PROSPECTS FOR WEST EUROPEAN ASSISTANCE IN FURTHER US MILITARY MOVES AGAINST LIBYAN TERRORISM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T01017R000403890001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 35
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 10, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 6, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000403890001-6
Fil~-
DATE J LE ~(i
DOC NO C-"y~ M brb~a-!.S
OCR
P&PD I
6 May 1986
Prospects for West European Assistance
in Further US Military Moves Against Libyan Terrorism
The continuing absence of harsh official criticism of the US
raid and recent EC actions to reduce the number and restrict the
activities of Libyan diplomats indicate that European leaders are
coming to grips with three new factors:
--A growing recognition of Libyan sponsorship of
international terrorism.
--An emerging private consensus that toppling Qadhafi may now
be the only way to deal with this problem.
--Mounting concern that more negative US public attitudes
toward Western Europe may jeopardize US support for the
Alliance.
Each government weighs these factors differently, producing
important variations in the private attitudes of key Allies
toward US requests for support in combatting Libyan terrorism.
Although opposition to a tit-for-tat cycle of reprisals for
terrorist attacks remains strong, some West European governments
such as France and Italy have promised to react militarily if
Libya were to follow through on threats to attack NATO bases in
Southern Europe. There are, moreover, a number of hints that
several Allies would offer at least passive support to a strategy
aimed specifically at bringing down Qadhafi. This would be
This memorandum, requested by Lieutenant Colonel Oliver
North, National Security Council, was drafted by members of the
Libya Working Group of the Office of European Analysis.
_uestions and comments are welcome and may be addressed to
Chief, West European Division
25X1
25X1
EUR M86-20065 25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000403890001-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000403890001-6
unlikely to involve anything more dramatic in most cases than
turning a blind eye to US overflights and allowing US tankers to
fly from bases in their countries, but France--if persuaded that
a combined operation would actually topple Qadhafi--might go so
far as to launch a simultaneous assault on Libya's southern
battle line in Chad. In any of these cases, turning around one
or two key Allies such as West Germany or France could create a
momentum that would encourage other countries to be more
cooperative.
At the Economic Summit in Tokyo this week, British, French,
West German, and Italian leaders approved a relatively tough
communique calling on countries to enact a series of measures to
combat terrorism. Although somewhat watered down from the
original British draft, according to press reports, the final
communique went beyond previous EC statements in recommending
improved extradition procedures for terrorists and stricter visa
requirements for nationals of states sponsoring terrorism. Most
importantly, it specifically identified Libya as a state
sponsoring terrorism. Short of massive Libyan attacks in Western
Europe or strong US pressure, the West European governments are
likely to confine their efforts now to amplifying the diplomatic
sanctions, drawdowns in economic relations, and police actions
already under way. Their increased willingness to take a tougher
public position against Libya, however, is a clear indication
d
i
on an
that they remain worried about further US military act
hope to avert it by being more cooperative on selective actions.
Reaction to US Raid
West European governments continue to believe that
retaliatory raids against Libya will simply goad Qadhafi and
other radical Arabs into further terrorist actions. They worry
that their support for US reprisals would not only call down the
wrath of the terrorists but would also jeopardize lucrative
economic ties with Libya and, more importantly, the rest of the
Arab world. In every country but France, moreover, domestic
public opinion strongly opposes retaliation against Libya
(despite widespread public acceptance that Libya is deeply
involved in terrorism), and some leaders--notably Prime Minister
Craxi in Italy and Chancellor Kohl in West Germany--must reckon
that open support for the US could endanger their own political
standing and even their hold on office.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000403890001-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000403890001-6
These concerns make the West European governments' tepid
response to the US raid on 15 April all the more striking.
Official statements were generally couched in terms of
disagreement or disapproval rather than condemnation. Kohl went
so far in public as to note his "understandig" for the US
The absence of harsh criticism reflects, LOAI
in our judgment, West European leaders' growing recognition that
Libya is up to its elbows in international terrorism generally
and specifically responsible for the Berlin attack that provoked
the raid. We believe there is also a developing tacit consensus
among these leaders that Qadhafi's removal from the scene would
be a beneficial development--although they are still a long way
from accepting a share of the responsibility for doing it.
West 25X1
Europeans are anxious to play down differences with the US in
order to halt adverse trends in American public attitudes toward
Western Europe that might jeopardize US support for the Alliance.
The relatively mild response of West European leaders to the
recent US raid also owes much, in our estimation, to the
perception that Moscow has so far shied away from direct support
of Qadhafi. We believe, in fact, that the vehemence of West
European opposition to future US military actions is likely to
increase in direct proportion to any evidence suggesting a Soviet
commitment to rescue Tripoli. For this reason, we also think
that almost all West European governments would strongly oppose
US military strikes against terrorism-sponsoring Arab states such
as Syria that are more highly valued by Moscow--no matter what
the provocation.
Impact of Further Libyan Terrorism
We doubt that isolated terrorist incidents, even if solidly
linked to Tripoli, would be sufficient by themselves to prompt
West European governments to facilitate US military retaliation
against Libya. These governments already acknowledge Libyan
complicity in terrorism but see tit-for-tat reprisals as
counterproductive. Publishable evidence further implicating
Tripoli might help to solidify anti-Qadhafi sentiment in Western
Europe and could improve the chances that governments will
eventually close down Libyan Peoples Bureaus. It would not be
likely, however, to alter government or public opposition to
military reprisals. Polls taken by the USIA in the UK, France,
and West Germany have shown simultaneous majorities agreeing that
Libya supports terrorism but opposing military action against
Tripoli.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000403890001-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000403890001-6
A wave of particularly bloody terrorist incidents linked to
Libya would probably harden attitudes toward Libya in the
countries worst hit and encourage them to consider seriously
further economic sanctions and severing diplomatic relations with
Tripoli. It could, however, also lead to resentment against the
US, which would be blamed for provoking Qadhafi. Skilfull
fanning of this resentment could produce large anti-American
demonstrations and calls for greater distancing from US policies
toward Libya.
Libyan military attacks against targets in Southern Europe or
even in North Africa would be a different story. Craxi has
warned publicly that any repeat of the Libyan attack on Lampedusa
or any other Libyan military assault on Italy would meet with a
military response. Italy would almost certainly press for a
joint NATO response to such provocation. France, meanwhile, has
assured Italy, Spain, and Tunisia that it would come to their aid
if they were attacked by Libya. Spain temporarily withdrew its
ambassador when Libya threatened military reprisals, and we think
Madrid at the very least would assist a US retaliation if Spanish
territory were violated by Libyan forces.
