spetsnaz
the mujahideen have been forced to adopt expensive
units to influence the war decisively.
countermeasures--using alternate supply routes and moving base
camps--in some areas of the country. Whether the Soviets can
extend these tactics sufficiently to have a long term impact on
the level of supplies reaching major insurgent groups, or whether
the resistance will learn to counter Soviet small unit tactics
remain open questions. Even with the introduction of additional
battalions last year, there still appear to be too few Spetsnaz
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Political Developments in Afghanistan
9. Babrak Karmal was replaced as General Secretary by
former Khad chief Najibullah just before the start of the Geneva
talks on May 5. Najibullah has close ties to Moscow and a track
record of vigor, efficiency, and ruthlessness, while Babrak was
apparently in the Soviets' bad graces for his inability--or
unwillingness--to implement policies designed to shift the burden
of the war to the Afghans. Babrak may also have resisted
Moscow's decision to resume proximity talks and its professed
10. The appointment of the former Khad chief strongly
suggests that in making the changes Moscow was more interested in
effective management than in "reconcilation" or broadening the
appeal of DRA to Afghans marginally dissatisfied with the
communist regime. Najibullah, moreover, has been a highly
partisan, factional figure even within the context of the PDPA,
and his replacement of Babrak has apparently met with substantial
opposition within the party. Furthermore, though the Soviets
encouraged interpretation of the move as an accommodation to
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Islamabad's aversion to dealing with Babrak, the selection could
not seriously have been expected to appeal to Pakistan, which
sees Najib as at least as unacceptable as his predecessor.
11. In his first weeks as party leader, Najibullah has
focused on the need to improve DRA military performance and party
unity and to root out official corruption. He has made a
concerted effort to increase the Afghan army by ending student
deferrals--reportedly including those for Afghans studying in the
USSR--and limiting other draft exemptions. He has also made
overtures to tribal leaders and may be expected to continue his
earlier efforts as Khad chief to reconcile them with Kabul while
encouraging them to subvert Pakistan's border provinces.
12. Moscow probably would have preferred to avoid the
display of military power that accompanied the change of leaders
in Kabul and the appearance of instability that it conveyed on 25X1
the eve of Geneva, but its hand may have been forced by the need
for a more capable leader to force unpopular policies on a
recalcitrant government and military establishment
There was considerable effort 25X1
to portray the change as an orderly, routine transition--notably
by retaining Babrak as president of the Revoluntionary Council--
but pro-Babrak, anti-Soviet demonstrations in Kabul were reported 25X1
both during and after the change. In Qandahar in May, more than
600 of Babrak's supporters were arrested 25X1
Further changes designed to remove Najibullah's rivals
from the arty and the government are constantly rumored.
13. Moscow continues to have Kabul publicize regime-
"broadening" measures, designed to establish the "national,"
"democratic," and "Islamic," credentials of the government.
Among these have been the holding of a traditional tribal council
(jirgah) last fall, the appointment of non-party members to
cabinet and sub-cabinet positions in December and to the
Revolutionary Council in January, recent promises to hold
parliamentary elections, and renewed efforts to woo the Afghan.
clergy. At the same time, "Sovietization" and cadre-building
programs continue, including media indoctrination, education in
the USSR of Afghan children and military and party personnel, and
reshaping of the educational system in the urban areas controlled
by the regime.
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Soviet-Afghan Pressure on Pakistan
14. The Soviets follow Pakistan's domestic scene closely
and have been employing a variety of tactics to exploit the more
fluid political situation since the end of martial law. Some
Soviet officials reportedly have made pointed references to the
country's instability in conversations with Pakistani
officials. During the last six months, Afghan air violations of
the Pakistani border have more than doubled, the Soviets have
orchestrated Kabul's destabilization campaign along the border
(which includes sabotage directed at both resistance and
Pakistani targets and the subversion of tribal dissidents). In
addition, Moscow has been in open contact with some opposition
leaders--not only People's Party leader Benazir Bhutto, who
visited Moscow in April, but well-known separatist leaders, whom
Islamabad may regard as an even greater threat.
