TREVI GROUP: ATTITUDES TOWARDS LIBYA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T01017R000403820001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 37
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 2, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 22, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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22 April 1986
This paper was prepared for Attorney General Meese by the West European Division, 25X1
Office of European Analysis. Questions and convents are welcome and may be
addressed to Chief, West European Division, 25X1
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Belgium
1. Attitudes Towards Libya
Belgium has tightened surveillance of Libyans and followed the lead of the
EC in instituting political and economic measures against Tripoli. Belgian
officials have expressed rising frustration over Middle Eastern- and
Libyan-sponsored terrorism and have emphasized that it was Belgium that first
called for an early meeting of the EC Foreign Ministers to discuss the Libyan
threat. A partial explanation for Belgium's relatively strong stand regarding
Tripoli is that Belgian-Libyan economic relations are small and hence Belgium
has little to lose materially if relations with Libya deteriorate. Although
Belgium, like other EC countries, generally opposed economic sanctions, oil
imports from Libya declined last year and Brussels apparently is ready to
consider further oil sanctions. Foreign Minister Tindemans, in fact, called
for a cessation of European oil purchases from Libya, and
ordered a study of the costs oil sanctions would impose on We
Belgian economy. Even though Brussels acknowledges the need for a greater
commitment to fighting Libyan-sponsored terrorism, domestic political problems
and the desire for an EC consensus will continue to constrain Belgian actions.
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2. Views on Libya's Connection with International Terrorism
Belgian authorities, according to US Embassy reports, are convinced that
Libya was directly involved in the West Berlin bombing. Belgium has few
independent means to uncover Libyan involvement in international terrorism, but
Brussels has accepted assurances from its larger Allies about Tripoli's role in
state-sponsored terrorism. In particular, Belgian officials were reportedly
convinced that Libya was 2.x1
contemplating future terrorist action at the time o -"S air strikes. 25X1
3. Reactions to US Strikes Against Libya
After initial negative reaction, Belgian public opinion apparently is
becoming more supportive of the US air strikes. Nevertheless, some Belgian
officials still worry about retaliation by Qadhafi and consider military action
an inappropriate means for combatting international terrorism. According to US
Embassy reports, there are significant divisions within the cabinet over the US
attack. Vice Prime Minister Gol--who also serves as Justice Minister and has
general responsibility for counterterrorism policy--reportedly was unhappy with
Foreign Minister Tindemans' initial lack of support for Washington. Perhaps to
smooth government differences and to better reflect public opinion, the Foreign
Ministry at the end of last week issued a communique which was less critical of
US actions.
it. Opportunities for US Influence
Belgian support for potential future measures against Tripoli, we believe,
would grow if Washington consulted Brussels in advance. Part of Tindeman's
pique with Washington stemmed from the fact that the US air strikes came so
soon after an EC meeting on Libya, and took him by surprise. In the past,
Brussels repeatedly has expressed resentment at being treated like a
"second-rate" ally. Belgium probably also would be more willing to defend US
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actions if Washington provides evidence which could be made public of Libyan
complicity in international terrorism. In addition, Brussels may be more
supportive of the United States if it believes that West European criticism of
US action is causing Americans--particularly Congress--to call for reducing the
US military presence in Western Europe.
We believe Belgium is willing to support measures within the EC similar to
those imposed by Britain in 1984--limitations on Libyans in Belgium, especially
diplomatic personnel, a ban on arms sales, and withholding future export
credits. Closing the Libyan People's Bureau in Brussels may also be
considered. Because Belgium represents US interests in Libya, Brussels
presumably would want a definite US statement that any break in diplomatic ties
with Tripoli has US approval.
Utimately, Belgian support for measures against Tripoli probably will
depend on the political fortunes of Jean Gol. As a party leader Gol is a key
player in Belgium's coalition government, and has been a relatively strong
supporter of US foreign policy. He has skillfully used the terrorism issue to
enhance his domestic political stature. Although Gol has a good relationship
with Prime Minister Martens, his efforts to aid Washington on the Libyan issue
could be hampered by his rivalry with Tindemans and Interior Minister Northomb.
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Denmark
1. Attitudes Towards Libya
Denmark's political and economic relations with Libya are limited and
likely to remain so. The Danes did not support US sanctions against Libya, but
Copenhagen has discouraged Danish firms from attempting to fill in behind US
firms affected by the sanctions.
Finally, the Danes apply to Libya their longstanding policy
of not selling arms to actual belligerents or to countries considered near
conflict or in a state of internal unrest.
2. Views on Libya's Connection with International Terrorism
Copenhagen recognizes that Qadhafi supports terrorism around the world. In
fact, the Foreign Ministry specifically acknowledged a Libyan connection to
terrorism when it said, in a statement issued after the US attack, that "...it
is clear and beyond doubt that Libya stands behind the terrorism which has
brought forth tensions in the Mediterranean area."
