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• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T01017R000202180001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: January 27, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 14, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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Central Intelligence Agency
washingon.D.C20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
14 April 1986
Afghanistan: Soviet and Pakistani Intentions
Summary
With the seventh round of negotiations on a settlement
in Afghanistan convening in Geneva next month, the Soviets
probably calculate that their diplomatic and military
pressures are placing Islamabad under increasing pressure to
compromise. We believe, however, that Pakistan will remain
committed to its two fundamental goals in any peace
settlement: the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan
and the return of some 3 million refugees from Pakistan to
Afghanistan. We perceive several modifications in Pakistan's
negotiating strategy, but we believe its basic tactic of not
negotiating directly with the Kabul government and insisting
on an acceptable timetable for Soviet withdrawal before a
settlement can be signed remain unchanged.
********
Soviet Negotiating Policy: What Is Moscow Up To?
This memorandum was prepared byl I the Pakistan/Bangladesh
branch, South Asia Division, Office of Near Eastern and South Asian
Analysis with a contribution from
April 1986 was used in its preparation.
directed to Chief, South Asia Division,
SOVA. Information as of 8
Questions and comments should be
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Whatever Moscow's intentions, it has lost little by having Kabul submit
a timetable. While it can no longer be offered as a quid pro quo for
direct talks, the timetable, however extended, can be presented by Moscow
as evidence of Soviet-Afghan reasonableness, especially in conjunction with
Kabul's agreement to return to the proximity format for the Geneva talks.
Moscow probably hopes that Islamabad will find itself under increasing
pressure to demonstrate comparable flexibility--perhaps by agreeing to a
lengthier timetable--and conclude that the time for compromise has arrived.
Meanwhile, the Soviets' diplomatic maneuvers in no way inhibit their
concurrent military effort in Afghanistan or their and the Afghan regime's
subversive activities in Pakistan, which they probably see as complementary
means of wearing down the will of the resistance and Islamabad to continue
the fight.
President Babrak Karmal knows that he is dependent on Soviet support
and, though he may squawk and stall, ultimately he has no choice but to do
Moscow's bidding. Indications that.the Soviets are dissatisfied with
Karmal and rumors that they mean to replace him abound and might account
for his reported reluctance to resume indirect talks. He may well fear a
Soviet sellout. Awkward though his removal would be at a time when the
Soviets are attempting to cultivate an image of the Kabul regime's
stability, popularity, and independence, there can be little doubt that
Moscow would drop him should he obstruct a settlement that the Soviets
want.
The New Pakistani Civilian Government and Afghanistan
We believe that the new civilian government of Pakistani Prime Minister
Junejo basically agrees with the goals and strategy for Afghanistan set
forth earlier by President Zia al-Haq. We believe that Junejo, however, is
cautious, especially about overt efforts to support the insurgency; he has
dragged his feet on cross-border humanitarian aid. According to the US
Embassy in Islamabad, he has again postponed a cabinet meeting to discuss
Afghanistan--last scheduled for 6 April.
there is no significant
opposition in Parliament to Zia's Afghan policy.
acceptance of this policy would erode if Soviet or Afghan
regime-sponsored terrorism was instigated in Pakistan's urban areas.
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In our view, the Pakistanis probably believe their policy of refusing
to talk directly with Kabul during the negotiations, demanding a
Soviet/Afghan timetable for Soviet withdrawal, and providing material aid
to the Afghan insurgency is paying off. The Pakistanis likely regard
Kabul's showing of a timetable for Soviet withdrawal to Cordovez as
vindication of their negotiating strategy, even though Foreign Minister
Yaqub Khan told the US Embassy that the timetable which was shown to him by
Cordovez was unacceptable. Pakistani Foreign Ministry officials told the
US Embassy that the Afghan-proffered timetable would not be the basis for
negotiations at Geneva VII.
In our judgment, Islamabad believes its agreement last month to meet
directly with the Afghan regime once an agreement is finalized and ready to
be signed is only a minor concession; a Pakistani Foreign Ministry official
told US diplomats that a face-to-face meeting between the two governments
would last only long enough to sign a completed settlement on Afghanistan.
The Pakistanis have rejected the suggestion of Cordovez that Pakistan and
Afghanistan form a bilateral commission on reconciliation--which might be
interpreted as recognition of Kabul--in Islamabad before a settlement has
been reached, according to the US Embassy in Islamabad.