15. In March the seventh round of proximity talks was
scheduled after Moscow had Kabul submit a draft of the fourth
instrument--including a four-year withdrawal timetable--to UN
negotiator Cordovez and drop its demand for direct talks with
Islamabad on the withdrawal issue. During the three weeks of
negotiations, which were recessed on 23 May, other provisions of
a settlement were agreed upon, but four key issues remained: the
composition and scope of a monitoring authority, unconditionality 25X1
of implementation, who should officially consult with the
refugees, and most importantly, the length of the withdrawal
timetable.
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Conflicting Soviet Statements About Settling the War
17. (before the
Geneva talks in May that Moscow was ready to be flexible on
several issues vital to an agreement--including simultaneous
implementation of withdrawal with other settlement provisions,
recognition that Pakistan's pledge of non-interference cannot
reasonably be expected to end all resistance activity,
acknowledgement that Iran will not be bound by a DRA-Pakistan
settlement, and the nature of the post-settlement regime. The
Soviet ambassador in Kabul even listed for the US charge early
this year those resistance leaders who were and those who were
not acceptable candidates for inclusion in a coalition
government.
19. Despite Soviet public statements that Moscow desires a
settlement--particularly Gorbachev's February Party Congress
references to Afghanistan as a "bleeding wound" and to withdrawal
in the "nearest future"--official Soviet pronouncements have
continued to take a hard line on conditions for a settlement.
Soviet media treatment has contained occasional items indicating
dissatisfaction with the performance of the Kabul regime, but has
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largely focused on indissoluble fraternal ties, the heroic deeds
of Soviet soldiers in the course of performing their
internationalist duty, and the unbounded gratitude of the Afghan
people.
What Are the Soviets Up To?
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Moscow continues to seek--through a war of attrition--a
survivable regime subservient to the USSR. Our judgment on
precisely what the Soviet strategy is, however, depends highly on 25X1
our reading of Moscow's evaluation of the domestic and
international costs of the conflict, Soviet assessments of their
own progress on the military front, and DRA prospects for
effectively assuming an increasing share of the fighting.
Substantial uncertainties surround each of these important
elements of the picture, and different Soviet perceptions than
those we assign to the Kremlin could lead to quite different
strategies. 25X1
Reducing Costs While Still Pursuing an Attrition Strategy
22. If the Soviets are reviewing their options with respect
to Afghanistan, it seems to us most likely that they are
exploring a variety of tactical expedients for reducing their
military and political exposure. This would be particularly
likely if we have somewhat underestimated the international and
domestic costs that high-profile involvement in Afghanistan has
imposed on the Soviets. While continuing to seek a survivable
Communist regime in Kabul and remaining convinced that a war of
attrition will ultimately secure it, Moscow may be less willing
than we have assumed to maintain its present course of gradually
increased military activity. If so, in the future Moscow might:
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-- Continue to press the DRA to assume more of the military
burden, using prolonged negotiations only as a means to
temper international condemnation and to wear down the
resolve of the other side while the new regime has an
opportunity to consolidate its position. A Soviet
decision to withdraw would be determined by DRA
performance, not by agreement with Islamabad.
-- Intensify even further its carrot-and-stick campaign to
end Islamabad's support for the resistance, judging that
Pakistan's domestic politics makes it increasingly
vulnerable to such pressures. The Soviets almost
certainly calculate that with the collapse of the greater
part of the resistance's outside support, a war of
attrition might be maintained--or even shortened--at less
military and political cost to Moscow.
-- Even go so far as to conclude an agreement at Geneva that
it has no intention of keeping. The Soviets would
calculate that a plausible pretext for reneging--such as
continued resistance activity--would be readily available,
that international opprobrium would be no worse than
before, and, most importantly, that Islamabad would not
renew support for the resistance at former levels.
23. Such a strategy would offer the Soviets the prospect of
reducing the discomforts caused by the war in Afghanistan--
perhaps even making possible some reduction of Soviet forces in
the fairly near term--while sacrificing nothing in the way of
Soviet control of Afghanistan. A potential disadvantage would be
that in the course of its complex playing out of the
negotiations, Moscow might unintentionally precipitate the
collapse of the Afghan regime, some of whose leaders reportedly
have displayed anxiety over talk of Soviet withdrawal. A further
disadvantage would be that realistically Moscow must regard
pressing the recalcitrant DRA army and government to develop
competence and reliability as a problematic and very long-term
project.
