AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T01017R000202350001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 8, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 6, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
-'i'so-9eeret--
Afghanistan Situation Report
6 May 1986
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DATE
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NESA M RP-.2Wb7--rX
DOC NO SovA M &6- ao~s~Y.sX
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Top SeeFet
NESA M 86-20067JX
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May
9866
Copy 0 8 1
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CONTENTS
AFGHAN REFUGEES IN IRAN
The Iranian Government has been forced recently to
request international aid to support the some 1.8
million Afghan refugees in Iran because of falling
oil prices and the cost of the war with Iraq.
PRAISE AND PROMOTIONS FOR THE AFGHAN ARMY 3 25X1
The Afghan and Soviet media are giving public
praise to the Afghan Army for its recent successes
Former intelligence chief Najibullah has been
appointed to replace Babrak Karmal as head of the
People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan. His new
role probably will not enhance the regime's public
image or imorove Kabul's ability to prosecute the
war.
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This document is prepared weekly by the Office of Near Eastern
and South Asian Analysis and the Office of Soviet Analysis.
Questions or comments on the issues raised in the publication'
should be directed to
6 May 1986
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AFGHAN REFUGEES IN IRAN
Over 1.8 million Afghan refugees--l.1 million since the
1979 Soviet invasion--have settled in Iran;
?bout 10 percent
of the refugees are received in centers, while the
majority have a more uncertain position as illegal
aliens. The Iranian Government--which had previously
refused international aid for the refugees--will
receive $11 million this year from the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and has a so
sought aid from the World Food Program (WFP).
COMMENT.- Deteriorating economic conditions in Iran--
caused by falling oil prices and the cost of the Iran-
Iraq war--have forced Tehran to overlook its fear of
outside interference and seek international, aid for the
Afghan refugees. The refugees' position in Iran
probably will become more difficult because of high
6 May 1986
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JSheherghao antes : C holm Ko duz1 iBADAKHS N
I BALKH / '? i teKUea.
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Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
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International boundary
-'-- Province boundary
# National capital
Province capital
Railroad
Road
6 May 1986
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unemployment and growing shortages of consumer goods.
Tehran probably wants to stop the flow of refugees into
Iran but cannot, given the long open border.
PRAISE AND PROMOTIONS FOR THE AFGHAN ARMY
The Afghan and Soviet media are playing up recent Army
successes in Paktia Province. In a speech given in
Khowst, Defense Minister Major-General Nazar Muhammand
.praised the army for its destruction of the nearby
insurgent camp in Zhawar Killi. Kabul-based soldiers
who participated in the attack were greeted on their
return by government officials including Prime Minister
Keshtmand. The Soviets reported in Krasnaya Zvezda how
Afghan Army units cleared the insurgents' supply
base. In a related move, the Central Committee of the
.People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan recommended
expediting promotions for eligible personnel in certain
military specialties and for some who have participated
in combat over the past year.
COMMENT: The extensive publicity and unusual
promotions come at a time when the Soviet Union is
pressing, the Afghan Army to assume more combat
responsibilities and are probably intended to boost
army morale.
Soviet and Afghan forces are
destroying houses, farms, and orchards to create a security
belt around Qandahar. When completed, the belt will have
some 37 squad-size outposts linked together with
minefields. The belt will hamper insurgent attacks in
Qandahar and make.it more difficult for insurgents to enter
and exit the city.
-- The Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization (AAPSO),
which will meet in Moscow in mid-May, has planned an "Afghan
solidarity day".
6 May 1986
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-- Iranian media, in a commentary on Najibullah's recent
appointment as General-Secretary of the People's Democratic
Party of Afghanistan, labeled the new leader a "KGB pawn."
The Iranians charged that Moscow's decision to remove his
predecessor Babrak Karmal is an indication of 'a "fundamental
instability" in the Soviet policy toward Afghanistan. 0
--
have returned to the camp but probably will not attempt to
Polish
during
protest
British
activists in Warsaw chanted "hands off Afghanistan"
pro-Solidarity Front demonstrations on 1 May. The
was broken up by Polish security forces, and two
journalists were arrested. r7
25X1
the insurgent base camp 25X1
at Zhawar Killi shows extensive damage from the Afghan regime
assault more than a week earlier. The guerrillas evidently
rebuild completely the large complex. 25X1
Ethiopian
leader Mengistu last week expressed concern about the Soviet
role in possibly ousting Babrak Karmal. The replacement of
Karmal as Afghan Communist Party chief on 4 May probably will
increaseistu's disquietude over Soviet intentions toward
him.
