AFGHANSTAN SITUATION REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T01017R000302790001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 22, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 22, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86TO1017R000302790001-9 :E
Directorate of
Intelligence
DATE b ~_t r+C r"`
5. /
OCR
lac; i~ r~ (-, ? ,,J , 13TY
DOC NO
5P&PD
Afghanistan Situation Re
79-81 Z MC/CB
22 July 1986
TO SeellIt
NESA M 86-20113JX
SOVA M 86-20062JX
July
Copy 0 8 1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000302790001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000302790001-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000302790001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000302790001-9
AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT I 25X1
insurgent activity in Kabul and in areas north of
the city increased last week, hut the intensity of
fighting elsewhere in Afahanistan slackened
somewhat.
AFGHANISTAN: RISING FOOD PRICES IN KABUL
Afghan Prime Minister Keshtmand recently expressed
concern over rising food prices in Kabul,
especially for fruits and vegetahles, and candidly
listed the reasons fnr the increases.
2 25X1
THE AFGHAN REFUGEES IN PAKISTAN--SHIFTING DYNAMTrS I 6
The experiences of Afghan refugees who flerl to
Pakistan in 1985 are different than those who left
Afghanistan earlier, according to recently
conducted interviews.
22 July 1986
NESA M 86-20113JX
SOVA M 86-20062JX
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000302790001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000302790001-9
This document was oreoared by the Office of
Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis and the
Office of Soviet Analysis. fuestions or comments
on the issues raised in the oublication should he
22 July 1986
NESA M 86-20113JX
SOVA M 86 20062JX
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000302790001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000302790001-9
lb
Naryn ,.... _..
SOVI ET UNION
IRAN
Farah
Ashrow tV
-,zKeleh^ - ` O% ,eeyzabad
Kheyrabad,
Mazare t nTa7agan Eshka3hem
Sh~eberghanharit n ~Kholrn Koi duz
Chaghcharan
O
r?
' 77Qalat
OQal'eh-ye
Now
Zaranj
Spin Buldakr
Boundary represe matron is
not necnssarily authors tat-.
krandu
arikowt
Damian, *! g A
Mehtarlam ,ya1 sadabad
Kewt a ' *Kabuh ~ ?Jala ad
Baghlah E~
tPol e Khomri , ~~ \\
Charikar Mahmud-e oa
7 Ragl'
Gardeyz
PAKISTAN
ass
Afghanistan
International bound
Provmc e boundary
* Nallonal capital
Province capital
Railroad
Road
0 50 100 150 200 Kilometers
0 50 100 150 200 Miles
22 July 1986
NESA M 86-20113JX
SOVA M 86-20062JX
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000302790001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000302790001-9
FIGHTING IN CAPITAL REGION FLARES
The level of insurgent activity in the Kabul region
increased last week. The Soviet Emhassv compound in
Kabul endured a coordinated small arms and rocket
attack on 16 July for two hours, according to the IIS
Embassy. Northwest of the city in Paqhman, Soviet
forces began an offensive to recapture about five
comDany-size security posts lost to the insurgents
during the past two months. Continuing strong
insurgent activity in Paghman evidently has forced the
Soviets to use air drops to resupply forces in the
area, although the US Embassy reports that the Soviets
are moving in reinforcements. In nearby Charikar,
repeated attacks on entrenched resistance forces have
forced out most of the local residents.
Elsewhere, the intensity of fighting in Afghanistan
slackened somewhat during the past week. Most units
that participated in the month-long Soviet and Afghan
regime offensive against insurgents in the
Taloqan-Eskamesh area are back in garrison
ig inq in the area have led to heavy civilian
casualties and significant damage, especialy in the old
sectors of the city, where areas have heen razed. F
According to the US Embassy, weeks of heavy
22 July 1986
NESA M 86-20113JX
SOVA M 86-20062JX
25X1
Z 25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000302790001-9
 25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000302790001-9 X'
25X1
Orlyi
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000302790001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000302790001-9
(claimed that
some ATg a pilots have refused to fly SU-22
Fitter fighter bombers in the Afghan Air Force
because the aircraft have a design flaw.
?Zs are based
1_
reservations about the fighter-bombers'
reliability are keeping them grounded.
Bagram, where the SU-
tle activity recently by
ese aircraft. ihis suggests that the Afghans'
25X1
25X1
In a speech on 9 July, Afghan Prime Minister Keshtmand
expressed concern over rising prices in Kabul of some
food commodities--particularly fruits and vegetables.