Prospects for Leverage
Most European governments will be particularly hard to budge
on the issue of open involvement in US military actions because
they are convinced that this would expose them to grave security
risks and economic setbacks--not to mention vocal public
opposition. But we believe they might respond in varying degrees
to certain types of US pressure, particularly if they could
demonstrate to their publics that they were fully consulted and
that proposed actions had a good chance of succeeding without
provoking further terrorist reprisals. Some might be moved by
high-level US appeals and most would be more likely to give
support if they could take cover behind a joint European
decision.
--West Germany's reliance on the US for its security
guarantee provides an additional factor that may create an
opening for US leverage. Even more than the other Allies,
Bonn worries about factors that could weaken US resolve to
defend Europe and might be motivated to grant overflights,
refueling by US tankers staging out of bases in West
Germany, and use of medical facilities by forceful
indications from Washington that Congress and the American
people regard the issue as crucial to the Alliance. If
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000403890001-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000403890001-6
Bonn did decide to cooperate with Washington, it would
almost certainly urge other Allies to join in, and this
could strongly influence Italy, Spain, and Portugal.
--Lisbon might also be susceptible to a high-level appeal
from the US for the use of Lajes Air Base because of
Portugal's broadly pro-American views and its desire to be
taken seriously as a partner in the Alliance. We believe
the odds of obtaining Portuguese approval for overflights,
transits of Lajes, and refueling from tankers brought into
mainland Portugal would be better than 50-50 if Lisbon
believed that the proposed US action either enjoyed
appreciable Allied support or was likely to deal a
definitive blow to Middle Eastern terrorism.
--British Prime Minister Thatcher, despite strong domestic
opposition, continues to support US policies, and we
believe she would allow at least one more raid to be
launched from British bases in reprisal for terrorism
clearly laid at the Libyan doorstep. Given the strong
public opposition in the UK, however, she would be even
more anxious for publishable evidence of Libyan complicity.
--Although Italian Prime Minister Craxi
heads a government that is badly divided
over Middle East policy and is not likely to be able to
offer any more direct assistance beyond what Italy already
provides in hosting the 6th Fleet.
--Spanish Prime Minister Gonzalez is in a stronger position
politically, but Spain has some of the greatest
reservations of all the West Europeans about alienating the
Arab world; we believe he would be unlikely to offer
support unless it could be done under the umbrella of joint
European action.
--The French, for their part, will be loath to follow the
American lead unless they can demonstrate clearly that it
is in France's national interest. Although toppling
Qadhafi would remove a thorn from their side in Chad,
small-scale strikes against him, in their view, might cause
him to lash out at France or at French interests in Africa.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000403890001-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000403890001-6
Support for Toppling Qadhafi
The effectiveness of leverage against the West Europeans
will, of course, depend to a large extent on what they are being
asked to do. European leaders draw a clear distinction between
selective reprisals for specific terrorist attacks--which, in
their view, do not get at the root cause of the problem and can
only make matters worse by provoking further terrorist
retaliations--and a comprehensive strategy for overthrowing
Qadhafi and containing terrorism in Europe. Although they are
highly resistant to any involvement in small-scale assaults on
Libya, several West European countries,- - have
an operation that had a good chance of overthrowing the Qadhafi
regime.
Mindful of the historical precedents of Italy's 20-year
struggle earlier this century for domination over Libya and
France's losing battle for Algeria, however, the Europeans will
tend to be skeptical about the feasibility of any plan to
overthrow Qadhafi quickly and cleanly. If they could be
convinced that the US, rather than responding to individual
provocations, has a carefully conceived plan of action for
removing Qadhafi and containing Middle Eastern terrorism,
European leaders may become more receptive to US requests for
assistance.
25X6
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000403890001-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000403890001-6
The British, too, would probably prefer decisive US action
against Qadhafi, especially if it could be justified under
international law. Thatcher would probably view this course as
less damaging over the long run to her government's domestic
standing and links to the Arab world than a drawn-out series
retaliatory raids from British bases or US aircraft carriers.
Reporting from the US Embassy in Madrid leads us to believe
that Spanish officials also would welcome a swift and clean
solution to Libyan terrorism. We suspect that Prime Minister
Gonzalez might be inclined at least to turn a blind eye to
overflights or US tankers taking off from Spanish air bases if he
believed it would lead to Qadhafi.'s ouster. Given the same
understanding, we believe the Portuguese would be even more
amenable than the Spanish to allowing overflights, transits
through Lajes, and refueling from tankers brought into mainland
Portugal. In both cases, the willingness to lend support would
be enhanced by the participation of other Europeans.
Italian
Italy can probably be counted
hosting the US 6t Fleet and allowing
use of Sigonella for emergency aircraft landings
and logistical flights to the Fleet. Rome has been flying in
Alitalia planes to evacuate foreign nationals from Tripoli and
would provide naval transport as well, should it become needed.
The West Germans, on the other hand, would probably oppose a
massive strike at Libya, arguing that it was out of all
proportion to the Libyan provocations. Bonn's worries about the
US resolve to defend Western Europe, however, make it vulnerable
to pressure focused on the importance of cooperation to Alliance
solidarity.
A major operation against Libya would almost certainly cause
West European public opinion to turn sharply against US policy,
and we would expect large demonstrations in most of the major
cities. This negative reaction would be dampened if France or
other Allies openly participated in the action. If the US
succeeded in removing Qadhafi and putting the lid on terrorism in
Western Europe, we would expect the major repercussions to die
down by the end of the year. Any upsurge in terrorism in the
wake of such an attack would, of course, be blamed on the US and
would feed the anti-US movement.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000403890001-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000403890001-6
The Price for Support
To the extent that West European governments openly support
US military action--and especially where this is perceived to be
in response to US pressure--there will be a price to pay. In
France the government would probably find considerable public
support for turning up the heat on the Libyans, but Mitterrand
and Chirac would have to convince Frenchmen that they were acting
out of purely French interests
balance or power in France between the Socialist President and
the conservative government.
In Britain Thatcher is already under siege from public
opinion, the media, the opposition, and a few Tory mavericks for
her support to the US raid. Nevertheless, we believe she will
allow US planes at least one more sortie in retaliation for
Libyan terrorism--not only because of her own convictions, but
also because reversing course now would look like caving in to
the opposition.
This damage could be limited by US support for British
ons on issues like the pending US-UK Extradition Treaty,
the ABM Treaty, SALT II, and SDI contracts.
Any cooperation in a future strike against Libya could have
severe political repercussions for the. West German government.
