(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T01017R000202390001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: March 4, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 13, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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SUBJECT: EMERGING ISSUES IN NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA
Internal (con't.)
1 - PPS/NESA
1 - C/PES
1 - D/OGI
1 - SOVA/TWAD
1 - D/OSWR
1 - DDO/NE
1 - PDB Staff
1 - NID Staff
1 - CPAS/ILS
4 - CPAS/IMC/CB
1 - C/NESA/AI
1 - C/NESA/IA
1 - C/NESA/PG
1 - C/NESA/SO
1 - NESA/IA/Chrono
DDI/NESA/Issues & Applications
DATE lp L2
DOC NO,145~54 /1 F(,-,(0071
OCR
P&PD /
(30MAY86) 25X1
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SUBJECT: EMERGING ISSUES IN THE NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA
External
The Honorable Michael H. Armacost
State
The Honorable Richard W. Murphy
State
Mr. Richard Solomon
State
Mr. Walter Anderson
State
Mr. Steven Cohen
State
Mr. Ronald Lorton
State
Mr. Aaron Miller
State
Mr. Ronald Neumann
State
Mr. Roscoe Suddarth
State
Mr. Wayne White
State
The Honorable Richard L. Armitage
Pentagon
Mr. Robert H. Pelletreau
Pentagon
Ms. Sandra Charles
Pentagon
Mr. Peter Rodman
NSC
Mr. Donald R. Fortier
NSC
Mr. Douglas Mulholland
Treasury
Internal
1 - DDI
1 - D/DCI-DDCI Executive Staff
1 - NIO/NESA
1 - NIO/At Large
1 - VC/NIC
1 - NIC/AC
1 - D/NESA
1 - DD/NESA
1 - C/PPS/NESA
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Central Intelligence Agency
Washington.D.C20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
13 May 1986
EMERGING ISSUES IN THE NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA
Executive Summary
Many of the major problems that will face the Near East and South Asia
over the next several years will be variations of existing, long- festering
difficulties. There is no reason to suppose, however, that the next decade
will not also see some major, sea-change developments comparable to those
that occurred during the past ten years, such as Sadat's peace initiative,
the Iranian revolution, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
An issue that is already with us but will assume a different form in
the mid-1990s is the impact of the world oil market on the region. By 1995
oil prices may once again be skyrocketing. If so, we are likely to be faced
with a rejuvenated, reorganized, and perhaps a trimmed-down OPEC that will
be a potent regional and political organization as well as an economic
cartel.
In the near term, however, the region must weather the economic and
political effects of lower oil prices. The issues that a soft oil market
pose for the region are:
Economic effects: How severe will be such problems as debt
servicing, capital flight, increased dependence on foreign
aid, a brain drain, and slow growth?
This paper was prepared by the Special Projects Center of the Office of Near
Eastern and South Asian Analysis. Comments and queries are welcome and may
be directed to Chief, Issues and Analysis Division, NESA
NESA M 86-20071
25X1
25X1
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Political impact: How will regimes handle the hard choices
between implementing economic austerity now to pave the way
for future development versus buying off discontented groups
to preempt challenges to regime authority?
Interstate relations: How sharp will disagreements become
among oil producers trying to maintain revenues and how
aggressive will larger, resource-poor states be in trying to
extract aid and other concessions from smaller, richer
neighbors?
In addition to the oil glut, the region will also face problems
associated with a shortage of other natural resources. There will almost
certainly be discord over access to water--particularly in the Levant, the
Fertile Crescent, and the Nile Valley. Land resources, especially in South
Asia, will be taxed by population growth and bad management.
In the face of these problems, governments will try a variety of new
ideological, political, and economic formulas. Many regimes will take steps
to privatize portions of their economies--particularly agriculture, small
industry, domestic commerce, and foreign trade. Economic liberalization and
the enlargement of the middle class may prompt expanded political
participation, calling into question the future role of several of the
region's monarchies. In other countries--probably including Syria, Iraq,
Iran, and Morocco--continued authoritarianism and popular alienation from
politics are more likely. In still other states, heightened instability may
prompt increased repression and possibly lead to radical populist regimes.
Although we will search for early signs of the next sweeping,
region-wide ideological trend--comparable to pan-Arabism in the 1950s and
1960s and Islamic fundamentalism in the 1970s and 1980s--we need to
concentrate on analyzing the parochial sentiments and concerns that will
shape the ideologies in regional states. The most significant currents are
likely to be:
State-oriented nationalism. Arab unification efforts by
Qadhafi and others will continue but will inspire little
enthusiasm.
Religious revivalism. Rather then asking whether religious
sentiment in general is rising or waning, we will be looking
at contests between reformist, conservative, modernist, or
other strains of Islam and the more extreme fundamentalist
movements. Hindu revivalism in India will assume equally
diverse forms, while religious extremism might increasingly
polarize Israeli politics.
Pragmatism. The region is likely to see much ideological
eclecticism, as even those regimes that have a strong
revolutionary ideology pay less attention to party dogma
than to what works.
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We can assume that in many cases, the new solutions will not work and
that many regimes will face serious internal instability. As a result of
the economic slowdown, existing inequalities and competition among social
groups will be magnified. In the more heterogeneous states (Algeria, North
Yemen, Sudan, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, India, and Pakistan, for example)
religious and ethnic divisions are likely to sharpen. In more homogeneous
societies (such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Kuwait, and Tunisia), class
distinctions will become the focus of economic and political competition.
The increasingly uneven distribution of job opportunities will spur the
migration of labor, causing economic dislocations, social friction, and
political tensions in both sending and receiving areas. Returning workers
from the oil-producing states will become more disaffected as they are
unable to find new jobs. Migration to the cities will severely strain urban
services. Large cities throughout the region will be focal points for
social tensions as well as growth, with young city-dwellers who are
frustrated by unemployment and high prices becoming likely participants in
periodic civil disorders.
Crime and anarchic violence could produce more "Beiruts," with central
governments losing effective control of other cities, and with rival ethnic,
religious, or class groups claiming authority over different sectors. As
disorders grow, governments are likely to call more frequently on their
armies to restore order, increasing the politicization of these armies and
undermining their external defense missions. The unrest will bring
opportunities for meddling by unfriendly neighboring states or by the
Soviets.
The management of socioeconomic problems will be complicated by a spate
of leadership changes, after a decade or more of surprising continuity.
Health factors alone place the leaders of Tunisia, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and
Iran at moderate to high risk of death or incapacitation during the next few
years. Few successions will be smooth, and we will need to examine the role
of various interest groups, including students, internal security elements,
and the military to explain what may come to be a wave of military coups.
Certain worst-case scenarios growing out of internal instability will
have to be kept in mind. One is for fractionation of unstable states along
ethnic or regional lines, with Sudan, Iran, India, and Pakistan being
probably the most vulnerable. Another scenario, which could hit the more
homogeneous states as well, is a broader political collapse and drastic
realignment--with Egypt being potentially the biggest horror story, bearing
in mind the regionally destabilizing aftereffects and the US interests that
would be at stake.
When it comes to inter-state conflict, the region is likely to be at
least as unstable in the next several years as it is now. Many external
conflicts will be fueled by nationalist, religious, and ethnic fervor, as
regimes exploit restive minorities in rival neighboring states. Moreover,
inexperienced leadership and imperfect brinkmanship will increase the risk
of armed conflict.