3. Reactions to US Strikes Against Libya
Despite its recognition of Libyan involvement in terrorism, the Danish
government expressed regret over the US military response and dissociated
itself from the action. The public and private responses of Danish political
leaders have ranged from a strong statement of support from the head of one
member party of the ruling center-right coalition to unbridled criticism by the
opposition Social Democratic and and Socialist Peoples' Party leaders. Prime
Minister Poul Schlueter said publicly on 16 April that he doubted that the
methods used during the previous night's action could solve anything, but he
noted that the US "felt itself forced to act."
4. Opportunities for US Influence
We believe the Danes are prepared to cooperate more fully in combatting
terrorism, but Copenhagen is unlikely to adopt measures on its own or to be
aggressive in urging measures on others. The Danes probably would support
sanctions against Libya if these were adopted by the EC. In our judgment, the
Danes will not undertake active anti-terrorism measures unless presuaded that
Copenhagen has a direct stake in countering Qadhafi; so far terrorism has been
limited in Denmark and most Danes continue to view Libya as a remote problem.
While the US has considerable Danish government sympathy, public opinion,
particularly in the younger generation, is marked by a predetermined skepticism
regarding US action -- a factor that will inhibit stronger measures than those
currently underway.
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1. Attitudes Towards Libya
The French government has been highly reluctant to publicly condemn Libyan
involvement in terrorism, but privately French officials show a great deal of
hostility toward Qadhafi both for his recent role in fomenting terrorism in
France and for his duplicity in Chad where French forces face Libyans across
the 16th parallel. France's public attitudes are probably tempered in part by
fear of provoking further terrorist attacks in France as well as by concerns
about triggering retaliation against French nationals in Libya or a
Libyan-backed offensive in Chad. Paris also would prefer to avoid
jeopardizing Its potentially lucrative commercial relations with Libya.
In the 1970s France reportedly worked out a series of informal agreements
with terrorists and their sponsors to grant terrorists safe conduct through
France as long as they refrained from terrorist acts on French soil. The
agreement with Libya apparently collapsed, however, under the strains of the
French-Libyan standoff in Chad. The growing proof of Libyan complicity in
recent terrorist acts in West Germany, along with French evidence of recent
Libyan attempts at terrorism in France, make it highly unlikely that this cozy
relationship can be revived. Paris has recently expelled two Libyan diplomats,
four Libyan citizens, and two north Africans who were almost certainly employed
by Tripoli to carry out terrorist violence in France.
French companies continue to do business in Libya, and about 850 to 1000
French citizens, most of them technicians, still work in Libya. Paris,
however, has banned sales of sophisticated weapons to Libya and significantly
scaled back its commercial relationship. As a result of the recent US raid,
many of the French workers now in Libya are likely to be withdrawn.
2. Views on Libya's Connection with International Terrorism
France has acknowledged publicly that Libyan diplomats have plotted violence
against US citizens in France
Although it almost certainly accepts the validity of US and West German charges
that Libya was behind the recent terrorist attacks in West Germany, France has
avoided publicly condemning Tripoli and on 14 April went so far as to oppose
British and Dutch attempts to promote an EC consensus on closing Libyan
Peoples' Bureaus--thus effectively derailing a forceful European response on
the eve of the US bombing raid. This reticence may reflect the difficulty of
decision making under "cohabitation"--where Gaullist Prime Minister Jacques
Chirac has to reach agreement with Socialist President Francois Mitterrand--but
we believe it also reflects France's longstanding wariness toward US-led
foreign policy initiatives, which the French fear do not adequately take West
European interests into account.
3. Reactions to US Strikes Against Libya
The new French government has publicly "deplored" the fact that escalating
terrorism has led to US reprisals. Privately, both Mitterrand and Chirac told
Ambassador Walters just before the raid that France would support a military
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action aimed at putting an end to the Qadhafi regime, but they argued that
"pinprick" operations would only generate more Libyan reprisals in Europe.
Chirac's refusal to permit US planes to overfly France aroused significant
criticism within his own legislative majority and probably divided his own
government.
4. Opportunities for US Influence
Since taking office in late March, Chirac has frequently renewed campaign
promises of a get-tough approach to terrorism and domestic violence. These
promises may be a sign that the new government will be more willing to
cooperate with the US on counterterrorism if that cooperation can be portrayed
as being in French and West European interests. Chirac announced a plan during
his first speech to the new National Assembly that emphasizes better European
coordination and calls for recruiting more informants, increasing electronic
eavesdropping, toughening police tactics, and revising the Vienna Convention to
allow closer scrutiny of diplomats. Chirac earlier announced that the
government will back the police even when their methods seem extreme and
promised to create a top-level interministerial committee to coordinate
government counterterrorism efforts. He also promised to sponsor legislation
to make terrorism--including conspiracy to commit terrorism--a crime in France.
