AFGHANISTAN-USSR: CAN THE AFGHAN REGIME SURVIVE AN 18-MONTH WITHDRAW TIMETABLE?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T01017R000302700001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 6, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 11, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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Central Intelligence Agency
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DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
11 July 1986
Afghanistan-USSR:
Can The Afghan Regime Survive An 18-month Withdrawal Timetable?
Summary
CIA analysts believe that the Soviet-backed government in
Kabul lacks the political institutions and the military strength
to survive if Soviet troops were required to withdraw in less
than one year following a peace agreement. Under an extended
withdrawal period--of three years or more--the Kabul government,
however, would have a fair chance of consolidating control and
surviving.
Analysts are divided over whether an 18-month timetable
would favor the
regime or the resistance. Most analysts do not believe that 18
months would be sufficient to allow the Afghan armed forces--even
with Soviet help--to significantly reduce the insurgency and
consolidate control. According to those analysts, even the
prospect of a relatively quick Soviet withdrawal would cause mass
desertions from the army and the government, leading to its quick
demise.
A minority of analysts argue there is a slightly better than
even chance that the Kabul regime could survive an 18-month
timetable, especially if the Soviets made good use of their
forces during the withdrawal period and a substantial Soviet
advisory contingent remained--backed up by air and artillery.
According to this line of reasoning, the replacement of Babrak
Karmal by the former intelligence chief Najibullah, gains by
Kabul in improving the armed forces and pacifying areas in the
north, the buying off of tribes and villagers through economic
incentives., the resistances long-:standing .divisiveness, and a
Pakistani aid cut-off, would probably enable the regime to endure
over an 18-month withdrawal period and beyond.
This typescript memorandum was prepared bye
the Afghanistan Branch, South Asia
Division, Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis. Information
available as of 23 June was used in its preparation. Comments are welcome
and may be directed to the Chief, South Asia Division,
NESA# 86-20104
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Our Assumptions
We focus on an 18-month timetable because it seems a plausible
compromise between Islamabad's call for a 3-6 month withdrawal, and Kabul's
offer of three-and-a-half years.
For the purposes of this memo, we assume that a Geneva-type agreement
would be reached within the next six months, that there will be Soviet
compliance with its terms, and:
--Islamabad would comply with the letter of the agreement and would
shut down all support for the resistance 30 days after an agreement
is reached.
--One-third of Soviet forces would leave Afghanistan at that time,
with the remaining two-thirds staying in-country for the better part
of the withdrawal period, as allowed in the draft agreements now
under discusssion.
--There would be no provision for a ceasefire in the agreement.
The Prevailing View -- The Regime Cannot Survive.,
Under the above assumptions, most analysts believe that the regime
would unravel quickly. This view is based primarily on our judgment that
the regime lacks popular support at any level outside of Kabul, is kept in
power primarily by Soviet troops and is badly divided on factional lines.
All the evidence shows that the Soviets have made only marginal progress
toward building a reliable army or party bureaucracy to maintain control.
Soviet and Afghan media commentary,
indicates that Babrak's recent removal from the top post reflected
Moscow's unhappiness with his inability to develop programs aimed at
consolidating Communist control or building a loyal cadre of. dedicated
Afghans to someday administer an effective pro-Soviet government.
The fragility of the ruling People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan
(PDPA) was underscored by the factionalism accompanying the replacement of
Party Secretary General Babrak Karmal by former intelligence chief
Najibullah. revealed deepseated hostility
to the leadership change on the part of members of the Parchami faction.
In addition to the highly unusual step of staging public protests, many
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Parchami members have become openly anti-Soviet,
Moreover, clashes between pro-Babrak and pro-Karmal
forces are occurring in the military as Najibullah seeks to consolidate his
power there.
We believe the regime's leaders--and perhaps much of the military
leadership--would begin to panic with the withdrawal of the first Soviet
troops and either seek to make deals with the resistance or flee the
country in order to survive. The disintegration of the party and
government structure would quickly follow as mid-and lower-level officials
realized that the government was collapsing around them.
.. The Soviets already have a keen appreciation of the divided loyalties
in the Afghan armed forces. According to press reports, during Babrak's
removal in May Afghan Army units were disarmed largely to prevent outbreaks
of factional strife.
We believe the psychological impact of a withdrawal announcement would
also set in motion an unraveling in the armed forces. The Afghan army has
gained slightly in effectiveness, but still has shown almost no capability
to operate without massive Soviet air support or to conduct sustained or
successive campaigns. Manpower levels within the Afghan army remain
critically low--less than 50 percent of authorized strength--and the
officer corps is riddled with disloyal individuals despite several recent
purges. during one five-day
period in January, 47 Afghan officers and soldiers deserted from three
posts in Paghman, west of Kabul, taking with them their personal weapons,
two 82-mm mortars, three rocket flamethrowers, and five light machine guns.
