YUGOSLAVIA: REACTION TO US AIR STRIKE ON LIBYA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T01017R000403900001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 15, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 5, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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Central Intelligence Agency
5 May "'`gCe)ws
Yugoslavia: Reaction to US Air Strike on Libya
Summary
Belgrade reacted to the US bombing of Libya with
its harshest condemnation of either superpower in
recent years. The reaction recorded high
measurements on virtually all the key indicators of
Yugoslav leadership behavior: swiftness of
response, unusually high level of authority,
strikingly blunt language, lack of balance, and
broad and sustained replay by individual leaders,
leadership bodies, and the media. Belgrade also
provided Tripoli with vigorous diplomatic support.
Yugoslavia was motivated in part by its concern,
as a leading moderate member of the Nonaligned
Movement, not to be outflanked by Cuba and other
radicals in advance of a Nonaligned summit this
August. Belgrade's close, though sometimes
troubled, economic and military ties to Libya also
played a role. Its reaction may prove a bonanza in
future civilian and military-related contracts.
Politically, Yugoslavia probably hopes that its
response will shore up its credentials in the Third
World while causing only minimal harm to its ties
to Washington.
This memorandum was prepared byl
Southeast European Branch,
East European Division, Office of European Analysis. It was 25X1
requested by Frank Vargo, Deputy Assistant Secretary,
Department of Commerce. Comments and auestion
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Official Condemnation
The official condemnation came the day of the attack in
separate statements by the top state and Party bodies. The
collective State Presidency, in an extraordinary session on
15 April, "most harshly condemned the US armed attack" as a
"flagrant violation" of Libyan sovereignty and demanded an
urgent end to the "aggressive US military operations." The
23-man Party Presidium similarly "vehemently denounced" the
"aggression" as a "dangerous threat" to peace. 25X1
An unusually large number of individual leaders and
leadership bodies also quickly jumped into the fray. The
action so far has been condemned by seven of the 23
Presidium members--Slovenia's Andrej Marinc, Croatia's Jure
Bilic, Serbia's Dobrivoje Vidic and Dragoslav Markovic,
Montenegro's Marko Orlandic, Vojvodina's Petar Matic, and
the Army's Party chief Georgije Jovicic. It has also been
denounced by State President Vlajkovic on two occasions, in
dinner speeches for visiting heads of state on 15 and 28
April; by the national legislature's 220-member Federal
Chamber on 23 April; in a resolution of a Slovenian party
congress; by prominent Slovenian Party official Joze Smole;
and by the trade unions and other official organizations.
Some leaders used even stronger language than the
official statements. The US was accused of "state
terrorism" or "international terrorism" by the Army's
Jovicic, the Slovenian Congress, Slovenian official Smole,
and Slovenian party chief Marinc. The Slovenian congress
charged Washington with the "crudest violation of
international rights."
Media treatment was harsh and seemed calculated to build
public support for leadership views. Along with the usual
ample factual reportage on breaking developments, the press
and radio carried numerous commentaries embellishing
official Yugoslav positions. One article in the nationwide
daily Borba called such attacks "Ramboism." The widely
respected Serbian daily Politika, described by the US
Embassy as among the more restrained of the Yugoslav papers,
carried frontpage factual reports under headlines of
"American Aggression" and "Solidarity With and Support for
Libya." Several commentaries discounted the US reasons for
the attack, and only a few so far have stressed concern
about Libyan retaliation with terrorist acts.
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The media gave terse, critical coverage to several
large, unauthorized demonstrations against both the US and
Libya by a growing Slovenian "peace movement." Reports have
toned down the demonstrators' call for an end to
Yugoslavia's military training for Libyans and dismissed as
naive their demands to curtail Belgrade's lucrative foreign
military sales. The relatively tolerant Slovenian
leadership so far has taken no action against the peace
activists. It probably hopes that its condemnations of the
US will placate other, less tolerant republics and the
military.
The Yugoslav Foreign Ministry did not call in the US
charge for a demarche, although it had done so three weeks
earlier on 26 March to protest the US actions in the Gulf of
Sidra. The Yugoslavs reportedly gave the US Embassy heavy
security protection during demonstrations by Arab students
at the nearby Libyan People's Bureau.
Belgrade also has stepped up official pronouncements
against terrorism, in part to address US concerns.
