(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T01017R000403840001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: January 14, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 29, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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Central Intelligence Agcncv
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29 April 1986
Yugoslavia: The Incoming Party Leadership
Summary
Yugoslavia is laying the groundwork for the
largest turnover in its collective Communist
Party leadership in four years. The change, to
be formalized at a party congress in June, will
eclipse the generation of leaders who fought as
Tito's partisans during World War II and ran the
country for much of the past 40 years. They
will be replaced by a diverse mix of younger
leaders, who in general are more pragmatic but
also tied more to parochial interests than their
Pan-Yugoslav elders. From the standpoint of US
interests, the shift to the new leadership could
create sharper strains at the federal level
among the country's many rival ethnic groups.
It could also hinder efforts by the incoming
premier, Branko Mikulic, to promote national
stability.
Southeast European Branch, East European Division, Office of
European Analysis. It was requested by Paula Dobriansky,
Director of European and Soviet Affairs, National Security
Council. Comments and questions are welcome and should be
addressed to Chief, East European
This memorandum was prepared by
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Impending Changes
Yugoslavia will soon be making one of its biggest
leadership changes in recent years. On 16 May, Branko
Mikulic of Bosnia will replace Premier Milka Planinc as head
of government. Barely six weeks later, from 25 to 28 June,
the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (Communist Party)
will hold its 13th Congress and elect both a new 165-member
Central Committee and a 23-member Presidium. The change
will be the first for both the government and Party
leaderships since 1982 and only the second since Tito's
death in 1980. Both the new premier and Party leadership
will rule for four years until 1990.
The premier and the Party Presidium are two of the key
decisionmaking centers in the complex Yugoslav political
system. The premier is more influential than the government
heads of most other Communist countries, with the main say
on economic policy and a voice on other issues under the
government's purview.
The 23-man Party Presidium is a collective body with
broad policy oversight. On the one hand, it has
significantly less authority than Politburos in most
Communist states because of its unwieldy size, its members'
close ties to their home regions, and its dependence on
those regions to carry out decisions. Its decisions have
sometimes been overturned by the Central Committee, and it
must share power outside the party apparatus, in an ad hoc
system of checks and balances, with the premier, a
nine-member State Presidency, and a bicameral Federal
Assembly.
On the other hand, the Presidium has regained some of
its traditional assertiveness during the past year both
toward the regions and the federal legislature. It overrode
the views of Slovenia and Croatia on a controversial foreign
exchange bill and intervened in a dispute over authority
between Serbia and its autonomous provinces of Kosovo and
Vojvodina. The Party President late last year had to defend
the Presidium's new-founded activism. The scope of the
Presidium's activity is illustrated by the agenda of a
recent session, where it demanded better government economic
performance, condemned the US air strike on Libya, and
promoted steps to ease ethnic strains in Kosovo.
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Choosing a Presidium
The composition of the Presidium has begun to
crystallize in recent weeks as each of the regional Central
Committees held elections to nominate its candidates. Some
21 of the 23 names so far have been made public. Each of
the six republics gets three seats on the Presidium,
Serbia's autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina two
apiece, and the Army party organization one. Of those
seats, one from each of the nine party organizations is
reserved for its party chief.
Once nominated, the candidates go through a lengthy,
quasi-democratic ratification process. They must first be
endorsed by the congresses of their home regions and then by
the National Congress in June for membership on the National
Central Committee. The Central Committee in turn will elect
the Presidium by secret ballot at its formative session
right after the congress.
Fights over candidates from the floor or in back rooms
are possible at every step. Barring more than the normal
tumult in the Yugoslav system, most or all the candidates
probably will be approved. But at least two of the
nominees--the Croatian ideologue Stipe Suvar and the Serbian
nationalist Radisa Gacic--may already be in trouble either
at home or in other regions
There is even a slim chance a congress or entra
Committee will reverse a previous decision and vote to scale
back the size of the Presidium. Such a move would strand
many of the Presidium nominees, upsetting plans by the
powerbrokers to hand out top jobs.
Generational Change
The incoming Presidium will look very different from the
one that preceded it. And that, in turn, could have a
broader impact on the Yugoslav political landscape. The most
striking difference between the incoming and outgoing
Presidiums is age. The incoming members average nine years
younger than their predecessors, with a mean age of 51 as
opposed to 60. At least a third of them are still in their
30's or 40's. Many are new, unfamiliar faces on the
national scene, having been pulled up from the second rungs
of their regions' hierarchies. One Macedonian candidate, at
age 35, probably will be the gest member of a top party
body in Eastern Europe.
