AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T01017R000202210001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 6, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 15, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
Afghanistan Situation Report
DATE L Ire
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OCR 02 79, so
P&PD
NESA M"86-20053JX
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15 April IW
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Heavy fighting in southern Paktia Province--
probably a prelude to major offensives this
spring--occurred last week as Afghan forces
intensified their assault on insurgent
strongholds. Combined Soviet-Afghan forces
conducted operations in Ghazni Province and in the
vicinity of Khowst, Jalalabad, and Kabul.
Babrak Karmal's speech on 2 April to the
Revolutionary Council was unusually critical of
the government's economic performance.
The Soviets are fitting more tracked artily
NEW MORTAR CARRIERS
tractors in Afghanistan with new mortars.
THE CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT IN PAKISTAN LOOKS AT
President Zia probably will not alter Pakistan's
policy on Afghanistan, despite pressure from the
Cabinet of Prime Minister Tunejo, but, ?akistan
probably would adopt a more accommodating position
if the Pakistan People's Party gained power. F ]
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AFGHAN INCIDENT DATA BASE: JANUARY 1986 13 25X1
A graphic portrayal of incidents of fighting in
Afghanistan in January 1986 from a new data base
will seek to identify general trends in the war.
This document is prepared weekly by the office of
Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis and the
Office of Soviet Analysis. Questions or comments
on the issues raised in the publication should be
15 April 1986
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Fighting in eastern Afghanistan probably is the prelude
to heavier fighting this spring. Last week, Afghan
forces intensified and expanded their assault against
insurgent strongholds in southern Paktia Province that
began on 4 April, according to
press sources. Although Soviet forces evidently have
not directly participated in these operations,
concurrent sweeps near Khowst possibly are supporting
the Afghan operation farther south. Thus far, regime
troops have failed in attempts to capture a large
insurgent mountain base at Zhawar Killi and strongholds
at Manne Narai and Lalizar
The guerrillas say Afgahan air and
artillery units have bombarded Zhawar Killi, nearby
base camps at Moghol Gi as well as three insurgent
strongholds in Pakistan. Press reports indicate that
Jalaluddin Haqqani--the top insurgent commander in the
Province--was badly wounded in a napalm attack and that
other insurgent casualties include at least 80 dead.
More than 250 Afghan soldiers are said to have defected
or been captured.
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Soviet and Afghan troops in the Moqor area 25X1
of Ghazni Province preparing to leave their garrisons,
possibly to support sweeps in neighboring Paktika
Province. According to the US Embassy, activity in
Kabul increased sharply last week; 10 bomb explosions
occurred and at least 20 other bombs were discovered
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KARMAL BERATES-POOR ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
Babrak Karmal's speech before the Revolutionary Council
on 2 April gave an unusually bleak assessment of
Afghanistan's recent economic performance. While
reiterating claims of great strides in economic
development made since the April Revolution (1978),
Karmal criticized Ministries and Departments for
falling short of their goals because of "...laziness,
lack of proper organization, and a lack of
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discipline..." He chastized government farms for
achieving only 60 percent of expected production owing
to mismanagement. Damage caused by insurgents was
mentioned several times as an impediment to economic
progress.
Comment: Previous official statements concerning
economic activity in Afghanistan have largely been
devoted to announcing the successful completion of
development goals, with only fleeting reference to the
disruptions caused by insurgents. By identifying
laggard ministries and departments publicly, the regime
is following recent practice in Moscow and'probably is
putting officials on notice that they will be replaced
unless their performance improves. At the same time,
giving heightened prominence to disruption's caused by
insurgents may bean attempt to.shift blame to them for
shortages of goods. and services.
NEW MORTAR CARRIERS
the Soviets are fitting
more MT-LB tracked artillery tractors in Afghanistari
with Vasilek-like -mortars. A total ,of five of these
mounted mortars have been identified in two mortar
batteries
at Konduz
Comment:, This is the fourth such deployment in
Afghanistan similar
batteries at Kabul, Herat, and at Rohka in the Panjsher
Valley. The use of the MT-LB chassis provides
increased mobility for mortar batteries.
on 17 April 1986, the Bonn Antihijacking Declaration
Group (3AHD) will lift sanctions imposed nearly. five
years ago against Afghanistan's Ariana Airlines. The
seven member countries (Federal Republic of Germany,
France, Canada, Italy, Japan, UK, and US) revoked the
airline's landing rights after Kabul backed hijackers
of a Pakistani aircraft, that killed a Pakistani
diplomat on board. To get the sanctions removed,
Kabul has agreed to observe the Hague antihijacking
convention.