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The Arab-Israeli stalemate is likely to remain a fixation of Middle
Eastern politics and diplomacy for some time to come. With domestic
pressures in Israel reducing the possibilities for a territorial settlement
and the Arabs hamstrung by disunity and a de facto Syrian veto over
settlement efforts, the risk of a new Israeli-Syrian war, extensive violence
on the West Bank, and Palestinian unrest in Jordan will grow. Nonetheless,
we will need to be attuned to the less likely but more sanguine scenarios,
which would involve, if not an outright settlement of the dispute, at least
a reduction in its salience or intensity.
As for other interstate conflicts, the Asian subcontinent probably will
have the greatest danger of tensions leading, inadvertently or otherwise, to
a major shooting war. In this case, Indian and Pakistani mutual suspicions
over the nuclear issue carry the risk of preemptive action leading to war.
Elsewhere in the area, the dominant scenario is for wars already
underway to continue--especially the two largest ones, Iran-Iraq and
Afghanistan. Although the possibility of expansion or escalation of any of
the conflicts, particularly Iran-Iraq, will deserve continued attention, we
will also need to examine the possibilities for peace. Specifically, we
will need to look at what events could serve as catalysts for settlement,
which mechanisms could get belligerents to the peace table, what would be
the likely shape of a settlement, and what would be the ramifications for
regional stability and US interests.
Wars in the region will tend to be more lethal, because of the
acquisition of new types of military hardware. Nuclear-programs in
Pakistan, India, and Israel, and possibly those in Iran and Iraq, will
increase the danger of a conflict or incident involving nuclear weapons.
Many NESA countries also will develop and stockpile chemical and biological
munitions as a supplement or cheaper alternative to nuclear weapons. During
the next several years, a few states are likely to acquire new long-range
weapons systems, and several will attempt to acquire and exploit high
technology to develop their own arms industries.
Domestic grievances and regional tensions will fuel additional
terrorism, which is likely to become more diverse and widespread. A growing
proportion of terrorism originating in the area is likely to feature
nihilistic violence by ad hoc groups, while regimes in the region probably
will continue a more calculated, coercive brand of terrorism. Middle
Eastern terrorists will continue to strike targets of opportunity within the
region but are also likely to step up operations in Europe and possibly the
United States. Terrorism within the region may undercut the legitimacy of
governments and compel some of them to curtail civil liberties further.
The growing military potential of a few of the larger Near Eastern
and South Asian states will contribute to the expansion of their region-wide
influence. India, in particular, will use its huge population, extensive
resource base, and pool of talent to secure a major regional role. It also
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has the potential to become the major naval power in the Indian Ocean by the
mid-1990s. Iran, once it extracts itself from war, is likely to become more
active in Afghanistan and throughout the Persian Gulf, and Egypt retains the
military capability to keep the Libyans off balance and the Sudanese mindful
of political missteps.
Both the United States and the USSR will find it more difficult to
protect their interests in the area for several reasons, including:
--The increased clout of regional powers;
--An overall trend in favor of nonalignment;
--Increased intra-regional cooperation; and
--Greater involvement of other extraregional states, including
Western Europe, Japan, China, and the newly industrialized
states of the Far East.
As a result, we will need to be on the lookout for where, and how far, US
ties to allies in the region will slip, and where there will be the best
openings for enhanced US influence in states with traditionally strong ties
to Moscow.
Besides the factors working against both superpowers, each will face its
own obstacles to influence. The US will continue to be handicapped by such
things as the perception that the US is ignoring Arab interests in the
Arab-Israeli dispute, fundamentalist resentment of Western cultural
intrusion, and identification of the US with the interests of local elites.
The Soviets will make every effort to exploit these US weaknesses, but
will face major handicaps of their own. These include resentment over
Afghanistan, suspicion of Soviet expansionist and subversive intentions, the
anti-Communist aspects of Islam, and, perhaps most of all, well-founded
skepticism about the Soviets' ability to provide sustained economic and
technological assistance. This last factor will provide an opportunity for
the US to expand nonpolitical ties with states that appear to remain in the
Soviet political and diplomatic orbit.
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Discussion
The Near East and South Asia are likely to be even more turbulent in the
next decade than they are now. The area also is likely to be changeable:
just as the past ten years saw several epochal events--including Sadat's
peace initiative toward Israel, the clerical revolution in Iran, and the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan--that redirected the region's history, there
is no reason to expect comparable events not to occur in the next ten.
Such events will directly affect major US interests. The United States
will have a large stake in the region at least through the end of the
century for several reasons, but chiefly because of:
--Continuing Western dependence on Middle Eastern oil;
--Soviet interest and involvement in the region;
--The increasing beleaguerment of an Israel allied with the United
States.
This paper explores the principal forces and trends that will drive
events in the region through the next decade and the sorts of major
changes--political, social, economic, and military--that might occur there.
It highlights the subjects and questions that will have to be studied to
reduce surprise for US policymakers, understand events before and as they
unfold, and assess their consequences. Although the discussion that follows
presents a series of propositions, it is not an estimate. It offers
possibilities and important issues rather than answers. Its purpose is to
stimulate--and, to some extent, guide--research and analysis on the region.
Reduced oil revenues and shortages of other resources will underlie
much of the conflict and instability in the reion in the 1990s.
A changing oil market and a new OPEC. Virtually every country in the
area will be trying to cope with a slowdown, and in some cases a reversal,
of economic growth, largely because of the soft oil market. For many,
austerity will be added to the pressures of rapid population growth,
increasing urbanization, and a burgeoning number of youth seeking
employment. Regimes will have to make changes--significant in some
cases--in their development strategies and to cut spending for social
welfare.
OPEC clearly has suffered a major setback, and oil prices are likely to
stay below $20 a barrel, probably for several years. Overpricing by OPEC
has stunted growth in demand, spurred exploration and development, and
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brought about the excess capacity that caused OPEC's current calamity. In
the short run, oil prices are likely to be volatile before stabilizing and
then rising only along with general inflation. Long-term contracts are
likely to disappear, while netback, spot, and barter deals will predominate.
Ultimately, however, oil prices will recover as marginal producers shut
down, excess capacity--which is costly to maintain--is lost, and demand
slowly grows.
By 1995, OPEC will have been reorganized and rejuvenated. It will be
as much of a political and regional organization as an economic one and may
be trimmed down to the major Arab oil producers plus Iran. Oil market
developments will give even this smaller organization a major role in oil
pricing. The more that prices fall in the near term, the stronger OPEC is
likely to be after prices recover. Over half of the world's oil reserves
are in the Persian Gulf region, and it is very unlikely any significant
alternative to hydrocarbons will be developed by the year 2000. Additional
oil pipelines will reduce the strategic significance of the Strait of Hormuz
and make an abrupt interruption of the international oil market, except by
political decision of the producers, less likely.
Shortages of land and water. In the meantime, other resources,
primarily water and arable land, will be in shorter supply. The rapid
population increases in the NESA region, coupled with limited, and in some
cases declining, water resources, almost assure regional discord over access
to water, particularly in the Levant, the Fertile Crescent, South Asia, and
the Nile Valley. Land resources will also be taxed by population increases
and poor management. Salinity may become a major problem in irrigated areas
due to poorly planned drainage schemes. Egypt, Syria,.-Iraq, and Pakistan,
among others, already are facing this problem. Desertification, erosion,
and salt water incursion also will be taking their toll of available arable
land.