While the overall foodstuff price index in Kabul rose
only 7 percent in 1985, the index for fruits increased
17 percent and the index for vegetables was 23 percent
higher. Keshtmand claimed rising transportation costs
are partly responsible for the increase in produce
prices. He said various production constraints,
including the farmers' preference for growing wheat,
inadequate irrigation and storage facilities, and a
weak markptina f tructure also contributed to the
problem.
AFGHANISTAN: RISING FOOD PRICES IN KABUL
regime's efforts to increase its popularity.
prices for these items will also detract from
Comment: The increase in transportation costs nrohahly
stems from poor security conditions alonq the main
roads and the high demand for trucking services. The
government is unlikely to persuade farmers not to grow
wheat because it is a traditional stable of the Afghan
diet and because its production is less of a drain on
already severe shortages of labor. The high Prices
will keep fresh produce beyond the means of many Kabul
residents, further worsening the incidence of
malnutrition in the capital. Failure to keen down
22 July 1986
NESA M 86-20t13JX
SOVA M 86-20062JX
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000302790001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000302790001-9
some 10
derelict armored vehicles on tank transporters
en route to the Khairahad transshioment facility
from Jabal Os Sara,i. Because of lack of a
capital repair capability for armor in
Afghanistan, vehicles that need to he rebuilt
are returned to the Soviet Union.
-- On 17 July, the Government of France announced
plans to increase aid to the Afghan resistance,
according to press reports. The subsidy--which
will go to eight humanitarian organizations
operating in insurgent-held areas of
Afqhanistan--anoarently will he at least
$300,000 this year. Previous official French
aid has been modest and unpublicized.
Burhanuddin Rahbani received pledges of
increased French humanitarian aid during his
recent visit to Paris as spokesman for the
Afghan resistance alliance.
-- Soviet Ambassador Taheyev recently returned to
Moscow from Kabul, where he had served since
1974 and was dean of the diplomatic corns. No
successor has yet been named.
22 July 1986
NESA M 86-20113JX
SOVA M 86-20062JX
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000302790001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000302790001-9
THE AFGHAN REFUGEES IN PAKISTAN--SHIFTING DYNAMICS
Inteviews conducted among refugees who fled from
Afghanistan to Pakistan in 1985 revealed results of
increasingly brutal Soviet military tactics. Although
the refugees talk about going back to Afghanistan, some
worry that the war is not going well for the
insurgents. They follow news of peace negotiations
closely hut have only the vaguest notions on the shape
of a settlement. The refugees in the camos appeared to
have little respect for the alliance of seven insurgent
groups. The Pakistanis, for their part. worry about
the impact of the refugee presence.
The Early Refugees
Interviews conducted in 1983 suggested the lame flew
of refugees from Afghanistan into Pakistan in 1980-81
was mainly because of panic as a result of the massive
Soviet invasion. Some tribal leaders also brought
their units to Pakistan as a political protest against
the Communist government in Kabul. Economic problems
were another important factor. Farming was no longer
possible in many regions because of fightinq,
destruction of irrigation systems, disrupted
distribution of seeds and fertilizer, and manpower
shortages.
The refugees during 1980-83 left Afghanistan as whole
villages or tribes in groups of from less than 100 to
over 1,000. Travel in the rural areas near the
Pakistani border was relatively easy and safe, making
large-group travel feasible. Many came out by bus or
other vehicles. By late 1983, the migration had slowed
in part because of a lull in the fighting in the
eastern provinces and because those who were in the
most immediate danger had already left.
The Newer Refugees
The refugee flow to Pakistan increased in 1985 compared
with 1984--although it remained much less than in the
early l980s. The increase in 1985 lamely reflected
increased air attacks and a general upsurge in the
Fighting in the border areas, especially in the plains
22 July 1.986
NESA M 86-20113JX
SOVA M 86-20062JX
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000302790001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000302790001-9
of Paktia Province and the Konar Valley. Pakistani
officials estimate that about 35,000 people a month
came out in the summer and fall. We believe the
Soviets intentionally drove the people from Afghanistan
so that guerrilla infiltrators could he more easily
spotted and destroyed, and so that the insurgents would
not have a ponulace to feed and hoiiee them and provide
them cover for their operations.
Because movement across the border became more
dangerous and difficult in 1985, refugees had to travel
in small groups and at night to avoid attack. Even so,
many were attacked from the air as they crossed exposed
areas, such as mountain passes or open plains. The
attacks on fleeing unarmed refugees Created further
nanic among the general population of Afghanistan.
The refugees in 1.985 were more often wounded, hurt, or
in shock from the fighting than the earlier refugees.
