AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T01017R000303140001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 25, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 30, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000303140001-9
- I (_ - a Y-) T ["1 L I/ L L-
Directorate of
Intelligence
t1 b(,. 1C IS3< x
DOC NO ,,0L;4 "1 s(,
OIR 1 17
P $ PD
Afghanistan Situation Report
30 September 1986
79-80 I nC/CB
op Swret
NESA M 86-20153CX
SOYA M 86-20091CX
30 Sept m 6
Copy 0 8 0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000303140001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000303140001-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000303140001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000303140001-9
25X1
Insurgent forces continued to conduct attacks in
Kabul last week despite concerted Soviet and
Afghan regime efforts in recent weeks to inhibit
such activity,
25X1
25X1
Afghan merchants are facing growing pressure to
trade with the USSR. The trade is less profitable
to the merchants and is increasing Afghanistan's
debt burden to the Soviet Union.
Analysts are divided in their assessment of
whether the recent Soviet force augmentation in
Afghanistan represent a deliberate a
Moscow to stage a bogus withdrawal.
30 September 1986
NESA M 86-20153CX 25X1
SOYA M 86-20091CX
6 25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000303140001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000303140001-9
This document was prepared by the Office of
Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis and the
Office of Soviet Analysis. Questions or comments
on the issues raised in the publication should be
30 September 1986
NESA M 86-20153CX
SOVA M 86-20091CX
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000303140001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000303140001-9
Chardzhou*'
SOVIET UNION
~Dushanbal/
Keleh"
Jeyre fin r
Tayyel f
0Farah
Zahedan
uetta
Gardeyz
Ghazni? O
Leyzabad
f Chitral
raadu
rikowt
adhbad
bad
CHINA
Khyber Pass 1~ -
~Phrachinar
Boundary representation is
not necassarily author i tat ave
III
Sharit 0Taloco Eshkashem
Kholm Konduz i r.. "r '-a.
h
h
b
an
e
erg
S
OPoll-el Khomri \e
Maymanah
:.'.
_.,..' Tune
h
u
r
Ma
m
e
Y
Charikar Rag
O l
Bamlan I Bagrarr~ aufielq
[Nehtarlam ',10
O 2~..~
Chaghcharan t
p Kowt a *KabuY.... _..?;Jali
_s, Ashrow ~r ..
Tarin
Kowt
*1211Mill I NO I A 11
Afghanistan
International boundary
Province boundary
* National capital
O Province capital
Railroad
Road
0 50 100 150 200 Kilometers
0 50 100 150 200 Miles
30 September 1986
MESA M 86-20153CX 25X1
SOYA M 86-20091CX
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000303140001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000303140001-9
Insurgent attacks continued in Kabul last week, despite
recent Soviet and Afghan regime efforts to curb
guerrilla activity in the capital area. According to
the US Embassy in Kabul, a car bomb--probably planted
by the insurgents--exploded on 28 September outside the
Soviet Embassy, where a Soviet delegation headed by the
First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers
was visiting. In addition, several other explosions
and rocket attacks occurred during the week. The
insurgents also said they assassinated two high-ranking
KHAD officials in the Kabul area. According to the US
Embassy, Soviet and Afghan regime combat aircraft
conducted several sorties west of the city toward
Paghman, where counterinsurgent operations have
occurred during the past month to stem rocket attacks
on the capital, and also south of Kabul.
