ALGERIA: BENDJEDID VERSUS THE HARDLINERS
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP86T01017R000303020001-2
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
5
Document Creation Date:
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date:
January 10, 2011
Sequence Number:
1
Case Number:
Publication Date:
September 8, 1986
Content Type:
MEMO
File:
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CIA-RDP86T01017R000303020001-2.pdf | 224.58 KB |
Body:
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/27: CIA-RDP86TO1017R000303020001-2 -,-
SUBJECT: Algeria: Bendjedid Versus the Hardliners
NESA M# 86-20138
DISTRIBUTION:
EXTERNAL:
Howard Teicher (NSC)
Elaine Morton (NSC)
Vincent Cannistraro (NSC)
Lt. Gen. Leonard Perroots (Pentagon)
Lt. Gen. Dale A. Vesser (Pentagon)
James L. Woods (Pentagon)
Sandra Charles (Pentagon)
Arnold Raphel (State Department)
R. Rand Beers (State Department)
Patrick N. Theros (State Department)
DATE Of
DOC NO NC~A /-r
OIR 3
P $PD
Ambassador David E. Zweifel (State Department)
Ambassador Morton I. Abramowitz (State Department)
Roger Merrick (State Department)
Richard Solomon (State Department)
US Embassy Rabat, Morocco
US Embassy Algiers, Algeria
US Embassy Tunis, Tunisia
DIR/DCI/DDCI/Exec
DDI
ADDI
NIO/AFR
NIO/NESA
CPAS/ILS
CPAS/IMC/CB
C/PES
PDB Staff
NID Staff
D/NESA
DD/NESA
C/PPS/NESA
PPS/NESA
NESA/IA
NESA/PG
NESA/SO
NESA/AI
NESA/AI/M
DDI/NESA/AI/M/
8 September 1986
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/27: CIA-RDP86T01017R000303020001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/27: CIA-RDP86T01017R000303020001-2
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington. D. C. 20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
8 September 1986
Algeria: Bendjedid Versus the Hardliners
Summary
Radicals within the Algerian Government are
beginning to challenge President Chadli Bend jedid.
Falling oil prices, the US-Libyan cri
is
25X6
7
have
given
his
25X6
opponents opportunities to try to undermine
President's domestic and foreign policies.
.old-line radicals are particularly unhappy
the
The
about
Bendjedid's program to move the country closer to the
West and away from adherence to a Soviet-style economic
system. Bendjedid is not in serious danger of being
ousted, but he almost certainly will be compelled to
pay greater attention to the demands of his opponents.
As a result, we anticipate
25X6
more cautious policies at home and
abroad,
25X6
greater Soviet meddling, and additional difficulties in
US-Algerian relations. 25X1
After coming to power in 1979, President Bendjedid has
gradually removed those in the ruling National Liberation Front
(FLN) and the government who were closely tied to former
President Boumedienne. Many of these individuals were fighters
from the revolutionary period who lacked the skills necessary to
run a complex government apparatus. Unlike his predecessors,
Bendjedid is little moved by ideological dogma or revolutionary
fervor. His political priorities are more pragmatic, focusing on
national and Maghreb concerns, such as agricultural and gas
production, and the Western Sahara problem.
25X1
25X1
25X1
Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis. Information as
of 4 September 1986 was used in its preparation. Questions and
comments should be directed to Chief, Arab-Israeli Division
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/27: CIA-RDP86T01017R000303020001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/27: CIA-RDP86T01017R000303020001-2
The President's successful initiative last year to modify the
National Charter--a document that outlines the country's ideology
and objectives--was the capstone of his efforts to redefine the
country's political orientation. The Charter, approved in a
national referendum last January, deemphasizes socialism and
places greater stress on private enterprise and governmental
decentralization. To implement this program, the President has
tried to move new faces into positions of authority.
