AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T01017R000302490001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 3, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000302490001-2 &
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Directorate of DOC NO Intelligence + ~. r
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Afghanistan Situation Report
79-81
IMC/C8
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AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT I 25X1
CONTENTS
INCREASED WFP DONATIONS FOR AFGHAN REFUGEESI 2 25X1
Donations to the World Food Proqram's 1986 relief
program for Afghan refugees have increased by 10
percent over last year's contributions but still
fall short of the target levels set by Pakistan.
VOICE OF AFGHANISTAN SPREADS THE WORD ~ 4 25X1
The voice of Afghanistan, the clandestine radio
station which serves as an important propaganda
tool for the resistance, has operated since 1978,
despite Soviet and regime efforts to disrupt its
broadcasts.
IN BRIEF 4
3 JUNE 1986
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TOP SECRET
PERSPECTIVE
AFGHANISTAN: NAJIBULLAH SETTLES IN I 6
New Afghan party leader Najibullah has moved
quickly to consolidate power. Despite his
efforts, the regime probably will not make much
headway against the insurgency because of the
government's longstandinq problems.
This document is prepared weekly by the Office of
Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis and th
Office of Soviet Analysis.
3 June 1986
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TOP SECRET
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Afghanistan
International boundary
Province boundary
National capital
Province capital
Railroad
Road
0 50 100 150 200 Kilometers
0 50 100 150 200 Miles
3 June 1986
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TOP SECRET
INCREASED WFP DONATIONS FOR AFGHAN REFUGEES
Donations to the World Food Program's (WFP) 1986 relief
program for Afghan refugees in Pakistan have increased
over 1985 levels, reversing a trend of declining
international support. In 1985, total wheat pledges
declined about 5 percent from the previous year, and
Islamabad was forced to use wheat from its own stocks
to meet refuqee needs. Although pledges this year for
361,000 metric tons of wheat--up 10 percent over last
year's--meet WFP goals, they still fall short of target
levels set by Pakistan. Islamabad officially estimates
that it will require 500,000 metric tons to support 2.6
million registered and over 300,000 unregistered Afghan
COMMENT: These figures indicate that Islamabad
probably will again be asked to draw on its own stocks
3 June 1986
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to supplement WFP donations. Although the Pakistani
Government probably will consent, it is sensitive to
the political ramifications of the issue of the
economic burden imposed on Pakistan by Afghan
refugees.
3 June 1986
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TOP SECRET
VOICE OF AFGHANISTAN SPREADS THE WORD
A publication of the Hizbi Islami (Gulbuddin) insurgent
group recently detailed the programming of the
clandestine station, Voice of Afghanistan. In
operation since 1978, the station broadcasts daily a
mix of Quran verses, war bulletins, and world
commentaries on the Afghan situation during four two-
hour segments. Most of the broadcasts are in Pashto
and Persian--Farsi and Dari--with some Uzbek-,
English-, and Russian-language programs. The
insurgents have occasionally had to relocate the
transmitter and change frequencies because of Soviet
jamming and bombing attacks on the broadcast site.
COMMENT: The broadcasts are an important propaganda
tool for the Afghan insurgents, given the ready
availability of radios and a 70-percent illiteracy rate
of the Afghan population. Pashto programs probably are
more popular than Farsi or Dari broadcasts, according
to a USIA survey in 1984 of radio listeners in the
Northwest Frontier Province refugee camps.
Pakistani Prime Minister Junejo is planning an
Afghan policy review meeting, according to the US
Embassy in Islamabad. The main item on the agenda
apparently will be a review of the Geneva peace
talks, although the Afghan media Project and cross-
border humanitarian assistance also may be
On 19 May, the Indonesian news agency Antara quoted
several Indonesian leaders who condemned the Soviet
Union for its policies in Afghanistan and urged an
immediate troop withdrawal. Many of the leaders
are affiliated with Muslim organizations; at least
one member of a secular political party also voiced
Kabul television on 26 May showed Babrak Karmal,
former head of the People's Democratic Party of
Afghanistan, attending a meeting of the Democratic
Youth Organization of Afghanistan. This was
Karmal's first public appearance since 8 May and
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probably was arranged to allay concern among his
supporters about his absence from public view.
According to the US Embassy in Kabul, Karmal seemed
to be weary and "subdued."
-- The Afghan government recently announced an amnesty
program for deserters and draft dodgers. Within the
next six months, servicemen will be allowed to
return voluntarily to their units or surrender to
the regime to complete their remaining
obligation. The lenient terms of the program
probably were motivated primarily by the serious
shortage of manpower in the Afghan military.
The pilot of a Pan American jet, told by Soviet air
controllers on 30 May to delay entry into Soviet
airspace on a flight from Karachi to Frankfurt,
took the aircraft back to Karachi. The incident,
which the pilot called "deliberate harassment,"
occurred on a route that has just become
operational. The airline only recently obtained
authorization from the Soviets and Afghans to
overfly their airspace.
Jamaica's leading independent newspaper--the
Gleaner--carried an editorial on 17 May that stated
the recent change in Afghan leadership did not
indicate a fundamental change in Soviet objectives
in Afghanistan. The anti-Soviet commentary
generally reflects the Jamaican Government's stance
on the Afghan Issue.
3 June 1986
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TOP SECRET
AFGHANISTAN: NAJIBULLAH SETTLES IN
New Afghan party chief Najibullah is moving quickly to
consolidate power, although some opposition within the
ruling People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA)
remains. He is focusing on strengthening the party and
the army, using his good tribal ties to undermine the
resistance, and launching a major effort to attract
refugees back to Afghanistan. Despite his efforts, the
regime probably will not make much headway against the
insurgency because of the government's longstanding
problems--party factionalism, a weak military, and the
absence of popular support.