Statements thus far, however, have either explicitly
exempted liberation movements from the "terrorist" rubric
or--as was the case recently in a statement by Deputy
Foreign Minister Loncar before the Assembly--sidestepped the
issue. In practice, Belgrade has continued to give militar
support to the mainline PLO and the PAC,
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Diplomatic Activity
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Along with condemnations at home, Belgrade launched an
active diplomatic effort to call Washington to account
before international tribunals. While Yugoslavia has played
a prominent role in other such occasions in the past, in
this instance it showed more than usual zeal.
Leading the effort was Foreign Minister Raif Dizdarevic,
who arrived in New Delhi for a previously scheduled
Nonaligned ministerial meeting just before the attack.
Dizdarevic's public statements during the ministerial
meeting were among the harshest from the movement's moderate
wing, which includes Egypt, India, and Indonesia.
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Dizdarevic, who issued the call for an emergency session
of the UN Security Council to discuss Libya, was also chosen
as one of six Foreign Ministers to travel to Tripoli to show
Nonaligned solidarity with Libya and to present the
Nonaligned view at the UN Security Council in New York.
After the triple veto (by the US, UK, and France) of the
Nonaligned resolution in the Security Council, Dizdarevic
was among several Nonaligned delegates urging that the issue
be addressed by the UN General Assembly.
According to the US Embassy in New Delhi, most other
moderate Nonaligned members did not make statements during
the special session held on Libya. Only India rivaled
Yugoslavia in the harshness of its proclamations. However,
India was speaking for the whole movement in its capacity as
current Nonaligned chairman. Moreover, India took greater
pains to balance its statements than Yugoslavia. For
example, in his opening speech to the Nonaligned members,
Rajiv Gandhi condemned all forms of terrorism without
exempting liberation movements. Gandhi's statement was
later cited approvingly in a speech by Ambassador Walters
during the Security Council debate on Libya.
Foreign Minister's Role
Dizdarevic has often been controversial in his own
right. US diplomatic reporting indicates
that he is disliked by prominent o icia s both in his own
ministry and elsewhere in the regime. He has been
criticized for abrasiveness and ineptitude.
Nonetheless, while Dizdarevic was clearly among the
hardliners in the Yugoslav leadership on this issue, there
is little he has said or done that has been out of line with
official policies. Dizdarevic will probably continue to
play a prominent role at least for the near future, as
incoming Premier Mikulic has asked him to stay on as Foreign
Minister when the new cabinet is formed on 16 May.
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Yugoslav press treatment of Dizdarevic's statements also
gives little indication that Belgrade attempted to distance
itself from him. While many of his remarks were carried in
summary or excerpt form, Belgrade media do not normally
carry texts of the Foreign Minister's statements at
Nonaligned forums or during bilateral visits abroad. Media
coverage of his comments at the latest Nonaligned session
was fuller than at the last such meeting last summer.
As for his remarks in New Delhi, Politika on 16 April
did not report one of his statements, carried in a Tanjug
dispatch, that "an act of brutal aggression was committed by
the United States of America" against Libya. But it did
cite another reference he made to "the brutal act of
aggression" against Libya. Borba the same day cited him as
denouncing the "aggressive American act," and both papers
carried his remarks that the bombing contradicted
international principles and cannot be justified.
Moreover, both Borba and Politika on 22 April frontpaged
Dizdarevic's comments in Tripoli about the Nonaligned
Movement's "condemnation of the American aggression against
Libya." Politika cited his reference to the "horrify. ng
sights" he saw in the wake of the American bombing.
Past Precedents
Dizdarevic's remarks aside, Belgrade's reaction
contrasts with its lower key response to other US and Soviet
military operations against Nonaligned countries, some of
which resulted in greater casualties and the toppling of
regimes.
Belgrade delayed its official response to the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan of Christmas 1979 for several days
until 30 December, when it issued a Foreign Ministry
statement. The statement failed to condemn the invasion
outright, merely expressing "astonishment" and "deep
concern" and saying that such actions in general were
"inadmissible." Media reports on Party Presidium and Sta.te
Presidency sessions held on 25 and 26 December gave no
indication they discussed Afghanistan. Individual leaders
generally avoided subsequent comment, which was limited
mostly to statements by the Foreign Minister. Nonaligned
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resolutions on Afghanistan in the UN backed by Belgrade,
unlike in the latest instance, have stopped short of
criticizing the attacker by name.
