THE WESTERN SAHARA CONFLICT: THE STALEMATE CONTINUES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T01017R000303220001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 18, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 17, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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r- / L 25x1
SUBJECT: The Western Sahara Conflict: The Stalemate
Continues
NESA M#86-20168
Fitt'
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Central intelligence igence Agency
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
17 November 1986
The Western Sahara Conflict: The Stalemate Continues
Summary
The dispute over the Western Sahara shows no sign
of a diplomatic or military solution. Although
Morocco, Algeria, and the Algerian-backed Polisario
guerrillas all publicly support a negotiated
settlement, none are ready to_make the compromises
necessary to end the war. During the past two years
Morocco has improved its military position, but Algeria
continues to hold the upper hand diplomatically.
Domestic factors alone probably are not enough to
encourage Morocco or Algeria to intensify the fighting.
The most immediate danger to both is that the other
will seek outside help, or attempt to include
Mauritania in the battle zone, in order to break the
deadlock. Such developments would heighten the risks
of direct conflict between Algeria and Morocco and
complicate efforts b W shington to expand ties with
both countries. 25X1
Eleven years of combat between Moroccan troops and
Algerian-backed Polisario insurgents for control of the Western
Sahara has produced a stalemate. We believe military activity is
at the lowest level in years. The primary reason for the reduced
activity is that Rabat has completed the seventh portion of an
earthen berm. The berm has helped King Hassan to consolidate his
hold on two-thirds of the former Spanish colony, including all of
the economically-useful territory. The berms give Moroccan
troops a shield for static defense. The guerrillas have engaged
This memorandum was prepared by 25X1
the Maghreb Branch, Arab-Israeli Division, Office of 25X1
Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis. Information as of
17 November 1986 was used in its preparation. Questions and 25X1
comments should be addressed to Chief, Arab-Israeli Division,
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in only periodic, small-scale raids, which have cost both sides
only a handful of casualties and no change in territorial
position.
We believe that Morocco's strategy has enabled it to control
the region, but not to pursue an all-out military victory.
Although King Hassan fields about 80,000 troops in the region
against the Polisario's 3,000 combatants, we believe that the
Polisario, with Algerian support, is capable of maintaining or
expanding the current level of fighting. Algeria provides
sanctuary and economic aid for Polisario troops, the Sahrawi
refugees aiding the insurgents, and the Saharan Democratic Arab
Republic (SDAR)--the Polisario government-in-exile. Algiers also
gives the insurgents an impressive array of weapons.
The dispute also is at a political impasse. No major
diplomatic initiative has been launched by either side in nearly
two years. In early 1985, Algeria made a proposal that would
give Morocco sovereignty over the territory, but allow the SDAR a
high degree of autonomy. Earlier this year, UN mediators engaged
Moroccan and SDAR diplomats in "prgximity talks" in New York.
They based their initiative on a call by King Hassan last fall
for a unilateral ceasefire and a renewed commitment to a
referendum that would decide the status of the Western Sahara.
The talks have foundered, however, primarily
because the two sides cannot agree upon the terms of the
ceasefire and a political solution.
The Goals of the Adversaries
We believe that the driving force behind King Hassan's
prosecution of the war is a strong national commitment to the
cause. Most Moroccans support the King's goal of incorporating
the region. According to the US Consul in Casablanca, Moroccans
believe the war is an attempt by Algeria to dominate the Western
Sahara, as well as extend its influence in the Maghreb, and that
King Hassan should pursue the conflict until Rabat's goals are
achieved. The war also imposes relatively limited burdens for
Morocco. We believe the war probably costs at least a
half-million dollars each day, a price the regime has sustained
without deterioration in urban living standards. Although the
desert conditions impose hardships on the troops, pay
differentials and other benefits have precluded widespread
military dissatisfaction with their assignment.
25X6
25X1
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Algeria
Algiers, for its part, believes that Hassan's control over
the territory would mean Moroccan dominance of the Maghreb.
Algeria originally supported total independence for the Western
Sahara, but President Bendjedid has revised Algiers' official 25X1
position because of Moroccan military gains, the decline in
Algerian oil revenues, and the burden of supporting Polisario
refugees. His new objective--as suggested in his 1985
initiative--appears to be a face-saving formula involving a
semi-independent Western Saharan state under a Moroccan flag.
The Polisario Front
The Polisario lacks the military strength to attain
independence. Bendjedid's publicly announced willingness to
accept less than total independence for the Western Sahara and
his limits on Polisario military activity have created tension
within the anti-Moroccan alliance. The Polisario hope to regain
the.military initiative by adopting more aggressive tactics,
including use-of armor in engagements, commando raids behind the
lines, and even terrorism against Moroccan interests.
Diplomatic Initiatives
In our view, the chances of a negotiated settlement in the
next 3-5 years are dim. Only a major change in players in Rabat
would cause us to revise this judgment. There are no indications
that King Hassan and President Bendjedid are prepared to hold a
summit or even authorize low-level meetings}: As long as King
Hassan has the upper hand militarily, he will not agree readily
to substantive discussions with Algeria, let alone with the
Polisario. Third party mediation by the UN also has proven
feckless, and this organization is not likely to come up with a
solution amenable to both sides any time soon.
