AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T01017R000202150001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 6, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 1, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of y o Top Secret
Afghanistan Situation Report
OCR c 79, F0
1 April 1986
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CONTENTS
Soviet forces conducted operations in several
border provinces last week
IRAN AND THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE: FOSTERING REVOLUTION IN THE
HAZAREHJAT
Iran is increasing its influence in the
Hazarehjat region of central Afghanistan, where
Tehran-backed insurgents are in ascendance. The
spread of Khomeini-style fundamentalism in
Afghanistan could affect Moscow's willingness to
negotiate a pullout of its forces.
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OPERATIONS / 13
increased
participation of Afghan Army forces in combat
operations near Jalalabad, Gardez, and Herat.
The Kabul regime has been under pressure from the
Soviets to have its troops take a more active
role in the fighting.
This document is prepared weekly by the Office of
Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis and the Office
of Soviet Analysis.
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OPERATIONS IN THE BORDER PROVINCES
Soviet forces conducted operations in several Afghan
border regions la week, althouah poor weather hampered
Soviet airstrikes and temporarily
interrupted some ground force movements near Qandahar.
The Soviets launched sorties against targets
in Kabol and Paktia Provinces and the Panjsher Valley on
24 March.
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IRAN AND THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE: FOSTERING REVOLUTION IN THE
HAZAREHJAT
Iran is increasing its influence in the Hazarehjat
region of central Afghanistan, where Tehran-backed Shia
resistance groups are in ascendance. Although Iran's
attempts to establish a Khomeini-style government in
the Hazarehjat have increased fighting among local Shia
resistance groups, as well as between Shia insurgents
and Sunni groups that transit the region, Shia. groups
would be able to concentrate on fighting Soviet and
regime forces if the gains of pro-Iranian groups in the
Hazarehjat could be sustained. Fear of the spread of
Khomeini-style fundamentalism in Afghanistan remains an
important factor in Soviet policy calculations. It
helps account for Moscow's reluctance to make
concessions during ongoing UN-sponsored peace talks.
TL-hran Increasingly Active
Recent evidence suggests that Iran has been
consolidating its influence in the Hazarehjat region
where Afghanistan's Shia community lives.
As evidence of Moscow's concern over Iranian subversive
efforts in the Hazarehjat, Kabul protested Iranian
behavior twice since the disappointing visit in
February of Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister
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Hazarehjat Society
The Hazarehjat is one of the most backward
and isolated regions of Afghanistan.
Because of their Mongoloid features,
separate dialect, and minority (Shia)
religion, the Hazaras have traditionally
been regarded by other Afghans as the
lowest social class.
the social
structure of this poor rural area is based
on a tenant-farming peasantry cultivating
land for large landowners.
Members of all classes of Hazara society
who have lived in Kabul tend to become
Marxists or Islamic revolutionaries,
Many,
especially the Islamists, have returned to
the region and provided the leadership for
the most radical of the fundamentalist
insurgent organizations: Sazman-i-[Vasr
and Sepah-e Pasdaran. With little
affection for the traditional social
institutions of the Hazarehjat, the
Islamists are attempting to foster
Iranian-style revolution--in our view,
with some success.
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Korniyenko to Tehran. A week after Korniyenko's
departure, Kabul issued a formal protest to Iran for
sending a delegation of Iranian clerics into
Afghanistan to promote Islamic revolution--a demarche
we believe Moscow probably inspired in light of
gloating Iranian press reports during Korniyenko's
How Important is the Hazarehjat?
The region has strategic value to the resistance. Some
insurgent groups active in western and northern
Afghanistan--such as Jamiat-i-Islami groups in Herat,
Balkh and Kapisa Provinces--use supply routes that pass
through the area. The Hazarehjat's terrain, moreover,
provides the insurgents with a natural redoubt from
which to strike Soviet and Afghan convoys and
installations on the highway encircling the region.
The Soviets would be at a disadvantage during such
assaults because the region's mountainous terrain makes
vehicle land transit difficult and hampers effective
helicopter support operations.
To date, the resistance in central Afghanistan has not
played a significant role in the war effort. Attacks
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Excerpts From Kabul's Foreign
Ministry Statement
The Iranian Charge d'affaires in Kabul was
summoned to the Foreign Ministry on 3
March and handed an unusually strong
protest note. Kabul complained that:
- During the current year (21 March 1985
- 20 March 1986), Afghan territory
"has been violated 63 times by the
ground and air forces of the Islamic
Republic of Iran, as a result of which
20 people have been killed, 245 people
wounded, and 19 people abducted to
Iran...."