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The prospect of being posted to Afghanistan is of
growing concern for Soviet conscript-age youths,
according to
Soviet Union. ?ress
veterans have raised
war.
who were recently
in the
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reports and stories from
public awareness about the
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The airfield perimeter at Konduz airfield has been
extended some 3500 meters since early February,
About 15 outposts
will hinder insurgent sabotage attempts and mortar
are now in place along the perimeter. The extension
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THE CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT IN PAKISTAN LOOKS AT AFGHANISTAN
President Zia and the Army are unlikely to relinquish
control over Pakistan's Afghanistan policy or give in
to pressures on Afghanistan from the Cabinet of Prime
Minister Muhammad Khan Junejo. A more open debate on
Afghanistan will now characterize Pakistan's politics.
But so long as lia remains in control, a change in
policy will occur only if the generals decide that
international or domestic events require a modified
approach.
Pakistan would adopt a more accommodating position on
Afghanistan if the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) gained
power. The most popular party in the country, the PPP,
and its leader, Benazir Bhutto, have recently
demonstrated its substantial popular support in Lahore,
capital of the key province of Punjab.
Zia and His Army
Zia and senior Pakistani generals have devised a system
they believe will restrict the new Cabinet's room for
maneuver on key defense and foreign relations
policies. Although Junejo and his Cabinet probably
will gain a free hand in foreign policy issues of
lesser consequence to the country, we believe lia and
his inner circle, including Foreign Minister Yaqub
Khan, will continue to make the final decisions on
Pakistan's relations with its most important enemies--
India, the Soviet Union, and Afghanistan.
President Zia and the military have taken a calculated
risk they can control Pakistan's politics during a
post-martial law era that could well see an outpouring
of pent-up political demands. This could be
particularly dangerous for Zia in a period of slower
economic growth. We believe lia's own political
skills, the support of the Army, and a careful courting
of key interest groups will enable the Pakistani
President to succeed over the short term (six to twelve
months). We do not rule out a significant and possibly
rapid deterioration of Zia's position in the longer
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Zia and the generals are strongly committed to the
present political arrangement and probably will act to
restrict the main opposition..group--the Movement for
the Restoration of Democracy. They could also
sacrifice Prime Minister Junejo, although this would
severely damage Zia's credibility if such a change
occurred too soon. Although the President has kept his
position as Chief of the Army Staff, we believe the
Army might try to persuade Zia to step down should an
antigovernment movement mushroom.
Afghanistan and the Politicians
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has created a
difficult dilemma for Pakistan's politicians. On the
one hand, they are painfully aware of the long-term
consequences for Pakistan of a permanent Soviet
presence in Afghanistan and support the need for
Pakistan to be strong enough to resist pressures from
both Moscow and New Delhi. On the other hand, they
resent the fact that the Afghan crisis has strengthened
Zia and the Army's command of the-state and their
access to the country's resources. The politicians are
also concerned about the eventual disposition of the
roughly 3 million Afghan refugees in Pakistan.
In the more moderate opposition, as well as among the
centrists around Prime Minister Junejo, there is a
recognition that Zia and the Army so far have deftly
preserved Pakistan's interests. In this regard, we
believe the debate on Afghanistan in the National
Assembly, last December probably helped more than it
hurt Zia. Although the moderates are concerned that
Zia will identify Pakistan too closely with the United
States on Afghanistan and expose the country to Soviet
reprisals, they are more concerned about the overall
stability of the country and probably will refrain from
open agitation on Afghanistan.
Zia and Junejo
Prime Minister Junejo has to demonstrate some
independence from Zia if he is to gain any credibility
for his Cabinet, party, or the current National
Assembly. Zia and the Army understand this and have
compromised on several constitutional issues--without
relinquishing the levers of control. The Army prefers
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to be out of sight in Pakistan's politics but still the
ultimate source of political authority. Both Zia and
Junejo are committed to "civilianization" and realize
there is broad public support for a responsible
National Assembly. Moreover, both know that only the
opposition outside the Assembly would benefit if the
experiment broke down.
Nevertheless, Junejo clearly plans to be more than a
cipher for Zia. He and his supporters in the Muslim
League will cautiously attempt to enlarge their power
but without confrontations with the President. This
means greater control over patronage and the
development funds needed to satisfy supporters and keep
the extra-parliamentary opposition at bay. For Junejo
to emerge as a real rival to Zia for power would
require considerably more political capacity and
personal support than he has so far shown. To build a
broader, independent political base, Junejo would have
to adopt a populist program, including land reform,
which would alienate his landlord allies in the Muslim
League. In a major domestic crisis, we think Junejo's
real problem would be to avoid either being jettisoned
by Zia or being crushed between the Army and a
resurgent opposition.