The Hardliners Fight Back 25X1
In our view, however, Bendjedid's initiatives are losing 25X1
momentum. Embassy reporting this year indicates that
leftist ideologues, led by FLN Permanent Secretary Messaadia, are
fighting back. Messaadia and his followers, for example, are
trying to get their militant message across by gaining control of
the official media. Those opposed to the President consider
their actions as one of the last opportunities to preserve the
socialist heritage of the Algerian revolution. 25X1
We believe the best evidence of the radical challenge is
Algeria's improved ties with Tripoli, growing cooperation with
Libya and Iran within OPEC, the slow pace of Algerian-US ties,
and the government's desultory record in making economic
decisions. In our view, the factionalism reflects ideological 25X1
division primarily, but other motives, such as bureaucratic
maneuvering and personal rivalry, also are at play.
there are sharp 25X1
differences between the Bendjedid and Messaadia camps on topics
such as relations with Libya, Iran, the USSR, as well as with the
US. In addition, they are at odds'on the Western Sahara dispute.
The hardliners believe the government should fully support the
Islamic revolution in Iran. On Libya, Messaadia's supporters
want Algiers to offer Qadhafi military assistance to demonstrate
solidarity with Tripoli against US pressure. They also perceive
that Bendjedid's policies have moved the country too close to 25X1
'
Washington, and that this works to the detriment of Algeria
s
strategic relations with the USSR. Finally, Messaadia's group
wants the government to take more direct action -- specifically
terrorism by the Algerian-backed Polisario inside Morocco -- zo
counter Morocco's military success in the Western Sahara.
Developments this year have helped the hardliners in their
efforts to undermine the President's policies. The rapid fall of
petroleum prices and the need for austerity will slow the pace of
domestic reform. Messaadia
views the economic situation as an opportunity to undermine
25X1
r.,__i_rn
n.,...,_-': ,' _
n l _.-r_ _
_ - _
Moreover
econo
nterests in
illness I 25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/27: CIA-RDP86T01017R000303020001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/27: CIA-RDP86T01017R000303020001-2
Ben je i s 25X1
supporters were particu ar y concerne a ou the President's
failure to take decisive action in dealing with economic
problems.
Outlook and Implications for the US
At this stage, none of these challenges, in our judgment,
represent a serious threat to Bendjedid. He remains first among
equals in Algeria's consensus-style government and still
maintains the support of most of the military. Nevertheless, the
President almost certainly has lost some standing among peers.
For example, Bendjedid was widely expected to announce 25X1
significant personnel changes in the FLN at its recent Central
Committee meeting, but no changes were made.
the hardliners successfully resisted 25X1
Bendjedid's efforts, producing a stalemate between the two sides.
We expect Bendjedid to act cautiously and to try to placate 25X1
his opponents. He will have increasing difficulty imposing his
agenda for political and economic reform on the FLN.
Nevertheless, during the rest of the year we do not foresee the
political opposition gaining the military support necessary to
challenge the President.
The Soviets will almost certainly try to influence
developments. Algerian-Soviet relations have deteriorated under
Bendjedid, and Moscow would like to reverse his turn toward the
West. They almost certainly view Bendjedid's current problems as
an opportunity to strengthen his opposition, but robably will
move cautiously to avoid souring ties with him.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/27: CIA-RDP86T01017R000303020001-2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/27: CIA-RDP86T01017R000303020001-2
In our view, continued political infighting will create
difficulties in US-Algerian relations. Bendjedid probably would
not push for more contacts in order not to placate the
hardliners. The Algerians believe the United States is not
encouraging bilateral trade in natural gas, modifying its
pro-Moroccan policy--particularly on the Western Sahara
dispute--or allowing Algiers to purchase sophisticated military
aircraft. We doubt that Algiers is prepared to develop closer
bilateral ties at this juncture, in any case, without what it
perceives as a significant gesture from Washington on military
aid. Algerian leaders want sophisticated weapons from the United
States, but they probably will be unwilling to make the political
concessions, such as completely breaking with Libya,to obtain
them. 25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/27: CIA-RDP86T01017R000303020001-2