Because of food shortages in narts of Afghanistan, many
of the more recent refugees, especially the children,
are suffering from varying degrees of malnutrition and
are in generally poorer health. They came with little
except the shirts on their hack, whereas the earlier
refugees often arrived in Pakistan with more
possessions, especially commercial vehicles or domestic
animals that they could use to make a living.
Many newer refugees attempted to find tribal or kin
members in Pakistan for help; tribal codes dictate that
tribesmen are obligated to help fellow tribesmen. gut
often the conditions for those already in Pakistan are
strained, and they are able to offer little help. Many
of the newly arriving refugees had no tribe or kinship
group to fall hack on because they came from areas of
greatest devastation and most of their tribe or village
had been killed.
Pakistani Discomfort with Refugees
The Government of Pakistan has firmly suonorted the
refugees. President Zia has announced many times that
he welcomes the Afghan refugees as Islamic brothers who
need help in a time of need. He usually adds that he
sincerely hones that they will soon he able to return
to their homeland. The Government of Pakistan has
treated the refugees well, spending about one million
dollars a day on them.
22 July 1986 25X1
NESA M 86-20113JX
SOVA M 86-20062JX
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000302790001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000302790001-9
But Pakistan is now facing increasing concerns about
the Afghan issue. It is a major topic of conversation
among the Pakistani public and has been the subject of
more editorials and public forums. The position of the
citizens of Pakistan as a whole on the refugees is hard
to gauge. Pakistan is a diverse multiethnic and
multi linguistic country.
In the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), where the
crush of the Afghan refugees is greatest, the people
are the most hospitable. There are two reasons for
this--first, the code of the Pushtuns, called
"Pushtunwali," that requires them to help fellow
tribesmen when they are in need, and second, hPcaiise of
the ex-governor, Fazle Haq. HP was a supporter of the
Afghan refugees, but more importantly would personally
intercede when potential conflicts came uo between
Afghans and Pakistanis. Fazle was well liked and
respected in the NWFP and set the tone for public
opinion and action.
Opinion in the Punjab toward the refugees is more
negative, hut not significantly so. Part of the
Punjahis' concern reflects historical ethnic
animosities. Punjabis, especially the educated, see
the Afghans as rather crude and wild. Tension between
the people of the Punjab and the Pathans dates back to
before the British presence. Some Pakistanis complain
about the refugees who do not stay in the camps.
Peshawar and Quetta are crowded with Afghans--buses are
jammed, the city parks are full.
Penetration of the Afghans into the Pakistan economy
has been tolerated because the Afghans' labor skills--
and their commercial vehicles have been needed.
Moreover, many Pakistani workers have found employment
abroad, mostly in the Gulf areas. Afghans serve as
shopkeepers, craftsmen, traders, truck drivers, and
general laborers in all parts of Pakistan. Although
the Government of Pakistan has tried to curb these
activities when they compete with Pakistani businesses,
officials have not pursued this policy aggressively.
Ordinances forbidding Afghans from buying real estate
or from engaging in business in some areas are largely
ignored.
To the Government of Pakistan, however, the Afghans'
22 July 1986
NESA M 86-20113JX
SOVA M 86-20062JX
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000302790001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000302790001-9
economic presence is a ticking time homh. Pakistani
workers are beginning to return from the Gulf countries
because of the collapse of oil prices. While it is not
clear that the returnees will directly compete with the
Afghans for ,jobs. they will nonetheless make the job
market tighter.
The Refugees and the Alliance of Seven
The refugees in the camos in gecemher and January of
1985-86 had little good to say ahnut the alliance in
Peshawar. The fundamentalists in the alliance
represent a militant. new ideology that means little to
the average Afghan; the so-called traditionalists in it
are too disorganized and unstructured to he of real
consequence. To the Afghan refUQee, the alliance must
he taken seriously only because it controls important
resources.
Many refugees see the alliance as a small group of
people enriching itself while they suffer. The
refugees live in tents or mud huts in crowded camps,
and they believe the leaders of the alliance are living
in relative grandeur and are uncaring of the refugees'
plight. The refugees suspect the alliance leaders of
being in league with Pakistani officials to get rich on
money designated for the refugees. Local insurgent
commanders, who have gained power at the expense of the
Peshawar leaders, say they are now faced with three
difficulties: the burden of fighting the war in
Afghanistan, providing for what might he left of their
people in Afghanistan, and taking care of the refugees
in Pakistan.
War Weariness
The interviews detected some war weariness inside
Afghanistan. Villagers assert that insurgent activity
in their areas often makes them a target of aerial
bombardment. Many said thev would prefer to he left
alone by bath sides.