Afghan Army Chief of Staff Tani admitted in
June that the desertion rate for the first quarter of the year was 35 to 40
percent higher than for the same period last year
Most analysts believe the Soviets would have to reduce the scale of
their military activity against the insurgents considerably during the
withdrawal period and would be unable to deliver a,knockout punch against
them. To execute a.highly visible withdrawal,. they believe approximately
40 of the present 110 combat maneuver battalions would be removed to meet
the initial withdrawal requirement of the proposed agreement (see box: How
the Withdrawal Might Look). The Soviet loss of over 35 percent of their
combat units will force'them to focus most of the remaining combat and
support units on security for.the withdrawing forces and lines of
communication, while attempting to reduce risks to remaining units. Under
this withdrawal scenario, the early departure of the airborne division from
Kabul--one of the most active offensive units in-country--would, in our
view, constrain Soviet offensive or rapid response capabilities, as well as
redistribute the burden for securing Kabul.
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We believe that sufficient military supplies will be available to the
insurgency to allow it to challenge the Kabul regime. Prior to the
enactment-of an agreement, the insurgents would cache weapons and
ammunition inside Afghanistan--something which is already taking place.
Although loss of military assistance from the Pakistanis would be a blow,
it would require the insurgents to return to small-unit, less
resource-intense tactics--to which they are particularly suited. We also
expect deserting Afghan military personnel--many with weapons and
equipment--to increase as Soviet withdrawals take place and to play an
important role in supplying.the insurgents. Captured weapons and
ammunition from vulnerable Afghan paramilitary units--police, border
battalions, and local militias--will also provide needed arms to continue
the insurgency. Operations against the Kabul regime under these
conditions, in our opinion could continue almost indefinitely, albeit at a
low level.
If and when an agreement is signed, we believe the insurgents would
continue to use Islam as a rallying point for opposition to the Najibullah
regime. We believe the intensity and long duration of the war have
intensified religious opposition to the regime's Leninist policies.
Despite factionalism, many insurgent groups share a strong belief in--and
are highly motivated by--Islamic religious ideology. In some areas, this
opposition has been personified in the mullahs, who have assumed new
political and military leadership roles.
A key variable in this scenario--and one on which we have little
information--is the possibility that a substantial Soviet advisory presence
might be allowed to remain under a Soviet-Afghan bilateral agreement that
will accompany the Geneva agreement. The bilateral, which spells out the
length of the withdrawal timetable, could also oblige Moscow to provide
continued air support for Afghan army units from planes based in the Soviet'
Union. We believe Soviet advisors--present down to the battalion
level--and their ability to call in Soviet artillery and air strikes are
largely responsible for the recent slight improvement in performance of the
Afghan army, particularly during recent sweeps in eastern Afghanistan.
Most analysts-believe that a substantial Soviet advisory presence--with air
support,from planes based in the Soviet Union--would enhance the staying
power of the Afghan army, but not enough to ensure the regime's survival.
The Alternative View
The minority view argues that Soviet artillery and air support could be
decisive during the 18-month withdrawal period. These analysts believe
that there are already signs that the regime is gradually expanding its
control, building a political infrastructure and improving the ability of
its military forces. These analysts argue that the regime will be able to
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conduct a reasonably intensive military campaign against resistance-forces
during the 18-month withdrawal period because of continuing air.support
from planes based in the Soviet Union and because the Soviet military
position--including supporting artillery units--will be strongest in the
most critical areas of eastern Afghanistan. Under these circumstances,
these analysts believe that the regime would have a slightly better than
even chance of enduring a Soviet withdrawal and standing on its own after
the withdrawal was completed.
Analysts who hold this view expect the Soviets to act vigorously to
keep the pressure on to ensure the regime's survival. They expect
Soviet-Afghan forces to maintain, if not intensify, their attacks on
insurgent supply caches, resistance bases, and logistics lines during the
withdrawal period. Moscow will probably prefer to support Afghan ground
units with heavy Soviet air and artillery support to boost Afghan Army
morale and ensure that any successes appear to be theirs alone. This
strategy has already been used with some success during the Army's capture
of an insurgent base camp at Zhawar Kili in April and in the Qandahar area,
although its sweeps in Nangarhar Province proved less fruitful. Our
estimate of Moscow's preferred withdrawal scenario, moreover, indicates
that the Soviets will be well-positioned in Eastern Afghanistan--with
Spetsnaz troops, air, and artillery assets. All Spetsnaz and artillery
units, for example, would remain in place in the east, and could be
bolstered by redeployments from the south and west, if necessary.
