BULGARIA: PROSPECTS FOR IMPROVED US RELATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T01017R000404460001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 8, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 24, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/12 : CIA-RDP86T01017R000404460001-2
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DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
24 October 1986
Bulgaria: Prospects for Improved US Relations
Summary
Bulgaria is signalling increased interest in improving
relations with the US following several years of unusually severe
strains. It has worked to resolve several outstanding bilateral
issues in recent months and has taken other steps to show its
desire for more active dialogue. We believe Sofia is now
susceptible to making further concessions to upgrade political,
economic, cultural, and scientific ties to at least the levels of
the late 1970's. But, in the broader sense, we believe that
Bulgaria's fealty to Moscow, dismal human rights record, and
international policies that regularly conflict with US interests
will continue to prevent any major breakthrough.
This memorandum was prepared byl
East European Division, Office of European
Analysis. Comments and questions are welcome and should be
addressed to Acting Chief, East European Division
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Bulgaria's relations with the US have long been among the
coolest of any of Moscow's East European allies. As one of the
most loyal Soviet bloc members, Bulgaria has based its policies
toward Washington largely on the Soviet line, echoing Moscow's
stances and rarely taking steps that the Kremlin might view with
disapproval. Moreover, Bulgaria's represssive human rights
policies--symbolized during the past two years by its harsh
treatment of its Turkish minority--its continued efforts to steal
high technology from the West, and its close ties to radical
Third World regimes have further exacerbated relations. Even the
interest in closer ties expressed more recently by top Bulgarian
officials frequently has not been matched by a willingness to
cooperate at the working level.
Bilateral ties have undergone some fluctuations in recent
years in response to international and other developments.
Following an easing in tensions in the 1970's, as Soviet-US
atmospherics improved, they worsened again in the early 1980's as
a result of increased strains between Washington and Moscow and
allegations of Bulgarian involvement in drug trafficking and the
assassination attempt on the Pope. Relations grew so strained
between 1982 and 1984, that Bulgarian officials routinely charged
Washington with singling out Bulgaria for harsher treatment than
the other hardline Soviet bloc countries.
Signs of Thaw
Since late 1984, the Bulgarians have taken increasingly
obvious steps to signal interest in improved relations. The
steps so far have been limited and in some cases designed to
address problems of Sofia's own making. The most notable have
been:
o Narcotics Control. On 3 October, after almost two years
of US efforts, Bulgaria formally agreed to cooperate with
a US Drug Enforcement Agency signature program under which
it would notify the US Embassy of heroin seizures
exceeding 1 kilogram and turn over to the USDEA samples of
intercepted contraband. Eleven days later, Sofia turned
over its first sample from a seizure. It also has
signalled its willingness to take part in international
conferences on narcotics control, such as one in Vienna
next year.
o Embassy Access. On 26 September, following repeated US
complaints, the Bulgarian government removed portable
metal barriers that it had placed in front of the US
Embassy in Sofia ten months earlier on the pretext of
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protecting the Embassy from an unspecified terrorist
threat. The removal has allowed several hundred
Bulgarians a day access to a USIS window display.
o Economic Ties. Sofia recently has shown greater
willingness to turn to the US for trade and credits.
Bilateral trade during the first six months of 1986 was
double that of the same period last year--up from $50
million to $99 million. Most of the increase came from a
tripling of imports--primarily of US corn, fertilizer, and
wheat--to compensate for poor domestic agricultural
performance. Last year, after a six-year lull in
borrowing from the West, Sofia negotiated $570 million in
new loans from a syndicate which included US and other
banks. Bulgaria also stressed its desire for improved
economic ties--particularly with individual US
firms--during visits this year by a deputy trade minister
and a parliamentary delegation.
o Arms Shipments. Bulgaria this year appears to be adhering
to a promise, made by Foreign Minister Mladenov in
December 1984, to halt arms shipments to Nicaragua's
Sandinista government. Before that pledge, Sofia
regularly shipped arms to Managua, and its record last
year is ambiguous.
o Divided Families. The Bulgarian Foreign Ministry has
resolved pending divided family cases in most instances,
allowing Bulgarian citizens to join their relatives in the
Bulgarian officials have accompanied these actions with
increased rhetorical and symbolic support for improved relations.
Most recently, Bulgarian leader Zhivkov urged expanded scientific
ties at a meeting with US scientists in Sofia. Ambassador Zhulev
in recent months has called repeatedly for establishing more
normal relations. Official Bulgarian attendance at the Embassy's
4 July reception was the highest in recent years. Moreover,
Foreign Minister Mladenov chose a Texas clinic for his recent
successful heart surgery. The choice, unusual for a high Warsaw
Pact official, presumably was made largely on medical grounds,
although Sofia probably gauged that it would convey a useful
political message.
Bulgarian Motivations
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Several factors seem to be prompting Sofia's increased show
of interest in better US ties. Chief among them, in our view, is
economic necessity. As this year's increased agricultural
imports demonstrate, Sofia looks to the West to cover specific
shortfalls in performance. But even more importantly, the US and
other Western countries are prime sources of the high technology
Bulgaria needs to generate long-term growth. This technology is
unavailable from Bulgaria's partners in the Soviet Bloc and is,
we believe, essential to implementing Sofia's program of economic
modernization. Bulgaria also would like to enjoy the benefits of
accession to GATT, both as a mouthpiece for Moscow and for its
own economic interests.