In contrast to these bleak prospects, there is an outside chance that a
major technological development will alleviate some of the region's
shortages of natural resources by the mid- to late-1990s. A breakthrough in
India's dry-land farming research, for example, could spur a second green
revolution throughout the region. A commercial salt-water farming project
under way in the UAE may also point to new ways to expand the production of
food in arid areas. Cheaper and faster water desalination technologies are
an additional possibility.
The broader economic effects of stagnation and austerity. In general,
however, the economic slowdown and the resultant adjustment to austerity
will be particularly difficult over the next five years. Debt problems,
including those involving FMS credits, will mount for the poorer countries.
The major oil exporters may have to borrow more on the international capital
markets in order to soften the social and economic impact until oil prices
firm.
In the richer countries, businessmen and banks will scurry to protect
themselves, and capital flight will increase. Poorer countries will find
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aid from oil-rich neighbors harder to extract and worker remittances
continually declining. They will feel increasingly buffeted by forces they
are unable to control and will turn to the United States and Western Europe
for more financial aid.
The downturn will increase the migration of skilled and educated people
to the industrialized countries, including illegal immigration to the United
States. This brain drain will adversely affect the ability of countries to
develop technologically, although it will also act as a safety valve to
relieve some of the pressures of discontent felt by the highly educated
people of the region.
Internally, slower economic growth and resource constraints will mean
more hard choices for some already troubled regimes and cuts in standards of
living. Limited growth will continue to imply trade-offs between
modernization and distribution. Most regimes will be compelled to divert
scarce resources away from improving the quality of human capital or
mobilizing it for national goals, using them instead to buy off discontented
groups and to preempt challenges to the authority of the regime.
Externally, the economic downturn and the turmoil in the oil market
will further destabilize the region, as larger countries--especially those
poor in resources--move more aggressively to extract concessions and aid
from smaller, wealthier neighbors and to deflect popular dissatisfaction
within their own borders. Disagreements will increase among oil producers
jockeying to maximize revenues. Iran and Iraq both are likely to press
Saudi Arabia and the smaller Gulf oil producers as they struggle to salvage
their domestic economies while continuing the war, and-Kuwait could be
absorbed by a victorious Iran or a desperate Iraq. Despite its vast oil
wealth, Saudi Arabia is likely to see its regional influence curtailed as
its traditional ability to provide aid diminishes. The pattern of aid
within the region is likely to be significantly altered, moreover, when the
1978 Baghdad Pact commitments expire in 1988.
In the face of these problems, governments in the region will try a
varety of new economic, political, and ideological formulas.
Economic liberalization. The prospect of economic austerity as a
seemingly permanent way of life will prompt many regimes to reevaluate their
economic strategies and eventually to "desocialize" or "privatize" their
economies, although economic reality will remain far short of the rhetoric.
Within most centrally planned economies, economic strategy over the next
five years will emphasize decentralization of economic decision-making.
Agriculture, small industry, domestic commerce, and some foreign trade will
be freed of some state control and bureaucratic over-regulation.
Governments will likely maintain control of large enterprises and extractive
industries, however. Moreover, privatization will be impeded by the
economic downturn, with considerable disagreement among the government, the
public sector enterprises, and private businessmen over who should bear the
burden of recession.
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It probably will be the mid-1990s before modified development
strategies begin to show significant changes in the economies of NESA
countries. Capital markets will likely develop in the wealthy Gulf
countries, enabling governments to tap the wealth of their private citizens
to finance government spending. By this time, the centrally planned
economies may be on their way to divesting themselves of some large public
enterprises, possibly by gradually giving employees stock ownership in their
companies.
Political liberties: more or fewer? In some states, economic
liberalization may be accompanied by political liberalization, although
others may become more authoritarian as austerity tests the stability of
their governments. The most optimistic outlook--which may hold true for
some wealthier countries--is for significant expansion of political
participation in the bureaucratic/authoritarian states that now prevail in
the region. An argument for this view is that the Arab states have become
stronger and more cohesive over the past decade, with greater stability than
in the 1950s and 1960s. Interest groups and a broader middle class are
emerging. The press will become a significant power center in some
countries, and economic liberalization will prompt looser controls on
political activity and less public tolerance of coercion and repression.
Liberalization will call into question the future of the region's
monarchies, with perhaps some of them learning to coexist with popularly
elected legislatures and others proving too inflexible to survive in
anything but a figurehead role.
A second view is that state-dominated politics will persist, most
regimes will be authoritarian, existing ruling elites will maintain their
grip on power, and there will continue to be a high level of popular
alienation from politics. The factors that support this view include the
increasing strength of state institutions in the region and in particular
the increasing efficiency of security services, as well as the weakness of
opposition groups. Evidence for this trend may already be found in Syria,
Iraq, Iran, Morocco, and elsewhere. A variation on the trend may possibly
be found in Algeria and India, where political and social developments
preclude political liberalization but the benefits of economic
liberalization are recognized and pursued.
The most pessimistic and probable outlook is that a sharp increase in
instability in many regional states will prompt increased authoritarianism
and repression. Radical populist regimes could come to power in some
states. Many ruling elites will see increased coercion and reliance on
security apparatuses as the only way to retain power in the face of extreme
social and economic pressures.
Ideologies: national variations. Regardless of whether liberalism or
authoritarianism predominates, the ideological movements that will affect
the region's politics during the 1990s are likely to be increasingly
complicated by parochial sentiments and concerns. The extent to which
sweeping, regionwide enthusiasms--such as pan-Arabism of the 1950s and 1960s
and the Islamic fundamentalist challenge of the 1970s and 1980s--will shape
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events will depend on whether government censorship and conflicting national
interests will impede the dissemination of ideas more than modern electronic
communications will facilitate it.
Among the ideological currents most likely to be significant in the
coming decade are:
--Religious revivalism in many variations. Traditionalist,
reformist, and modernist Islamic constituencies will
increasingly emerge as rivals to the most extreme fundamentalist
movements. Hindu revivalism in India will assume equally
diverse forms, with traditionalist state leaders emerging to
greater prominence at the center on one hand and more modern
Hindu populists or chauvinists broadening their appeal on the
other. Secular and religious extremism might increasingly
polarize Israeli politics, although balancing mechanisms are
likely to persist in Israel's more complex political system.
--State-oriented nationalism. The greater "presence" of
governmental authority in even remote districts of the states of
the region and deepening conflicts between neighboring states
will contribute to a stronger sense of national identity.
People with little sense of belonging to the new national
entities a generation ago already are more comfortable with
their identity as Jordanians, Syrians, or Saudis. Arab
unification efforts among states may persist as tactical
stratagems by such leaders as Qadhafi, but they are unlikely to
inspire popular enthusiasm.
--Pragmatism or ideological eclecticism. Technocratic elites
appear likely to play increasingly prominent roles, as regimes
seek to stave off social turmoil, economic stagnation, and
political instability. Algeria's Bendjedid, Syria's Assad,
Iraq's Saddam Husayn, and India's Gandhi, although strongly
identified with well-institutionalized political parties, appear
to be driven more by the need to find what works than by the
sacred writ of their parties' ideological forebears.