Fighting in the Qandahar area has been heavy at times
during the past month. According to the US Embassy,
Soviet and Afghan regime units from Qandahar launched
an operation in mid-month in the Darya-ye Arghandab and
Bazar-e Panjva'i regions outside the city, probably to
30 September 1986
NESA M 86-20153CX
SOYA M 86-20091CX
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000303140001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000303140001-9
Afghan merchants are facing growing pressure to trade
with the Soviet Union, according to the US Embassy in
Kabul. The merchants complain that this trade--which
is conducted on a barter basis--is less profitable than
their hard currency trade and they have no choice but
to accept poor quality Soviet products in payment.
the Soviets are also
delaying passage of Western-bound goods shipped through
the Soviet Union to disrupt Afghanistan's trade with
Afghanistan's exports are increasingly being used to
finance the regime's mounting debt to the Soviet Union,
according to press reports. A Soviet diplomat recently
stated that about 85 percent of Soviet aid to the
regime is now on a loan basis and will eventually have
to be repaid. The diversion of resources--such as
natural gas and cement--from domestic use to the Soviet
Union for debt repayment may also constrain Kabul's
modernization and development efforts.
30 September 1986
NESA M 86-20153CX
SOYA M 86-20091CX
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000303140001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000303140001-9
-- The Government of Sweden has provided more than
100 million kronor--some $14.5 million--in
humanitarian aid to the Afghan resistance since
1980, according to a recent estimate by the US
Embassy in Stockholm. The main channel for this
aid is the Swedish Afghanistan Committee, which
provices medical care to Afghans in country and
in Pakistan. In addition, the US Embassy says
the Swedish Red Cross is considering a
children's vaccination campaign, provided it can
conduct the program on both sides of the Afghan-
Pakistan border.
-- Saudi Arabian officials welcome the
establishment of an Afghan resistance alliance
office in Jeddah so long as it is an office
representing all parties, according to the US
Embassy in Riyadh. The Saudis do not intend to
push for alliance representation at the next
sunmit of Organization of the Islamic Conference
(OIC), however, because Pakistan opposes such a
move. Furthermore, the Saudis believe alliance
representation would be impractical, given the
staunch opposition from other OIC member
countries--such as Syria and Libya--with strong
-- Pakistani Foreign Minister Yaqub Khan told US
officials that Moscow had responded positively
to Islamabad's suggestions on monitoring a UN-
mediated peace agreement. Yaqub said Cordovez
would probably resume a diplomatic shuttle
between Kabul and Islamabad--probably late this
year--to finalize monitoring arrangements and
refocus the talks on a Soviet troop-withdrawal
timetable.
-- Afghan resistance alliance spokesman Mojadedi
told US officials last week in Islamabad that
Islamabad is the "key to Afghan unity." He said
that Pakistan encourages divisiveness in the
resistance by favoring Gulbuddin's party because
Islamabad fears that resistance political unity
would result in establishment of a PLO-type
organization within its borders.
30 September 1986
NESA M 86-20153CX
SOMA M 86-20091CX
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000303140001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000303140001-9
-- Afghan resistance alliance spokesman Mojadedi
told US Embassy officials in Islamabad that
Kabul is offering to pay tribal groups willing
to relocate away from Afghanistan's border with
Pakistan. Resistance commanders, however, are
effectively countering the regime's program,
warning those who would cooperate that they
would be punished.
-- The US Embassy in Kabul recently reported that
separate delegations of the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the League
of Red Cross visited Afghanistan in early
September. The ICRC delegation--which plans to
reopen an office in Kabul for a six-month trial
period--apparently discussed assistance to the
Afghan Red Crescent Society but not arrangements
for visitation of regime-held prisoners. The
ICRC has long stalled on fulfilling its promise
in 1982 to allow the ICRC to visit imprisoned
insurgents. The League of Red Cross officials
visited health facilities in Kabul and Jalalabad
and discussed the provision of orthopedics
aid.
30 September 1986
NESA M 86-20153CX
SOVA M 86-20091CX
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000303140001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000303140001-9
In a speech at Vladivostok on 28 July, Soviet General
Secretary Gorbachev announced the Soviet Union would
withdraw six regiments--three antiaircraft, two
motorized rifle, and one tank--from Afghanistan by
yearend. Available evidence indicates that the three
antiaircraft regiments he pledged to withdraw are
currently preparing to leave Afghanistan. But since
the speech:
the Soviets,
shipped to
Afghanistan arms and equipment that could
constitute the major elements of two motorized
rifle regiments. They do not appear to have
replaced other motorized rifle regiments normally
based at those two locations, although the unit
that was at Konduz has not returned to garrison
since combat operations in June.
