AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T01017R000302730001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 5, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 15, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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Intelligence
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Afghanistan Situation Report
15 July 1986
79-8j
ICiC/CB
COPY 0 8 1
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Combat activity increased in Afghanistan during the
past two weeks in Kabul, Herat, and Qandahar city,
although a month-long offensive against insurgent
forces in northern Afghanistan seems to have
ended.
Recent talks between General Secretary Gorbachev and
French President Mitterrand underscored the Soviets
efforts to convince international opinion of their
seriousness and willingness to be flexible in
seeking an Afghan settlement.
Leadership changes made at the 19th Central
Committee plenum of the People's Democratic Party
of Afghanistan suggest that General Secretary
Najibullah is moving slowly to consolidate his
power because of factionalism and Soviet
concerns.
A West German and an American journalist were
recently invited to visit Afghanistan, but their
accounts of the situation probably will be
disappointing to the Kabul regime.
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The Soviet Union and Afghan regime are trying to
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prevent the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan from
becoming an issue at the 8th Nonaligned Movement
(NAM) Summit in Harare in August.
Combat intensified in June as Soviet and Afghan
forces conducted antiguerrilla opeations in the
areas of Konduz, Herat, and Qandahar in an attempt
to preempt expansion of insurgent activity in the
north and to consolidate control of key urban
areas.
This document was prepared by the Office of
Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis and the
Office of Soviet Analysis.
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TEMPO OF FIGHTING INCREASES NATIONWIDE
the major
combat operation against Panjsher Valley commander
Masood's forces in Takhar Province was ending, after
almost a month-long campaign that probably achieved
little. Earlier in July--during the second phase of
the offensive--Afghan forces swept the road from
Taloqan past Keshem in Badakhshan Province, probably in
an attempt to preempt insurgent operations as well as
find and destroy resistance base camps. Numerous air
and artillery strikes were conducted against guerrilla
ositions
Fighting in urban areas intensified in July. Soviet
and regime forces have extensively shelled Herat city
for several weeks, according to US Embassy sources.
The heavy combat evidently has also closed sections of
the road to Kabul between Herat and Shindand. In
Qandahar, Soviet and Afghan forces apparently have
gained control of much of the city. They have
intensified efforts to impede insurgent infiltration in
The resistance stepped up activity in the northeastern
provinces during the past two weeks. The US Embassy in
Kabul reports that an insurgent attack on Bagram
airbase last. week resulted in four helicopters
destroyed or damaged. The guerrillas also attacked
three Soviet columns recently--two in the Shomali
Plain, one south of Kabul, and another north of the
Salang Tunnel--causing considerable vehicular damage
and significant Soviet casualties, according to
US Embassy sources. In addition,
numerous explosions and firefights occurred in Kabul
during this period; these probably were mainly the
result of insurgent activity although factional
fighting within the regime may also have contributed.
SOVIETS SEEK TO SHOW FLEXIBILITY ON AFGHANISTAN
General Secretary Gorbachev again referred to
Afghanistan as a "raw wound" during French President
Mitterand's visit to Moscow earlier this month and
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blamed US pressure on Pakistan for lack of ro ress
toward a settlement.
underscore Moscow's efforts to convince
international opinion of the USSR's seriousness and
willingness to he flexible in seeking an Afghan
settlement. Moscow probably hopes that its
representations will create pressure from France and
other Western governments on the US and Pakistan to
make concessions. Ry presenting the ITS as the main
obstacle to a settlement, the Soviets also hope to
drive a wedge between the U1S and its Furopean allies.
While the proposal for a UN-sponsored conference could
indicate that Moscow is exploring alternatives to the
Geneva negotiations for a settlement, Kabul's
participation in the proximity talks provides
considerahle public relations benefits and is likely to
remain an important component of Soviet strategy.
NINETEENTH PARTY PLENUM MAKES LEADERSHIP CHANGES
readership changes made at the Central Committee plenum
of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan on
In July suggest factionalism and Soviet concerns are
preventing General Secretary Najihullah from moving
quickly to consolidate control. Former General
Secretary Rahr_ak Karmal and Prime Minister Keshtmand
retained their positions on the Politburo, but four
full members of the Central committee were replaced:
Asadulla Sarwari, Abdul Ghaf_ar Azad, Mohammad Anwar
Farzam, and Major General M. Yasin Sadegi. Minister of
Nationalities and Tribal Affairs Solayman Laeq--a
niajihullah supporter--was elevated to full Politburo
membership; two other Najihullah proteges were
appointed candidate members. Full membership in the
Central Committee rose from 53 to q5, while alternate
membership increased from 27 to 50.