Many regimes in the area--despite their willingness to try new
solutions--will be unable to contain serious internal conflict and instability.
Domestic turmoil is likely to be exacerbated over the next fifteen
years by:
--The growth of social tensions, as economic disparities deepen
class, regional, and rural-urban cleavages and cause explosive
overurbanization.
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--Heightened pressures on a new, inexperienced generation of
administrators and leaders to sacrifice long-term social
programs in favor of sops for discontented groups.
--The vulnerability of beleagurered governments to leadership
challenges and of some states to fragmentation.
Modernization in the context of low economic growth is likely to
intensify existing disparities and competition--among social groups and
regions and between cities and rural areas. The introduction of new
technologies will change the nature of the competition but not necessarily
its severity. New technalogies in both agriculture and industry tend to be
capital- rather than labor-intensive and to require highly skilled labor.
Their greater use may thus increase unemployment or underemployment, thereby
contributing to labor dislocations and social strains.
The fault lines of domestic conflict will vary from country to country.
In virtually all of the Near East and South Asia, modern communications are
likely to heighten subnational as well as national identities and to
increase awareness of opportunities, inequalities, and relative privation.
In relatively heterogenous states (Algeria, North Yemen, Sudan, Lebanon,
Syria, Jordan, India, and Pakistan, for example), the effect may be to
sharpen religious and ethnic divisions. In more homogenous societies (such
as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Kuwait, Qatar, and Tunisia), class distinctions will
become the focus of economic and political competition. It is unclear what
effect, on balance, social homogeneity will have on longterm political
stability.
More migration. The increasingly uneven distribution of job
opportunities within and between countries will spur labor migration to
areas of greater economic growth--causing economic dislocations, social
friction, and political tensions in both sending and receiving areas. To
the extent that shortages of labor compel the Gulf States to continue their
reliance on foreign workers, for example, demands by these workers for
redress from the falling wages and worsening living conditions that result
from declining oil revenues will challenge the control mechanisms of local
governments and risk backlashes from local populations.
The backflow of labor from the oil-producing states will cause similar
problems in their home countries over at least the next five years.
Returnees will become disaffected as they confront local labor markets that
cannot absorb them or markets where they have been displaced either by
machinery (as in Egypt's now overmechanized agricultural sector) or by
foreign immigrants (as in Pakistan's volatile Baluchistan Province).
Returning laborers and the decline in remittances will pose particular
problems for Egypt, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, and Pakistan. Returning
Palestinians not only will create economic problems for Jordan and the West
Bank but also will add to the volatile political environment.
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--Heightened pressures on a new, inexperienced generation of
administrators and leaders to sacrifice long-term social
programs in favor of sops for discontented groups.
--The vulnerability of beleagurered governments to leadership
challenges and of some states to fragmentation.
Modernization in the context of low economic growth is likely to
intensify existing disparities and competition--among social groups and
regions and between cities and rural areas. The introduction of new
technologies will change the nature of the competition but not necessarily
its severity. New technologies in both agriculture and industry tend to be
capital- rather than labor-intensive and to require highly skilled labor.
Their greater use may thus increase unemployment or underemployment, thereby
contributing to labor dislocations and social strains.
The fault lines of domestic conflict will vary from country to country.
In virtually all of the Near East and South Asia, modern communications are
likely to heighten subnational as well as national identities and to
increase awareness of opportunities, inequalities, and relative privation.
In relatively heterogenous states (Algeria, North Yemen, Sudan, Lebanon,
Syria, Jordan, India, and Pakistan, for example), the effect may be to
sharpen religious and ethnic divisions. In more homogenous societies (such
as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Kuwait, Qatar, and Tunisia), class distinctions will
become the focus of economic and political competition. It is unclear what
effect, on balance, social homogeneity will have on longterm political
stability.
More migration. The increasingly uneven distribution of job
opportunities within and between countries will spur labor migration to
areas of greater economic growth--causing economic dislocations, social
friction, and political tensions in both sending and receiving areas. To
the extent that shortages of labor compel the Gulf States to continue their
reliance on foreign workers, for example, demands by these workers for
redress from the falling wages and worsening living conditions that result
from declining oil revenues will challenge the control mechanisms of local
governments and risk backlashes from local populations.
The backflow of labor from the oil-producing states will cause similar
problems in their home countries over at least the next five years.
Returnees will become disaffected as they confront local labor markets that
cannot absorb them or markets where they have been displaced either by
machinery (as in Egypt's now overmechanized agricultural sector) or by
foreign immigrants (as in Pakistan's volatile Baluchistan Province).
Returning laborers and the decline in remittances will pose particular
problems for Egypt, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, and Pakistan. Returning
Palestinians not only will create economic problems for Jordan and the West
Bank but also will add to the volatile political environment.
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Urbanization: troubles for both cities and countryside. Regional
disparities within countries will increase migration to areas of greater
opportunity, which in most instances will be cities. More than 60 percent
of Middle Easterners will be city-dwellers by the year 2000, compared with
about 40 percent in 1970. In some countries, the most rapid urbanization
over the coming decades will occur in middlesize cities rather than the
largest ones, heightening competition among urban areas for investments.
In many states, populous rural areas will continue in effect to fund
urban industrial development. The flow of the best and brightest to the
cities will denude many rural areas of entrepreneurial talent while swelling
the informal as well as the modern sector of the urban economy. Some
governments will try to meet the increased urban demand for social services
at the expense of social welfare in rural areas. This approach will
accentuate the effects on rural areas of what may be an overall decline in
social expenditures--particularly on health care--in the coming years. The
desire of urban middle classes to preserve their economic gains could turn
the "benign" neglect of impoverished rural dwellers into de facto
triage--with middle class administrators, for example, deliberately slowing
the implementation of famine relief.
The exclusion of the hinterland from modernization may contribute to a
growing cultural, economic, and political gap between cities and villages.
Village traditionalism might, for example, exclude rural women from
educational and job opportunities that will gradually open to urban women--a
difference likely also to be reflected in higher birth rates among the
traditional rural women. The migration to the cities also will weaken the
authority of tribal leaders and tribal identities generally.
The growing concentration of opportunity-seekers in urban areas will
make large cities throughout the region focal points of social tensions as
well as growth in the 1990s. Young city-dwellers frustrated by
unemployment, high prices for commodities, and inadequate social
infrastructure are likely participants in periodic civil disorders. The
abuse of narcotics is likely to spread in this environment. Rampant crime
and anarchic violence could cause governments to lose effective control of
cities, with rival ethnic, religious, or class groups claiming authority
over different sectors.
Attempted solutions: education and the military as channels for
advancement. Governments will adopt several different expedients to head
off such strife. Some will try to use the educational system to coopt
aspiring middle and lower middle class citizens as well as to train them to
serve national goals. In some countries, a growing educational system will
provide a pool of able technocrats and expand the government's
administrative capabilities--although these are more likely to result in
enlarged internal security bureaucracies than in wider availability of
public health facilities and other social services.