24. This interpretation probably best reconciles the range
of evidence that we have seen in recent months. It takes into
account signals indicating Soviet concern about the war but
concludes that while these strains have caused Moscow to probe
for ways to reduce costs, they have not yet altered Moscow's
ultimate objectives. This assessment is consistent with Soviet
military and political activities in Afghanistan, Soviet behavior
in the negotiations up to now, and the Soviets' multifaceted
treatment of Pakistan.
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Less Likely Interpretations: The Withdrawal of Soviet Forces...
25. Despite the occasional line from Soviet officials that
Moscow no longer cares what form of government prevails in
Afghanistan, as long as it is non-hostile and neutral, we believe
there is no prospect that the USSR would simply withdraw its
forces from Afghanistan and leave the PDPA to its own devices.
The mass of evidence continues to show the Soviets consider their
interests in Afghanistan compelling and do not yet see the costs
of involvement as sufficiently high to warrant the damage to
Moscow's prestige that would accompany such a move.
26. Nonetheless, if Soviet dissatisfaction with the
consequences of involvement in Afghanistan is considerably
greater or Soviet views of the USSR's long term prospects in the
war far more pessimistic than we believe, Moscow may be
reassessing not only its tactics, but the minimum conditions that
it might be able to tolerate in Afghanistan. Two scenarios mark
the range of conceivable possibilities:
-- The Soviets could attempt to negotiate withdrawal and some
form of coalition in Kabul, setting terms that they
believed would guarantee the persistence of a non-hostile
government with communist participation adequate for
Soviet security and prestige--probably communist control
of all important ministries with some participation of
certain resistance leaders.
-- Moscow could still aim at a viable Soviet satellite but be
willing nonetheless to negotiate withdrawal, hoping that
by the end of the withdrawal period, the regime under
Najibullah would be able to stand on its own or with KGB
and Soviet military "advisory" support. Should the regime
seem in danger of collapse during this period or at its
end, Moscow could find an excuse to renege and try to
recoup the Kabul overnment's position by reintroducing
27. Both of these options would obviously run the risk,
however, that the post-settlement regime might be unable to
survive Soviet troop withdrawal, even--in the case of a
repudiated agreement--should Soviet forces be reintroduced. The
reintroduction of troops, moreover, could be difficult and
dangerous, and encounter much harsher conditions than the
original invasion, and the position of the remaining Afghan and
Soviet forces might have dangerously deteriorated in the
28. Recent Soviet efforts to improve their own military
performance, the attempt to get DRA forces to assume more of the
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probes.
burden, and the installation of Najibullah would be consistent
with a plan to prepare the ground for withdrawal, hoping to leave
the Afghan regime in as strong a position as possible--either to
stand on its own or to win a dominant role in a coalition--after
a settlement. Soviet behavior at Geneva, however., has shown no
urgency and does not suggest that the stress caused by
Afghanistan has become severe enough to force significant
risk-taking. Nor have the Soviets yet shown a serious desire to
discuss a "government of reconciliation," despite Pakistani
...and Military Breakthrough
29. Another possibility is that Moscow takes a far more
sanguine view of the military situation than our evidence
suggests. If so, the Soviets could believe that they are poised
for a military breakthrough that could--within the space of a few
years enable them to win the war or at least to ease insurgent
pressure so radically that they could reduce their commitment of
troops to Afghanistan. A necessary element of such a strategy
would be a sharp reduction or halt in Pakistani support to the
insurgency, but the Soviets may calculate that:
-- Their military performance is improving, and continued
efforts to interdict mujaheddin supplies, expanded use of
Spetsnaz, and other small, mobile units, improved
firepower, air support, and better use of intelligence may
combine to demoralize the resistance.
-- Their position can be even further strengthened by
improved DRA performance.
-- Some of the resistance--or at least internal elements
supportive of the mujahideen--can be coopted, and that
Khad can exploit traditional ethnic and tribal rivalries
to further isolate the resistance.
-- A sharp intensification of Soviet intimidation and
subversion against Pakistan could strengthen domestic
opposition elements and convince Islamabad to limit
support to the mujahideen, and--combined with domestic
problems--could even lead to a leadership more willing to
negotiate than the present government.