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COMMENT: The retention of Rabrak and several of his
key supporters on the Politburo indicates that
Najibullah does not yet feel confident enough of his
control to move against them. Moscow, concerned that
continuing unrest in the party could harm the war
effort, may also have urged Najibullah to move
cautiously. Soviet Central Committee Secretary
Korniyenko probably relayed this message during his
visit to Kabul last month. The extraordinary increase
in the size of the Central Committee and the
appointment of less doctrinaire members are intended
mainly to pack the committee with members beholden to
Najibullah and to improve the regime's image before UN-
sponsored peace talks resume later this month.
The New Politburo of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan
Age. Faction Date of Cawnts
App intment
Najihullah 39 Parchami Jun 1981 POPA Central Committee General
Secretary.
Karmal, Rabrak 57 Parchami Dec 1979 Refuses to leave political scene,
supporters have split Parchami
faction.
Keshtmand, 54 Parchami T1ec 1979 Part of ruling triumvirate, ouster
Soltan Ali rumored.
Laeq, Solayman 55 Parchami Nov 1985 Promoted to full member July 1985,
close to Najibullah
Nur, Nur Ahmed 49 Parchami Dec 1979 Anti-Khalqi plotter 1978-79, may he
jealous of Najibullah.
Raf_i, Mohammed 42 Parchami Jun 1981
Watanjar, 40 Khalqi Jun 1981 Enemy of Najibullah, but fellow
Mohammed Aslem Pashtun.
Ratebzad, 55 Parchami Dec 1979 Strong Rabrak supporter, boycotting
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7,iray, Saleh 50 Khalgi. Apr 1978
Mohammed
Candidate Members
Raryalai,
Mahmud
42
Parchami
Dec 1979
Karwal,
Mir Sahib
?
Parchami
Jul 1986
Mohammed,
NVi7,ar
58
Khalqi
Nov 1985
Razmjo,
7,nhur
Abdul
34
Parchami
Dec 1922
Yaquhi,
Fa niq
i,hulam
42
Parchami
Jul 1986
Rahrak's younger brother, anti-
Khalqi plotter, 1978-79
Longtime party workhorse, ethnic
Pashtun.
nefense minister.
Close friend and confidant of
Najibullah; his deputy (1980-85)
and successor as head of the
intelligence service.
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The Soviets are concerned that the war in Afghanistan
may he one of the main subjects debated at the 5th
Nonaligned Movement (NAM) summit scheduled for late
August in Harare
According t
the ITS Fmhassy in Islamabad, Pakistan has lined up
support for a strong antiSoviet statement on
Afghanistan at the summit hut does not want an Afghan
resistance alliance delegation to attend.
COMMENT: Despite efforts by the Kabul regime--and
Moscow--to pigeonhole a critical statement on
Afghanistan at the summit, the final communique will
probably again call for the withdrawal of all foreign
troops from Afghanistan. It would he the third time
that this Third World forum has indirectly criticized
the Soviet Union for its role in Afghanistan.
Islamabad's opposition to a resistance alliance
presence at the summit probably stems from a concern
that a fight to gain admission could undermine support
for the antiSoviet resolution.
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nn May 25, Afghan resistance leaders allowed
representatives of the International Committee of
the Red Cross (I('RC) to visit regime prisoners
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being held at Khowst, according to insurgent press
accounts. Their decision was probably motivated by
the hope that it will result in a reciprocal
gesture by the regime. Kabul agreed in April to
allow ICRC delegates to Visit insurgent prisoners
hut has not yet followed through on its offer.
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the
Soviets have constructed a helicopter airfield at
the Special Purpose Forces (Spetsnaz) garrison at
Tapa in Farah Province. Built since early March,
the airfield has hardstands for eight
helicopters. A permanently based attack helicopter
unit at Tapa would facilitate air support for the
Spetsnaz unit there and for other operations in the
area.
Private enterprise accounted for R2 percent of
Afghanistan's gross domestic product last year,
according to official Afghan press reports. The
private sector predominates in retail trade,
transportation, and agriculture. Although the
regime has previously highlighted the achievements
of the state sector, its recent encouragement of
the private sector reflects its dependence on that
sector for revenue and foreign exchange.
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Combat activity in June intensified as the Soviets and
Afghan regime forces conducted several multiregimental
operations against guerrilla forces, notably south of
Konduz, in the Herat area, and at Qandahar. These
combat actions represented attempts to consolidate
control of key urban areas and preempt expansion of
insurgent activity in the north. Because of the Afghan
military's continuing inability to meet authorized
strength levels, the regime resorted to drastic
measures during the month to increase manpower.
Guerrilla forces in some areas experienced logistical
problems during the month.
Masood is the Objective
Panjsher Valley insurgent commander Masood was the
focus of major combat operations by Soviet and Afghan
forces in June. Over the past several months, Masood
has attempted to extend operations by Jamiat-i-Islami
guerrillas into some of the northeastern provinces
bordering the USSR, where insurgent activity heretofore
has been comparatively limited.