--In addition, enough tanks for two understrength
tank battalions--possibly from the Soviet Union--
at the headquarters garrison of the
lone Soviet tank regiment in Afghanistan. Only one
battalion of the regiment had been observed there
since early 1985.
Analysts do not agree about Soviet intentions toward
Some analysts believe the evidence is too ambiguous to
determine whether the Soviets are introducing new units
solely for the purpose of being withdrawn.
--They note uncertainties about the status of the
units in Konduz and Shindand. In their view, they
are not certain the new arms and equipment
constitute actual regiments. Moreover, because
these units are equipped differently than the other
13 Soviet motorized rifle units in Afghanistan--
with BTR-60/70 armored personnel carriers in one
battalion and trucks in the other two battalions--
and are not up to full strength, the Soviets would
be concerned that these units could easily be
30 September 1986
NESA M 86-20153CX
SOYA M 86-20091CX
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000303140001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000303140001-9
identified as bogus regiments.
--They say that possible alternative uses for the
newly detected equipment, although they all have
"drawbacks", cannot be dismissed out of hand.
These include bringing in new equipment to be
handed over to the Afghan armed forces, preparing
to use the newly arrived equipment in the
withdrawal while leaving the better equipment of
the motorized rifle units normally stationed at
Shindand and Konduz as reserves, and using the new
units to provide road security for the other units
being pulled out.
--They are, above all, skeptical that the Soviets
would risk undertaking a sham withdrawal that might
be exposed, and jeopardize Gorbachev's credibility
and political objectives.
--The military significance of a withdrawal of two
motorized rifle regiments would not be great.
Although withdrawing two of the 13 motorized rifle
regiments in country would somewhat reduce Soviet
combat capabilities, the Soviets appear to be
shifting away from large-scale ground offensives
that employ such regiments.
Other analysts believe that the Soviets have introduced
new units specifically to be withdrawn.
--They estimate that the motorized rifle regiments
at Konduz and Shindand are units that have enough
manpower and equipment to take part in an effective
staged withdrawal. In their view, the Soviets
believe that the regiments would appear to the
journalists brought in to cover the ceremonies to
be what the Soviets are likely to claim they are,
although the units are understrength by the
standards of the table of organization and
equipment for a regular motorized rifle regiment.
--They believe that the evidence available to date
substantially reduces the likelihood of uses for
the new units other than participation in a bogus
withdrawal. For instance, the regiments are ill-
prepared to undertake road security missions, and
the units almost certainly would not be considered
by the Soviets to be adequate replacements for any
30 September 1986
MESA M 86-20153CX
SOVA M 86-20091CX
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000303140001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000303140001-9
of the motorized rifle regiments in country.
--They believe that the Soviets consider the risk
of having their withdrawal deception exposed to be
overshadowed by the importance of maintaining
combat power in Afghanistan and by the public
relations benefits of appearing to be conciliatory
on the Afghan issue. The Soviets may be counting
difficulty proving persuasively in public that the
Soviets had orchestrated the alleged deception
scheme.
--They argue that the new units probably were
introduced to offset the military impact of the
promised withdrawal of two motorized rifle
regiments, and that this action indicates the
Soviets probably considered the potential loss in
combat power to be more than marginal. Since June,
for example, the Soviets, in conjunction with
Afghan regime forces, have conducted a number of
multiregimental operations with motorized rifle
units, including at Herat, Konduz, and south of
Kabul in Vardak Province.
30 September 1986
NESA M 86-20153CX
SOYA M 86-20091CX
25X1
ZoA]
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000303140001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000303140001-9
Top Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000303140001-9