The educational system itself is likely to become an object of intense
competition and controversy. Middle class citizens in many states will
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continue to view access to higher education as their birthright, while
disadvantaged groups may press for preferential access. Almost all
governments in the region will face unpopular choices among slowing the
growth of educational institutions, increasing the supply of politically
volatile educated unemployed, or further swelling an inefficient bureaucracy
to accommodate surplus graduates. In any event, fierce competition for
scarce educational and white collar employment opportunities will promote
corruption.
Most governments also will confront competing middle class demands for
a more Westernized curriculum (with the potential to alienate educated
elites from other citizens and ultimately to cause a backlash) or a more
indigenous one (which would emphasize local culture and languages to the
detriment of modern skills). These divergent approaches will mirror broader
differences of orientation--modernist, reformist, and traditionalist--among
the growing middle and lower middle classes in many countries.
The army is likely to serve as another avenue of mobility for lower and
middle class youth, even as it becomes increasingly prominent as an agent of
domestic control in an era of heightened social tensions. The ethnic,
religious, and class composition of the military could become an important
determinant of how well it performs its domestic security duties as well as
what its political ambitions will be.
Heightened disorder. Despite efforts by many governments to ease
social strains, urban strife in some cases will thwart efforts to maintain a
coherent development strategy, undermine the legitimacy of regimes, and
compel governments to divert additional resources to the maintenance of law
and order. The perceived need to mollify urban dwellers will reinforce the
urban bias of decisions on investment and the use of foreign aid. Urban
unrest will physically destroy infrastructure and encourage capital flight,
to the detriment of future investment. As civil disorders grow, governments
are likely to call more frequently on the Army to restore order, to the
potential detriment of its external defense mission. The unrest will bring
opportunities for meddling by unfriendly neighboring states or by the
Soviets.
Turnover of leadership. The management of socioeconomic problems in
the states of the Near East and South Asia will be further complicated in
the 1990s by a spate of leadership changes, after a decade or more of
surprising continuity. Health factors alone place Tunisia's Bourguiba,
Morocco's Hassan, Syria's Assad, Jordan's Hussein, the PLO's Arafat, Saudi
Arabia's Fahd, Iran's Khomeini, and Pakistan's Zia at high or moderate risk
of death or incapacitation before the end of the next decade.
In many states of the region, there is little prospect for a smooth
succession. Aspiring interest groups will press new leaders for greater
participation and a share of power. Students will provide a growing pool of
activists to serve a range of populist causes. Security forces lobbying for
their own rights will inhibit the ability of regimes to maintain order. The
growing leverage of key military officers--often bolstered by the expansion
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and modernization of the military--is likely to give them an enlarged role
in policymaking. Their impatience with the faltering efforts of
inexperienced civilian leaders to deal with thorny economic problems and
social unrest may result in more military takeovers.
Ethnic separatism and political disintegration. In some countries,
leadership instability will encourage separatist movements by frustrated
ethnic-regional minorities. Sudan, Iran, India, and Pakistan will be
particularly vulnerable to fission along these lines. Although their
long-term viability is doubtful, ethnically-based states comprising
subregions of several existing countries could emerge--including "Kurdistan"
in the Near East and "Pakhtunistan" in South Asia.
In some states, leadership instability may trigger a broader collapse
into anarchy. Egypt is potentially the most extreme case of political
collapse, abandonment of international obligations, and regionally
destabilizing realignment. Instability in Jordan could set off a contest
for supremacy between Palestinians and East Bank Arabs and spark another
regional war. The fall of the Saudi royal family would threaten not only
the delivery of oil to the West at reasonable prices but also raise the
specter of a wealthy, xenophobic, centrally located regime wreaking havoc in
the Gulf. Political disintegration in India might give rise to a militant,
chauvinistic Hindu regime with profoundly destabilizing consequences for the
South Asia region.
Regional states also will be unable to control inter-state conflicts.
Internal political, economic, and social problems--although in some
cases they will reduce the ability to engage in foreign adventurism--will
exacerbate tensions between states and erode the confidence of governments
in their ability to protect their own interests. New pressures will
reinforce longstanding hatreds and suspicions and impede efforts to resolve
or prevent conflicts. Hostility between Israel and the Arab states is
unlikely to abate, Arab-Persian rivalry will continue to threaten the
Persian Gulf, and ancient Hindu-Muslim enmity may surface in new, more
virulent forms on the Asian subcontinent. Growing nationalist, religious,
and ethnic fervor also will increase tensions between some neighboring
states, as countries try to exploit restive minority groups to harass and
weaken rival regimes.
Armed conflicts will become more likely in this environment, with
perceived threats making some regimes in the region more aggressive and
trigger-happy. Imperfect brinkmanship will increase the risk of costly
mistakes, particularly if the leadership changes in the region produce
inexperienced rulers eager to solidify their power.
The Arab-Israeli stalemate. This standoff is likely to dominate Middle
Eastern politics and diplomacy over the near term, with both sides unable to
overcome the obstacles to a negotiated settlement. Israeli public opinion
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is becoming more uniformly opposed to territorial compromise, and deep
divisions among the Arabs will continue to prevent a broader Arab consensus
on dealing with Israel. The Camp David Accords are widely dismissed as
irrelevant, and the gap between Israel and her Arab neighbors probably will
remain unbridgeable.
Domestic pressures inside Israel will diminish further the prospect for
peace with the Arabs. - Determination to keep and eventually annex the
occupied territories probably will grow, particularly among the younger
generation of Israelis born after 1967, for whom the West Bank has always
been under Israeli control. Israeli settlement activity in the West Bank
probably will continue, and economic growth and development will tie the
area more tightly to Israel. Israeli attachment to the occupied territories
for religious and nationalistic reasons increasingly may overshadow security
concerns as the rationale for retaining them. The Israelis' disappointment
at the failure of the Egyptian-Israeli treaty to produce what they regard as
genuine normalization between the two countries, moreover, appears to be
deepening their sense of beleaguerment and unwillingness to compromise.
Israel's isolation in the region is likely to continue. With Lebanon
,diplomatically hamstrung by Syria and Jordan seeing no way to move toward
direct negotiations, prospects for a new bilateral settlement between Israel
and an Arab state are poor. Although many Arab governments tacitly
acknowledge the durability of Israel, they see little incentive to be more
accommodating to it. Few believe they can risk the domestic repercussions
of such a move, and anti-Israeli sentiment will remain one of the few issues
upon which shaky regimes can base their legitimacy. Israel's relations with
Egypt will remain a chilly armistice, although ties are-not likely to be
broken unless anti-Israeli sentiment dramatically escalates pressure on the
Egyptian government. A change of regime in Cairo that resulted in a
militantly anti-Israeli leadership, however, would substantially increase
the military threat to Israel and could lead to renewed Egyptian-Israeli
hostilities.
The Palestinian problem probably will continue to plague both sides,
but most Arabs will play a marginal role. Palestinian-Israeli relations on
the West Bank are likely to become increasingly contentious and violent.
Palestinian influence in Jordan probably will increase, particularly if King
Hussein dies or is ousted. Such a trend could result in the creation of a
Palestinian-dominated state east of the Jordan River, which would severely
strain Israeli-Jordanian relations and probably energize West Bank
Palestinians to challenge the Israelis more openly.