Although most refugees out little credence in the
recent tribal "Loya Jirga" called by Kabul, they note
that some tribes or Darts of tribes are cooperating
with the regime--or at least not cooperating with the
insurgents. Refugees expressed concern that Kabul's
plan to establish village militia to keep out the
22 July 1986
NESA M 86-20113JX
SOVA M 86-20062JX
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000302790001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000302790001-9
insurgent fighters could be successful, although they
were careful to say that they knew of no village that
had yet gone along with the clan.
Will the Refugees Return?
In the camas, the Afghans themselves freauentiv talk of
returning to Afghanistan. They believe that they will
he going hack, although most realize that it will
orohahly be later than sooner. They closely follow
events in Kabul for any sign that the regime is
weakening or that a settlement is near. In late 1Q85,
the camps were full of rumors from Afghanistan
regarding a potential settlement.
Interviews in the camps revealed some realism regarding
the shape of a settlement of the Afghan hostilities.
The Afghans believe that the insurgents will eventually
be victorious but often say that the war is not goinq
well, and that the Soviets are becoming more difficult
and cunning. When asked what kind of a settlement or
of a government might he acceptable to all sides, most
Afghans have no answer. Even though King Zahir Shah
was ousted thirteen years ago, he is s leader
most mentioned to reunite Afghanistan. _ 1- the
Several Pakistani officials suggest that the number of
refugees who would return to Afghanistan would depend
on the nature of the settlement, the political
stability in Afghanistan after any settlement, and the
degree to which the refugees have penetrated the
Pakistani economy. Most Pakistanis feel that those
refugees who have been onlitically active in Pakistan
would not he able to return. The Pakistanis believe
that Afghans who have received asylum abroad will also
not return to Afghanistan after a settlement.
According to the Pakistan Commissioner of Refugees, 2.7
million Afghan refugees are registered in Pakistan,
with another 500,000 unregistered. There are 312
refugee camps in three provinces: 240 in the
22 July 1986
NESA M 86-20113JX
SOVA M 86-20062JX
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000302790001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000302790001-9
Northwest-Frontier, 61 in Baluchistan, and 11 in the
Puniah.
The refugees in Pakistan are primarily Pushtu, the
ethnic and linguistic group that also dominates the
Northwest-Frontier Province and the area of Afghanistan
closest to the Pakistani border.
The size of the refugee camps varies greatly. Near
Peshawar, the center for Afghans in exile, the camas
are large, well organized, and generally affluent.
Several "show" camos near Peshawar routinely entertain
foreign visitors and journalists. Farther from
Peshawar, the camps tend to be small and less well
organized, and the quality of life is considerably
poorer.
The Pakistan Refugee Organization
Over 10,000 Pakistani administrators are involved in
managing the refugees under the overall supervision of
SAFRON, the State and Frontier Regions Oivison. A
Chief Commissioner for Refugees in Islamabad answers
directly to SAFRON and provincial commissioners for
each of the three provinces. In addition there are
district administrators, area administrators (each in
charge of five camps) and camp administrators. It is
the stated intent of the Government of Pakistan to let
the refugees settle their own disputes through tribal
"iirgas," or councils, and to govern themselves exceot
where they deal directly with the laws of Pakistan.
The task of the Pakistani administrators is largely to
dole out humanitarian assistance to the refugees.
Registration and Rations
The maior tensions of camp life stem from the related
issues of registration and the distribution of the
humanitarian assistance. To he eligible to receive
rations, a refugee must first be registered as an
official refugee, and then receive a ration card. To
become registered as a refugee, a newly arrived Afghan
must get a letter from one of the seven official
parties and then apply for a card from the local
Pakistani refugee office. This requires that he obtain
the endorsement of one of the political parties, thus,
in a way, politicizing the registration process.
22 July 1986
NESA M 86-20113JX
SOVA M 86-20062JX
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000302790001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000302790001-9
Refugees encounter several problems in obtaining a
ration card. The refugee must register at one of the
official camps, but the camps in the desirable areas
are full and have long waiting lists, especially the
camps near Peshawar and those near the border. The
refugees do not want to be too far from the border
because many cross back and forth. These people
include the insurgent fighters, but also farmers and
traders who often bring their families out to refuge in
Pakistan, and return to farm or trade.
Other reasons prompt Afghan refugees to stay near the
Afghan and Pakistani border. Thp topography there is
similar to Afghanistan--mountainous with hiqh plains.
In addition, the Pakistani neople in the border areas
are ethnically and linguistically similar to the
Afghans, whereas the Pakistanis of areas further inland
are traditional and hitter enemies.
22 July 1986
NESA M 86-20113JX
SOVA M 86-20062JX
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000302790001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000302790001-9
Top Secret
Top Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000302790001-9