30. Under this scenario, as in the attrition scenario
described above, Moscow could have Kabul conclude an agreement
with no intention that it would be carried out, expecting that
Islamabad would be unable or unwilling to resume support to the
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opportunity to disrupt the opposition.
insurgents once the agreement was abrogated. Negotiations would
probably be pursued only for their propaganda value and the
present levels.
31. If outside aid were reduced, the Soviets might be
prepared to increase their military effort for a short period in
the expectation that the temporarily higher costs would provide a
secure, communist Afghanistan at relatively small cost
afterwards. It is also possible that the Soviets are convinced
that their own tactical refinements, coupled with improved DRA
performance, will allow them to win the war within a reasonable
period even if outside support to the insurgents continues at
This material not only re ects no c ear trend
the Soviets intend their signs of flexibility since the 25X1
November summit to buy time and to deceive the other side. But
while Soviet professions of readiness to negotiate might--taken
alone--represent sheer deception, the acknowledgements of serious
strain that sometimes accompany them would be of questionable
utility in such a strategy. Moscow would probably realize that
these signals--though possibly confusing the other side--might
undermine DRA resolve while the resistance and its supporters
would be encouraged to persist in their course by signs that it
was sapping Moscow's determination. F__~ 25X1
disinformation effort.
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towards defeat of the insurgency but continues to include Soviet
assessments that stress the war's long-term, "generational" 25X1
character. Moreover, the Soviet statements indicating concern
over continuing involvement in Afghanistan'and increased interest
in a political solution would, under this assumption, have to be 25X1
interpreted exclusively as an elaborately orchestrated
Indicators of Soviet Strategy
33. For the moment, Moscow appears to be pursuing a
multitrack policy. Its current maneuvers seem to be aimed
primarily at Pakistan in the hope that this will eventually lead
to an arrangement whereby support for the resistance would cease,
permitting the Soviets at least to reduce their military
visibility, and the Communist regime--perhaps with further
cosmetic changes--would remain in place. Meanwhile, Moscow is
positioning itself to adopt alternative strategies. With the
Geneva talks recessed until 30 July, the Soviet leadership will
have more time to judge which way to press on the basis of the
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summer military campaign and the success of the changes in the
DRA government. In addition, the recent change of leadership in
Kabul may have touched off more internal resistance than
expected, and Moscow may need additional time for Najibullah to
consolidate his position.
34. Once Moscow's plans for Afghanistan have crystallized,
we would expect to see evidence that would clarify Soviet
strategy. The key indicators are the Geneva talks, developments
in Najibullah's regime, Soviet treatment of Pakistan, military
developments, and expressions of Soviet opinions about
Afghanistan. Some indicators could be relatively clear signs of
Soviet intentions, but others are likely to be ambiguous or
contradictory. Certain events, of course--such as a radical
change in the military situation, or erosion of Pakistan's
stability or steadfastness--could alter whatever strategies the
Soviets may have begun to consider.
Progress through Attrition with Reduced Costs
35. If Moscow adheres to its original objectives but
intensifies its efforts to reduce the political and military
costs, future evidence might resemble what we have seen in recent
months. For example, Kabul would remain in the Geneva talks and
could continue to show flexibility on nonessential points, as the
Soviets seek to deflect international disapproval to the other
side, stimulate divisions within the resistance and with its
supporters, and buy time for Najibullah to consolidate his
regime. At the same time, we should see delaying tactics,
including a refusal to propose a reasonable timeframe for Soviet
36. Regardless of Soviet intentions, we would expect to see
roughly the same kind of military developments over the next
several months. For example, the Soviets will continue to push
the Afghan regime to improve its military performance and its
ability to govern regardless of their strategy. If the Soviets
intended to continue manipulating the negotiations, however, we
would not expect Najibullah to carry out these efforts in so
ruthless a fashion as to eliminate his opponents or substantially
increase subversion against Pakistan.
Withdrawal of Soviet Forces
37. If the Soviets mean seriously to negotiate a withdrawal
of their troops--assuming this depended on the viability of
Najibullah's regime--they might continue to spin out the Geneva
talks to buy time for Najibullah and in hopes that developments
would make Pakistan more amenable to Soviet terms. But we would
expect Kabul to propose a withdrawal timetable at the July
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session that is significantly shorter than its earlier offers.