Although it would probably not provoke a Cabinet crisis, it could
contribute to major Christian Democratic losses in the state
election in Lower Saxony on 15 June.
The Italian Cabinet is badly split on Middle East policy.
Open support for US attacks could trigger a government crisis
similar to the one that shook Rome last fall over the release of
Abu Abbas and lead to new elections, possibly returning a new
majority less sympathetic to US policies. It would also be
likely to renew pressure on the government to establish
control over US military activities on Italian bases.
The conflict with Libya comes at a critical time in the
evolution of Spain's security relationship with the West, as well
as during the runup to the national election on 22 June. Any
25X6
25X6
25X1
25X6
25X6
25X6
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000403890001-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000403890001-6
missteps by Gonzalez would almost certainly increase pressure for
reducing the US military presence and for limiting Spain's role
in NATO.
If Portuguese backing for the US results in terrorist attacks
in Portugal, support might decline for security cooperation with
the US--including construction of the GEODSS deep space satellite
tracking station in southern Portugal.
Conclusions
We believe the West Europeans will hope to hold the line at
the diplomatic measures they are now pursuing to limit the Libyan
presence in Europe. At the Tokyo Economic Summit, the communique
on terrorism went beyond previous EC statements in some
respects--notably on extradition cooperation and visa
requirements for nationals of states sponsoring terrorism--but it
essentially pointed to stricter enforcement of measures already
in train. In our view, the factor most likely to move them
beyond this posture would be some further dramatic terrorist
incidents clearly linked to the Libyans. In that case, we think
most European leaders would seriously consider adopting limited
economic sanctions and severing diplomatic relations with
Tripoli. To the extent that they are seen to be yielding to US
pressure, however, some of our strongest supporters among West
European leaders could be seriously damaged domestically, and
US-European security ties could be strained.
Calculations of self-interest will continue to be the
overriding factor in West European responses to US policy toward
Libya. West European leaders remain deeply worried about the
security and economic implications for them of further US
military action against Tripoli. They will be particularly alert
for signs that the US is wedded to a tit-for-tat strategy that
European leaders fear will alienate their electorates and produce
a spiral of violence on their soil. The more convinced European
leaders are that the US has a comprehensive and multifaceted plan
for containing Libyan terrorism--and getting rid of Qadhafi--the
more likely they are to respond positively to requests for some
form of support. Realistically speaking, we believe this support
is most likely to take the shape of quietly allowing overflights
and use of US tankers and other logistical support stationed on
European bases. In our view, a more public show of support by
certain key Allies--especially the French and West Germans--would
encourage others to be more cooperative. With the exceptions of
the UK and France, the Allies would clearly feel freer to endorse
US actions if they could do so under the umbrella of a united
European response.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000403890001-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000403890001-6
Government Position
Prime Minister Thatcher continues her strong support for
Washington's military action despite numerous opinion polls
showing nearly 70 percent of Britons disagreeing with her
decision to allow US use of UK bases. Among the factors steeling
the Prime Minister's resolve are her personal concern for
protecting the US-UK "special relationship," her conviction that
US retaliation was justified, the broad Tory approval for the
UK's role in the Libyan raid, and the damage to her political
image from backsliding.
Although the press is claiming there is some Cabinet and
backbench dissatisfaction with the Prime Minister's decision, the
Tories--with the prominent exception of former Prime Minister
Heath--are supporting her solidly. Indeed, even Thatcher's
would-be successor and former Defense Secretary Michael Heseltine
backed the Prime Minister in the aftermath of the US raid. We
also believe that Thatcher's position was somewhat strengthened
on 17 April when Foreign Secretary Howe mended some fences with
Britain's EC partners--apparently with the help of US
intelligence supplied to justify the raid.
In our opinion, Thatcher intends to continue supporting
Washington and will do so for the immediate future despite
adverse polls and the invective of the opposition leaders.
Winning Greater Flexibility
We believe there is little more London can do at this point
to boost support for the US.
Her
government, however, cannot afford any perception that Washington
has open-ended use of the bases. Indeed, both Thatcher and her
ministers have publicly asserted that the US does not have carte
blanche and must provide convincing evidence if and when
Washington wants to use the bases again.
We also believe Thatcher's ability to hold her ground would
be improved if she received whatever evidence Washington can
supply that links Libya to terrorist incidents as they occur,
and, just as importantly, material detailing Tripoli's plans for
the future. Evidence tying Libya to terrorist attacks on British
installations and nationals, of course, would be particularly
helpful, especially if some of the material could be used in the
public debate. If Thatcher is unable to turn British public
25X1
25X1
25X6
25X6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000403890001-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000403890001-6
opinion around through her parliamentary expositions of London's
intent to "defeat terrorism," and particularly if British
casualties keep mounting, we believe that it will become
increasingly important to provide UK authorities with evidence
that can be given to the British media.
The Cost to the UK
Thatcher is clearly under seige at the moment from public
opinion, the media, the opposition, and--though to a lesser
extent--fellow Allies in Western Europe. Although we believe the
Prime Minister intends to stand by her present policy and
probably would authorize a second use of UK bases if Washington
presented another convincing case, there are several events that
could deal her--and Tory reelection chances--a serious political
blow.
--If the US became locked in a tit-for-tat battle with Libya
that required repeated use of UK bases, Thatcher almost
certainly would be attacked--and probably with telling
effect in parliamentary byelections and local elections set
for 8 May and perhaps in the general election expected in
in our 25X6
opinion, London probably would prefer a US attempt to knock
Qadhafi out in one or two large-scale blows rather than a
protracted series of "surgical" strikes.
--Paradoxically, Thatcher could also be exposed to political
damage if the US had to carry out another mission against
Libya and did not use UK bases. Thatcher and her ministers
have both quoted Pentagon sources to drive, home the point
that UK bases were essential to the raid on 15 April. If
Washington were to stage another successful raid without
using British bases, the opposition almost certainly would
claim that she had been duped by Washington into allowing
actions that were contrary to the wishes of a large
majority of Britons; it would further charge that she had
thereby isolated the UK from the rest of Western Europe.
In our opinion, Thatcher fully anticipated these short-term
political problems but expects to gain over the long-term by
contrasting her decisiveness with the tepid response of others at
home and abroad and by receiving something in return for
defending US policy. In this vein, the Prime Minister almost
certainly approved of Tory Party chairman Tebbit's speech on 22
April calling for speedy Senate passage of the US-UK Extradition
Treaty and for exempting British trade from US extraterritorial
laws. We also believe that Thatcher expects Washington to avoid
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000403890001-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000403890001-6
decisions that could undercut her government's positions on
issues such as the ABM Treaty, SALT II., SDI contracts, and the
treatment of British and French nuclear forces in US-Soviet
negotiatons. London may also attempt to limit damage to its
political and economic interests in the Middle East by arguing to
moderate Arabs--especially during Britain's EC presidency in the
second half of 1986--that British aid to the US has placed the UK
in a stronger position to influence Washington.
