AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T01017R000202070001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 6, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 18, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000202070001-9
Directorate of
Intelligence
79-t 1
Afghanistan Situation Report
I1mc/:3
DATE
DQC NO oCSA
tG TX
OCR
P&PD
/- -,ri /
NESA M 86-20038JX
SOVA M 86-20026JX
18 March 1986
COPY 0 8 1
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000202070001-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000202070001-9
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AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT I 25X1
Fighting continued at an unusually intense pace
for the winter in many areas of Afghanistan. 25X1
Scores of Afghan Army officers, most of them from
the Khalqi faction, have been arrested during the
past few months on charges that include coup
plotting and involvement with insurgent groups.
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KA3UL'S "RECONCILIATION WITH THE PEOPLE" 25X1
The Kabul regime is actively trying to elicit the
cooperation of tribes in Zabol, qelmand, and
Qandahar Provinces by offering money, political
and other economic incentives, and promising
reduced military activity.
'Pakistani press reporting on the proposed Afghan
media center will increase Islamabad's
apprehensions about cooperating with Washington on
cross-border humanitarian aid.
18 March 1986
MESA M 86-20038JX
SOVA M 36-20026JX
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Combat activity was at a high level in western
Afghanistan in 1935 as the Soviets aggressively
attempted to dislodge the insurgents. They probably
will continue their efforts in 1986, but do not have
enough forces committed to the area to establish
control over the cities, much less the
countryside.
This document is prepared weekly by the office of
Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis and the
office of Soviet Analysis. Questions or comments
on the issues raised in this publication should be
18 March 1986
NESA M 86-20038JX
SOVA M 86-20026JX
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000202070001-9
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18 March 1986
NSA M 86-20038JX
SOVA M 36-20025JX
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000202070001-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000202070001-9
LXTE-WINTER COMBAT CONTINUES
Military activity continued at a comparatively high
level. last week. In western Afghanistan, Soviet
units conducted sweep operations near Herat
US Embassy in Kabul have said supporting Soviet air
strikes have caused considerable damage in the Herat
area. The Embassy also reports continuing clashes
in Qandahar and environs, where the Soviets
intensified efforts last month to quell resistance
activity.
an increase in helicopters at Gardeyz, prior
to a combat operation in Paktia Province last
week. the Embassy claims the Soviets
wound up an unsuccessful operation in Lowgar
Province last week. Although there were at least
two rocket attacks on the capital and a military
outpost southwest of the city was hit by insurgents,
Kabul was relatively calm.
MORE SENIOR AFGHAN ARMY OFFICERS ARRESTED
In late January 1985, 45 senior afghan officers in
the Ministry of Defense were arrested for suspected
involvement with insurgent groups,
Most of those detained, including
eight general officers, were members of the Khalgi
(Masses) faction of the People's Democratic Party of
Afghanistan (PDPA) .
Comment: Scores of Afghan Army officers and
government officials have been arrested in recent
months on charges of coup plotting, working for
foreign intelligence, and collaborating with the
t8 March 1985
MESA M 86-20038JX
SOYA M 86-20026JX
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Jamiat-i-Islami and Hizbi Islami (Gulbiddin)
insurgent organizations. The scale of the arrests
and the Khalqi affiliation of many of the detainees
suggest that a purge is under way. It probably was
instigated by Naj.ibullah, former head of the 'kfghan
intelligence service, who has a reputation for anti-
Xhalqi views. lie is in a better position to oversee
such an action since being named Central Committee
Secretary for the Ministries of State Security,
Interior, and Defense last November. In any event,
the loss of experienced senior officers is something
the Army can ill. afford and will fuel factional
infighting in the PDPA and the military.
KABUL'S "RECONCILIATION WITH THE PEOPLE"
The Kabul regime is seeking to secure the
cooperation or neutrality of tribes in Helmand,
Qandahar, and 3abol Provinces,
it has offered villagers generous
financial and technical assistance to return to
their farms and promised the release of some local
insurgents. The regime pledged to prevent
bombardment of villages, to provide villagers a
voice in the government, and not to implement land
reform or restrict private enterprise. In return,
the villagers were asked to reopen schools, accept
"mild taxation", provide conscripts, reorganize
local ruling bodies, and help maintain security.
