AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T01017R000303000001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 12, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 26, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000303000001-4
Intelligence
DATE
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DOC NO
P & PD C)
Afghanistan Situation Report
26 August 1986
v a cll
19_81
NESA M 86-20135JX
SOVA M 86-20077JX
26 August 1986
Copy 0 8 1
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Soviet and Afghan combat operations continued last
week against guerrillas entrenched in Herat city,
and insurgent attacks in Badakhshan Province
apparently caused Soviet counterattacks earlier this
month.
DUTCH SUPPORT FOR THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE
The Dutch Government recently doubled its modest
aid allotment to Afghans inside Afghanistan, and a
Dutch Catholic peace group has expressed interest
in mobilizing opposition to the Soviet occupation
of Afghanistan.
Food shortages in sections of Afghanistan because
of the disruption of agricultural production and a
possible dry spell in the north could play into
the hands of the regime.
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IN BRIEF 5
COMPETING DIPLOMATIC OFFENSIVES I 25X1
Kabul, under Moscow's tutelage, has embarked on a
more aggressive diplomatic campaign to improve its
international image in preparation for the
Nonaligned Movement (NAM) summit in Zimbabwe and
the United Nations General Assembly session (UNGA) 25X1
this fall. We believe this campaign reflects
long-standing Soviet-Afghan sensitivities to world
26 August 1986
NESA M 86-20135JX
SOYA M 86-20077JX
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000303000001-4
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000303000001-4
public opinion, but also concerns about stepped-up
Afghan resistance diplomacy in recent months.
Although the insurgent alliance's tour of the US
and Europe this summer fell short of its goals, we
believe it raised the diplomatic costs of the war
This document was prepared by the Office of
Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis and the
Office of Soviet Analysis. Questions or comments
on the issues raised in the publication should be
directed to
26 August 1986
NESA M 86-20135JX
SOYA M 86-20077JX
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26 August 1986 25X1
NESA M 86-20135JX
SOVA M 86-20077JX
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000303000001-4
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000303000001-4
FIGKPING IN THE WEST AND NORTH CONTINUES
Soviet and Afghan combat operations in the Herat area
continued last week in an effort to curb insurgent
la Soviet command
post has been deployed to Herat to support combat
operations. Elements of a Soviet tank battalion and a
motorized rifle battalion from Shindand that left
garrison in mid-August-
b-may be moving against guerrillas south of
In Lowgar Province, the Soviets began their third drive
this summer to secure the road, according to the US
Embassy in Kabul. During the latest engagements, the
insurgents apparently captured a Soviet officer, and
the Soviets responded with artillery aerial
strikes. I ft~ elements
of an Afghan artillery battalion and at least 200
additional vehicles were being marshalled on the main
road south of Kabul on 21 August. Another Afghan
artillery battalion from Hesarak was en route to the
DUTCH SUPPORT FOR THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE
The Dutch Government recently doubled its modest aid
allotment to Afghans inside Afghanistan to 1 million
guilders annually--approximately $430,000. Relief
efforts were expanded to include educational and
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26 August 1986
NESA M 86-20135JX
SOYA M 86-20077JX
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000303000001-4
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000303000001-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000303000001-4
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000303000001-4
Comment: Official Dutch humanitarian aid to the Afghan
resistance has been modest and low-key--in part because
of limited public interest in the issue. The aid
programs have also been complicated in the past by
rivalries between the two main private organizations
involved--"Corrmittee for a Free Afghanistan" and "Help
Afghanistan", according to the US Embassy at the
Hague. Criticism of the Soviets' occupation of
Afghanistan by the Dutch Peace Movement--which has
"impeccable leftist credentials," according to the US
Embassy at the Hague--could potentially have a positive
impact on Dutch public awareness of and support for the
Afghan resistance.
according to the US Embassy at the Hague.
medical service programs as well as donations of food
and medical commodities, and the Dutch Development
Cooperation Minister expressed interest in the McCollum
patient airlift program. In addition, the leader of a
leading Dutch Catholic peace group promised, after a
recent trip to Afghanistan and Pakistan, to organize
opposition to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan,
FOOD PROBLEMS IN THE NORTH
surrounding Konduz
Heavy fighting has disrupted agricultural activity in
Balkh Provinces, and possibly other areas in northern
Afghanistan, also may be experiencing drought
conditions. Food shortages are resulting in rising
prices.
irrigated.