25X1
25X6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000403890001-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000403890001-6
Government Position
Paris opposed the US raid on Tripoli and refused permission
for US Fllls flying out of England to overfly France on their
way. The government's official statement on the US raid,
repeated personally by Prime Minister Chirac in the National
Assembly, "deplored" the escalation of terrorism that had led to
US reprisals and called on both Washington and Tripoli to stop
F_ I
the "cycle of violence."
The decision to deny overflight was probably based primarily
on longstanding French concerns--fear of drawing terrorist
reprisals against France, French nationals still resident in
Libya, and French hostages held in Lebanon; fear of disrupting
profitable commercial relations with Arab nations; and tradi-
tional reluctance to become involved in any initiative that
France does not control. The decision, however, was made more
difficult because it had to be agreed to by two men from opposing
political camps--Socialist President Mitterrand and neo-Gaullist
Prime Minister Chirac. Both men are still maneuvering to domi-
nate French policymaking, and both want to appear tough on terro-
rism. Chirac, in particular, has talked tough on dealing with
terrorism, but his Gaullist constituency would be leery of any
action that smacked of subservience to the United States
Once made public, the decision
weakened Chirac's coalition with the Centrists by pitting him
against former President Giscard d'Estaing and other Centrist
leaders who sharply criticized the government's position in the
National Assembly.
Chirac has reportedly assured Italy, Spain, and Tunisia that
France will come to their aid militarily if they are attacked by
Libyan forces. French officials have also hinted that they would
support a serious effort by the United States to topple Qadhafi.
Although there is inevitably a certain amount of posturing in all
this, we believe that France might be willing to consider mili-
tary support for the struggle against Qadhafi's terrorism under
certain circumstances, particularly given that French forces
already confront Libyan troops across the 16th parallel in Chad.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000403890001-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000403890001-6
Winning Greater Flexibility
The Chirac government, which rests on a slim two-seat major-
ity in parliament, finds itself in a bind. If Chirac were to
support a US operation, he might risk an open confrontation with
Mitterrand over control of foreign and defense policy; he would
also leave his government open to Socialist criticism for any
terrorist retaliation. On the other hand, his "Gaullist" neu-
tralism has generated ugly divisions in conservative ranks--most
Centrists probably agree with Giscard, and National Front leader
Le Pen's approval of US actions completes the Gaullists' isola-
tion on the right. In the short term, Chirac can probably smooth
ruffled feathers in his coalition, especially by putting out the
line that he actually would have supported a tougher US response
but could not sign on to half-measures. He may eventually find
it necessary, however, to adopt this position publicly--a move
that could reduce his maneuvering room with Mitterrand.
For the time being, Mitterrand and Chirac have both found it
useful to leak hints that they would support a more concerted US
effort to oust Qadhafi. This may simply be an attempt to divert
US pressure, based on the assumption that Washington will not
call their bluff. In any case, it is a useful stance for them
because it maintains the foreign policy consensus, and neither
probably now finds it in his domestic political interest to start
an open row with the other, especially over France's attitude
toward US policy. On balance, this course carries risks for both
men in their maneuvering with each other, but they would be
encouraged by the apparent drift of French public opinion toward
support for bold action. In our judgment, therefore:
--France would continue to deny support for reprisals of the
kind already carried out (barring major Libyan terrorist
activities in France).
--French cooperation in an effort to deal a decisive blow
against Qadhafi is achievable, but probably only on the
basis of an agreement on broad strategy.
In our view, if Paris were to agree to support a major US assault
on Qadhafi, it would be in the context of a joint military opera-
tion in which French and Chadian forces attacked from the south,
through northern Chad and the Aozou Strip--making crystal clear
to all French political actors that the government was acting
from French interests.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000403890001-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000403890001-6
It will not be easy to convince France that a plan to oust
Qadhafi is likely to succeed. French experiences in Algeria and
Lebanon and the struggle against Libya in Chad have left Paris
cynical about "quick fixes" to Middle East problems.
Meanwhile, Paris supports a European consensus on scaling
back drastically the freedom of movement accorded to Libyan dip-
lomats and on cutting back Libyan representation. Chirac has
already announced that he wants to renegotiate portions of the
Vienna treaty establishing diplomatic privileges for embassies,
and he has already shown a willingness to expel Libyans from
France at any provocation. He does not appear to have encoun-
tered any resistance from Mitterrand on this issue.
Although France is a strong proponent of maintaining open
channels of communications--even with enemies--Chirac and Mitter-
rand might be willing to go along with closing all Libyan Peoples
Bureaus in Western Europe if there were a clear EC consensus.
Unity with Bonn would be a prime concern on this issue, and the
German position could tip the balance. A wave of Libyan terro-
rist attacks on French soil or a renewed Libyan offensive in Chad
might push France in the direction of severing relations, but we
do not believe unilateral US pressure would be very effective.
The Costs to France
Chirac is likely to have considerable public support if he
turns up the heat on Libyans in France, and we believe he and
Mitterrand could commit French military forces against Libya
without encountering major opposition from a public inured to an
on- again off-again war with Libya in Chad. Recent opinion
polls indicate that the French public--far more than either the
Germans or the British--would approve (56 percent) US military
action against Qadhafi, if there were good evidence of Libyan
responsibility for terrorism. According to the US Embassy in
Paris, a strawpoll taken by a Paris radio station the morning
after the US attack showed 80 percent support for Washington and
a strong current of shame that the French government had refused
to accomodate US overflights. Assuming that Paris could paint a
convincing picture of pursuing French objectives, we believe
there might be little political cost for the government to bear.
The cost would, of course, go up if the operation failed dismally
or if it provoked a bloodbath of terrorist retaliations in France
and against French interests abroad.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000403890001-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000403890001-6
Potential Support Facilities for Operations Against Libya
Could provide airspace fly-over permission. No US/NATO bas-
es--only French.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000403890001-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000403890001-6
Government Position
Chancellor Kohl clearly has been in a quandry in respondng to
the US attack on Libya. He publicly expressed understanding for
the airstrike while questioning its effectiveness
Kohl is strongly pro-US
and publicly accuses Libya of supporting terrorism, but he
probably fears the airstrike will provoke further violence and
damage Western ties'to the Arab world. In addition, Kohl almost
certainly wants to avoid giving the opposition further grounds to
accuse him of subservience to Washington.