The Main Opposition
Those most implacably opposed to Zia have charged that
he and the generals have connived with the United
States to keep tensions on Afghanistan high in order to
preserve the Army's power. They want Islamabad to
enter into direct talks with Kabul, thus easing
tensions with Moscow and undercutting the Army's reason
to maintain its overall control.
The Pakistan People's Party is the one group that Zia
and the senior generals want to keep out of power. The
PPP and its leader, Benazir Bhutto, seek vengeance for
the execution by the Zia regime of its founder, former
Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto--Benazir's father--
and a drastic reduction of the Army's role in Pakistani
politics. Party leaders believe that only by
reordering the Army as an institution and by
substantially reducing its size can it be brought to
heel. But they also realize that only major errors by
the Army and ..a. revolutionary mass movement could
achieve this.
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The Movement for the Restoration of Democracy, a
center-left alliance of 11 parties, dominated by the
PPP, is showing strains as some of its constituent
groups react variously to the Political Parties Act of
December 1985, which sets the conditions under which
parties can resume their activities. Zia and Junejo
may be able to exploit these strains and possibly gain
support from the more moderate MRD parties. However,
we believe the PPP, the smaller leftist parties allied
with it, and the main regionalist parties will be
nominally united by opposition to Zia, his relations
with the United States, and his policy on
Afghanistan.
The PPP is currently testing its support in Punjab and
the limits the regime will allow for political
activity. It probably also is looking for allies in
the army and the bureaucracy. Pro-Libyan
demonstrations in Lahore in January 1986 were large and
quickly turned both against the US and President Zia.
It is difficult to judge whether this is a temporary
venting of pent-up frustrations or the beginning of a
broader movement against Zia. A continuation of
demonstrations in Punjab this spring could gain
momentum, as moderates and uncommitted elements rush to
be on the winning side. In such a volatile situation,
a figure like Benazir Bhutto, who retains the loyalty
of the party rank-and-file, might be able to turn the
movement decisively against Zia.
The Refugee Issue
The problem of the 3 million Afghan refugees on
Pakistani soil will remain a key issue in the country's
politics but should not become critical to the stability
of the regime so long as Islamabad restricts their
access to Punjab. Although there is considerable
grumbling among Pakistani Pakhtuns allied to Khan Abdul
Wali Khan's National Democratic Party and among Baluch
associated with the Pakistan National Party of Ghaus
Bakhsh Bizenjo--both pro-Moscow groups--most Pakistanis
support Islamabad's policy of giving sanctuary to their
Muslim brethren. Further, none of the opposition groups
has offered a resolution that is practicable. Most
Pakistanis probably would agree that the refugees cannot
be expelled and would return voluntarily only under an
acceptable political settlement, which must include the
withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan.
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The current period of more open politics could well see
increased tensions where refugees have settled in large
numbers, particularly around Peshawar and Quetta.
Opposition politicians are likely to attempt to mobilize
support by playing on old Baluch-Pakhtun enmities and
strains arising from economic competition. Further,
both Moscow and Kabul will continue to use covert means
to increase tensions between refugee groups, between
refugees and locals, and between Islamabad and the more
recalcitrant Pakhtun border tribes.
We do not, however, foresee a groundswell of anti-
refugee sentiments in the North-West Frontier Province
sufficiently strong to force Islamabad to alter its
Afghanistan policy. The Pakhtun tribal nature of
society in the Province has made the area substantially
impervious to mass movements. Although the refugees
pose an unprecedented problem, we believe Islamabad
still would be able to mobilize centrists and Islamic
rightists to neutralize any anti-refugee, pro-Moscow
thrust from the left in provincial politics.
The Border Tribes
The Pakhtun tribes along the Pakistan-Afghanistan
border have long resisted central authority and have
sought to play Kabul and Islamabad off against each
other to preserve their own interests. The Soviet
invasion and the war in Afghanistan generally-have made
the border tribes more reluctant to deal with Kabul.
Islamabad also has been able to strengthen its
influence in the border areas by mediating disputes
between local tribes and powerful resistance groups.
Islamabad has acted rapidly to suppress clashes between
the two, using regular troops--as in the Kurram clashes
in 1934--where paramilitary militias were either
insufficient or loyal to one side.
The Afridi and Shinwari tribes have been a special
problem. Afridi territory fronts directly on populous
Peshawar District, unlike other areas where border
tribes are screened from settled districts by powerful
and largely pro-Pakistan tribes. Both tribes have long
engaged in trade, transport, and smuggling, both
locally and across the Khyber Pass between Afghanistan
and Pakistan, and have adopted a pragmatic approach to
the war, selling weapons to the resistance, but
cooperating with Kabul to keep the road between Kabul
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and Peshawar open to trade. One of the reasons
Jalalabad has been the most secure Afghan city has been
the reluctance of the Shinwari to cooperate with the
resistance.