- "Despite repeated requests, the
propaganda, publicity, and
organizational operations against the
Democratic Republic of Afghanistan
have not been reduced, but the hours
of hostile broadcasting of the Iranian
radio and television against -(us{ have
been-increased and...is -Csic1 full of
hostile articles and concocted
subjects against -[usI....."
"The authorities and leaders of fIran,}
have expanded their interference in
organizing, provoking, and instigating
the resident Afghans and
counterrevolutionary elements in Iran
to such an extent that religious
leaders, instructed by the high
authorities, enter the territory of
{Afghanistanj- in order to carry out
unfriendly secret actions which the
Iranian media extensively publicize.
Such actions are taken at. the
instruction of such personalities as
Ayatollah Montazeri...."
- "Some Iranian media...admit that the
Islamic Republic of Iran gives broad
material, financial, political, and
military assistance to the Afghan
counterrevolutionaries and exposes
those persons at the Presidency, the
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Prime minister's office, the Ministry
of Internal Affairs and the Islamic
Revolution. Guards Corps who are in
charge of and oversee these actions.
It is due to the involvement of these
authorities that the Afghan
counterrevolutionary bands have been
organized in Tehran, Qom, Mashhad,
Yazd, Esfahan, and other parts of
Iran, and are sent to Afghanistan for
murder, plunder, and subversion...."
"It has become necessary once again,
in the light of evidence and documents
at hand, to state -IAfghanistan'st
strongest protests at the Iranian
state land ask it tol- reconsider its
position and method of approach. . .and
not allow, by supporting reactionary
and US-linked hands, to take up
positions within the ranks of US
imperialism and its collaborators...."
"The Democratic Republic of
Afghanistan states that if the
authorities in the Islamic Republic of
Iran do not cease, resolutely and
effectively, the course of their
interference and aggressions in the
internal affairs of Afghanistan,
conditions will be imposed on us such
that we shall defend our national
sovereignty and security at any
cost. In that case undoubtedly the
responsibility for their inevitable
and dangerous consequences will rest
with the Islamic Republic of Iran."
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against the Soviets and the Afghan government have been
minimal. Much of the resistance's potential in the
Hazarehjat has remained unfulfilled because of fighting
among the numerous Iranian-backed groups. There also
has been fighting between Shia groups and the
mainstream Sunni insurgents based in Pakistan that seek
to transit the region.
Major Resistance Groups
Four major Shia groups compete for power in the
Hazarehjat:
-- Shura-Inqilab-i-Itifaq-i-Islami (Shura) is a
traditionalist, Hazara coalition of some 30 groups
that united during local uprisings in 1979 against
the Communist government. Once dominant in central
Afghanistan, its influence has declined because of
internal weaknesses that caused the departure of
many of its original member groups, and the growth
of more revolutionary Iranian-supported groups in
the Hazarehjat.
-- Harakat-i-Islami (Harakat) operates on the
periphery of the Hazarehjat region. It is the most
active in fighting the Soviets in the Qandahar
region. Sheikh Asef Mohseini, the head of Harakat,
is based in Qom but reportedly gets no arms from
Iran. He is highly suspicious of revolutionar
Its members are mainly of Tajik, Pushtun,
and Turkmen ethnic stock, with some Hazaras.
-- Sazman-i-Nasr (Nasr), an Iranian-backed group,
seeks the establishment of a Khomeini-style society
in the Hazarehjat. Formed in 1972 by Shia students
in Kabul, it moved to Iran in 1979 and became
active in the Hazarehjat in 1980. We believe most
Hazaras who are attracted to Nast- view it as more
nationalist than pro-Iranian.
-- Sepah-e Pasdaran (Pasdaran), the most
revolutionary of the Hazara resistance groups, is
a direct instrument of the Iranian Revolutionary
Guards Its
recruits are young Hazaras, uprooted from their
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villages, often without family ties and
dissatisfied with the traditional social structure
in the Hazarehjat.
Relations With Other Resistance Groups
The Pakistani-based resistance alliance has a history
of troublesome relations with Shia groups in the
Hazarehjat, partly because of Iranian meddling.
Even Hizbi-Islami faction leader Gulbuddin--whose
staunchly fundamentalist and anti-Western values most
closely mirror Iran's--is reportedly unhappy with
Iran. He objects to the low level of support to
Individual Nasr commanders, however, make ad hoc
transit arrangements with local Sunni commanders,
because the Shias are not adequately supplied by
Iran. The arrangements often include the collection of
"tolls" from comparatively better-supplied Sunni
groups.
The
agreement provided for sate passage for Jamiat convoys
to Balkh and Jowzjan Province, in exchange for a
percentage of ammunition, medicine and money for Shia
commanders along the convoy route. The system appeared
to be working well in late 1985, according to press
reports.