Removing Babrak Karmal
Babrak Karmal's ouster came amidst signs of growing
impatience in Moscow at his inability--after more than
six years of war--to build an effective party
apparatus, broaden popular support, or strengthen the
armed forces.
27th Soviet Communist Party Congress in February,
Soviet leader Gorbachev announced that the Soviet Union
and Afghanistan had worked out a timetable for Soviet
troop withdrawal; Karmal made no reference to this
announcement during his speech to the Congress and
instead suggested that Afghanistan was not ready to
stand on its own. Although we doubt that the Soviet
Union is ready to leave Afghanistan any time soon,
there probably is considerable tension between Kabul
and Moscow over the peace negotiations in Geneva and
the sensitive issue of a withdrawal timetable-
Officially.
Najibullah was probably selected by Moscow in hopes
that he could build a more effective regime. He is a
proven administrator who, as head of the Afghan
intelligence service (KHAD), increased its size and
effectiveness dramatically, orchestrated two highly
publicized tribal councils, and masterminded Kabul's
destabilization program in Pakistan's border regions.
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The Transition
Despite Moscow's apparent support for Najibullah, the
appointment was contentious. The Central Committee
plenum which elected Najib met amid tight security for
three days--perhaps an indication that some high level
party leaders were opposed to the move.
Strong party opposition to Najibullah's advancement may
have prompted the Soviets to keep Babrak on the
Politburo and the Revolutionary Council.
Reqime media are portrayinq the
transition as a move to a triumvirate, with Najibullah
as party head, Babrak Karmal as President of the
Revolutionary Council, and Prime Minister Soltan Ali
Keshtmand as head of government.
Nevertheless, the transition proceeded fairly smoothly
--there was no bloodshed--and security in the capital
is now back to normal. According to the US Embassy in
Kabul, most Politburo members--with the exception of
Babrak and Anahita Ratebzad--were dispatched to the
provinces in mid-May to promote the change in
leadership among concerned party members. Najibullah's
other major opponents--Interior Minister Gulabzoi and
Defense Minister Nazar Mohammad--have either publicly
endorsed Najibullah or appeared by his side at public
ceremonies since his promotion, indicating at least a
tacit acceptance of his new status.
We believe the troika style of leadership will
gradually disappear, as Najibullah puts his own team in
positions of power. Babrak and Keshtmand are now
rarely seen in public.
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Najibullah's Agenda
Najibullah's most formidable challenge will be to build
strong institutions of state control, especially the
army. He will almost certainly try to meet Soviet
demands that the Afghan armed forces assume more of the
burden of fighting the war. Najibullah will also be
under the gun to replicate the army's success in April
in overrunning an insurgent base camp in eastern
Afghanistan.
Najibullah's ability to subvert border tribes in order
to interfere with resistance resupply activities will
be a major factor in determininq the success of this
strategy. Most observers believe that Najibullah's
Pashtun heritage and proven ability as intelligence
chief to work with border tribes suit him to the task,
but tribal loyalties are notoriously fickle and he will
likely make only limited gains.
Kabul and Moscow are sure to continue their camoaiqn of
military pressure and sabotage against Pakistan--which
Moscow almost certainly views as the "weak link" of the
insurgency. Violations of Pakistani air space have
escalated markedly in recent months, and bombings in
Peshawar frequently occur.
Najibullah also has a mandate to widen the public
appeal of the regime, in part by improving party
discipline and performance. Soviet media coverage of
Najibullah's early public statements highlight his
attacks on party laxity, corruption, and
ineffectiveness at the local level. In particular,
"faulty implementation" of policies aimed at tribal
minorities, students and businessmen was cited. These
statements suggest that Najibullah will intensify
Babrak's effort to broaden the social base of the
regime by appealing to tribal leaders, ethnic
representatives, and clergymen--with whom he has
already met.
Apparently as part of this effort, Najibullah said in a
late May speech to religious leaders in Mazar-e Sharif
that the qovernment would establish a bicameral
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legislature, or shura, in the next few months. The
legislature is to consist of a council of
nationalities--with equal representation of all ethnic
groups in Afghanistan--and an elected council of
representatives of the people. Najibullah invited
resistance participation in the elections, presumably
in the hope of enticing resistance defections.
Kabul is also trying to lure refugees back to
Afghanistan in order to gain political legitimacy. In
late May Najibullah directly appealed to the refugee
community, calling for reconciliation with "those of
our countrymen who are wandering abroad in misery."
His statements follow earlier reports indicating that
Kabul has established a commission to oversee land
distribution to returning refugees and has instructed
its embassy in India to encourage refugee return.
Prospects
The longer it takes to unify the party around its
leadership, the more difficult it will be for
Najibullah to address the regime's serious weaknesses--
a demoralized army and ineffective local party
control. Najibullah's appointment has brought to the
surface serious divisions within even the dominant
Parchami wing of the party, and his reputation for
ruthlessness against the rival Khalqi faction suggests
that opposition to his appointment in the military,
where Khalqis dominate, is bound to arise. In this
environment, he will be hard pressed to raise morale in
the army and improve its effectiveness.
Barring a collapse of external support for the
resistance, Najibullah probably will be unable to make
serious inroads against the insurgency in the near
term. His appeal for resistance participation in the
upcoming elections will have little effect, in our
view, because the insurgents consistently reject
participation in a Communist-dominated government.
Nevertheless, Najibullah will probably capitalize on
the regime's recent marginal gains in some urban areas
and in northern Afghanistan to redirect military forces
to and increase pressure in the east, particularly
against insurgent resupply operations.
3 June 1986
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Top Secret
Top Secret
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