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NEW PARTY CHIEF IN AFGHANISTAN
By OCR
Former intelligence chief Najibullah's appointment as
head of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan
(PDPA) to replace Babrak Karmal will not improve the
regime's ability to prosecute the war and could
aggravate factionalism. For now, Karmal remains as
chairman of the Revolutionary Council--the regime's
executive branch--and as a member of the PDPA
Politburo. Najibullah's good relations with the
Soviets while head of the intelligence service suggest
he will be a compliant partner, although his background
probably will reinforce the regime's image as a Soviet-
controlled and narrowly based police state.
Unusual Activity in Kabul
Najibullah's appointment--publicly praised by Soviet
leader Gorbachev--followed two days of substantially
increased security measures and unusual military
activity in Kabul. According to the US Embassy, Afghan
troops--mostly unarmed--blocked off a large section of
the capital around the presidential palace and key
government buildings on 2 May. Soviet combat forces
were observed at several points throughout the city on
3 May. Kabul airport was closed to civilians, and air
activity over the city was unusually light.
Moscow probably had decided before Karmal's return to
Kabul on 1 May that he should be replaced, but we do
not know whether the Soviets intended this to occur
immediately or whether events forced their hand.
Moscow probably would have preferred to have avoided
the public display of military power in Kabul
associated with the changeover--and the appearance of
instability in the regime that it conveyed--but may
have felt compelled to make the switch because of a
deterioration in Karmal's health, internal Afghan
plotting, or a desire to have a leader more capable
than Karmal of forcing unpopular policy choices upon a
recalcitrant government and military establishment.
5 May 1986
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Up the Ladder
Najibullah's appointment in November 1985 as a
Secretary of the People's Democratic Party of
Afghanistan (PDPA) Central Committee gave him a much
broader role in the regime and expanded his already
considerable power. .By overseeing the Ministries of
Defense and Interior, as well as the Afghan
intelligence service (KHAD), he was able to consolidate
his control of all of the regime's security
forces.
In addition, Najibullah's new position helped to give
him broader experience in party affairs and increase
his public visibility, already considerable for a
secret police head. Moscow may have seen such expanded
horizons as essential preparation for assuming the top
post in the regime. Last year a Soviet diplomat in
Kabul acknowledged the similarity between Najibullah's
rise and Yuri Andropov's movement from KGB chief to
party secretary to General Secretary.
The Man from KHAD
The new Secretary brings numerous professional, party,
and personal assets to his position. As leader of KHAD
since the Soviet invasion, Najibullah presided over the
growth of the secret police into a powerful and feared
organization, which has at times overshadowed the party
itself. He also built a personal reputation for
ruthlessness and relative competence.
Najibullah has traveled frequently to the USSR for
consultations. A fervent Communist, he has impressed
those around him as fanatically pro-Soviet in
6 May 1986
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Parchamis and Other Strangers
Links to others in the PDPA hierarchy may have eased
Najibullah's rise to power. As an early party
activist--he was a student organizer for Karmal in the
late 1960s--Najibullah has longstanding ties.. to most
high-ranking members of the Parchami faction.
Najibullah's links to other Parchami luminaries also go
well back in the PDPA's turbulent history. Along with
Nur Ahmad Nur, Anahita Ratebzad, Mahmud Baryalai, and
Babrak Karmal, Najibullah was sent into ambassadorial
exile by the Khalgis in 1978.
Problems Ahead?
Despite his many assets, Najibullah will have to
overcome his reputation as violently anti-Khalqi to
become the successful, effective leader the Soviets
apparently want.
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In his efforts to mold the PDPA into a more effective
governing body, Najibullah may also encounter
resistance from the party's old guard. While the PDPA
Politburo is hardly a Kremlin-style gerontocracy, seven
of the 12 full and candidate members are a full decade
older than the new Secretary and may resent his rapid
advancement.
Outlook
The Soviets probably deemed Najibullah most capable of
molding Afghan security forces and the PDPA into a more
effective, cohesive unit. The Soviets probably hope
such a new, improved regime would prove capable of
shouldering a greater share of what they expect to be a
long, grinding struggle--permitting, in effect, an
"Afghanization" of the war.
The elevation of a former secret police head, in our
-view, will reinforce the regime's image as.a Soviet-
controlled and narrowly based police state, however.
Najibullah's appointment is unlikely to draw back many
of the Afghans who have fled the country over the past
six years, and the Afghan resistance almost certainly
views his accession to power as offering no improvement
over Karmal.
Najibullah's accession will almost certainly complicate
Afghanistan's relations with Pakistan and will not
advance diplomatic efforts to reach a compromise
solution to the war. Efforts to destabilize Pakistan
can also.. be expected to continue with Najibullah's rise
to power.
6 May 1986
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Top Secret
Top Secret
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