Chirac and Mitterrand have also agreed to put terrorism on the agenda at the
forthcoming Tokyo summit, where they expect to reach a multilateral agreement
to coordinate anti-terrorism policy.
Interior Minister Pasqua, moreover, assured the US Ambassador recently that
he intends to promote a pro-police, no-holds-barred run at terrorists operating
in France and confided that he has told the police bluntly that the "only good
terrorist is a dead terrorist." He promised tougher visa and hotel
registration checks--which Embassy officials have noticed are already in
effect--and allowed that French laws would have to be changed in order to grant
immunity to witnesses who can help convict terrorists. Like other government
officials, he seemed open to revising the existing extradition treaty between
the US and France to facilitate the transfer of terrorists.
The new government's tough line is focused on domestic counterterrorism, and
we suspect that Paris will continue to shy away from international initiatives
where the French role could be portrayed as subservient to the US and where it
would have no veto over actions that could threaten French interests. France
is far more likely to speak out forcefully against international sponsors of
terrorism, such as Libya and Iran, in forums where it can present itself as a
leader and molder of West European opinion and where it feels it has some
measure of control over decisionmaking.
US and allied encouragement might persuade Paris to reduce sharply Libya's
official presence in France--already apparently agreed to at the 21 April EC
ministerials. But Chirac is unlikely to close the Peoples' Bureau because
France wants to retain a line of communication with Libya.
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Our sense is that the new French government is moving in the right direction
on terrorism.
Particularly with the new government still in a transitional
phase, we think Paris is likely to respond more positively to applause for
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1. Attitudes Toward Libya
Greece maintains friendly relations with Libya as part of its general
policy of expanding ties with the Arab world. Athens' guarded friendship
toward Libya flows from four factors:
--Libya supplies about 20 percent of Greece's oil imports -- 25 percent of
consumption -- and is willing to accept Greek goods in partial payment.
While trade with Libya has been declining -- accounting for only an
estimated 1.2 percent of Greek exports in 1985, down from 5.2 percent in
1981 -- the Greeks continue to hope that their friendship with Libya will
pay off.
--Greece and Turkey compete for Arab and Libyan support on Aegean disputes
and on the Cyprus issue. Greece hopes, for example, that by supporting
Libya they can help counter Turkish and Turkish Cypriot calls for Islamic
solidarity.
--Prime Minister Papandreou, like his predecessors, sees Greece as a
bridge between Europe and the Middle East. There is also sympathy in
Greece for the Arab viewpoint on the Middle East conflict -- a sympathy
that transcends party politics.
2. Views on Libya's Connection with International Terrorism
The government has been and continues to be reluctant to acknowledge
publicly Libyan involvement in terrorism. Instead, its public reaction has
ranged from silence to studied skepticism.
--During the specially scheduled EC Foreign Ministers' meeting on 17 April,
Deputy Foreign Minister Pangalos reportedly said that Greece's
implementation of agreed EC measures against Libya (i.e., reducing the
size of the Libyan Peoples' Bureaus and embargoing arms sales to Libya)
would depend on proof of Libya's involvement in terrorism.
--Alternate Minister for Public Order Tsouras echoed this position when he
reportedly said that Greek security services had "absolutely no
information" that Libya or Libyans were involved in terrorist attacks.
(Athens' stance against
terrorism in general has improved markedly since the hijacking of a TWA
airliner from Athens airport and the subsequent issuance of a travel advisory
for Greece last summer. The government has upgraded airport security, begun
participating in US counter-terrorism training programs,
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The shift is primarily the
result of the loss of tourist revenues due to the increase in Middle Eastern
terrorism in Southern Europe and the fact that Greek citizens have become the
victims of terrorist violence.
3. Reactions to US Strikes Against Libya
Shortly after the US action against Libya, Foreign Minister Papoulias
expressed Greek "disapproval" of the US operation, which he said "undermines
international legal order" and "will not put an end to terrorism." The
government's public reaction to the US strike--relatively restrained by Greek
standards--reflects its desire not to reverse the trend toward improving
Greek-US relations as well as to find cover under the EC umbrella given the
risks involved.
Privately, the government has underscored to the US Ambassador its belief
that a US-Libyan military confrontation will only serve to destabilize the
region and push Qadhafi closer to the Soviets. Athens is also concerned about
any involvement of US bases in Greece in the crisis. Such involvement would
create complications for Papandreou at a time when he is trying to prepare his
public for a continued US presence in Greece. Over the weekend, Foreign
Minister Papoulias told our Ambassador that Libyan Deputy Foreign Minister
Shahati had issued a thinly veiled threat against US bases in Greece in the
event of further US military action. According to Papoulias, the government
warned Shahati in return that it would not tolerate violent acts against Greek
territory and would defend the bases.
4. Opportunities for US Influence
In general, the Greeks have displayed a mixture of concern and caution
about events in the Mediterranean. They have modified their positions to
minimize risks from any direction. Thus, they went along with recent EC
restrictions on Libya when the evidence against Libya began to mount and when
it became clear that the US was seriously considering military action. This
suggests that there are some opportunities for influencing Greek views and
behavior.