There are some less likely alternative futures for the Palestinian
problem, each of which would require a substantial change in popular
attitudes and/or leadership strategy:
--A conclusion by most Palestinians that time is not on their side
and that they will have to abandon most aspects of their dream
of self-determination to gain any improvement in their current
situation;
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--A perception by most Israelis that West Bank Arabs were
becoming too strong an internal force for Israel to delay
resolving the question of whether it is going to be a Jewish
state or a binational one; or
--A fading away of the Palestinian issue in the face of continued
Israeli military superiority, dim diplomatic prospects, and a
waning of interest among Arab governments.
As long as the Arab-Israeli stalemate does continue, Syria under Asad
will benefit from it. Jordan might strengthen its ties with Damascus in
hopes of easing pressure from Syria or Syrian-sponsored elements of the PLO.
Saudi Arabia, despite its reduced resources for giving aid, will continue
significant financial support to Syria. Egyptian popular hostility to
Israel will curtail Cairo's ability to counter Syrian influence over the
Arab-Israeli dialogue. Iraq will remain sidelined as long as its war with
Iran continues, and Libya's opposition to Israel will be a pale reflection
of Syrian antipathy to Tel Aviv.
A stronger Syria and a more uneasy Israel increase the likelihood of a
major military confrontation. Israel almost certainly would win a war with
Syria, but the loss of life and destruction for both countries would be
greater than they suffered in previous wars. The political costs to
Damascus would probably be less than the military ones, however, if Syria
inflicted substantial damage on Israel, strengthening the Arab perception
that Israel's misadventures in Lebanon showed it is not invincible. It also
could increase Israeli militancy, if Israel seeks to restore a military and
psychological edge over the Arabs. Arab rivalries might--be muted in the
aftermath of such a conflict, and at least secret cooperation between Israel
and Iran could expand to counter a reinvigorated Arab bloc.
Iran-Iraq. The war is likely to grind on as long as both regimes stay
in power, with Iraq growing steadily weaker and more war-weary and Iran
apparently determined to keep up the pressure at least until Saddam Husayn
is gone. The Iraqis probably will stick to their largely defensive
strategy. Iran will maintain its advantage in manpower and commitment, as
long as its faltering economy does not collapse. The war could widen if
Iran fails to stabilize its economy in the face of declining oil revenues
and thus becomes desperate enough to strike Iraq's Arab allies directly.
Short of this, Tehran will be reluctant to expand the conflict and risk
greater superpower involvement in the region.
A fundamentalist clerical regime is likely to remain in Tehran after
Ayatollah Khomeini's death and probably would not alter Iranian strategy in
the near term. A post-Khomeini government would be likely to adopt a more
conciliatory policy only if significant domestic opposition to the war or
other severe internal problems develop. Even then, it would be difficult
for any Iranian leader to advocate a peace agreement that abandoned
Khomeini's goal of toppling Saddam Husayn, although Tehran might let the war
fade away by curtailing military operations without offering any new peace
terms.
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If Iran prevails militarily and the Baathist government in Baghdad is
toppled, Tehran is likely to adopt a more aggressive posture toward other
Gulf countries. It will intensify pressure on those countries with large
Shia populations--notably Kuwait and Bahrain--possibly precipitating changes
of regime in those countries. It probably could force greater cooperation
from Saudi Arabia on a variety of issues, particularly if it maintained de
facto control over Iraqi oil exports and was willing to threaten Gulf
shipping to impose its will on other producers.
The Asian subcontinent. Tension between India and Pakistan is likely
to grow through the 1990s. India's expanding power and influence will
enable it to exert greater leverage on its regional rivals--especially
Pakistan, which will remain heavily dependent on outside aid. The risk of
conflict would be heightened by the emergence of intensified Hindu
nationalism and antipathy to Muslim influence in the region. This would
increase Pakistani fears of Indian intentions. India will continue to
suspect Pakistani meddling among the Sikhs and Muslims in its northern-tier
states, while Pakistan will have similar concerns about Indian fomenting of
troubles in Sind. These mutual fears, coupled with expanded militarization
and mutual suspicions over the nuclear issue, increase the risk of another
Pakistan-India war before the end of the century.
Although such a war would be costly for both countries, particularly if
it involved nuclear weapons, the basic balance of power between the two
probably would not change significantly. A badly battered Pakistan probably
would receive large-scale aid from several sources to stabilize the country
internally and maintain its territorial integrity and independence. India
might back off quickly if it feared greater US or Chinese involvement on
Pakistan's behalf or a Soviet shift toward Islamabad.
The war in Afghanistan. There is little prospect of a major Soviet
troop withdrawal as long as the government in Kabul remains too weak to
maintain control. A change in Pakistani policy or heightened
Pakistani-Indian tensions, however, could significantly affect the course of
the war. Islamabad probably views the Soviet presence as more or less
permanent, and it may be increasingly willing to reach an accommodation with
the Soviet-controlled Afghan regime to stabilize the border, ease the drain
on its resources, and facilitate the return of at least some of the Afghan
refugees.
The Afghan resistance will remain a potent ideological and religious
issue among the world's Muslims, but aid to the Mujahedin may decline as
donor countries, many of them facing economic constraints, see declining
prospects for the movement even to push the Soviets out. Iran probably
would play a larger role in the Afghan equation, if the war with Iraq ended
decisively, freeing up political and military resources. Tehran would step
up support for Shia opposition elements in Afghanistan but would not
directly challenge Moscow, to avoid Soviet pressure along Iran's northern
border.
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Tension in the Maghreb. Conflict in North Africa probably will revolve
around Libyan meddling and Algerian-Moroccan tensions over the Polisario
issue. A more remote possibility is a major redrawing of the map of
northeast Africa, with northern and southern Sudan finally splitting apart,
the northern portion perhaps being absorbed by Egypt, and the overthrow of
Qadhafi being followed by Libya splitting up as well. As long as Qadhafi
does rule Libya, he will exploit opportunities in Tunisia, to weaken it and
to loosen its links with the US and Algeria, and Sudan, in part to keep
pressure on Cairo. Qadhafi is not likely to harass Egypt more openly than
he has already, but he probably will provide covert support to Egyptian
oppositionists and to step up such aid if Mubarak or his successor appears
to stumble. Qadhafi's demise alone would not necessarily reduce Libyan
troublemaking, because a likely successor would be a coalition of
extremists. Although Algeria and Morocco remain at odds over the Polisario
issue, they may move slowly toward a settlement of the conflict, to avoid
having it escalate into a direct military confrontation and to ease internal
economic and political pressures.
Domestic grievances and regional tensions in the Near East and
South Asia will fuel additional terrorism, which is likely to become more
diverse and widespread as terrorist tactics become acceptable to a wider
range of groups and powerful weapons become more accessible.
Two types of violence--by groups and by states. A growing proportion
of terrorism originating in the region is likely to feature nihilistic,
seemingly pointless, violence. Ad hoc groups will strike--often in suicide
missions--symbols of national authority or international power to take
revenge, express inchoate anger, or simply gain attention. Conversely,
terrorism as a tactic for groups to seek broader political support is apt to
decrease.
Regimes, as distinct from ad hoc groups, are likely to continue the
more calculated, coercive brand of terrorism. An increasing number of Near
Eastern and South Asian states will consider sponsorship of terrorism, as an
international culture of violence makes the tactic more acceptable, or at
least more thinkable. Otherwise moderate regimes may elect to fund, train,
and provide sanctuary for terrorists waging war on unfriendly neighboring
governments, with a view to influencing those governments' policies,
discrediting them, or subverting them.
