(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T01017R000303400001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: February 18, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 21, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/29: CIA- RDP86T01017R000303400001-0
Memorandum for:
The attached is talking points/background
paper for the
Naval War College, in preparation for his
meeting in late February with West German
Navy Staff.
DATE 2 / 2 / Lee,
DOC NO EUR V G- oo/(,
OCR 3
P&PD /
18 February 1986
EURA
Office of European Analysis
Directorate of Intelligence
EUR M86-20016X
Distribution:
1 - Addressee
1 - D/EURA
1 - EURA/EI/SI
1 - C/EURA/EI
2 - EURA Production
4 - IMC/CB
1 - Author
DDI/EURA/EI/SI/
~18Feb86)
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/29: CIA-RDP86T01017R000303400001-0
 I; Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/29: CIA-RDP86T01017R000303400001-0
BACKGROUND PAPER ON EXPANDED MISSIONS FOR WEST GERMAN NAVY
Bundesmarine missions are to contribute to 1) defense of FRG coast, 2)
control of the Baltic Approaches, and 3) protection of the Northern Flank's
maritime lines of communication for reinforcement and resupply. In 1984 the
West German MOD revised the navy's mission statement, expanding the
Bundesmarine's operational area to include the southern Norwegian Sea. There
the Bundesmarine envisions participation in barrier operations and offensive
patrols forward of the barriers.
- Beginning it, the late 197Os the Bundesmarine began development of
proposals for expanded missions in the Eastern Atlantic or Norwegian Sea
as a hedge against the coming manpower and budget crunch. The
Bundesmarine also saw growing threat to Northern Flank as rationale for
additional resources.
- Several allies opposed expanded missions for the Bundesmarine. Norway was
concerned about any steps increasing forces in the Norwegian Sea in
peacetime (but had agreed to let the Bundesmarine preposition materiel in
Norway as early as 1964). The UK, probably anxious to preserve its
special relationship with the US, cited complications in command and
control among other objections. The Royal Navy may also see an expanded
German naval presence as weakening its arguments to maintain its current
force structure. Denmark was concerned that the new German naval mission
might divert FRG attention and resources from the Baltic. Prolonged
British resistance led the FRG in 1981 to drop its proposals for the
Eastern Atlantic in favor of Norwegian Sea missions.
SACLANT has supported an expanded role for the Bundesmarine. However,
tripartite agreement by the major NATO commanders is still required before
the appropriate Bundesmarine elements can be incorporated into the SACLANT
force structure. That is a politically sensitive issue between SACEUR,
CINCHAN, and SACLANT. Pending such agreement, the FRG takes the position
that deployment of German naval forces into the Norwegian Sea can be made
on the basis of the Tri-MNC coordinating agreements currently in effect.
The Bundesmarine would, however, still like to become involved in the
planning process with SACLANT and wants a flag officer billet in the
policy division of SHAPE (DACOS), to better balance a perceived lack of
maritime influence on the SHAPE policy making process.
This typescript was prepared byl Ithe Office of European
Analysis for the Naval War College. Questions and comments may
be directed to Chief, European Issues Division,
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/29: CIA-RDP86T01017R000303400001-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/29: CIA-RDP86T01017R000303400001-0
The new German maritime strategy is not seen as initially representing a
major departure or a large difference to NATO capabilities until new
Bundesmarine assets come on stream in the early 1990s. The Bundesmarine's
destroyers and frigates currently operate in the North Sea. Most West German
DDGs,DDs and FFs are now based on the FRG's North Sea coast. German naval
fuel, mines and torpedos are already prepositioned
Capabiliities
three phases:
- Phase One involves completion and deployment of the new Type-122 Bremen
Class Frigates, each with two Sea Lynx ASW helicopters aboard. The sixth
frigate of this class was commissioned in 1984. Two additional Bremen
Class frigates and five additional Sea Lynxes were funded in 1985 and will
come into service in 1988 & 1989.
- Phase Two might involve development of missions outside the Baltic for the
two wings of the German naval air arm which are currently replacing their
F-104s with the naval strike version of the Tornado. The naval air arm is
scheduled to complete its acquisition of 111 Tornados by 1989.
- Phase Three is expected to be deployment of the initial six of the new
class of larger Type 211 diesel attack submarines beginning in 1991.
These have been designed for deep-water ASW, will have a ainelaying
,capability, and may carry a torpedo tube-launched anti-ship missile.
The primary issue raised by the Bundesmarine's adoption of an expanded
mission in the Norwegian Sea is the future adequacy of forces allocated to the
Baltic. The new Type 211 submarines may be too large to operate effectively in
the shallow waters of the Baltic. They are planned to replace obsolescent
smaller Type 205 submarines that are committed to the Baltic with ainelaying,
ASW and coastal defense anti-ship missions there. The Tornados of the naval
air arm are a potent major portion of the total Bundesmarine resources
committed to the Baltic. The expected development of missions for these
aircraft outside the Baltic potentially double-tasks these Bundesmarine assets
that might not then in all scenarios be available to meet a threat in the
Baltic. Moreover, procurement of the new Bremen class Type 122 frigates is a
commitment of resources to assets that would be too vulnerable to air attack to
operate in the Baltic. The Bremen class funding could alternatively have been
allocated to assets optimized for effective wartime employment in the Baltic or
its approaches. There is a possibility that the navy's share of the defense
budget may improve once Admiral Wellershof replaces General Altenburg as
Inspector General of the Bundeswehr in October 1986. The Bundesmarine,
however, will still face hard choices on allocation of future funds between
missions in the Norwegian Sea and the Baltic.
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/29: CIA-RDP86T01017R000303400001-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/29: CIA-RDP86T01017R000303400001-0
The FRG is sensitive to the concern of its allies that adequate resources
be allocated to the Baltic. Replacement of the Baltic-deployed Type 205
submarines by larger Type 211s would not result in as great a loss for the
Baltic if Denmark would buy the Type 205s and also commit to keep some of its
older subs in service there as well. That is why the FRG pushed Denmark so
hard on that option. It now appears, however, that Denmark will not purchase
the German Type 205s, and even if it purchases older subs from Norway there
will still be a net reduction in submarines committed to the Baltic.
The impact of the the Bundesmarine's expanded Mission on its Baltic operations
needs to be evaluated in light of a possible growing strategic significance for
the Baltic. The Soviets are currently procuring and deploying in the Baltic
new rail-ferry capacity which will give them a partial alternative to
deployment by land routes across Poland. This new strategic option for the
Soviets may Justify or require allocation of additional force to the Baltic.
The Bundesmarine has programmed upgrade of its 22 search-and-rescue helicopters
(Sea King MK41s) with the Sea Squa antiship Missile between 1987 and 1989.
This additional combat capability might free some of the navy's Tornados for
longer-range missions in either the Eastern Baltic or the North Sea.
The uncertain future size and force structure of the Royal Navy is another
key factor to consider in evaluating the Bundesmarine's expanded mission. Even
Though NATO's Baltic defenses remain a concern, German procurement of
Bremen-class frigates and Type 211 submarines for operations in the Norwegian
Sea could benefit NATO if the UK's funding for conventional naval forces
declines in the 1990s. The Royal Navy will be particularly vulnerable to
budget cuts in the late 1980s and early 1990s because of the high volume of
planned warship construction, including a new class of diesel attack subs, more
frigates, and a new class of ^inehunters.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/29: CIA-RDP86T01017R000303400001-0