Regime officials argued that a prolonged conflict
benefits only external powers and claimed that the
Soviets would withdraw within six months if peace
were maintained.
Since the initial. approaches six weeks ago, some
villagers have received aid, and military actions
against villages have decreased,
Two insurgent commanders have been
freed, while several well-known tribesmen have been
appointed as non-party representatives to the
Revolutionary Council..
18 March 1985
MESA M 86-20038JX
SOVA M 96-20026JX
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Comment: The regime's political campaign in the
south is part of its effort to broaden the social
base of the revolution and acquire the legitimacy it
needs to stay in power. Kabul is willing to curb
military actions and provide financial and political
inducements, so long as it believes its campaign is
working. Steady progress in the campaign would be a
boon for Kabul's counterinsurgency effort and
difficult for the insurgents to match.
A recent newspaper report on the proposed Afghan
media center is likely to reinforce Islamabad's
sensitivities about the risks of public cooperation
with Washington in humanitarian assistance
programs. The Muslim, a Rawalpindi daily that has
been critical of Islamabad's Afghan policy, reported
that the US Ambassador in Islamabad and the Minister
of Information had recently met to discuss
collaboration in the USIS effort, which it described
as "designed to project to the ordinary American
about the plight of the refugees." The Soviet news
agency TASS has picked up the story.
Comment: Islamabad will be watching domestic and
Soviet reaction to the leak. The incident almost
certainly will further delay a Pakistani decision on
cross-border humanitarian aid.
-- In a recent press interview--his first in nearly
a year--former Afghan King lahir Shah said he
remains devoted to the Afghan cause, but has no
plans to return to Afghanistan. The king, now
in his seventies, has been living in exile in
Rome since the monarchy was toppled in 1973.
18 March 1986
MESA M 86-20038JX
SOVA M 96-20026JX
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-- Afghan resistance leader ;bdul.Haq met with
3ritish Foreign Secretary Sir Geoffrey Howe and
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in London last
week, according to press reports. The Soviet
news agency TASS sharply criticized the meeting,
and authorities in Kabul delivered 'a protest
note to the 3ritish Embassy.
-- The Italian Communist Party Youth organization
has mounted a petition drive which calls on
Moscow to withdraw troops from Afghanistan. Its
campaign is slated to last two months, and the
youth organization hopes to obtain 300,000
signatures on a petition it plans to deliver to
the Soviet Embassy in Rome. The gesture
probably is an attempt by the group to
demonstrate that its stand on international
issues can differ from Moscow's.
-- Fuel deliveries from the Soviet Union have
increased since late February l986,
F
In
addition, a much smaller percentage of the 400
to 500 fuel truckloads arriving weekly are being
rejected now because of poor fuel quality than
in earlier months. Increased deliveries and
improved fuel quality will help ease the severe
shortages of electricity that have plagued Kabul
recently.
Last week, the 42nd Session of the United
Nations Human Rights Commission adopted its
annual resolution on self-determination in
Afghanistan, which calls for the immediate
withdrawal of foreign troops. Introduced by
Pakistan, the resolution was cosponsored by 27
Third World and Islamic countries. The vote of
31 in favor, 6 against, and 5 absentions was
almost the same as last year's.
-- An Afghan regime representative went to Libya
last week to attend a conference on "the
aggression of imperialism." Despite lukewarm
relations with Tripoli, Kabul probably was eager
to participate in an anti-US forum. For its
18 March 1986
NESA M 86-20038JX
SOVA M 86-20026JX
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part, Libya most likely regarded the invitation
to the Afghan regime as a way to curry favor
with the Soviets without jeopardizing relations
with other Arab states.
18 March 1986
NESA M 86-20038JX
SOVA M 86-20026JX
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Since early 1985, the Soviets have made concerted
efforts to bring western Afghanistan under control.