--The Papandreou government is likely to remain skeptical about "proof" of
Libyan complicity. We doubt that Athens will be able to maintain its
ostrich-like position, however, if it becomes clear that most of its EC
partners acknowledge Libyan involvement.
--The Greeks want to protect their economic interests in Libya, but they
also realize that Middle Eastern terrorism has badly damaged tourism and
the Greek economy. They are more likely to reconsider their relationship
with Qadhafi if convinced that they stand to lose more from terrorism
than they will gain from potential Libyan trade and investment.
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the Greeks in advance consultations, Athens may be more prone to adopt
helpful positions if it feels it is being treated as an equal.
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--The government does not want to be isolated; thus, the more consensus
there is among the EC countries on what measures to adopt toward Libya,
the less contentious the Greeks are likely to be.
--Likewise, the Greeks will be looking closely at the reaction of Arab
states. Any indication that the Arabs themselves are willing to adopt a
less accomodating stance toward Qadhafi would affect the Greek position.
--Finally, Papandreou is anxious to preserve the progress that has been
made in US-Greek relations since last summer. While the government would
balk at the US drawing a direct connection between the Libyan issue and
US-Greek relations, it is nonetheless likely to be more attuned to US
wishes than in the past.
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Ireland
1. Attitudes Towards Libya 25X1
Dublin until recently took little notice of Libya's involvement in
international terrorism, and coordinated its overall response to worldwide
terrorism with that of its EC partners.
Prime Minister FitzGerald's government with evidence establishing
Libya as a supplier of arms and munitions to the Provisional Irish Republican
Army (PIRA) in early 1986, however, Dublin has begun to take a greater interest
in participating in multilateral cooperation against terrorism.
In our opinion, Dublin almost certainly would support an EC consensus that
favored stricter diplomatic and even economic sanctions against Libya. There
is no Peoples' Bureau in Dublin, and Irish Foreign Ministry officials claim to
closely monitor the 500 Libyan students now in the Republic. Irish Foreign
Minister Barry, furthermore, recently said that although Ireland values its
economic ties with Libya -- which primarily are based on the barter of Irish
beef for oil -- his government believes that combating terrorism must take
priority over economic consideration. We believe that Dublin will invoke
whatever anti-terrorist measures are agreed to by the EC, but will not act on
its own or go beyond the EC consensus.
2. Views on Libya's Connection with International Terrorism
Because Prime Minister FitzGerald was aware of the connection between Libya
and the PIRA, we think he was predisposed to believe US claims regarding
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3. Reactions to US Strikes Against Libya
FitzGerald's public statements since the raid indicate that Dublin accepted
the validity of US claims regarding Libyan responsibility for the Berlin
bombing. The Prime Minister said that Ireland fully understood the reasons
behind the US action.
4. Opportunities for US Influence
We believe that Dublin's pro-US pronouncements
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are designed to attract widespread notice and prase in 25X1
Washington during the final stages of congressional deliberations on the amount
of US funding to be committed to the international reconstruction fund
established by the recent Anglo-Irish Accord on Northern Ireland. Likewise,
FitzGerald's anti-terrorist stand is aimed at persuading some unconvinced
right-wing Tory MPs in the United Kingdom that Dublin is indeed serious about
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In our opinion, there is little Dublin can do on its own to lend support to
Washington.
Hints of how highly
Washington values Irish support--particularly if delivered in the context of a
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discussion of US financial support for the Anglo-Irish Accord--would, in our
view, probably steel Dublin to support US Libyan policy in EC deliberations.
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Italy
1. Attitudes Towards Libya
Italy's longstanding commercial and cultural links to its former
colony, its close physical proximity, and the presence of several important
US military facilities within Italian borders have convinced Italian
leaders that Italy has more to lose from further escalation of tension in
the Mediterranean than any other NATO ally. The size of the Italian
expatriate community in Libya--which reportedly has fallen to 4,000
people--has also played a large part in tempering Rome's public responses
to Libyan-inspired terrorism, and it is clear that government and public
alike fear that following Washington's lead will spur Qadhafi to further
atrocities instead of convincing him to abandon terrorism. Nevertheless,
Rome has shown grudging willingness to disengage from its ties to Tripoli
in the face of growing evidence of Libyan involvement in terrorist activity
and pressure from the US for tougher measures to combat Libyan-inspired
terrorism.
Prime Minister Bettino Craxi's Cabinet has been seriously divided for
several months over foreign policy generally and policy toward Libya in
particular. Defense Minister Spadolini has consistently emerged as the
strongest advocate of tougher action against Qadhafi and his terrorist
allies, and he is clearly unhappy over Rome's condemnation of the US
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His views are sharply at odds with those of Foreign Minister
Giulio Andreotti who has frequently expressed reservations about
Washington's evidence linking Qadhafi to terrorism and argued that little
progress will be made until there is progress on the Palestinian question.