A similar pattern held true in the case of the US
military action in Grenada on 25 October 1983. Official
reaction came the following day by the Foreign Ministry's
press department, which expressed "profound concern," called
such actions "inadmissible" and contrary to international
principles, and called for an "urgent end" to the
intervention.
The latest response is roughly on a par with Belgrade's
sharp and authoritative reaction to the Soviet invasion of
Czechoslovakia in 1968, an event of graver consequences for
Yugoslav security. A government statement issued on that
occasion expressed "extreme concern" over the "most brutal
form of trampling" on a country's sovereignty. A Party
Central Committee declaration voiced "profound indignation
and protest" over the use of "crude force."
Other Comparisons
Yugoslav's current stand was also strong compared to
that of many of Moscow's East European allies. While some
of the East Europeans were more vitriolic, few issued such
an authoritative and sustained reaction as did Belgrade.
Yugoslavia was also the only East European country other
than Bulgaria whose leader reportedly sent a personal
message to Qadhafi, and Belgrade was the most assertive in
East Europe in pushing for a condemnation by the UN.
Belgrade's response in the latest case also marks
stepped up diplomatic support for Libya, particularly
compared to the more temperate position taken in late
February on the growing tensions. The two countries have
had an often uneasy political relationship because of
Qadhafi's unpredictable behavior and his hostility to other,
moderate Nonaligned countries like Egypt with which Belgrade
has had close ties. Tripoli vied with Belgrade last year to
host the Nonaligned summit.
Political Motivations
Belgrade would be expected to criticize the US air
strike in any case, as it has long perceived such actions,
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rightly or wrongly, as having implications for US and Soviet
policy in the Balkans. The decision to respond so sharply,
however, is due partly to several political factors:
Nonaligned Jockeying: Belgrade sees a tough reaction as
important to strengthening its hand toward Nonaligned
radicals like Cuba in advance of the summit this August in
Zimbabwe, a forum held only once every three years.
Yugoslavia stands a chance of being chosen as host of the
next summit in 1989 should a deadlock develop over a Latin
American candidate.
Libya's Proximity: The geographical proximity of Libya,
as a fellow Mediterranean littoral state, probably also
played a role. The interventions in Afghanistan and
Grenada, by contrast, were geographically remote.
Prior Warnings: Belgrade probably believes it gave
Washington adequate advance notice of its likely response.
The State Presidency on 25 March condemned the US action in
the Gulf of Sidra in similarly unbalanced terms, even if the
language was more temperate.
Limited Political Risk: Belgrade probably also
calculates that its condemnation will result in only
minimal, temporary damage to its ties to Washington.
Yugoslavs generally recognize that the US supports
Belgrade's independence and stability.
US Naval Actions: Yugoslavia's sensitivities about US
military actions in the Mediterranean were heightened by
several recent alleged US naval incursions in Yugoslav
territorial waters, actions that have resulted in a
diplomatic demarche.
Yugoslav Lives: Belgrade was probably also angered by
the threat posed by the US attack to the some 16,000
Yugoslavs working in Libya, some of them on projects--like
the naval academy--hit by US aircraft.
Domestic Factors: The Yugoslav leadership also probably
sees the issue as one that can help galvanize the many
factions in the fractious political system, even if only
temporarily.
Institutional Rivalries: The intensity of the
leadership's reaction reflects in part increased competition
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among top leadership bodies for a say in both foreign and
domestic affairs. Not to denounce the action could suggest
that the body was out of the policymaking loop.
Economic Motivations
Yugoslavia's close, though sometimes troubled, economic
ties to Libya also were probably a factor in its response.
Libya is Yugoslavia's second most important partner for
foreign civilian and military construction work, behind only
Iraq, accounting for about 15 percent of Belgrade's total
overseas construction earnings. Yugoslav builders completed
construction projects worth $1.5 billion in Libya during the
past four years, including over $400 million in 1985. The
Libyan contracts have assumed added importance in recent
years as the volume of new construction in Yugoslavia and
worldwide has fallen sharply.
More than 50 Yugoslav work organizations, employing
roughly 14,000 workers, reportedly participated in
construction projects in Libya last year. Projects have
included civilian and military airfields, housing, schools,
factories, agricultural enterprises, hospitals, pipelines,
and irrigation, water, and energy supply systems. Some
2,250 other workers reportedly are involved in medical work.
According to Western press reports, some 500 Yugoslav
workers over a period of five years helped build the naval
academy hit by American bombs.