Revolutionary Groups Take the Lead
revolutionary groups
backed by Iran, Nasr and Pasdaran, have displaced
those in the Hazarehjat which are more traditionalist
--a development we believe will give Iran an important
foothold in the country
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Implications...
...For the Mainstream Resistance. We do not expect
transit through the Hazarehjat--which has always
depended on local and somewhat fragile arrangements--to
become significantly more difficult. Because Iranian
materiel support is minimal, we believe Shia insurgents
have come to rely on Sunni groups that transit the area
for needed supplies and weapons. Only a major
breakthrough in the Iran-Iraq war, which would allow
for a significant increase in Iranian materiel support
for Shia groups in Afghanistan, would alter this
assessment.
...For the War. The growing capabilities of Iranian-
trained forces operating in the Hazarehjat are likely
to increase military pressure on the Soviets somewhat,
but Shia groups probably will not make a substantial
difference to the course of the war until Nasr and
Pasdaran can sustain and further consolidate their
position. Shia groups would then be able to
concentrate on fighting Soviet and regime forces--a
development we believe would be a major step toward
opening a front west of Kabul. Soviet-Afghan forces
now have only two outposts in the region--at
Chaghcharan and Bamian--but a significant increase of
antiregime activity would force them to garrison more
units.
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...For a Peace Settlement. Growing Iranian control and
intervention in Afghanistan would further complicate
progress toward a settlement, in our view. Fear of
rising pro-Iranian fundamentalism in Afghanistan was
one of the reasons for the Soviet invasion and remains
an important part of the Soviet policy-making
calculus.
although Kabul and
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Moscow appear to have softened their demand that an
Iranian-Afghan bilateral agreement on non-interference
be a part of a settlement, Kabul still insists that
Iran "sign off" on any peace agreement.
Iran, which has consistently called for a unilateral
Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan to be followed by
the creation of an Islamic state in Kabul, has not
backed down from these demands. Although we do not
belie?-e Tehran currently could torpedo a peace
agreement--the level of military activity in the
Hazarehjat remains only a nuisance to the Soviets--a
substantial increase in Iranian-sponsored attacks would
make Moscow more reluctant to make concessions.
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EVIDENCE OF INCREASED USE OF AFGHAN ARMY FORCES IN COMBAT
OPERATIONS
participation ot Afghan Army orces during com a
operations with Soviet units near Jalalabad, Gardeyz,
and Herat. The Afghan Army conducted sweeps while the
Soviets apparently provided mainly air, artillery, and
advisory support. Earlier this year, an Afghan
regimental-size task force was observed operating on
the Shomali plain without substantial involvement of
Soviet ground units (see ma ).
Jalalabad Operation
elements of the Afghan 11th Infantr 25X1
Division at Jalalabad were observed 25X1
preparing for sweep operations. The divisional task
force--which consisted of four armored companies (40
tanks and armored personnel carriers), two field
artillery battalions, two BM-13 multiple rocket launcher
batteries, a command post, and at least 250 additional
trucks and vehicles--relocated to an area about 35 km
southeast of Jalalabad One to 25X1
two companies of the Afghan forces were subsequently
seen on patrol in the river valley extending south from
the deployment area. Soviet air support for this
operation evidently was provided by MI-8 and MI-24
helicopters from Jalalabad, where a hi he
number had been observe The sweep 25X1
operation concluded and Afghan units were 25X1
back in garrison 25:25X1
Gardeyz Operation
Afghan forces 25X1
conducted sweeps on two sides of a mountain ridge about
60 km northeast of Gardeyz Preparations 25X1
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for the operation were observed) when an
Afghan command post was established near a Soviet signal
battalion, and Afghan units left their post at Gardeyz.
The Afghan units, including an infantry regiment, armored
company, and two field artillery battalions, swept the
river valley north of the ridge. A Soviet air assault
battalion from Gardeyz, positioned in the rear area, did
not appear to be directly involved in the sweep
operations. South of the mountain ridge, another group
of Afghan forces moved up a river valley. This task
force comprised at least three battalion-size armored
groups and one field artillery battalion, probably drawn
from the 25th Infantry Division at Khowst. A concurrent
increase in MI-8 and MI-24 helicopters at Gardeyz
suggests that Soviet units at the airfield supported the
ground operations.
Herat Operations
A small Afghan sweep operation with Soviet artillery
support was observed in Herat Three
armored companies maneuvered south of Herat, and the
Afghans also established at least four field artillery
batteries on the edge of the city. North of Herat, the
Soviets set up an artillery fire support base.
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