If the Soviets decide they can live with a multiparty Afghan
regime, the issue of a post-settlement regime probably would be
addressed in discussions with Pakistan or by appeals from
Najibullah to resistance leaders to join a coalition.
Soviet views of Afghanistan might indicate concern about
damage to Moscow's international standing or the drain on
economic resources, or pessimism about a military victory in the
38. We would not necessarily expect a decline in military
activity; we might even see an increase to give the
post-withdrawal regime a running start and to cover the drawdown
of Soviet troops. The Soviets could reduce activities against
Pakistan as a gesture of goodwill but also could intensify such
intimidation to provide breathing space for the Afghan regime and
to pressure Islamabad to accept terms more favorable to the
Soviets, such as an extended withdrawal timetable.
Military Breakthrough
39. If the Soviets judge that they can prevail militarily
within a few years, we would expect Kabul to continue to
equivocate at Geneva or even let the talks break down.
Najibullah might be given free rein to eliminate his rivals and
pursue a harsh policy toward Pakistan. In the military sphere,
we might see tentative signs that the Afghan military is doing
better; more small unit raids and ambushes, suggesting Soviet
confidence that recent tactics are on the right track; more
pressure along the border to cut insurgent supply routes;
additional special purpose forces, artillery, or air units, and
upgrading of facilities.
40. Each of these developments would be consistent with an
attempt to reduce Soviet costs, to put Moscow and Kabul in a
strategic position to negotiate withdrawal, or to put the Afghan
reigme in a better position to survive it. Taken together,
however, they would support the conclusion that the Soviets have
determined to intensify the effort to defeat the insurgents
militarily, particularly if a significant military build-up were
41. Soviet opinion might contain optimistic
views of the military situation and a hard line on Soviet
operations. We might see continued emphasis in the media on
Soviet heroism in Afghanistan.
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Implications
42. The impact of Soviet decisions and actions on the
opposing actors in the Afghan equation--the mujaheddin, Pakistan
and other supporters, and US policymakers--will vary depending
upon the strategy the USSR is trying to pursue and the success of
various elements of that strategy. The Soviets have identified
Pakistan as the key--and most vulnerable--link in the chain of
support for the mujahideen, and most of the possible strategies
we have identified work in some combination of ways to loosen
Pakistani commitment to the Afghan resistance. The impact of
Soviet actions on Pakistan is likely to present the US with
difficult decisions and choices in coming months and years.
43. If, for example, a Soviet effort to obtain a military
breakthrough by a combination of stronger Soviet/DRA military
performance and diplomatic and destabilization measures to weaken
Pakistani support produced improvement in the Soviet/DRA
position:
-- The resistance might become demoralized and we would
probably see growing debate-in Pakistan about the wisdom
of its current Afghan policy.
-- If Pakistan decided that the resistance's cause was
doomed, it might want to loosen ties with the US,
distancing itself still further from any overt support for
the insurgents. In such a case, the utility of continued
aid to the insurgents could be called into question even
in the United States. Alternatively, Pakistan's need for
assistance to cope with the absorption of the Afghan
refugees who would now be unable to return home might
serve to reinforce Islamabad's interest in its ties with
the US.
44. Many of these same issues would crop up if the Soviets
are successful in influencing domestic developments in Pakistan
that threaten President Zia. Similarly, if the Soviets were able
to create a widely accepted impression that progress in the
negotiations was at least partly due to Pakistani intransigence,
domestic and even international pressures might then build on
Pakistan to meet the Soviets "halfway." This strategy would
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 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/24: CIA-RDP86T01017R000505120001-7
Pakistan.
fail, however, if the Soviets and Afghans are widely seen to be
the ones obstructing the process with such maneuvers as delaying
tactics at the negotiations and attempts to destabilize
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SUBJECT: Afghanistan: Are Soviet Intentions Shifting?