Libya accounts for about 15 percent of Yugoslavia's oil
import needs. In recent years exports of Libyan crude oil,
averaging about 1.5 million tons annually, have comprised
almost all of Tripoli's exports to Yugoslavia, which in 1984
totaled $447 million. Roughly one-third of these oil
deliveries have been in payment for Yugoslav construction
Trade ties also have helped Belgrade's sagging balance
n .
Yugoslavia has enjoyed a trade surplus
with Lilby-ain recent years of $40-90 million annually.
Yugoslav exports to Libya are comprised largely of
manufactured goods--consumer items, machinery, semi-finished
goods, and aircraft.
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Belgrade's financial dealings with Tripoli in the past
often have been difficult. Since 1982, Belgrade has
grudgingly agreed to allow Libya to settle claims for
Yugoslav construction services with deliveries of crude oil.
Military Factors
and assistance. This
assistance includes arms, equipment, training, and
military-related construction. Since 1980, Belgrade's total
arms trade has increased by 15 percent annually. In view of
Yugoslavia's $20 billion hard currency debt, coupled with
military leaders' support for arms sales, this business is
unlikely to be affected by protests like those of the
Slovenian peace activists.
Among the weapons systems Yugoslavia supplies Libya are
mini-submarines, as well as Galeb jet trainers, which are
easy to fly and of which Libya now owns about 120. Belgrade
also is probably building at least one patrol boat for the
Libyan Navy. The remainder of arms sales have been largely
light arms, ammunition, and some defensive chemical warfare
equipment.
One of the more critical and unique military services
the Yugoslavs provide is the maintenance of Libyan
submarines. Six Foxtrot submarines, of Soviet origin, are
routinely taken to the Montenegrin port of Tivat for
overhauls. Yugoslavs also
regularly repair Libyan ships, aircraft, and ground force
equipment, both in Libya and Yugoslavia.
As for training, there are presently some 500 Yugoslav
military instructors in Libya and probably 150-200 Libyans
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in Yugoslavia,) I Midlevel
Libyan officers are trained at Yugoslav staff colleges, and
enlisted men receive technical training.
30 Libyans currently are being trained to
repair Soviet-made radars; the figure was 100 in 1983.
Instructors in Libya train pilots and naval cadets.
Barring renewed US-Libya clashes, Belgrade probably is
counting on letting its strong support for Tripoli speak for
itself. In the coming weeks it will probably try to repair
damage caused to its ties with Washington through public
statements and private assurances. Should the US take
further military action against Libya, however, Belgrade is
likely to renew its rhetorical and diplomatic activities.
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Its actions so far probably will put it in good stead within
the Nonaligned Movement leading up to summit this August.
Yugoslavia may reap significant economic and military
benefits from its stand. Should the Libyans be concerned
about Moscow's level of support, and should strains between
Tripoli and Western Europe grow, Belgrade may prove an
increasingly attractive alternative as a capable and
reliable supplier of arms and related services. The fall in
oil prices, however, could constrain the extent of Libyan
purchases from Belgrade.
Bilateral relations, otherwise, will probably return to
the past mixture of cooperation and strains. Belgrade will
continue to suspect Libyan designs against Yugoslavia's
moderate friends in the Arab world. Financial cooperation
will probably continue to be strained by differences over
payments policy, although the Libyan market is too im
for Belgrade to risk an open confrontation.
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Subject: Yugoslavia: Reaction to US Air Strike on Libya
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Frank Vargo, Dept. of Commerce
Roland Kuchel, Dept of State
Harvey Shapiro, Dept of Treasury
Carol Miner, Dept of Commerce
John Huber, Export/Import Bank
Robert Baraz, Dept of State
DIA
Paul Dobriansky, NSC
Chief, FBIS/AG/EE
DO/SE
DO/SE
DDI
D/EURA
NIO/Europe
DI/PES
EURA/PS
EURA/PS
C/EURA/EE
DC/EURA/EE
EURA/EE/NE
EURA/EE/QA
EURA/EE/CE
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EURA/EE/CEMA
C/EURA/EE/SE
D/OEA
EURA/EE
CPAS/IMC/CB
CPAS/IMC/CB
CPAS/IMC/CB
CPAS/IMC/CB
CPAS/IMC/CB
EURA/EE/SE/Chrono
EURA/EE/Yugoslavia Production Book
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