Expanded target lists. Wherever possible, terrorists will continue to
strike against targets of opportunity associated with both the United States
and regional governments (including, for example, US businesses and the
embassies of Israel and moderate Arab states, in the case of Arab
terrorists, and banks owned by the Indian Government, in the case of Sikh
extremists). Terrorists are likely to step up operations in Europe,
particularly if US interests assume a lower profile in the Middle East, and
may extend operations to the United States. Soviet interests may come under
attack, particularly if the status of Muslims in Soviet-controlled
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territories becomes a major issue. Vital economic installations (including
offshore oil facilities) and symbols of rival religious groups (including
mosques or temples, Hajjis or other pilgrims to religious shrines, and holy
places, such as Jerusalem or the sacred Sikh city of Amritsar) will be at
high risk.
Expanded methods and costs. The spread of modern technology will
increasingly shape terrorist activities in the 1990s. Efficient
communications will encourage the development of links among diverse
subnational and international terrorist groups--although they will also
bolster the counterterrorist capabilities of regional states. The expansion
of mass media will acquaint disadvantaged groups in remote areas with
terrorist tactics and invite their emulation. Growing stockpiles of
sophisticated weapons in the states of the region may be used to supply
state-sponsored terrorists but also risk becoming targets of raids by
free-lance terrorists. Obsolescent weapons may well find a market among
terrorists. The proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons
virtually assures attempts by terrorists to blackmail authorities with the
threatened use of such weapons against civilian populations. The ease with
which chemical weapons can be manufactured makes it likely that some
terrorists will try to produce their own.
Mounting terrorism will impose severe costs on target governments. At
a minimum, it will compel them to increase expenditures for intelligence,
security and anti-terrorist forces. In some states, terrorism may undercut
the legitimacy of governments unable to protect their citizens from random
acts of violence, and it may precipitate leadership changes. Governments
will feel compelled to sacrifice some civil liberties for increased
security.
Wars in the region will tend to be more lethal, because of the
acquisition of new types of military hardware.
Wars will involve more casualties and extend over a greater area, as
Near Eastern and South Asian countries acquire more advanced weapons and
military-related equipment.
Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons proliferation. As many as
five NESA countries--India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, and Pakistan--will have
nuclear weapons by the year 2000, increasing the danger of conflict or
incidents involving nuclear weapons. These countries will develop their own
doctrines and strategies on the role nuclear weapons will play in their
political and military policy. They will not necessarily adhere to the
rules and restraints on the use of such weapons practiced by the United
States and the USSR. Even a limited nuclear exchange would inflict
casualties and damage so great that the countries would suffer major social,
economic, and political problems and need years to recover. Such
destruction could occur unintentionally, because lax security and safety
measures could lead to the theft or accidental detonation of nuclear
weapons.
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Many of the region's countries also will develop and stockpile large
amounts of chemical and biological weapons. The relative ease and low cost
of developing and manufacturing chemical weapons will encourage some states
to acquire them as a supplement or cheaper alternative to nuclear weapons.
Ineffective international prohibitions will reduce the reluctance of
governments to use chemical weapons in combat. Biological weapons will be
.especially dangerous because their accidental or intentional use could cause
widepread epidemics.
Over the next decade, a few regional countries will acquire long-range
weapons systems capable of delivering nuclear and chemical munitions
throughout the region or to Europe and much of the USSR. India, Iran or
some of the richer Arab countries will have developed or acquired ballistic
missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads to a range of 1,000
kilometers. They may also have the technology to make long-range cruise
missiles to carry nuclear or chemical payloads. Conversely, these same
countries will be unable to defend their civilian populations from nuclear
or chemical attacks. As countries in the region appear close to acquiring
nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and related delivery systems, the
danger of pre-emptive attacks by their adversaries will increase.
More influx of conventional arms. Fear of rivals' military
capabilities also will fuel a spiraling conventional arms race in the
region. Most of the acquisitions will be anti-armor, air defense, and
airborne warning systems, while communications and control, logistics, and
transportation will receive less attention or be ignored. Regional arms
control agreements to reduce this build-up are unlikely:.- Countries are
likely to waste resources by attempting to match adversaries' capabilities
or to meet a wide range of threats. Rivals' increases in weapons will tend
to offset each other and yield no improvement in security.
The smaller, wealthier Arab countries will reach a point in the next
few years where they can no longer absorb more arms, but they will continue
to purchase military equipment. These countries will become the arsenals of
the region and will use the weapons to support insurgents or to attempt to
increase their own security indirectly by supplying an ally with equipment.
They also will have to rely more on mercenary forces for their own defensive
needs.
Faulty use of weapons.- Despite the influx of sophisticated weapons,
armed forces in the region will be no better able than they are now to win
clear-cut military victories. Many conflicts will end indecisively or
continue as stalemates. This ineffectiveness will be due in part to a
decline in the number of highly skilled and intelligent personnel entering
the military. Many governments will place too much reliance on
sophisticated weapons--instead of the quality and training of troops--to win
wars. Civilian leaders' fear of military coups will impede the development
of professional and effective armed forces. Important military positions
will be filled by "politicians in uniform" to assure political reliability
at the cost of reduced military efficiency.
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The enhanced military potential of some Near Eastern and South Asian
states will contribute to their development as regional powers with expanded
influence.
India will make remarkable progress over the next 15 years and is
likely to emerge as a regional superpower during the 1990s. Its huge
population, extensive resource base, and tremendous pool of talent will
secure it a major role in regional political, military, and economic
affairs. By the late 1990s, India's military might and naval capabilities
will give it the ability to challenge US and Soviet influence in the Western
Indian Ocean, to intervene in littoral states, and potentially even to
thwart or promote US and Soviet interests in Southeast Asia. Its growing
economic power and ability to capture export markets will translate into
political leverage over smaller neighboring states such as Bangladesh,
Nepal, and Sri Lanka. The Indians are likely to use the nascent South Asian
Regional Cooperation scheme as a vehicle to increase its influence.
Other states in the region also are likely to exert broad regional
influence:
--Israel's quest for security will lead it to continue dedicating
enormous resources to enhancing its military forces and
improving its ability to take preemptive measures against
perceived threats from Arab states. It also will expand its
presence in the Mediterranean and enhance its ability to monitor
activities in neighboring states.
--Iran--once it extracts itself from war--is likely to play a
major political and economic role in the Persian Gulf regicn,
because of its large population, strategic position, economic
development, and oil wealth. Although presently preoccupied
with its western border, Iran is likely to become more active in
Afghan and Persian Gulf littoral state affairs after the war.
--Egypt's economic problems will limit its regional role, but
Cairo's military capabilities will keep the Libyans off balance
and the Sudanese mindful of political missteps.
--Syria's increasingly central role in the Arab-Israeli conflict
has given it enhanced influence over the actions and policies of
other Arab states and organizations. If its domestic front
stays politically stable, Syria probably will be able to exert
even greater influence over Arab affairs in the 1990s.