The early actions and regime media coverage of NajibullahE
suggest that the new administration
will also be pushing in several areas--political and economic--to build a
strong party and increase popular support. Najib has the vigor that the
ailing Babrak Karmal lacked. He has already cut back Kabul's more radical
social and economic programs, paid more attention to Islam, invited
non-party participation in the government, and spent a good deal of time
and money bribing tribes and local elites to remain neutral in the
conflict, if not to actively support the government.
The minority view believes this strategy has begun to pay limited
dividends.. Attempts by Kabul officials to secure the cooperation--or at
least neutrality--of tribal chiefs in Qandahar, Zabol and Helmand Provinces
are making sufficient inroads to be of concern to Afghan resistance
leaders, US academic experts on
Afghanistan believe Kabul also is having more success gaining the
cooperation of border tribes in Paktia and Nangarhar provinces, to the
detriment of resistance logistics in these areas. Najib can take some
credit for these successes: as head of the Afghan intelligence directorate
he orchestrated several councils of pro-government tribal leaders; his
Pashtun heritage should help the regime expand these efforts during his
tenure as party chief.
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These analysts also believe the regime will be able-to manipulate
tension between.-ideologically motivated "young turks" in the resistance and
local elites--such as tribal or village chiefs--to advance pacification
efforts in some local areas. Because the power of traditional elites is
threatened by militant resistance commanders seeking revolutionary change
and an Islamic government, they believe at least some tribal leaders will
strike deals during the period of uncertainty following the Soviet
withdrawal in an effort to preserve their authority. Even a moderately
successful tribal policy would, in their view, allow the government to
create enclaves of peaceful territory to which the Afghan refugees could
return.
The Afghan government is increasing its control over major cities--a
strategy we believe will forma basis for expanding their control over
Afghanistan after the Soviets leave. The government has improved its
position in Kabul by enlarging its defense perimeter--through the
construction of outposts and bypass roads--and placed the responsibility
for manning these defenses largely in Afghan hands. According to the US
Embassy in Kabul, this has effectively reduced insurgent activity to a
nuisance level and allowed the Afghan regime to consolidate its control of
the capital last year, when the city was noticeably auieter and security
forces much less evident than in the past.
Although the regime cannot claim the same level of control in Qandahar
or Herat, it is beginning to apply the lessons it learned in Kabul.
Soviet-Afghan forces recently 25X1
began to extend their perimeter security around Qandahar and to build
bypass roads in an effort to eliminate the very strong insurgent presence
in the city with some success in our view. Even in the insurgent bastion
of Herat--where Ismail Khan has waged a determined effort despite
problematic supply lines--the US Embassy reports that a significant number
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The minority view argues that the 18-month withdrawal scenario would
probably enable the regime to build on these marginal gains--allowing Kabul
to gain control of the cities and major lines of communication to the
Soviet Union, while undercutting insurgent control of other areas (in the
south and west) through continued heav aerial bombardment and terror
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The analysts who hold this view do not believe the Soviets see control
of the entire country as essential to the survivability of a Communist
regime. Afghanistan has never had a strong central government, but rather
has been a loose confederation of regions and tribes that have made
political accommodations with whoever was in power in Kabul. We thus
expect Soviet strategy to focus on fatally weakening the insurgency in the
north and east--the most strategically important areas--in the ho that
the troublesome southwest would eventually follow suit. 25X1
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Because the insurgents would be cut off from their major sources of
external support-under-the draft agreement now being negotiated, the
analysts who hold this view believe that the resistance would almost
certainly experience a serious degradation of its combat capabilities as
arms caches are depleted. They also believe the loss of Pakistani
sanctuaries--a critical ingredient in other guerrilla wars--will be a major
setback for insurgent military capabilities and, in turn, morale.
According to analysts who support the alternative view, longstanding
resistance weaknesses--disunity, preoccupation with emigre politics, and
dependence on external supplies--will undercut its ability to meet a
determined Soviet-Afghan effort-:_-Although some commanders--notably Ahmad
Shah Masood in the Panjsher Valley--are relatively well-placed to cope with
a cutoff of these supply lines because of their effective military
organization and attention to building caches, they believe that many
resistance groups would simply collapse under the shock of such an abrupt
change. The disunity of the resistance leadership both in Peshawar and
inside Afghanistan will also limit the resistance's military effectiveness.
They would expect this infighting to intensify as the Soviet withdrawal
approaches--a time when each group will be increasingly focused on gaining
political and military advantage for the ultimate struggle for power in
Kabul. We believe this will make it easier for the Soviets and regime
forces to gain the upper hand militarily.