The government and coalition parties are divided over the US
airstrike.
Winning Greater Flexibility
We believe the only means of inducing Bonn to lend support in
a future strike against Libya would be forceful indications from
Washington that Congress and the American people regard the issue
as crucial to the Alliance. The West Germans--especially the
Christian Democrats--probably would be concerned that a blanket
refusal to cooperate would lead to inexorable domestic pressure
in the United States to reduce forces in the Federal Republic.
And Bonn probably would be concerned that the perception of a
major defeat for the United States could undermine the
credibility of the US security guarantee to Western Europe.
A positive response probably would be more likely if
Washington avoided putting public pressure on the West Germans,
gave the appearance of close consultations, and expressed strong
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000403890001-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000403890001-6
support for the renewed EC-Arab dialogue promoted by Foreign
Minister Genscher. Even more important for Bonn's decision, in
our opinion, would be a clear delineation of US military
objectives, a high probability of achieving them, proportionality
of US attacks to Libyan provocations, and assurances that
reprisals against Libya will not continue indefinitely. Bonn
probably would be more likely to agree to US requests if they
If Bonn did agree to some form of cooperation against Libya,
it almost certainly would insist on limiting it to US
overflights, refueling of aircraft from tankers staging to bases
in West Germany, and use of medical facilities. The West Germans
almost certainly would resist bombing missions originating from
bases in the Federal Republic and the use of US forces assigned
to NATO.
In addition, the West Germans almost certainly would try to
prolong consultations as long as possible and to conduct them in
a NATO framework.
We believe the Chancellor
also would prefer that any action be perceived publicly as a
joint Alliance decision. He has stated repeatedly--most recently
regarding the expulsion of two Libyan officials from Bonn--that
he prefers a coordinated response among the West Europeans,
especially the French, British, and West Germans. Thus, if Bonn
did decide to cooperate with Washington, it almost certainly
would strongly urge other Allies to do so also.
The Costs to West Germany
Any cooperation in a future strike against Libya could have
severe political repercussions for the Kohl government, in our
jud ment.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000403890001-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000403890001-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000403890001-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000403890001-6
Government Position
Rome, believing that it is more vulnerable to economic and
military retaliation from Libya than other NATO Allies and that
it has the most to lose from further escalation, publicly
condemned the US raid. At the same time, however, government
leaders worry increasingly that Italy and Europe cannot afford to
become further estranged from the US. Thus Rome will probably
continue to walk its narrow policy tightrope, maintaining
distance from the US in public to avoid provoking Qadhafi and
domestic opposition, while quietly trying to facilitate
Washington's efforts.
Prime Minister Bettino Craxi's Cabinet has been seriously
divided for several months over foreign policy generally and
policy toward Libya in particular. Defense Minister Spadolini
has consistently emerged as the strongest advocate of tougher
action against Qadhafi and his terrorist allies. During the
Achille Lauro hijacking last October, Spadolini argued that Rome
must be prepared to use force against the perpetrators, and his
resignation over the government's release of Abu Abbas nearly
caused the collapse of the coalition. He is clearly unha over
Rome's public condemnation of the US retaliatory raid.
Spadolini's views are sharply at odds with those of Foreign
Minister Giulio Andreotti who insists that Italian and Western
interests can best be served by engaging Qadhafi rather than
isolating him. Andreotti has frequently expressed reservations
about Washington's evidence linking Qadhafi to terrorism. He
repeatedly has argued that little progress will be made toward
ending Middle East-generated terrorism until there is progress on
the Palestinian question
Most observers have assumed that Craxi's views on the Middle
East are closer to Andreotti's.
Craxi
probably worries that a majority of Italian leaders and the
Italian public buy Andreotti's argument that the way to forestall
Libyan terrorism is to continue negotiating with Qadhafi.
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000403890001-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000403890001-6
Craxi is first and foremost a political animal, however, and
he will adopt his position to the prevailing political winds.
Last weekend he threatened to use military force in response to
further Libyan attacks against Italy. This toughening of his
position may have been prompted in part by Spadolini's threat to
resign. Craxi may also be responding to hints of considerable
discontent among Andreotti's Christian Democrats--the largest
party of the governing coalition--with the Foreign Minister's
line. Moreover, Craxi seems genuinely concerned that the gap
developing between the US and Western Europe over Libya could
portend serious consequences for the future of the NATO alliance.
Winning Greater Flexibility
Despite the hardening of Craxi's remarks to the public, we do
not expect Rome to alter its stand significantly in the weeks
ahead. Italy can probably be counted on to continue hosting US
ships and allowing surreptitious use of Sigonella for emergency
aircraft landings and logistical flights to the 6th Fleet, but
the Italians will remain nervous about their role. We believe
that Craxi would be hardpressed, at this point, to facilitate.
aerial refueling or grant transit through Italian airspace in the
event of a follow-on airstrike against Libya. Rome has been
willing, on the other hand, to take the lead in helping to
organize the evacuation of those West Europeans resident in Libya
Although Craxi's ability to maneuver at-home seems quite
limited, a shift in political trends could free him to be more
assertive. A growing number of leaders within the governing
coalition, for example, are worried about the gap that has
developed between the US and Europe over Libya and have begun to
call for Italy to take a more aggressive stand against Qadhafi.
A media campaign designed to counter Tripoli's exploitation of
the civilian casualties generated by the US raid--one that
featured footage of recent Qadhafi-related terrorist attacks and
played up Qadhafi's ties to various terrorist groups--in
conjunction with further publication of evidence linking Qadhafi
to recent events, might turn enough public and political opinion
to tip the balance toward more open support for US policies.