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Craxi is first and foremost a political animal,however, and he will
tailor his position to the prevailing political winds. Over the weekend he
threatened to use military force in response to further Libyan attacks
against Italy. This toughening may have been prompted in part by
Spadolini's threat to resign, Craxi may also be responding to hints of
considerable discontent among Andreotti's Christian Democrats with the
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Foreign Minister's line. Moreover, Craxi seems genuinely concerned that
the gap developing between the US and Western Europe over Libya could
portend serious consequences for the future of the NATO alliance.
2. Views on Libya's Connection with International Terrorism
We believe that both Craxi and Spadolini accept our evidence of Libyan
complicity in and support for terrorism, but like Andreotti, they continue
to harbor misgivings about the utility of using force against Qadhafi.
3. Reactions to US Strike Against Libya
Craxi's original statement on the US raid disassociated Italy from the
attack and condemned Washington's decision. In subsequent remarks to
Parliament and the press, Craxi has continued to criticize the US use of
force, but he has emphasized that Washington reacted to Libyan provocation.
Craxi is walking a political
tightrope domestically, and he will craft any public statements with an eye
to public opinion. According to press reports, nearly 400,000 Italians
demonstrated in cities across the country against the raid last week.
Spadolini, for his part, has adhered to the government line on the raid in
his formal statements but has been more "understanding" of US action in his
remarks to the press.
4. Opportunities for US Influence
Rome is already considering additional steps against Libya in
conjunction with its EC partners. Craxi's diplomatic counselor told our
Embassy late last week that the Cabinet was weighing a formal evacuation of
Italian citizens, a reduction in the size of the Peoples' Bureau in Rome,
and additional restrictions on trade. Spadolini and Interior Minister
Scalfaro both tend to favor stronger action against Libya. The more
Andreotti's softer position is undermined by public revelations of
Qadhafi's plots against Italian and West European interests, the more
likely Spadolini and Scalfaro are to prevail in tilting Craxi toward
action.
Should Craxi decide that some form of military response can no longer
be avoided, he is almost certain to insist that it must take place within a
NATO framework. The problem, in short, lies not in convincing Craxi that
the Libyans are guilty but in persuading him to take in finding a way to
assure him that support in actions will not jeopardize Italian security or
the stability of the government.
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Luxembourg
1. Attitudes Towards Libya
Luxembourg has minimal diplomatic dealings with Libya; relations are
conducted through Belgium.
Luxembourg follows the lead of its EC partners. In a recent
meeting with US diplomats, Foreign Minister Poos expressed understanding of US
feelings about Libyan-sponsored terrorism, but emphasized that it would be
wrong to hold Qadhafi responsible for all acts of international terrorism.
Nevertheless, Luxembourg probably would agree to any sanctions recommended by
the EC, short of military actions.
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2. Views On Libya's Connection with International Terrorism
Since last year, Luxembourg has been plagued by several bombings, which
apparently have no link to Libyan or Middle Eastern groups. The government of
Luxembourg has accepted without question evidence of Tripoli's 25X1
role in both the Berlin bombings and broader support for terrorism. Recently
the Luxembourg armed forces have been used to assist the police in
counterterrorist operations--a move the US Defense attache reports irritates
some officers transferred from other assignments.
3. Reactions to US Strikes Against Libya
Compared with statements from other West European capitals, Luxembourg's
public and private reactions to the US air strikes were relatively supportive.
In a recent meeting with US diplomats, Foreign Minister Poos expressed
understanding for US actions, but said military action against Tripoli would
aggravate the terrorist problem. He told US officials that international
terrorism will only be eliminated if its underlying cause, the Palestinian
issue, is removed.
4. Opportunities for US Influence
Luxembourg will likely support initiatives to combat Libyan terrorism,
including restricting the Libyan diplomatic presence in Western Europe.
Luxembourg can do little, however, beyond what its EC partners accept. Given
the small size of its security services, Luxembourg would welcome intelligence
cooperation with its Allies and probably go along with their recommendations.
Luxembourg is especially concerned with NATO disunity and probably will urge
the smaller Trevi members to prevent this. Evidence of Libyan complicity in
terrorism could induce Luxembourg to call on its Benelux partners to close--or
at least restrict--the Libyan Peoples' Bureau in Brussels.
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Netherlands
1. Attitudes Towards Libya
The Hague has been a consistent critic of state-sponsored terrorism, but has
taken few actions directed against Libya beyond those adopted by the EC.
Prime Minister Lubbers' government has urged
Dutch nationals and companies not to fill in behind US firms leaving Libya as
the result of Washington's sanctions. We believe that the Dutch have used
their EC presidency to push for will tougher measures against Libya, including
closing Peoples' Bureaus, restricting Libyan travel in Western Europe, and
banning arms sales. The Hague will readily invoke measures against Libya, if
done in conjunction with policies adopted by the EC.