Islamabad's efforts since last December to suppress the
production of heroin by the Afridi have given Kabul and
Moscow their best opportunity so far to turn the border
tribes against Pakistan. Some tribal chiefs refused to
comply and their acceptance of arms from Kabul,
participation in the Loya Jirga, and disruption of
resistance supply lines forced Islamabad to act. It
has blockaded the area and forced recalcitrant chiefs
to negotiate. Although even the tribe most opposed to
the regime will in time negotiate the reopening of the
Khyber road and their smuggler's bazaars--the sources
of much of their wealth--it could be some time before
the situation normalizes.
Baluchistan
Historic tensions between the T3aluch and Pakhtuns make
the refugee problem in Baluchistan potentially more
destabilizing than in the NWFP. The T3aluch are
outnumbered by Afghan refugees, most of whom are
Pakhtuns with tribal ties to Pakistani Pakhtuns north
of Quetta and in the Zhob Valley region. In recent
decades, the T3aluch have found it difficult to maintain
their culture in the face of Pakhtun and Punjabi
inroads. Serious Baluch insurgencies occurred in 1968-
1969 and 1973-1977, although President Zia has kept the
Province quiet by a careful development policy, by
paying attention to the interests of the powerful
Baluch tribal chiefs, and by keeping central authority
from too rapidly intruding into tribal heartlands.
There are indications in both the Moscow and Kabul
media of renewed Soviet interest in anti-Islamabad
Baluch groups that took refuge in Afghanistan after the
last insurgency. We believe a determined Soviet
campaign to subvert the Baluch could result in a
marginal deterioration of security conditions in the
province, but most 3aluch tribal chiefs fear the
Soviets more than they do Islamabad.
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Implications for the US
The threat to US interests in Afghanistan is more
likely to come from domestic political change in
Pakistan than from a modification of policy by the
current regime. Zia's policy has been unwavering in
its opposition to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan
and should remain so long as the resistance is active
and Pakistan receives strong support from its friends
abroad. FI
Pakistan's relationship with the United States will
continue to be a focus of opposition efforts to
discredit the Zia regime. Apart from the military and
a thin layer of industrial and landed families, few in
Pakistan support the US connection. Intellectuals are
either Marxists or Islamists, while Muslim clerics can
be vociferous in their denunciation of "Western
materialism and immorality." Pakistanis continue to be
irritated by US support for Israel. 3ut most
importantly, they are convinced that the United States
let their country down in Pakistan's two major wars
with India and that America is an unreliable ally.
Zia has been unsuccessful in appearing to be
independent of US interests. Opposition pressures
could, however, force the government to emphasize
Pakistan's more popular connections with the Islamic
world, particularly Saudi Arabia, and China. We doubt
that the substance of Pakistan's Afghanistan policy
will change, but Islamabad might consider it necessary
to appear to be more flexible. In this event, it is
possible the regime will agree to "direct talks" with
Kabul, provided a timetable for the withdrawal of
Soviet troops is on the agenda and the talks are
expanded to include both the Soviets and the
resistance.
Should a PPP-led opposition movement emerge, and
succeed in unseating Zia, it is unlikely that a truly
revolutionary situation will emerge in the foreseeable
future. More moderate elements seem likely to dominate
a future PPP government after a period of factional
infighting. Such a regime, in our view, would seek to
promote a rapid settlement of the Afghan issue.
Moreover, the military almost certainly will continue
to be a silent partner in any foreseeable civilian
regime, able to assert its-will on strategic issues and
play the role of kingmaker.
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The following charts represent some initial results
from the compilation of a data base which will be used
to indicate general trends on the war in Afghanistan.
The caveats below apply to the charts on the following
pages:
"Military Activity initiated" seeks only to portray
who initiated incidents. The chart does not
measure the,. type or intensity of the incident or
the results.
"Incidents by Province" does not necessarily
reflect combat intensity.
The "Targets" charts show what was attacked, but
does not judge the success, intensity, or method of
operation.
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MiLITARY ACTIVITY INITIATED
JANUARY 1986
Soviet and Afghan Regime Forces
25.0%
Undetermined
16.0%
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INCIDENTS BY PROVINCE
JANUARY 1986
74
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..Government Buildings
.0%
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MAJOR TARGETS OF SOVIET AND AFGHAN REGIME FORCES
JANUARY 1986
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000202210001-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000202210001-3
Top Secret:,
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Top Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86TO1017R000202210001-3