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000403890001-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000403890001-6
The Costs to Italy
Craxi's fractious coalition does not have a high tolerance
for internal stress and an attempt to apply pressure on Rome or
to play various leaders against one another over Libya carries
the risk that his government will come unglued. A government
crisis at this point--in the wake of disputes over the
Achille Lauro affair, the release of Abu Abbas, and this year's
uget--could very well lead to a dissolution of parliament and
an early national election. The danger of such an election is
that it could yield a governing coalition--perhaps dominated by
the Andreotti faction of the Christian Democratic Party--that is
less sympathetic to US policies than the existing one. Even the
current level of support already promises, at a minimum, to focus
further attention on US use of NATO installations in Italy and to
galvanize support among moderate Italians for leftist calls to
25X1
25X6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000403890001-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000403890001-6
Government Position
Prime Minister Gonzalez publicly "disagreed" with (but did
not "condemn") the US raid on the implied ground that it would
lead to an increase rather than a decrease in terrorism. In
addition to Gonzalez's concern over an upsurge in terrorism from
the large resident Arab community in Spain, he is also likely to
worry that protracted tension in the Maghreb would strengthen
radical elements in the region and ultimately fuel challenges to
Spain's hold on its enclaves on the Moroccan coast
Spanish leaders have also indicated publicly--though without
closing all doors--that they would deny a US request for
overflights, tanker support from bases in Spain, and other forms
of direct assistance to US military efforts. At the same time,
however, Gonzalez and Foreign Minister Fernandez-Ordonez have
made Madrid a leader in the effort to persuade the EC to adopt
anti-terrorism measures that would both discourage Qadhafi from
striking at Western Europe and the United States from hitting
back at Libya.
the US raid has increased public anxiety
about terrorism, and the political costs of cooperation with
Washington have gone up . Gonzalez still retains room for
maneuver on the issue, but that could shrink if the crisis drags
on for long.
25X1
25X6
25X1
25X6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000403890001-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000403890001-6
We believe that meeting these various conditions would
probably be enough to encourage Gonzalez to brave the adverse
climate of public opinion that has developed in Spain since the
US raid. If all of them were fulfilled, the prospects would be
substantially better than 50-50 that Gonzalez would grant both
overflights and tanker support. However, those odds could fall
to even or less if he believed the US action would not be a
definitive blow to Libyan terrorism. In any event, we believe
there is little chance that he would sanction participation by
Spanish-based US aircraft in direct combat roles in Libya.
Similarly, the chances are virtually nil that Spanish military
units would participate in an attack on Libya unless Gonzalez
were responding to a direct Libyan military attack on Spain.
Even in that case, Gonzalez would probably be reluctant to
retaliate against Tripoli without the help of his Mediterranean
allies--especially France and Italy.
The Costs to Spain
The conflict with Libya comes at a critical time in the
evolution of Spain's security relationship with the West. Madrid
is in the midst of preparations for bilateral talks on the future
of the US military presence in Spain, and after the referendum
last month Spanish leaders are crystallizing their thinking on
the future shape of Spain's participation in NATO. Recent US
confrontations with Libya, moreover, have already fueled public
misgiving over Spain's security links with Washington, and
further US moves against Qadhafi would probably deepen that
concern unless they quickly brought an-end to the problem.
Increased public anxiety, in turn, would almost certainly
increase pressure for a reduction in the US military presence and
for carefully limiting Spain's role in NATO.
25X1
25X6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000403890001-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000403890001-6
Government Position
Prime Minister Cavaco Silva, who leads Portugal's minority
Social Democratic government, and Foreign Minister Pires Miranda
have been circumspect so far in responding to the US strike
against Libya. Both expressed their "surprise" that the raid had
taken place and reaffirmed their support for the positions taken
by the EC ministers. Cavaco Silva called for "dialogue," rather
than "force," to deal with international terrorism. President
Soares, who founded the rival Socialist Party, has had little to
say.
The Portuguese position on Libya is more complex than the
generally unified picture presented to the public so far. Soares
has long been a major supporter of US foreign policy on terrorism
and the Middle East. His enthusiasm for championing US policies,
however, has almost certainly been dampened by what he perceived
as a lack of US support for his presidential campaign earlier
this year. Soares is also concerned about establishing good
relations with Cavaco Silva, his longtime political rival, and
the Prime Minister has made it clear that he would resist
"interference" by Soares in the government's conduct of foreign
policy. Cavaco Silva, for his part, has a strong pro-Western
orientation but believes that his country has more to gain as a
new EC member by coordinating its diplomacy closely with the rest
of Western Europe than by continuing the generally
Washington-oriented diplomatic course charted by Soares. Foreign
Minister Pires Miranda, who has a significant voice in shaping
Portuguese diplomacy, is strongly rumored to have Arab
sympathies, which suggests that he is less supportive of US
policy.
Winning Greater Flexibility
In general, public opinion in Portugal is both more
pro-American and more apathetic about foreign policy as a whole
than in most other West European countries, making it easier for
Portuguese leaders to support Washington. Nonetheless,
politicians of virtually every stripe believe that Portugal has
received little in return for being one of Washington's
staunchest allies since the end of World War II. At least some
of the recent prickliness in Portuguese policy toward the United
States could be undone by simply demonstrating that Washington
takes Lisbon seriously as a partner and values its past
contributions to Western security arrangements.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000403890001-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000403890001-6
Portuguese receptivity toward support for US out-of-area
operations would also increase if Lisbon could be convinced that
the US action would bring.a quick end to Libyan sponsored
terrorism and thereby reduce the threat of retaliation against
Portugal. The Portuguese are especially sensitive on this score
because they recognize that they do not have the ability to
monitor and counter foreign terrorists in their country.
A final factor that would facilitate Portuguese support for.
US policy would be indications that other Allies--especially
Spain, France, and Italy--were also on board. Assurances along
those lines would reduce Lisbon's fear of being singled out for
retaliation and would give the appearance of the sort of
coordinated European response that would appeal to Cavaco Silva
in particular.
The odds of obtaining Portuguese approval for overflights,
transiting Lajes AS, and refueling from tankers brought into
mainland Portugal would be better than 50-50 as long as Lisbon
believed that the proposed US action either enjoyed appreciable
Allied support or was likely to deal a definitive blow. to Middle
Eastern terrorism. If both conditions were met the odds of
obtaining Portuguese support would be high. If neither obtain
there would be little cahnce of winning Portguese support.
The Costs to Portugal
The most important current bilateral issue between Washington
and Lisbon is expediting construction of the GEODSS deep space
satellite tracking station in southern Portugal. Construction
could be delayed or--in an unlikely worst case--derailed
altogether as a result of Portuguese support for US action
against Qadhafi. The Communists are a significant political
force that controls about 15 to 20 percent of the electorate, and
they would almost certainly try to exploit the issue. They could
argue that the United States had "forced" Portugal's leaders to
back a "reckless" military operation that increased the terrorist
threat to Portugal itself. If the US operation were successful,
Communist agitiation would probably fail to produce a significant
reaction. On the other hand, a protracted upswing in Middle
Eastern-based terrorism in Portugal following Lisbon's support
for Washington would give some credence to Communist charges and
make it harder for the government to move ahead quickly on
GEODSS. Indeed, a failed operation of any sort would weaken
confidence in US judgment, but the reaction would be especially
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000403890001-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000403890001-6
adverse if it appeared that Washington had "dragged" Lisbon into
it. In that case, support might decline for security cooperation
with the United States, and the climate would be less favorable
for renegotiating the bilateral agreement governing use of Lajes
AB when that accord. expires in 1991.