2. Views on Libya's Connection with International Terrorism
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that Libya is responsible for the recent bombing of a 25X1
Berlin nightclub. Indeed, Van Den Broek is using the platform provided by the
current Dutch presidency of the EC to try to persuade his colleagues to speed
up the implementation of the anti-terrorist measures adopted on 14 April, which
specifically cite Libyan culpability. Van Den Broek, according to US
officials, believes the EC must move quickly to adopt the stricter diplomatic
and even economic sanctions a ainst Libya, and defuse an issue that threatens
NATO solidarity.
3. Reactions to US Strikes Against Libya
Dutch government and public opinion reacted negatively to the US raid on
Libya, with officials expressing disappointment that the United States failed
either to consult or forewarn its allies. Likewise, the Dutch media almost
universally condemned the attack, arguing that it increased Europe's exposure
to terrorism, forced moderate Arab states to rally to the defense of Libya, and
failed to address the "root political and economic causes" of terrorism.
Privately, however, several Dutch politicians and civil servants have told US
counterparts that they understand Washington's reasons for action, and that the
EC may have in some ways forced Washington's hand by failing to adopt stronger
measures against Libya after the attacks on the Rome and Vienna airports in
December.
4. Opportunities for US Influence
We believe that at present the Hague's first priority is to prevent further
US military action. Toward that goal the Dutch are likely to work assiduously
for more effective EC-US cooperation against Libya, especially in the areas of
limiting the Libyan presence in Western Europe, instituting an arms embargo,
and even urging the Community to adopt limited economic sanctions. In our
opinion, Van Den Broek's personal worry that the terrorism issue has a
potential for dividing NATO will lend added urgency to Dutch efforts in the EC.
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We believe that Justice Minister Frederik Korthals Altes--who is the Dutch
representatiive to the Trevi Group--and his Liberal Party colleagues in the
coalition government are generally more supportive of US policy toward Libya
than their Christian Democratic (CDA) partners. In our opinion, they probably
acted as a moderating influence on The Hague's post-raid public comments. We
believe that Korthals Altes would welcome further evidence of Libyan
complicity, especially if it could be publicized and thereby used to prevent a
weakening of CDA support for the EC action.
Although Korthals Altes almost certainly is more supportive of US Libyan
policy than Lubbers and Van Den Broek, we do not think he would be willing to
go beyond an EC consensus in pushing for stronger anti-Libyan measures in the
Cabinet--such as the elimination of the Libyan presence in Western Europe or
full economic sanctions. Recent polls show that the current center-right
coalition has only a slightly better than 50-percent chance of winning the
national election on 21 May, and we do not believe that Korthals Altes would
risk precipitating a cabinet split on the eve of the election. If Lubbers'
coalition is reelected, however, we believe that Korthals Altes would be more
willing to threaten his CDA colleagues with public criticism if they refuse to
agree to stronger counterterrorism actions.
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Portugal
1. Attitudes Towards Libya
Portugal has not focused much attention on Libya or the Mediterranean.
Trade with Libya is minimal. Some Portuguese diplomats, including Foreign
Minister Pires Miranda, would like to expand Portugal's profile and trade in
the Middle East, but there is a general wariness about becoming entangled in
that region's bitter political conflicts.
2. Views on Libya's Connection with International Terrorism
Portuguese leaders accept a Libyan connection to international terrorism.
They mute their criticism, however, because they are afraid of Qadhafi. Their
reluctance to antagonize him is increased by their awareness of the
shortcomings of their internal security apparatus and the substantial
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3. Reactions to US Strikes Against Libya
Prime Minister Cavaco Silva and Deputy Prime Minister Pires Miranda have
been circumspect so far in responding to the US strike. Shortly before the
attack, the foreign minister had declared that Lisbon would not provide support
for US military operations against Tripoli. After the US action, the prime
minister and foreign minister expressed their "surprise" that it had taken
place and reaffirmed their support for the positions taken by the EC ministers
the previous week. Cavaco Silva also declared that "dialogue," not force, is
the best method for dealing with international terrorism.
4. Opportunities for US Influence
Public opinion in Portugal is both more pro-American and more apathetic
about foreign policy as a whole than in most other West European countries, and
those twin circumstances make it easier for Portuguese leaders to support
Washington. Nonetheless, politicians of virtually every stripe believe that
Portugal has received little in return for being one of Washington's staunchest
allies since the end of World War II. An important element in generating
support for US policy, accordingly, could be to demonstrate that Washington
took Lisbon's views seriously and valued its past contributions to western
security arrangements. Portuguese support for US out-of-area operations would
also increase if Lisbon could be assured that any future US action would bring
a quick end to Libyan sponsored terrorism and thereby reduce the threat of
retaliation against Portugal. A final factor that would facilitate Portuguese
support would be indications that other allies--especially Spain, France, and
Italy--also were on board.