Comment: A reduction in food supplies caused by
fighting and drought could play into Kabul's hands by
enabling the regime to use food to win popular
support. It may also further strain insurgent
logistics by forcing resistance groups to devote a
larger portion of caravan loads to food. Northern
agriculture is particularly dependent on adequate
amounts of precipitation because much of it is non-
Konduz and northern
26 August 1986
NESA M 86-20135JX
SOYA M 86-20077JX
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000303000001-4
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000303000001-4
-- Pakistan's Director of Afghanistan Affairs in
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Arif Ayub,
downplayed Islamabad's interest in private talks
with the Soviets on broadening the Kabul regime.
He said no back-channel talks have occurred
since the Geneva negotiations ended on 8
August. Sources of the US Embassy say Pakistan
will use the visit of a Soviet South Asian
expert in early September to probe Soviet
intentions, however.
-- Kabul announced establishment of an Afghan-
Indian Friendship Soviet in a radio broadcast on
21 August. Afghan General Secretary Najibullah
said he considered the society an important step
in expanding bilateral relations. Although New
Delhi has yet to confirm its participation, it
probably will agree to society activity in
Kabul, but not in India. New Delhi's sizable
Afghan refugee community almost certainly would
seek to disrupt such activities if undertaken in
India.
-- The provincial party secretaries for Kabol and
Jowzjan Provinces were relieved of their posts
last week for alleged "weaknesses in party
work," according to Afghan media reports. The
dismissals occurred at a Politburo meeting that
also revealed serious deficiencies in economic
planning and the distribution of goods. F
-- Pakistani Foreign Ministry Additional Secretary
Shaikh met in Washington with US officials on
26-27 August to discuss Afghanistan and other
South Asian regional issues. The meetings are
26 August 1986
MESA M 86-20135JX
SOYA M 86-20077JX
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000303000001-4
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000303000001-4
preliminary to US-Soviet experts' talks on
Afghanistan, scheduled for 2-3 September in
Moscow.
According to the US Embassy in Islamabad, some
500 to 600 insurgents were observed near Chitral
in mid-August waiting for weapons and
transportation. Guerrilla leader Rabbani
recently estimated that logistic problems had
backed up "thousands" of resistance fighters at
the northern Pakistani staging area for
insurgents in Badakhshan Province and the
Panjsher Valley.
26 August 1986
MESA M 86-20135JX
SOYA M 86-20077JX
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AFGHANISTAN: OOMPETING DIPLOMATIC OFFENSIVES
by NESA
Kabul, under Moscow's tutelage, has embarked on a more
aggressive diplomatic campaign to improve its
international image at the Nonaligned Movement (NAM)
summit in Zimbabwe in September, and the United Nations
General Assembly (UNGA) session next month. We believe
this campaign reflects long-standing Soviet-Afghan
sensitivities to world public opinion, but also
concerns about stepped-up Afghan resistance diplomacy
in recent months. Although the insurgent alliance's
tour of the US and Europe fell short of its goals, we
believe it did succeed in raising the diplomatic costs
of the war for Moscow.
Kabul Promises Diplomatic Campaign
In his July address to the People's Democratic Party of
Afghanistan, General Secretary Najibullah urged that
"propaganda and counterpropaganda" be further
activated. Saying that "this task has special
importance on the eve of the conference of the heads of
states and governments of the nonaligned countries in
Harare and with regard to the next session of the UN
General Assembly," Najibullah asserted that Afghan
ministries and respective departments had been
instructed to "broadcast facts about the revolution and
establish and develop relations between Afghanistan and
the developing... countries" as soon as possible.
As part of this diplomatic initiative, a delegation led
by Afghan Deputy Foreign Minister Sarwar Yurish
traveled in July to Zimbabwe--the NAM chairman for the
next three years--to establish diplomatic relations.