25X1
25X6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000403890001-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000403890001-6
Government Position
Turkey has been very low-key in its reactions to the US raid
on Tripoli. The only explicit intervention by Turkey in NATO
meetings has been a request to examine the current operational
status and plans for the Standing Naval Force Mediterranean
(presumably with an eye to keeping it out of any hostile actions
against Libya).
The Turks have little sympathy for Qadhafi, but their major
economic interests in Libya and other Middle Eastern countries
and their common borders with Iran and Syria--both outspoken
supporters of Libya--make them anxious to avoid any escalation of
the US-Libyan conflict. The government has publicly said that US
air attacks on Libya are not compatible with international law
and that only joint action will be effective ainst
international terrorism.
Winning Greater Flexibility
Turkey might be more inclined to support US actions that
have a NATO imprimatur or at least tacit support from moderate
Arab states. In addition, Ankara might tighten restrictions on
Libyan diplomatic and cultural activities in Turkey if Turkey
were persuaded of a potential internal threat from Libyan
officials. It also is possible that a potential security threat
can be used to encourage an indefinite extension of the current
temporary ban on aircraft and ship movement from Turkey to
Libya. Turkish reluctance to support the US might dissipate,
however, if Libya were to harm or threaten the 30-40,000 Turkish
workers in Libya, or overtly threaten Turkish officials.
The Costs to Turkey
Threatening Turkish security assistance carries obvious
risks for long-term US interests. It would probably cause
serious damage to US relations with the Ozal government and could
25X1
25X6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000403890001-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000403890001-6
undermine the government's standing and stability. It would also
play into the hands of the leftist opposition, which regularly
accuses the government of being too accommodating to the US.
Strenuous US arm-twisting would probably strengthen opposition to
US base rights and foment anti-Americanism in Turkey.
25X1
25X6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000403890001-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000403890001-6
Government Position
Foreign Minister Papoulias, speaking for the government,
expressed "disapproval" of the recent US operation on the grounds
that it would not put an end to terrorism. The ruling Socialist
Party was more critical--charging that the attack had placed all
of Europe in mortal danger. According to Embassy reporting, the
Greek public appears genuinely uneasy over the potential
consequences for Greece should the present US-Libyan clash
escalate. The Greek leadership has repeatedly told the public
that the US bases in Greece will not be used in support of US
operations against Libya, and there are some indications that it
has taken steps to ensure this does not happen.
Winning Greater Flexibility
The Greek government has become increasingly aware of the
threat posed to its security and economic interests by
international terrorism and has moved to a position of explicit
condemnation. The Papandreou government is anxious to protect
its commercial and political role in the middle East, however,
and fears terrorist retaliation. Of all the Allies, Greece, in
our view, is the least likely to apply sanctions or allow the use
of US bases in Greece against Libya.
Probably the best chance of budging Papandreou would be if
he were pressed to act in concert with a firm EC consensus--
particularly one supported strongly by fellow Socialists in
France, Spain, and Italy.
25X6
25X6
2bAl
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000403890001-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000403890001-6
Cyprus
It is virtually certain that the government of Cyprus would
oppose use of the British bases to be used against Libya. The
Cypriot government has condemned the US attack on Libya and
repeatedly expressed disapproval of possible third party use of
the British bases on Cyprus. Cyprus is economically dependent on
Arab markets, and its geographic location and large Arab presence
make it extremely vulnerable to terrorist attack.
25X1
25X6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000403890001-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000403890001-6
SUBJECT: Prospects for West European Assistance in Further US
Military Moves Against Libya
Distribution:
External
1 - Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North, NSC (handcarried 5/01/86)
1 - Mr. Ray Caldwell, State
1 - Ms. Gloria Kroll, Army
1 - Mr. Steven Danzansky, NSC
1 - Mr. Donald Fortier, NSC
1 - Mr. Peter Sommer, NSC
1 - Mr. Tyrus Cobb, NSC
1 - Mr. Donald Gregg, NSC
1 - Mr. James Davis, The Pentagon
1 - The Honorable Michael H. Armacost, State
1 - Mr. Barry Lowenkron, State
1 - Ambassador Rozanne Ridway
1 - Mr. Charles H.Thomas, EUR/State
1 - Mr. 14. James Wilkinson, EUR/State
1 - Mr. William M. Woessner, EUR/State
1 - Ms. Diana Smith, EUR/State
1 - Mr. Tom Troy, EUR/PP/State
1 - Mr. Harry Gilmore, EUR/CE/State
1 - Mr. Michael Habib, EUR/CE/State
1 - Mr. Marten van Heuven, EUR/WE/State
1 - Mr. William Rope, EUR/SE/State
1 - Mr. Martin A. Wenick, EUR/NE/State
1 - The Honorable H. Allen Holmes, State
1 - Mr. Robert Dean, State
1 - Ambassador Morton I. Abramowitz, INR/State
1 - Mr. Henry Myers, INR/State
1 - Mr. Glenn R. Cella, INR, State
1 - Mr. J. Richard Thurman, INR/State
1 - The Honorable Richard W. Murphy, State
1 - Mr. John A. Cantwell, INR/LAR/State
1 - The Honorable Fred C. Ikle, Defense
1 - Mr. Darnell M. Whitt, Defense
1 - The Honorable Richard L. Armitage, Defense
1 - The Honorable Richard N. Perle, Defense
1 - Deputy Assistant Secretary for European & NATO Policy, State
1 - Mr. James W. Morrison, Defense
1 - Mr. George W. Bader, Defense
1 - Mr. Thomas C. Thorne, INR/C, State
1 - Ms. Susan J. Koch, Defense
1 - Mr. Leo Michel, Defense
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000403890001-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000403890001-6
Internal
1 - DDI (7E47)
1 - NIO/EURA (7E62)
1 - NIO/CT (7E47)
1 - NIO/NESA (7E47)
1 - D/ALA (3F45)
1 - D/CPAS (7F16)
1 - D/OCR (2E60)
1 - D/OEA (4F18)
1 - D/OGI 3( G03)
1 - D/OIA
1 - D/NESA (6G02)
1 - D/SOVA (4E58)
1 - D/OSWR (5F46)
1 - D/EURA
2 - EURA Production Staff
4 - IMC/CB (7G07)
1 - C/EURA/WE
1 - WE Subject File
1 - WE/BBC
1 - WE/CM
1 - WE/GN
1 - WE/IA
EURA/WE/CM
(6 May 1986)
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000403890001-6
 25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000403890001-6
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000403890001-6
 Attitudes of West European Governments
on Key Issues of Counterterrorism
United Kingdom Publicly blames Libya for terrorism and
Berlin bombing; large reservoir of doubt
among the population.