--Saudi Arabia's recently discovered backbone in dealing with
contentious oil issues suggests Riyadh may play a more
aggressive role in international energy and financial matters
during the 1990s.
Projection of military power. Regional powers will try to enhance
their influence by beefing up their ability to deploy armed forces
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throughout the region. Naval and airmobile/airborne forces will receive
more attention as the primary means to project power. Such capabilities
will encourage governments to send forces abroad to aid allies or clients
against external or internal threats. Some states will view this projection
of power as threatening, but an increasing number of smaller states will
expect the regional powers to play a greater policing role.
:. Use of technology. The regional powers will try to import and exploit
high technology to enhance their power and influence. The introduction of
new technologies will intensify existing disparities of income and
opportunity between countries. India, in particular, will use its large
research and development establishment and earlier high technology
acquisitions to generate its own technology, both industrial and
agricultural. Many Indians living overseas who are employed in high
technology industries and are engaged in basic and applied research are
likely to return to take advantage of the "new India."
The expansion of India's technological capabilities will spur similar
Pakistani efforts, particularly in the nuclear field. Israel also will seek
to enhance its security by stepping up technological research that has
military applications and by inhibiting the acquisition and development of
high technology items by Arab states. A winding down of the Iran-Iraq
conflict probably would result in both states seeking to develop high
technology capabilities to enhance their influence over Persian Gulf
littoral states.
Development of local arms industries. Technological advances will aid
the regional powers in manufacturing weapons for their-own use and for
export. Most defense industries will be limited to the production of small
arms, ammunition, and vehicles, but India has the potential to develop and
sell more sophisticated weapons, including aircraft, electronic systems and
ships. India is also likely to develop and launch photographic satellites
capable of providing early warning of attack and imagery of defenses, troop
and vehicle concentrations, and air and naval deployments. Economy of scale
problems are likely to force smaller countries, such asall Israel, into
either expanding military exports rapidly or reducing theirnd arms
industries and resigning themselves to reliance on foreign countries for
most of their arms.
The United States and the Soviet Union will find it more difficult to
protect their interests in
the Near
East and
South Asia, because
of the
expanded influence of the
stronger
regional
states and a broader
trend
towad nonalignment.
The increased clout of regional powers and the move toward
nonalignment, together with increased regional cooperation and expanded
involvement by other extraregional states, will complicate the interests of
both Washington and Moscow in the Near East and South Asia in the 1990s.
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These trends will lessen the superpowers' ability to influence regional
events at the very time that increased domestic instability, the
intensification of regional conflicts, and the proliferation of advanced
weapons will increase the risk of superpower confrontation in the region.
Shared problems for the United States and the USSR. US and Soviet
influence in the Near East and South Asia during the 1990s will not be a
zero-sum-game; setbacks for one will not necessarily entail-advances for the
other. Indeed, there will be a significant convergence of US and Soviet
interests in the region through the next decade, with these interests being
advanced or set back by many of the same developments:
--Regional powers are likely to have more confidence in their
relations with the superpowers in the 1990s and to demonstrate
greater independence of action.
--Xenophobia is likely to propel many political movements.
--The increasing military capabilities of regional states will
make it more difficult for Washington and Moscow to maintain
credible defense commitments to allies.
--The development of several crises in the region at once would
stretch thin both US and Soviet military assets.
Many states in the region will loosen their ties to the superpowers in
favor of nonalignment. This trend will be due partly to increasing
frustration with what many regimes will perceive to be--an insufficient
commitment by the superpowers to the relationship. In addition, avoidance
of close relations with a superpower will decrease a regime's vulnerability
to domestic and regional criticism; cordial but not intimate relations with
both Washington and Moscow will be preferred. As a result, longstanding US
ties to allies in the region can be expected to slip during the 1990s, but
there also will be openings for enhanced US influence in states with
traditionally strong ties to Moscow. This trend is subject to change,
however, because regional crises that threaten a state's national security
interest are likely to drive it back into closer cooperation with a
superpower.
Separate problems for the United States and the USSR. The United
States-and the Soviet Union will also face individual obstacles to expanding
their influence and interests. The United States will be most handicapped
by:
--a deepening conviction among Arabs that Washington is ignoring
their interests in the Arab-Israeli conflict;
--resentment, particularly among Islamic fundamentalists, of the
intrusion of Western culture and values;
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--growing lack of confidence in the United States as a dependable
ally;
--identification of the United States with interests of the local
elite.
Anti-Americanism is likely to wax and wane during the 1990s, and any
erosion of US influence is likely to be gradual and frequently
imperceptible. Nonetheless, the cumulative effect of the erosion will be
significant, particularly on relations between the United States and its
current allies. Anti-US vitriol will be used most as a political expedient
by regimes and organizations and will have a strong impact on popular
attitudes, especially among the young. Sharp upswings in anti-Americanism
probably would follow an outbreak of Arab-Israeli or Indo-Pakistani
fighting; regardless of the outcome, US action or inaction would be subject
to criticism.
Major impediments to enhanced Soviet influence will include:
--regional resentment over the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan;
--deep suspicion among conservative Arab and bordering states
about the Soviets' subversive intentions and.expsansionist aims
in the region;
--skepticism about Soviet willingness and ability to provide
sustained economic or advanced technological assistance.
The last of these reasons will be particularly significant: US
technological, economic, financial, and commercial expertise will be sought
by virtually every state in the region, giving the United States a decided
edge over the Soviet Union. Although this expertise can be exploited to
further US political interests, in others--for example, Libya, Iran, and
South Yemen--it will allow the United States to enhance nonpolitical ties.
Regional cooperation. The trend toward nonalignment will be
accompanied by increased regional cooperation and the establishment of
regional organizations. Regional powers, trying to exert greater influence
over smaller neighboring states, will take the initiative. The fledgling
Gulf Cooperation Council and even newer South Asian Association for Regional
Cooperation exemplify the emerging polycentrism in the area. Such
organizations will provide a means for reducing reliance on superpowers,
lessening tension among geographically proximate states, and advancing
regional objectives.
Although the extent of cooperation within regional organizations
probably will be limited initially, such areas of common concern as
narcotics trafficking, counterterrorism, and custom controls are likely
subjects for joint efforts. States will increasingly use the umbrella of a
regional organization when dealing with the superpowers, which, in turn,
will be able to exploit particularly close ties with individual states to
enhance their influence with other members.
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Increased involvement of extraregional actors. Western Europe, Japan,
China, and some other Third World nations will expand their involvement in
the Near East and South Asia in the 1990s, causing increased political and
economic competition for the United States and the Soviet Union. Some of
these states will cut into US export markets. Some Near Eastern and South
Asian states will opt for improved security, political, and economic ties
with the West Europeans to reduce further their dependence on the
superpowers. Expanded arms sales by the British, French, West Germans, and
Italians will lead to their increased political involvement.
The shift toward economic liberalization will produce economies
increasingly in tune with American philosophies, but the governments
themselves will be looking to and probably citing Japan, China, and the
newly industrialized Far East nations as their role models. Japanese
companies will move upstream into the exploration, production, and partial
ownership of oil resources. China has the potential to have a major impact
on the politics, economics, and military balance of South Asia, but it
probably will remain distracted by internal events and its southeastern
borders. Beijing, however, probably will make some diplomatic inroads in
some of the more conservative Arab states.
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