Pakistani Attitudes Towards A Post-Settlement Afghan Government
Pakistani Foreign Ministry officials have told US diplomats that
Islamabad's thinking on a post-settlement government in Kabul is in a "very
preliminary stage." Yaqub Khan, according to press reports, has
acknowledged that a new Afghan government must not be seen as hostile to
the USSR. Pakistani officials have also said that Islamabad would probably
try to hold separate, direct talks with Moscow on the composition of the
Afghan government.
We do not believe that Islamabad would allow the resistance veto power
over any settlement that the Pakistanis would accept. The insurgents
clearly could play a spoiler role, however, if they are unsatisfied with
its terms. The Pakistanis told the US Embassy that they have briefed the
resistance alliance three times on the proximity talks since December and
have promised to consult the resistance before any agreement is reached.
The Pakistanis realize that most Afghan refugees and insurgents would
not return to Afghanistan if the present government is still in power in
Kabul--and return of the refugees remains a major objective of Islamabad.
President Zia's speech in February which suggested that Pakistan could
assimilate the Afghan refugees was, in our view, an attempt to prepare the
Pakistani public for the possibility of at least some the refugees staying
indefinitely in the country, even if a settlement is reached.
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What if the Soviets Renege?
The possiblity exists that the Soviets will present a seemingly
reasonable timetable for withdrawal, induce the Pakistanis to sign a
comprehensive settlement, and then halt troop withdrawals after removing a
token contingent. If this happens, we believe that the present government
in Islamabad would resume aiding the resistance; Pakistani acquiesence to a
Soviet betrayal would invite reprisals inside Pakistan from embittered
Afghan insurgents and refugees and pose a threat to internal security.
Such acquiesence would also antagonize states that have currently close
relations with Islamabad or the insurgents, most importantly Saudi Arabia
and China. At the same time, a Pakistani decision to revive aid to the
insurgency would almost certainly be quickly followed by requests for
material and diplomatic support from the United States, Saudi Arabia, and
China.
Pakistan has previously insisted that if one of the four settlement
instruments is violated, the others should remain intact because it feared
that the insurgents would break a ceasefire that would lead to the Soviets
halting their withdrawal. Pakistani officials have now told the US Embassy
that they are "reconsidering" that position because they realize that it
could be used against them if the Soviets unilaterally decided to halt
their withdrawal from Afghanistan. By dropping their previous stand, it
would enable the Pakistanis to resume, or threaten to resume, aiding the
insurgency if Moscow halted its troop withdrawal.
We believe that most insurgents would be able to regroup and resume
fighting relatively quickly, given the porous nature of the Afghan-Pakistan
border, lack of central authority over many parts of Afghanistan, and the
abundance of weapons in the area. Indeed, many insurgents are suspicious
of Pakistan's intentions and have been building arms caches inside the
country in case an unfavorable peace settlement is reached. Some of the
Pakistan-based resistance leaders have only loose authority over their
forces in Afghanistan and would probably be unable to force their fighters
to lay down their arms.
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SUBJECT: Afghanistan: Soviet and Pakistani Intentions
NESA M#86-20050C
Copy 1 - Robert Peck (State)
Copy 2 - George Harris (INR)
Copy 3 - Col. McKim (DOD)
Copy 14 - (DIA)
Copy 5 - Steve Cohen (State)
Copy 6 - DDI
Copy 7 - NI0/NESA
Copy 8 - D/NESA
Copy 9 - C/PPS/NESA
Copy 10, 11 - PPS/NESA
am
Copy 12 - C/PES
Copy 13,14,15,16, 17,18 - CPAS/IMB/CB SfiCoY~D
Copy 19 - DC/DDO/NE~
Copy 20 - PDB Staff
Copy 21 - NID Staff
Copy 22 - C/NESA/PG
Copy 23 - C/NESA/AI
Copy 24 - C/NESA/IA
Copy 25 - C/NESA/SO
Copy 26 - DC/NESA/S0
Copy 27 - C/NESA/S0/P
Copy 28 - C/NESA/S0/A
Copy 29 - C/NESA/S0/S
Copy 30 -
COPY 31 __](SOVA/TWA/A
DDI/NESA/S0 (14Apr86)
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