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The demographic shift on the Presidium contrasts with
the continuity that marked the last party congress in 1982.
The Presidium installed at that time--even though virtually
the whole membership was replaced then also--was of the same
age as the one that was leaving. Most of that group were
familiar faces, many with prior national-level experience.
Only two were under age 50, but just barely.
The generational change is likely to affect the tone and
substance of Yugoslav politics. The outgoing leaders were
of the generation whose experience was shaped by several
historic events--the wartime fight of Tito's partisans
against the Nazis, the break with Stalin in 1948, and the
struggle to build a viable Communist state out of the many
ethnic groups. While generalizations about Yugoslav age
groups are tenuous at best, this partisan generation has
tended to be more unquestioning, self-congratulatory, and
committed to Tito's Pan-Yugoslav ideal. Several of the
senior leaders who are leaving
fit this mold.
The new group is a different breed. Most of its members
were under 15 years old when the war ended. They came to
political maturity in the period, during the past two
decades, when economic realities often had more impact than
ideology and when narrow regional interests increasingly
took precedence over national goals. The younger
generations of several ethnic groups in particular--Serbs,
Albanians, and to some extent Croats and Slovenes--are
reputedly more parochial and nationalistic than their
elders. The incoming Presidium candidates as a group seem
better educated, more sophisticated, and in some ways more
flexible. Yet many have scant experience outside their own
regions and will probably be at least as beholden as their
predecessors to their home bases.
The generational change will probably be repeated on the
165-member Central Committee, the body to which the
Presidium will report. The mean age of the outgoing Central
Committee is about 57, nearly that of the departing
Presidium. According to Yugoslav media, more than half (53
percent) of an interim list of 147 nominees for the new
Central Committee are no older than 50. The final list,
still being drawn up, may look even more youthful, even if
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it includes some of the senior leaders who have been elbowed
out of more meaningful jobs.
Lines of Conflict
Apart from the age factor, the backgrounds and political
reputations of the current nominees to the new Presidium
suggest that destabilizing factional infighting will
probably increase. Most of the issues in question are
perennial troublespots, which even the most high-minded
Yugoslavs could do little to ameliorate. Still, the
incoming leaders seem even more internally divided and less
impartial than their predecessors. Following are highlights
of some of the more likely conflict areas. As in past
years, regional alliances will probably shift depending on
the issue:
Interregional Economic Relations: Polemics within the
Presidium probably will sharpen over allocating economic
resources at a time of slow growth and nationwide austerity.
Several of the more moderate, federally-inclined members of
the departing Presidium will be replaced by staunch
advocates of their regions' interests. Many of the
newcomers to the Presidiuml
looking after local interests.
The longstanding dispute between the richer north and
poorer south is likely to worsen. All three candidates from
Slovenia, the country's richest republic, are uninhibited
proponents of the decentralized system, that has allowed
Slovenia to keep much of its resources
Meanwhile, Jakov Lazarevski,
the incoming party chief of Macedonia, is a forceful
spokesman for the distressed south, warning recently of
impending nationwide strains without more northern aid. The
three Serbian representatives, moreover, appear to favor a
stronger central government and will probably draw the ire
of the Slovenes and other northern regionalists.
Dissent: The new Presidium will probably come to blows
over the limits for freedom of expression, long an
inflammatory issue in authoritarian Yugoslavia. Several of
the new Presidium members seem equally as rigid as some of
their predecessors. The most notable among them is the
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50-year-old Croatian Stipe Suvar, viewed
as one of the country ,s most notorious
dogmatists. Even if Suvar fails to be seated--because of
opposition within Croatia or from other republics--the
banner of intolerance will probably be waved by the other
Croatian candidate, Ivica Racan, and by the Bosnian Ivan
Brigic and the Vojvodinan Bosko Krunic. Each of these three
men has publicly demanded crackdowns on ideological
"enemies" and "opposition forces"--conventional codewords
for liberal dissidents. Krunic two years ago claimed that
apposition "political bloc" had already been formed. F_
Market Forces: Disputes also will flare over the use of
market forces, an issue that continues to concern the IMF
and Western creditors. One faction of the incoming
Presidium is made up by the several ideologues and other
traditionalists who prefer the conventional Yugoslav mix of
market forces with planning by governmental, workers, and
managerial bodies. The other faction includes the Serbian,
Slovene, and other Presidium members who appear to see a
greater use of market forces as necessary to promote
economic recovery. The actual implementation of such
measures, however, will almost surely remain in the hands of
will probably set the tone.