Military Initiatives
Both sides want to avoid a situation in which Algeria will
become a full participant in the war. King Hassan is likely to
continue his current strategy, since it has proven successful.
We do not see any domestic problems in the short term that would
require him to reconsider his tactics. Nevertheless, there are
several potential developments which could lead the King to
become more aggressive:
--If outsiders, such as Libya, were becoming involved,
particularly if linked to the Polisario's devising
tactics of penetrating the berms;
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--A sharp decline in the Moroccan economy, prompting
Rabat to beat the war drums to head off any widespread
unrest over declining living standards; and
--A sustained campaign of Polisario commando or
terrorist raids deep inside Moroccan territory.
Algeria is likely to continue supporting the war at its
current level because of shortages of funds due to declining oil
revenues and uncertainty over military strategy in confronting
the berm. Nonetheless, Bendjedid also may have little choice but
to take a more aggressive posture if:
--Algerian frustrations build over the lack of progress
toward a negotiated settlement;
--Elements opposed to Bendjedid's policy of
"moderation" gain greater influence in the Algerian
military or ruling party; and
--A domestic and international perception develops that
Morocco, through the war, was gaining the upper hand in
the Maghreb.
Foreign Intervention
The absence of progress toward a negotiated settlement
increases the potential for foreign intervention as a means to
break the stalemate. Although we have no firm evidence that
Morocco and Algeria are seeking foreign assistance, the breakup
of the Moroccan-Libyan union raises the empos;sibility of renewed
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In our view, Algeria probably will allow Libya to resume aid
to the Polisario because of Algiers' own economic problems and
the burden of supporting the conflict. Although the Polisario
could press Algeria to accept increased military aid from Libya,
Algiers would not allow Tripoli to impose military and diplomatic
strategy on the Polisario. Libya probably will be willing to
accommodate Algiers, in hope of building closer ties with
Algeria. Tripoli's support to the Polisario also would signal
Qadhafi's displeasure over Hassan's abrogation of the
Moroccan-Libyan union. Nevertheless, because of his own
financial problems and interest in maintaining ties with Morocco,
Qadhafi is likely to provide less sophisticated weapons than the
armor and SAM equipment he sent to the Polisario in the early
phases of the war.
Morocco almost certainly would use resumed Libyan support
support to the Polisario involvement to pressure France and the
United States to join in the fray. If Hassan is dissatisfied
with the response from Paris and Washington, he might look to
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Israel. Algeria already believes--erroneously in our judgment--
that the Israelis are supporting Morocco militarily in the
Western Sahara as a result of the meeting between Hassan and
former Prime Minister Peres last summer.
Morocco and Algeria may also attempt to change the status quo
by expanding the geographic scope of the war into Mauritania.
That country represents the "soft underbelly" of the Western
Sahara war, given lack of control by Nouakchott over its northern
frontier. Both countries could try to bring Mauritania, which
currently is neutral, into its sphere of influence. Algeria and
the Polisario see northern Mauritania as a convenient base of
operations for expanded attacks on Moroccan forces. For Algiers,
such an option would avoid the danger of Moroccan "hot pursuit"
into Algerian territory and a major military clash. At the same
time, Hassan could use hot pursuit into Mauritania to satisfy
demands within his own military to respond aggressively to
A less likely possibility is an attempt by Bendjedid to
influence President Taya in Nouakchott to allow the Polisario to
base its forces in northern Mauritania. If Hassan perceived that
Bendjedid was following this course, he too might attempt to
undermine Taya's regime. Rabat's reluctance to go this route
would be based on the likelihood of Algerian intervention.
Hassan almost certainly is aware that Algiers would justify such
a move under the joint defense provisions of its Treaty of
Fraternity and Concord with Mauritania.
Prospects for US Interests
Continuation of the current stalemate allows Washington the
breathing room necessary to expand ties with Algeria and develop
a more balanced relationship with the principal players in the
Maghreb. Hassan would like to have the full support of the
United States for its position in the dispute, but he probably
will be satisfied with Washington's neutrality. Hassan
nonetheless wants further US military aid, in particular armor
and trucks. In the unlikely event that Algerian intervention in
the conflict turned the tide of war against Morocco, Hassan
almost certainly would increase his pressure on Washington for
more sophisticated weapons, such as the F-16 fighter aircraft.
Moroccan acquisition of the F-16 would have a limited effect on
the war, however, because of Algeria's overwhelming superiority
in the air. To the extent that Washington is not responsive to
Moroccan needs, Hassan would turn to France.
Algerian-US relations are not likely to be affected by the
Western Sahara conflict, unless Algiers perceives a significant
increase in US military assistance to Rabat is responsible for a
more aggressive Moroccan posture. In such a case, Algiers almost
certainly would insist that Washington restrain Hassan or risk a
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rupture in US-Algerian cooperation. Algiers could also use
increased US support for Morocco as justification for giving the
Polisario freer rein to attack Moroccan positions along the berm
or civilian targets inside Morocco.
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