Libyan responsibility for terrorism, espe-
cially West Berlin bombing
US Gulf of Sidra operations and air raids
of 14 April
Defends fully US actions in both in-
stances, despite strong public opposition
and some backbench Tory grumbling.
West Germany Publicly accuses Libya of supporting ter-
rorism and says Tripoli responsible for
Berlin bombing.
France
Publicly accuses Libya of sponsoring ter-
rorism;,
Italy
Greece
Turkey
Spain
Portugal
Publicly acknowledges Libyan complicity
in and support for terrorism generally.
Blames Tripoli for Berlin murders.
Publicly claims to be unconvinced by evi-
dence of Libyan involvement in Berlin
bombing;
Officials and public aware that Libya
promotes terrorism. Appear convinced of
Libyan responsibility for Berlin bombing,
but have not taken public position,
Believes Qadhafi is involved generally in
terrorism; accepts possibility that Libya
was responsible for Berlin bombing.
Recognizes Libyans play active role in
international terrorism; says no reason to
doubt Qadhafi's complicity in Berlin ter-
rorism incident.
Endorses US right to maneuver in interna-
tional waters in Gulf of Sidra. Did not
back airstrikes but expressed "understan-
ding."
Viewed Gulf of Sidra operation as danger-
ous provocation; "deplored" increased
terrorism but charged that US actions
contributed to cycle of violence.
Dissociated itself from Gulf of Sidra ma-
neuvers and condemned bombing raid; pri-
vately more supportive. Government bit-
terly divided on Middle East policy.
Concerned Sidra operations are threat to
regional peace. Condemned bombing raid
as leading to more terrorism. Says root
cause of violence-the Palestinian prob-
lem-must be addressed.
Regards both as justifiable in theory, but
concerned they will enhance Qadhafi's
standing without reducing his ability to
promote terrorism.
Regarded Gulf of Sidra operations as un-
duly provocative and expressed disagree-
ment with bombing raid.
Maintained low profile during Gulf of
Sidra operations. Declared "dialogue"
rather than "force" is best means of deal-
ing with international terrorism.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000403890001-6
EC sanctions thus far and possible further Raising or pressing counterterrorist issue
restrictions on Libyans at Tokyo Summit
Had pressed for closures of LPBs but gave
full support to consensus measures adopt-
ed. Severed diplomatic relations in April
1984.
Would support if it seemed likely to pro-
duce a consensus and if US is not seen as
dictating terms.
Pushed strongly for measures adopted.
Probably would take further action
against Libyan officials if Qadhafi
launched another terrorist attack in West
Germany.
Opposed call for EC consensus to close
LPBs but supported restrictive measures
adopted. Will probably reduce LPB staff-
ing and make more cuts in economic ties.
Voted in favor of EC measures. Has re-
stricted movements of LPB members and
tightened visa regulations. Eventually,
may reduce size of LPB.
Reluctantly accepted EC measures; enact-
ment tied to "national circumstances" and
more solid proof. Monitoring Arab popula-
tion.
Likely to support to help assuage US
concerns and provide symbol of interna-
tional cooperation.
Mitterrand and Chirac have announced
support. Both will assert that cooperation
will be dictated by national interest.
Since Rome Airport attack, has pushed for
more coordinated international action;
would welcome Summit commitment,
Would feel "left out." Probably would
criticize any agreement arrived at by
Summit countries.
Largescale effort to overthrow Qadhafi
Would prefer decisive US action to tit-for-
tat raids. Major Libyan attack in UK
might prompt contribution of British
forces.
Would applaud overthrow of Qadhafi, but
public opinion and ties to Arab states
would rule out involvement, barring strong
US pressure or EC joint action.
May offer overflight rights and bases as
staging areas; might agree to participate,
perhaps by attacking in Chad.
Unlikely to support any action outside
NATO framework.
Unlikely to support but would probably
not interfere with "regularly scheduled"
reconnaissance flights from US bases in
Greece.
Extremely reluctant to expel Libyan diplo- No official view of Summit. Has consis-
mats; has about 35,000 workers in Libya tently applauded international cooperation
and is owed $3 billion by Tripoli. to counter global terrorism.
Strongly supports EC unity and would
probably go along with stiffer controls.
Would not break diplomatic relations but
is expelling 11 Libyan officials.
Supports EC measures but has said each
country must apply in light of own inter-
ests; will not "expel Libyans just for being
Libyans."
Would applaud progress in multilateral
efforts to combat terrorism.
Would applaud progress in multilateral
efforts to combat terrorism.
Would welcome demise of Qadhafi and
might be willing to give tacit support for a
serious US effort to overthrow him.
Reluctant to get out in front of EC part-
ners but might be willing to support US
operation to oust Qadhafi.
Support for stronger economic and diplo- Response to Libyan military attacks on
matic sanctions, including blockade of Lib- NATO bases in southern Europe
yan ports
Opposes economic sanctions but has al-
ready suspended export credits and arms
sales. Slim chance of support for EC oil
embargo; would probably respect block-
ade, if supported by Allies.
Opposed to sanctions in principle; would
fear economic consequences and US-
Soviet confrontation.
Would support NATO military
response.
Would press for stiff EC reaction-
possibly more expulsions and new re-
strictions on movement of Libyans;
would endorse military response.
Opposes sanctions but has scaled back
significantly trade with Tripoli. With full
consultation, would probably support a US
blockade.
Probably would support additional sanc-
tions only within the EC context. Would
respect US blockade but condemn action
publicly.
Would oppose any stiffer sanctions or
blockade.
Would not support more severe sanctions
but might be persuaded to extend de facto
embargo of Libyan oil.
Probably would join other EC countries in
sharper sanctions. Fears blockade would
aggravate crisis and provoke confrontation
with Moscow.
Likely to go along with more sanctions, if
generally supported in EC.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000403890001-6
Would probably respond unilaterally
with military force to any attack on
Italy or Spain. Might launch simulta-
neous attack in northern Chad.
Would press for NATO response but
might take up US or French offers of
assistance if need was urgent.
Would blame US for provoking attacks
and move to block use of US bases. Has
warned Tripoli, however, that any at-
tack on US bases is attack on Greece.
Would not back NATO action against
Libya unless supported by formal deci-
sion of the Alliance.
Probably willing to join France, Italy,
and other Allies in military response to
Libyan military attacks on NATO
bases in southern Europe.
Probably would support Allied military
response.