Yurish obtained Prime Minister Mugabe's agreement in
principle--a development Kabul media immediately
announced with great fanfare. According to the US
Embassy in Islamabad, however, Zimbabwean officials
told the Pakistanis that they have no intention of
opening an embassy in Kabul, will not allow Kabul to
open one in Zimbabwe soon, and will delay diplomatic
relations until a political solution to the Afghan
conflict is reached. The Zimbabweans promised no
change in support for the proposed NAM summit or UNGA
language on Afghanistan.
26 August 1986
NESA M 86-20135JX
SOYA M 86-20077JX
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(Moscow has been
worried that Afghanistan would be one of the main
topics discussed at the summit. According to the US
Embassy in Islamabad, the Soviets told the Pakistanis
that Moscow wants a "calm deliberation" of Afghanistan
We believe Soviet Secretary General Gorbachev's
announcement in July that Moscow is prepared by yearend
to remove six regiments from Afghanistan is partly
designed to support Kabul's diplomatic initiative by
deflecting international attention from the stalled UN-
sponsored peace talks. Gorbachev may also be hoping
that Moscow's overtures toward China will raise concern
in Islamabad about China's long-term steadfastness on
the Afghan issue. F_~
According to the US Mission to the UN, the People's
Democratic Republic of Yemen--Moscow's client--
proposed, in a surprise move in June, that the UNGA's
Asian Group endorse Afghanistan's candidacy for one of
the vice-presidencies of the 41st UNGA. The US Mission
to the UN believes its candidacy has virtually no
chance of success, however. F__]
The Resistance's Grand Tour
The Soviet-Afghan diplomatic offensive may be an
overreaction to the more active diplomacy of the Afghan
26 August 1986
NESA M 86-20135JX
SOYA M 86-20077JX
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000303000001-4
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000303000001-4
resistance alliance this year, although it is also in
keeping with the regime's heightened image-building
efforts over the last year or so. In early June,
members of the alliance began a tour to gain
international recognition for the organization, enhance
its legitimacy, and increase the diplomatic costs of
the war for the Soviets. Although the visit failed to
gain the alliance official US diplomatic recognition,
the resistance leaders' well-publicized meeting with
President Reagan was irrinediately condemned by Soviet
and Afghan media, which accused the US of supporting
The Soviets may also have been disturbed by the high-
level reception Burhannudin Rabbani--then alliance
spokesman--received in Saudi Arabia, where he met with
King Fahd and in France, where he met with French Prime
Minister Chirac and Foreign Minister Raimond.
the Saudis
feted the delegation at their Embassy in Washington and
publicly acknowledged Riyadh's contribution to the
resistance war chest. In France, Rabbani received the
highest official reception accorded any Afghan
resistance leader to date and also pledges of increased
humanitarian aid. The French gestures probably were
particularly galling to Moscow because they came just
before French President Mitterrand was to meet Soviet
leader Gorbachev.
Prospects
The Afghan regime's efforts will have little chance of
significantly eroding support for the resolutions on
Afghanistan at the UN and the NAM summit, in our
view. The language of these resolutions is in fact
anodyne, falling short of condemning the Soviets by
name and calling only for an end to foreign
interference in Afghanistan and for peaceful resolution
of the dispute. Nevertheless, we believe the regime
will look for opportunities to keep the resistance and
its external supporters on the defensive. Such
surprise moves as seeking a UNGA vice-presidency are
likely to be repeated.
The Soviet-Afghan response to the resistance's
increased politicking is, in our view, disproportionate
to the alliance's real gains internationally, but is,
in itself, an indication that the resistance can--and
26 August 1986
NESA M 86-20135JX
SOVA M 86-20077JX
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000303000001-4
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000303000001-4
did--raise the diplomatic costs of the war for the
Soviets. Still, the resistance remains hamstrung by
internal divisions over its international diplomacy and
Pakistani disinterest in pushing stronger language for
the resolutions.
26 August 1986
NESA g 86-20135JX
SOYA M 86-20077JX
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Top Secret
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