External Distribution
NSC
1 - Ambassador Jack Matlock
Special Assistant to the President for European
and Soviet Affairs
Room 368 OEOB
2 - James P. Covey
Near East and South Asian Affairs Senior Director
3 - Paula Dobriansky
National Security Council Staff
Room 368 OEOB
4 - Walter Raymond
National Security Council Staff
Room 300 EOB
5 - Vincent Cannistraro
Intelligence Liaison
National Security Council Staff
6 - Donald Gregg
Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs
Room 298 OEOB
State Dept
7 - H. Allen Holmes
Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs
Room 7327
8 - Richard W. Murphy
Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern
and South Asian Affairs
Room 6242
9 - Herbert Hagerty
Director, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Bangladesh
Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Room 5247
10 - Desiree Millikin
Afghanistan Desk Officer, NEA/PAB
Room 5247
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Subject: Afghanistan: Are Soviet Intentions Shifting?
External Distribution (Continued)
11 - Rozanne L. Ridgway
Assistant Secretary for European and Canadian Affairs
Room 6226
12 - Morton I. Abramowitz
Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Research
Room 6531
13 - Robert H. Baraz, Director
Office of Analysis for the Soviet Union/Eastern Europe
Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Room 4758
14 - Wayne Limberg
Chief, Soviet Foreign Political Division, INR/SEE
Room 4843
15 - Mr. Richard Solomon
Director, Policy Planning Staff
Room 7311
16 - Philip Kunsberg
Assistant Undersecretary of Defense for Policy
17 - LTG John M. Moeldering, USA
Assistant to the Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Room 2E872, Pentagon
18 - LTG Dale Vesser
Director, J-5 Plans and Policy
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Room 2E996, Pentagon
19 - CIA Representative NMIC
DIA/SSO (JSO-l)
Room 2D 801-A
20 - LGen Leonard H. Perroots, USAF
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
Room 3E258, Pentagon
21 - Wynfred Joshua
DIO for European and Soviet Political-Military Affairs
Defense Intelligence Agency
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11
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Subject: Afghanistan: Are Soviet Intentions Shifting?
External Distribution (Continued)
22 - Col. Walter P. Lang
DI0 for Near East and South Asia
Room 2C238, Pentagon
Chief, Ground, Frontal Forces Branch
Soviet/Warsaw Pact Division, DIA/DB-1
24 - LTG S. T. Weinstein, USA
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
Department of the Army
Room 2E466, Pentagon
25 - MGen Schuyler Bissell, USAF
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
Department of the Air Force
Room 4A932, Pentagon
26 - RADM William Studeman
Director of Naval Intelligence
Room 5C572, Pentagon
27 - LTG William E. Odom, USA
Director, National Security Agency
Fort George G. Meade, Md.
National Security Agency
Fort George G. Meade, Md.
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(11 July 1986)
SUBJECT: Afghanistan: Are Soviet Intentions Shifting?
Internal Distribution
DI/SOVA/TWA/A:
29 - D/DCI-DDCI Executive Staff
30 - ED/DCI
31 - Executive Registry
32 - DDI
33 - Senior Review Panel
34-38OCPAS/IMD/CB
39 - Vice Chairman, NIC
40 - NIC/AG
41 - NIO/USSR
42 - NIO/FDIA
43 - NIO/CT
44 - NIO/NESA
45 - PDB Staff
46 - ILS
47 - C/DO/SE
48 - C/DDO/NEB
49 - DDO/SE,.
50 - DDO/NE
51 - FBIS/A
52 - FBIS/A
53 - D/NESA
G/
G/
54 - C/NESA/SOA
55 - C/NESA/SOA/A
56 - C/NESA/SOA/PB
57 - C/OIA/WPB
58 - C/OIA/TWA
59 - C/OGI/SRD/AAB
60 - D/SOVA
61 - DD/SOVA
62 - EXO/SOVA
63 - SA/SOVA
64 - C/ES/CIB
66 - C/SOVA/RIG
66 - C/SOVA/NIG
67 - C/NIG/DPD
68 - C/NIG/EPD
69 - C/SOVA/SIG
70 - C/SIG/FSD
71 - C/SIG/SPD
72 - C/SOVA/DEIG
73 - C/DEIG/DED
74 - C/DEIG/DID
75 - C/SOVA/TW
76 - C/SOVA/TW/FA
77 - C/SOVA/TW/A
78 - C/SOVA/TW
79 - SOVA/TW/ASIA Chrono
80 - SOVA/TW/ASIA,
:06.Sfro y P o co el c' '7143 /0--946 -PM-
25X1
25X1
25X1
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