Most of the ground forces that participated in the
first and largest phase of the offensive were Soviet.
suggest
that during the 10-day-long first phase, the task force
relied heavily on artillery bombardments and air
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strikes to assault the guerrilla positions. Motorized
infantry units appeared to be largely used to secure
fire bases and lines of communication, although they
engaged some guerrilla units in combat southeast of
Eskamesh. When the second phase of the offensive began
on about 24 June, Afghan forces took a more active
role,
Insurgent forces probably were put on guard about the
impending offensive by airstrikes in the area between
Eskamesh and Taloqan that occurred a week in advance of
the actual ground operations and the movement overland
of Soviet reinforcements from Kabul.
The Battle for the Cities and Towns
Fighting in Herat flared again in June.
insurgent forces commanded by Ismail Khan
were on the offensive in the area after mid-month. The
upsurge in guerrilla activity evidently prompted the
Soviets to employ major,elements
in the operation.
Soviet forces involved in the combat included three
motorized rifle regiments and a tank regiment as well
as two independent, artillery battalions. According to
the US Embassy in Kabul, Soviet forces increased
bombardment of guerrilla-occupied sections of the city
on 20 June.
In Qandahar, the insurgents encountered more problems,
and the guerrillas may have
lost control of the city. Unable to root out the
insurgents by periodic sweeps, the Soviets and Afghans
apparently have had more success in limiting guerrilla
activity by "ringing" Qandahar with security
outposts.
The
new defensive perimeter evidently has made insurgent
movement in and out of the city more difficult,
especially in terms of keeping forces supplied with
materiel.
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Fightin in and around Ghazni increased during the
month. most of the
Soviet motorized rifle regiment in Ghazni was out on
operations after about 6 June. A traveler recently
told officials of the US Embassy in Kabul that
extensive destruction has made the approaches to Ghazni
virtual "free-fire zones."
(source of
the US Embassy said a Soviet-Afghan regime force that
conducted sweeps in two villages outside Ghazni
suffered heavy casualties in the fighting.
For most of June, Kabul remained fairly quiet, although
insurgent activity began to pick up at month's end.
The US Embassy in Kabul says the level of guerrilla
rocket attacks conducted against the capital is lower
than in 1984 and 1985.
Combat in the Northeastern Provinces
Soviet and Afghan
forces initiated an operation in the lower Panjsher
Valley in mid-month to expand the government's presence
in the upper reaches of insurgent leader Masood's home
region. Although information is scanty, few insurgent
groups were in the area, and the Soviet and Afghan
regime offensive probably had little impact.
Press reports indicate that regime forces had engaged
the guerrillas in combat around the Nazian section of
Nangarhar Province as of late June.
Army Roundups
During the month, the Afghan regime accelerated efforts
to resolve its continuing serious shortages of military
manpower. A decree on 6 June by the Politburo of the
People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA)
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stipulated that access by draft-age males to "higher
and vocational education establishments" at home and
abroad would depend on their completion of military
duty. The US Embassy in Kabul reported that Kabul's
recruitment centers were "awash" with new conscripts
brought in off the street or directly from schools.
Some boys as young as 15 years of age may have been
inducted into the military, and one foreign youth was
mistakenly nabbed and sent to the garrison at Khowst.
These press-gang tactics probably will have a
detrimental impact on the Afghan armed forces, even if
they succeed in increasing their size. Desertion will
almost certainly increase, and morale is also likely to
suffer. A concurrent flareup in factionalism within
the armed forces--stimulated by the changeover in the
leadership of the PDPA--is likely to hamper further the
Kabul regime's efforts to develop a proficient
military.
Pressure on Guerrilla Logistics
the insurgents
had increased problems during June in moving supplies
from Pakistan into some areas of Afghanistan. Soviet
and Afghan efforts to block key infiltration routes had
forced rerouting of supply trains, and transportation
costs for supply caravans have increased sharply.
Moreover, depopulation efforts in some areas have
reduced the support that insurgents were once able to
count on from local populations.
Priority objectives for the Soviets and Afghan regime
in the fighting over the next few months probably will
include curbing insurgent activity in Afghanistan's
second- and third-largest cities--Qandahar and Herat--
preventing Masood from further developing an insurgent
infrastructure in the north, and maintaining pressure
on the guerrillas' logistics system.
The use in the Eskamesh operation of a multiregimental
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task force, which relied heavily on artillery fire and
airstrikes, to hit insurgent targets will probably be
repeated in other key offensives this summer. Sweeps
by division-size task forces in past summer campaigns
have generally had disappointing results, probably
leading the Soviets to stress smaller operations. The
fighting in June also suggests that the Soviets will
continue to provide the core elements in major
offensives for some time, despite attempts earlier this
year to increase the combat role of the Afghan
military.
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Top Secret
Top Secret
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