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• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T01017R000302710001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: February 3, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 11, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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Central Intelligence Agency
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
11 July 1986
PAKISTAN: Responding to Recent Nuclear Demarches
Summary
We believe that Pakistan is determined to pursue its nuclear
weapons program, despite foreign pressure. President Zia is
likely to respond to the recent spate of hard-hitting demarches
from Washington and Moscow on nuclear weapons development by
making low-cost tactical concessions--such as temporarily halting
or slowing. uranium enrichment. Islamabad is even more likely to
continue its low-cost confidence-building efforts directed toward
India on the diplomatic front. But Zia will gamble that
Washington will not put nonproliferation concerns ahead of its
desire to have Pakistan continue to play a major role in
supporting the Afghan insurgency.
Committed to Acquiring a Nuclear Capability
We believe Islamabad is determined to pursue its nuclear weapons
program in the face of unprecedented superpower pressure not to do so.
Views expressed privately by many Pakistanis and occassional public
discussions of the nuclear issue indicate that Pakistanis believe their
country faces a serious and continued threat from India and a growing
threat from the Soviet Union; war with either could mean the end of
Pakistan as an independent nation.
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In our view, the Pakistanis believe they cannot count on outside help
in a war with either India or the Soviet Union. They believe that China,
thn Isiami,-. countries, and. especially, the United States have not
effe~rivc-P.. -;upporte:r PAk ,,n in its the wars with India. We believe
Zia's recent efforts at normalization with India have done little to allay
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Pakistani fears of dismemberment by India.
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This memorandum was prepared b
y
Pakistan/Bangladesh
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Branch, South Asia Division, and Issues Branch, Issues and
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Applications Division, Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis.
Comments and questions should be directed to Chief, South Asia Division,
f, Issues and Applications Division at
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NESA M#86-20105C
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COPOZ-of l/0
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Diplomatic reporting indicates the Pakistanis appreciate US military
assistance and believe it will help make Pakistan less--not more--dependent
on outside support. We judge, however, that the Pakistani military knows
it could never match Indian or Soviet conventional forces. In the view of
most Pakistanis, only the threat of nuclear retaliation would raise the
cost of victory to a level their enemies would find unacceptable.
We count both Zia and Prime Minister Junejo in this majority. Zia has
demonstrated genuine flexibility on other seemingly fundamental
issues--such as his Islamization program and the transition to civilian
rule--but his intransigence on the nuclear issue suggests that he considers
a nuclear deterrent indispensible. Available evidence suggests that Junejo
is far less involved in nuclear decision making, but 25X6
the traditional Pakistani suspicion of India 25X6
he betrays in unguarded moments lead us to believe he is convinced of the
need for nuclear weapons. Junejo, more than Zia, probably also sees the
nuclear issue as one of sovereignty. Junejo has been outspoken in his
criticism of a Western conspiracy aimed at preventing Pakistan from
acquiring nuclear technology. 25X1
Second-Guessing Washington
In our view, the Pakistanis are not convinced of Washington's
commitment to nonproliferation.
approval by the Administration for a significant ollow-on US aid program
probably has reinforced Islamabad's erce tion that Washington will not
jeopardize the Afghan program.
We believe, however, that Zia is almost certainly less confident about
Congressional views and probably doubts how many more times he can deny the
existence of a weapons program. Zia probably is concerned that the
Administration will share full intelligence on the nuclear program with
Congress. Even if Congress passes the multiyear aid package, he may fear
that it will require annual certification from the Administration before
releasing aid funds. Moreover, Zia probably worries that New Delhi's
lobbying efforts on the Hill against the Pakistani aid package could
succeed unless Indo-Pakistani rapprochement can be put back on track.
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Tactical Concessions Likely
Zia's doubts about the Congressional response and his strong desire for
continued US economic and strategic assistance probably will induce him to
make short-term concessions on the nuclear issue. In our view, such
concessions would mainly involve the pace of the program.
We judge that the Pakistanis may believe they are so close to achieving
a nuclear capability that a temporary slowing of the program--at least
until the aid package clears Congress next year--would not be a serious
threat to Pakistani security. Islamabad would hope that such a
response--even if it did not convince anyone that long-term nuclear goals
had been abandoned--would give its friends in the West ammunition to argue
for continued support for Pakistan.
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Diplomatic Steps
In our view, Pakistan will continue to try to reduce nuclear tensions
with India. We believe Indian representations to Moscow are at least
partly behind recent Soviet pressure. Although Islamabad maintains the
next step in reducing tensions is up to India, which has rejected
Pakistan's previous confidence-building proposals, Pakistani officials
probably believe they could regain the high ground by appearing to be
forthcoming on the issue. At virtually no cost, Pakistan could:
--Renew efforts to move forward on proposals it has already made to
India, such as the tentative agreement reached last year foreswearing
attacks on each other's nuclear installations or on a longstanding proposal
for declaring South Asia a nuclear weapons-free zone.
--Ratify the limited test ban treaty Pakistan signed in 1963. Foreign
Minister Yaqub Khan already has agreed to study this possibility.
--Renew an offer to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty if India
did or agree to mutual inspection of nuclear facilities
--Broach with New Delhi the idea of a "gentlemen's agreement" on the
non production of nuclear wea ons
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Pakistani acceptance of full-scope safeguards would be a convincing
gesture, but such a step is highly improbable because it would seriously
hamper--if not preclude--weapons production. In our judgment, the
Pakistanis do not believe US and Soviet pressure has reached a level to
warrant such a dramatic step.
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SUBJECT: Pakistan:
NESA M#86-20105C
DISTRIBUTION:
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INTERNAL
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DDI/NESA/IAA
(11Jul86)
33
71,,? 4 /,-
1 -
2 -
3 -
4 -
5 -
6 -
7 -
8 -
9 -
Responding to Recent Nuclear Demarches
Vice President Bush
Admiral Poindexter
Secretary Schultz
Secretary Weinberger
Admiral Crowe
Vincent Cannistraro
Shirin Tahir-Kheli
Robert Peck
Herbert Hagerty
10 - Ron Lorton
11 - Bob Upchurch
12 - James Devine
13 - Richard Kennedy
DCI/DDCI/Executive
DDI
NIO/NESA
NIO/AL
D/NESA
DD/NESA
C/PPS
C/IA/NESA
C/SO/NESA
C/IA/I
C/SO/P
C/OSWR/NED/NPB
C/NE
27 - CPAS/ISS
28-33 - CPAS/IMD/CB
34-35 - NESA/PPS
36 - C/OGI/NP
37 -
38 -
39 - C/NESA/PG
40 - C/NESA/AI
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