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Spain
1. Attitudes Towards Libya
The Spanish recognize that Libya exports terrorism and contributes to
instability in the Mediterranean.
Nonetheless, the Spanish
view Qadhafi in the context of Madrid's relations with the Maghreb as a whole.
In their eyes, not only Libya, but also Algeria and Morocco, are important and
potentially dangerous to Spanish interests in the region. Madrid relies on
Libya and Algeria for much of its oil and natural gas, and does not want to
alienate either for fear of becoming too dependent on the other. The Spanish
worry about Moroccan challenges to the enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla and
Algerian support for the now somewhat somnolent independence movement in the
Canary Islands, as well as the possibility that Qadhafi could step up his
support for those causes or other dissident groups. Under these circumstances
Gonzalez has walked a diplomatic tightrope--as have previous Spanish
leaders--and has tried to maintain good relations with all of the Mahgreb
countries.
2. Views on Libya's Connection with International Terrorism
Spanish leaders do not doubt that Libya is an active center of state
sponsored terrorism and efforts to persuade them on that score would strike
them as gratuitous. The Spanish also believe, however, that Libya is only one
component of Middle Eastern terrorism, and that many of the roots of that
larger problem lie in the frustration of Palestinian aspirations for a
homeland.
3. Reactions to US Strikes Against Libya
Publicly the Spanish have been ambivalent about the US strike against Libya.
They have reaffirmed their condemnation of terrrorism and denounced Qadhafi's
threats to retaliate against US interests in Spain. At the same time, they
have expressed "disagreement" with the US raid on the grounds that it would
lead to an upsurge in terrorism. They have also indicated--though not yet
categorically declared--that they would deny a US request for overflights or
other forms of military support.
Privately, however, they have been somewhat more forthcoming. Gonzalez
hinted to Ambassador Walters before the raid that if asked, he might "not
notice" if US planes overflew Spain, and might sanction use of Spanish-based US
tankers for inflight refueling. The US strike has increased public anxiety
about terrorism and increased the political costs of cooperation with
Washington, but we still believe that Gonzalez has room to maneuver on the
issue.
4. Opportunities for US Influence
If Washington asked Gonzalez to support another US strike, the Prime
Minister would almost certainly want assurance that the US action would quickly
and decisively end the problem. He also might be influenced by indications
that US plans enjoyed the support of other allies, particularly--in approximate
order of importance--France, West Germany, and Italy. Allied support might not
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be absolutely essential to obtain Spanish support, but it would certainly
increase the odds of obtaining it. Playing to Gonzalez's considerable pride
with a direct personal appeal from the President--perhaps through a personal
emissary--would be a final factor that could help swing Madrid behind US
policy.
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United Kingdom
1. Attitudes Towards Libya
Since coming to power in 1979, Prime Minister Thatcher's Conservative
government has been outspoken in its denunciation of state-sponsored
international terrorism, and Thatcher has in public comments frequently
attributed personal responsibility for terrorism to Libyan leader Qadhafi. The
death of a British policewoman as the result of gunfire from the Libyan
Peoples' Bureau in London in April 1984 added further stridency to London's
position, and caused Thatcher to break diplomatic relations and most
government-to-government economic dealings with Tripoli and to step-up
anti-terrorism cooperation with Britain's allies. Within the EC the British
continue to call on members to take steps to break diplomatic relations and
restrict new economic deals that London took in 1984. The Thatcher government
continues to oppose comprehensive economic sanctions as ineffective and
ultimately harmful to British interests.
2. Views on Libya's Connection with International Terrorism
Thatcher and most of her Cabinet reportedly were fully satisfied that the
evidence supplied by Washington established an irrefutable link between Libya
and the Berlin bombing. Likewise, the Prime Minister had few qualms about
allowing the use of UK air bases by US forces despite the anticipated domestic
outcry. We also believe that Thatcher displayed a greater degree of
willin ness to accs t Washington's claims regarding Libya than the other NATO
allies
Thatcher also made a point of publicly linking Libya to
the Provisional Irish Republican Army.
3. Reactions to US Strikes Against Libya
The reaction of the British opposition parties, media, and public opinion
to the US raid has been almost uniformly negative. Polls taken late last week,
for example, indicated that at least two-thirds of Britons believed that
Thatcher should not have allowed Washington's use of UK bases. In addition,
Labor leader Kinnock and Liberal leader Steel have been quick to stoke latent
anti-Americanism by accusing the Prime Minister of playing the role of
"Reagan's poodle rather than the British bulldog." In our opinion, however,
Thatcher and her cabinet colleagues fully expected a short-term deluge of
negative reaction and are prepared to ride it out. Thatcher probably
believes--and we agree--that over the long run she will be able to turn her
current decisiveness to political advantage by contrasting it with the
"limp-wristed" response of other European leaders and the dangers to Britain of
the anti-Americanism displayed by her domestic opposition.