The Serbia Problem: One of the most volatile political
issues--Serbia's campaign to regain greater control over its
two reluctant provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina--seems bound
to ignite in the new Presidium. The issue heated up in 1984
and was "federalized" last summer when the Presidium adopted
a statement setting a framework within which it could be
handled. But the efforts to dampen the conflict so far have
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had little effect, and Serbia's frustrations have darkened
inter-ethnic relations and affected other policy issues.
The incoming Presidium will face an even more inflammatory
situation. In recent weeks, members of Kosovo's ethnic Serb
minority have turned out in the thousands in public
demonstrations to highlight their concerns, and the protest
actions already have sharpened inter-regional strains. F -
The new Presidium delegates of the main parties to the
dispute are more defensive of local interests than their
predecessors. Serbian moderate Vidic will be leaving, as
will Dragoslav Markovic, a colorful Serbian nationalist who
actually directed most of his energies beyond the two
provinces. In their place will be Radisa Gacic, described
by the US Embassy as the leading "province basher,"
and--even if Gacic is not seated--the like-minded Serbians
Ckrebic and Milosevic. Kosovo's moderate old-guard member
Sukrija will be replaced by the assertive young Azem Vlasi,
and Vojvodina rights advocate Bosko Krunic will supplant the
more restrained Petar Matic.
Outlook
Factional rivalries probably will sharpen on the new
Presidium, hampering its effectiveness. But non-party
bodies that have preserved more of a Pan-Yugoslav outlook
may increasingly try to fill the vacuum. These would
include Mikulic's government and the nine-man State
Presidency, many of whose members are still old guard
Titoists. The Army also might feel compelled to assert
itself in its traditional role as the ultimate defender of
Yugoslav national integrity.
The Presidium may be less strife-ridden than its
composition suggests.
Those that are may grow into their jobs, tone down their
rhetoric, and develop a broader federal outlook. They will
probably develop an institutional stake in preserving the
Presidium's authority. And they are likely to override
parochial interests if the system itself is threatened. F_
For US interests, a weakened, fractious Presidium could
have mixed effects. On the one hand, it could move
Yugoslavia even closer to the models of its pluralistic,
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democratic West European neighbors and away from the more
monolithic one-party systems to the East. On the other
hand, it could be harmful to national stability. The
Presidium has helped reconcile conflicting interests and
enforce central decisions. An erosion of its authority
could leave Yugoslavia with fewer means to confront mounting
political, ethnic, and economic problems.
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Presidium Candidates
Party Chief
Regular
Region ex officio Presidium member)
Presidium Members
Bosnia
Milan Uzelac (54)
Ivan Brigic (49)
Milanko Renovica (57)
Croatia
(not yet announced)
Ivica Racan (42)
Stipe Suvar (50)*
Kosovo
Azem Vlasi (38)
Kolj Siroka (64)
Macedonia
Jakov Lazarevski ( )
Milan Pancevski (51)
Vasil Tupurkovski (35)
Montenegro
Miljan Radovic (52)
Marko Orlandic (55)
Vidoje Zarkovic (59)
Serbia
Slobodan Milosevic (44)
Dusan Ckrebic (58)
Radisa Gacic (47)**
Slovenia
Milan Kucan (45)
Stefan Korosec (48)
Franc Setinc (57)
Vojvodina
Djordje Stojsic (58)
Bosko Krunic (56)
Yugoslav (not yet announced)
People's Army
* Fair to good chance of being rejected.
** Fair chance of rejection.
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SUBJECT: Yugoslavia: The Incoming Party Leadership
Distribution:
Original - Addressee
1 - Roland Kuchel, Dept of State
1 - Harvey Shapiro, Dept of Treasury
1 - Carol Minor, Dept of Commerce
1 - John Huber, Export/Import Bank
1 - INR/SEE, Dept of State
1 - FBIS/AG/EE Branch
1 - FBIS/ELAAD/Balkan
2 - DO/
1 - NIO/Europe
1 - DDI
1 - D/EURA
1 - DD/EURA
1 - C/EURA/EE
1 - DC/EURA/EE
1 - EURA/EE/NE
1 - EURA/EE/CE
1 - EURA/EE/QA
1 - EURA/EE/EW
1 - EURA/EE/CEMA
2 - EURA/PS
1 - DI/PES
1 - D/OEA
5 - CPAS/IMC/CB
1 - EURA/EE/SE (Chrono)
1 - EURA/EE/Yugoslavia Production Book
1 - EURA/EE/SE
1 - Originator
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