Political and national image factors also are important. To
achieve better ties with the US would appeal to Bulgaria's
elevated sense of its own importance and at the same time ease
its innate insecurity about its role on the world stage.
Bulgarian leader Zhivkov, at age 75 the senior party chief of a
Warsaw Pact country, has long believed that small nations such as
Bulgaria have an important role to play in international
relations. Sofia may also believe that the Soviet-American
climate is now more conducive to Bulgarian overtures to the US as
long as they do not produce results counter to Soviet interests.
Indeed, Moscow may be encouraging such overtures.
Outlook
We believe that Bulgaria will probably carry forward with
diplomatic and other initiatives to improve US ties in the coming
months, barring a major downturn in Soviet-US relations. We do
not expect, however, any change in its close orientation to the
Soviet Union and Soviet policies. Nor do we believe it will
substantially improve its record on key domestic or foreign
policy issues.
Nonetheless, we believe that Sofia is probably more
susceptible than it has been at any time during the past several
years to making at least marginal improvements in some areas.
These areas could include human rights--especially better
treatment of Catholic and Protestant religious sects and ending
jamming of Western radio broadcasts--further movement on
narcotics control, improved commercial climate for US firms,
nuclear safety cooperation, and at least discussions on
compliance with US technology controls.
Sofia is probably most likely to respond positively in areas
that can be discussed on an issue-by-issue basis. The Bulgarians
probably would be most responsive to a judicious mixture of
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pressure and incentives. The following are some incentives that
could induce movement:
o Economic Ties. Sofia is interested in intensifying
official fora for economic exchanges--such as the
US-Bulgarian Economic Council, scientific and trade
seminars, and business roundtables. The Bulgarian
leadership seems to respect and listen to American
business leaders and is eager to bring more American
expertise, in the form of joint ventures and
consultations, to Bulgarian soil.
o Technology Sharing. Bulgaria is highly interested in
increased access to US technology, even if slightly
outmoded. Nuclear safety technology in particular is of
increased interest in the wake of the Chernobyl accident.
Sofia may be willing in return to improve controls on
legal acquisition of advanced technology. In a
conversation with the US Ambassador in early October,
Deputy Prime Minister Markov expressed interest in a
technology control verification system, possibly including
end-user checks and plant visits, to determine Bulgaria's
compliance with US laws. Nonetheless, Sofia is continuing
its illegal diversion of advanced technology from the
West, much of which is destined for Moscow.
o Official Contacts. The Bulgarians would welcome
assurances of an increase in the number and level of
official bilateral contacts. Sofia especially values
exchanges--such as past briefings by US officials on arms
control issues--that help it project the image of an
important and autonomous player in European political
affairs.
o Other Exchanges. Sofia remains highly interested in
stepping up exchanges in culture, science and technology,
and other fields. Bulgarian officials recently expressed
a willingness to discuss CSCE Basket III human rights
issues including information, education, and tourism.
Regardless of any new agreements, Bulgaria will probably do
little more than the minimum to meet US interests and will avoid
actions that would interfere with its other policy objectives.
Particularly in economic areas, numerous bureaucratic obstacles
will continue to exist to hinder even those improvements approved
by top Bulgarian officials.
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Bulgaria. Imports from US: 1st 6 Months of the Year?
Million US $
0+-
1982
1983 1984 1985
? According to US Statistics
Bulgaria: Total US Trade With CEMA 6,1985?
Million US $
? According to US StvtlRtlc L
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DDI/EURA
SUBJECT: Bulgaria: Prospects for Improved US Relations
INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION
1 - NIO/EUROPE
1 - ANIO/EUROPE
1 - O/DCI-DDCI EXEC STAFF
1 - D/EURA
1 - C/EURA/EE
1 - DC/EURA/EE
1 - C/EURA/EE/SE
2 - EURA/PS
5 - CPAS/IMC/CB
1 - DI/PES
1 - DDI
1 - C/EURA/EE/REW
1 - C/EURA/EE/CE
1 - C/EURA/EE/NE
1 - C/EURA/EE/CEMA
1 - EURA/EE/SE CHRONO
1 - EURA/EE/SE PRODUCTION
1 - ORIGINATORS
EXTERNAL
1 - Mr. Donald Gregg, The White House
1 - Ms. Paula Dobriansky, National Security Council
1 - Ambassador Morton I. Abramowitz, Dept of State
1 - Mr. Robert Baraz, Dept of State
1 - Mr. Martin Wenick, Dept of State
1 - Mr. Barry Lowenkron, Dept of State
1 - Mr. John Evans, Dept of State
1 - Mr. Tom Simons, Dept of State
1 - Mr. Harvey Shapiro, Dept of Treasury
1 - Mr. Frank Vargo, Dept of Commerce
1 - Mr. Wynfred Joshua, Pentagon
1 - Mr. Roland Kuchel, Dept of State
1 - Ms. Rozanne Ridgeway, Dept of State
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