They have improved the structure and capabilities of
forces in Herat and Farah Provinces, including
introduction of a new Special Purpose Forces (Spetsnaz)
battalion--the first elite unit in the region. Even
with these improvements, Soviet and Afghan regime forces
probably are insufficient to reestablish control over
Herat city or to shut down resistance supply lines, much
less to dominate the countryside.
The Importance of the Area
Western Afghanistan is important to the USSR because of
its proximity to Iran as well as for its logistical
significance to the Soviet war effort in Afghanistan:
-- Herat is Afghanistan's third largest city, with a
population of about 1.1 million. Without control
of Herat, the government cannot collect revenues,
conscript armed forces, or maintain transportation
networks in about one-fourth of the country.
-- Over the long run, the Soviets could not capitalize
on the presence of their military forces along
Iran's eastern border without a more extensive
infrastructure and a significantly reduced
insurgent threat to military facilities in western
Afghanistan.
-- Supplies from the USSR to the western and southern
portions of the country pass through Herat and
Shindand, while a fuel pipeline parallels the road
to Shindand.
Force Improvements in Western Afghanistan
Until early 1985, the Soviets tried to control the
western region with one understrength motorized rifle
division, supported by three squadrons of aircraft--one
1S March 1986
NESA M 86-20038JX
SOVA M 96-20026JX
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helicopter and two fighter. With so few forces, the
Soviets could not easily conduct offensive operations
or even provide adequate security for their own
military facilities, Herat city, or important roads.
The deployment to Herat in March 1985 of a new
motorized rifle regiment was an early indicator of
Soviet plans to intensify activity in the west.
In addition, early this year the Soviets stationed a
new Spetsnaz battalion north of Farah,--the first such
unit committed to the western region. They probably
will deploy a separate battalion of 152-mm self-
propelled field guns to Shindand, and there are
indications that as many as two battalions of towed
240-mm mortars will also be located there.
A year-long upgrading of the airfield at Shindand is
nearing completion. Construction includes a new
aircraft dispersal area that is large enough to
accommodate a fighter squadron, new parking aprons, and
taxiways. These improvements will eliminate the
vulnerability of wing-to-wing parking and facilitate
more extensive air operations.
18 March 1986
NESA M 96-20038JX
SOYA M 36-20026JX
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The Insurgency in the West
In Herat Province, Jamiat-i-Islami commander Ismail
Khan is the preeminent insurgent leader. His influence
extends into Farah, Ghowr, and 3adghis Provinces, and
he directly controls as many as 2,000 of the estimated
total of 7,000 to 11,000 insurgents in northwestern
Afghanistan. Some Western observers believe that the
predominance of ethnic Tajiks and widespread influence
of a Sufi brotherhood have provided a social bond
among western Afghans not apparent elsewhere in the
northern tier and have made Ismail's organizational
tasks easier.
The insurgents' ability to sustain fighting in the west
continues to be constrained by shortages of supplies.
The region is remote from Pakistan, and caravans must
transit extremely difficult terrain. Few supplies come
from Iran; Iran has even occasionally hampered
deliveries from Pakistan.
Combat Operations Since 1985.
Early July 1985. Insurgent forces already established
in Herat city launched an offensive that expanded their
control to about two-thirds of the urban area,
according to the US Embassy in Kabul. With Afghan Army
forces, supported by Soviet air and artillery strikes,
unable to repulse the guerrillas, Soviet forces from
both Shindand and Herat moved in.
3ut the
offensive only temporarily quieted the city; insurgent
groups were again active in the city before the end of
August.
18 March 1985
NESA M 96-20038JX
SOVA ."Q 86-20026JX
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000202070001-9
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What Next?
Even with the recent buildup, Soviet and Xfghan forces
are insufficient to defeat the insurgents conclusively,
to sever resistance supply routes, or to reestablish
control over Herat city. Without major force
additions, Moscow at best is likely to keep the
18 March 1986
NESA M 86-20038JX
SOVA M 96-20026JX
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/23: CIA-RDP86T01017R000202070001-9
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insurgents off balance and limit the damage along its own
lines of communications during the coming year. 25X1
18 March 1986
MESA M 86-20038JX
SOVA M 96-20026JX
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Top Secret
Top Secret
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