Key Factors to Watch
The following list represents the variables we believe are critical to
assessing the relative strengths of both sides during the period leading up
to the signing of a peace agreement and beyond. Much of what occurs during
a withdrawal rests on local perceotions of who is winning, shifts in
morale, and other intangibles.
Afghan Army Performance: The ability of the regime to develop unit
cohesion and better morale in the Afghan Army will be a key element if it
is to survive even the initial hints of a Soviet pullout. We believe the
frequency of independent Afghan Army operations, its ability to follow up
on intelligence and preempt insurgent attacks, to capture insurgent base
camps and caches, to disrupt supply routes, and to prevent or slow
desertions will-be indicators of the Afgharr-Army's-performance.
Development of Reliable Political Cadre. Second only to the risk of
Army collapse is the risk of disintegration in the People's Democratic
Party of Afghanistan and the government's bureaucratic infrastructure.
Indicators of regime collapse from within would include increased
factionalism in the Party; frequent purges; evidence of tribal chiefs and
others siding with the insurgents; reduced travel of high-level officials
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because of security concerns; and defections of party members to the
resistance.
Resistance Capabilities and Morale. Insurgent operations are hampered
by political disunity, poor leadership, and insufficient training in
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susceptible to cyclical changes, and yet one of the key elements to
insurgent success. The loss of external support will probably be extremely
demoralizing to the resistance, perhaps causing defections of some leaders
and a greater polarization of the resistance political spectrum. To assess
morale changes, we will need to pay attention to how well the insurgents
are able to defend their base camps, logistics routes, and caches, and to
the ability of the resistance to establish external supply routes through
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Refugee Movements. The size of the number of refugees willing to
return to Afghanistan when the agreement is signed should indicate the
degree of confidence they have in the government's ability to provide for
their security.
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How The Withdrawal Might Look*
The Soviets will design a troop withdrawal that will leave them in as
strong a military position as possible, while remaining believable to
Pakistan, the United States, and the world community. At a minimum, the
Soviets will want to protect their lines of communication while withdrawing
and put out "fires" the Afghan troops cannot handle on their own. Such a
withdrawal would, in our view:
--Leave a sufficient Soviet presence in all major regions of the
country to maintain government control of important cities and lines
of communications.
--Leave the strongest Soviet presence in eastern Afghanistan to
protect Kabul and patrol the Pakistani border.
--Leave all Spetsnaz units in place. We do not believe the Soviets
could increase the number of Spetsnaz units prior to implementing a
withdrawal and still appear sincere.
--Require that support troops be pulled out along with the troops they
support.
--Involve pulling out the airborne division from Kabul, but leave in
place other airborne forces and Spetsnaz units. We believe the
Kabul-based airborne division would be removed because of the
improved security in the capital and the ease with which it could be
reintroduced.
*Troop withdrawal arrangements are to be part of a bilateral Soviet-Afghan
agreement, the details of which will probably not be made available to
Pakistan.
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The Soviets probably would not decrease their fighter-bomber strength
in Afghanistan and might increase their utilization of air assets based in
the southern USSR to support Afghan Army operations. Helicopter strength
would probably be reduced by about one-third.
Sufficient logistic and maintenance support and command and control
assets would remain throughout the withdrawal and could occasionally
function at peak levels, in our view. The Turkestan military district
would have to assume a greater support load, but the Soviets have greatly
improved over the period of the war the military infrastructure in
Turkestan to better support operations in Afghanistan.
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NESA M# 86-20104
DISTRIBUTION:
EXTERNAL:
DOD: 1 - Fred We
1 - Ambassador Pelletreau (ISA)
DAS Peck
Charles Dunbar, Special Assistant for Afghanistan
Herb Haggerty, Afghan Desk
Desiree Milliken, Afghan Desk
Morton Abramowitz
Ron Lorton, INR
George Harris, INR
Michael Armacost
Richard Solomon
Zalmay Khalilzad
NSC: 1 - Vincent Cannistraro
1 - Steve Sestanovich
1 - Peter Rodman
2 PPS/NESA
6 CPAS,IMB,CB
1 - DC/DDO/NE~
1 - PDB
DIR/DCI/DDCI Exec Staff
DDI
NIO/NESA
NIO/USSR
VC/NIC
C/PES
D/ODA
D/OIA
D/SOVA
D/NESA
DD/NESA
C/PPS/NESA
NID
C/NESA/AI
1 - C/NESA/IA
1 - C/NESA/SO
1 - DC/NESA/SO
1 - C/NESA/SO/A
1 - NESA/SO/A
DDI/NESA/SO/A 11July86)
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