4. Opportunities for US Influence
In our opinion, there is little more that Thatcher's government can do to
support Washington's Libyan policy. Indeed, we believe that she would be
willing to allow a second use of UK bases if the US presents compelling
evidence of Libyan complicity in further terrorist attacks, and if some of the
evidence can be used both with the other Allies and even with the public. We
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Although the United Kingdom has been the staunchest European supporter of
US military action, London is the strongest European opponent of economic
sanctions against Libya. Thatcher has consistently contended that economic
sanctions do not work and has steadfastly refused--despite intense pressure
from her domestic opponents, some EC partners, and Commonwealth brethren--to
invoke them against South Africa. While Home Secretary Hurd will be willing to
push at the Trevi Group meeting for the speedy implementation of the recently
drafted EC measures aimed at controlling the Libyan presence in Western
Europe--measures which the UK took on its own in 1984--we believe he will balk
at agreeing to wide ranging economic sanctions. In our view, Thatcher probably
views decisive military action as preferable to either a series of limited
raids against Libya or the imposition of full economic sanctions.
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West Germany
1. Attitudes Towards Libya
Bonn favors stronger international cooperation against Libyan-backed
terrorism and has tightened controls over Libyans in West Germany. The Federal
Republic expelled two Libyan officials earlier this month and is keeping the
Libyan Peoples' Bureau in Bonn under close surveillance. The West Germans are
unlikely, however, to close the Bureau altogether, as Washington has requested.
A Foreign Ministry official explained to the US Ambassador that Bonn fears more
expulsions would lead to similar action against West German diplomats in
Tripoli. The West Germans favor close cooperation among Western security
agencies, and they are pushing the idea of a renewed dialogue between the
European Community and moderate Arab states to counter terrorism and take
political initiatives to remove its causes.
Bonn adamantly opposes economic sanctions against Libya, arguing that they
would be ineffective and unenforceable, would jeopardize West German
investments, and might trigger reprisals against Westerners resident in Libya.
Bonn almost certainly fears harming its trading relationship with Libya, which
is its third-largest supplier of crude oil. More generally, the West Germans
consistently have rejected all use of economic sanctions to achieve political
objectives, and they probably believe that allowing an exception in the case of
Libya would make it harder to resist calls for sanctions against other
countries such as the Soviet Union and South Africa.
2. Views on Libya's Connection with International Terrorism
Chancellor Kohl told the Bundestag last Wednesday that there is clear
proof of Libya's leading role in encouraging, supporting, and controlling
numerous acts of international terrorism. He added that intelligence findings
unequivocably reveal the hand of the East Berlin Libyan Peoples' Bureau in the
bombing of the La Belle discotheque in West Berlin. The opposition Social
Democrats say that, while Qadhafi certainly has supported terrorism in the
past, Washington has not proven his responsibility for the West Berlin attack.
3. Reactions to US Strikes Against Libya
West German public reactions to the air strike have been almost uniformly
negative. Christian Democratic Chancellor Kohl says he does not support the US
action, although he understands its motivations. Spokesmen for Kohl's junior
coalition partner, the Free Democratic Party, have denounced the air strike, as
have the opposition Social Democrats and Greens. By contrast, Franz Josef
Strauss, chairman of the Christian Social Union -- Kohl's other coalition
partner -- has spoken out in support of the US action, noting that inaction by
the West Europeans left Washington no alternative. Demonstrations against the
air strike are taking place thoughout West Germany, although the number of
participants is much smaller than in the anti-INF rallies of the early 1980s.
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4. Opportunities for US Influence
We believe Bonn would strongly support proposals for closer Western
cooperation against Libyan-backed terrorism, including training and
intelligence exchanges, joint measures to enhance airport security, and more
Bonn also might be willing to ex
pel
more Libyan officials involved in supporting terrorism, although the Foreign
Ministry almost certainly would oppose such action strongly.
The West Germans would be extremely reluctant to support an future US
military action against Libya, in our ud ment.
(Bonn would be taking a serious
political risk. Given the public reaction to the US air strike last week, even
such passive cooperation could cause major Christian Democratic losses in a
crucial state election in June.
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SUBJECT: Trevi Group: Attitudes Towards Libya
- Attorney General
- DCI
- DDI
- NIO/EUR (7E64)
- C/PES (6E2911)
- D/ALA (3F45)
- D/CPAS (7F16)
- D/NESA (6G02 ~
- D/SOVA (4E58)
- D/OSWR (5F46)
- D/EURA
- IMC/CB (7G07)
- D/OCR (2E60)
- D/OEA (4F18)
- D/OGI (3603)
- D/OIA (3N109
2 - EURA Production Staff
1 - C/WE
1 - GN 'Branch
1 - BBC Branch
1 - CM Branch
1 - IA Branch
12 - WE Authors
EURA/WE/FO
(22 April 1986)
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